This paper aims to examine the role of Islamic banks’ (IBs) governance in the management of investment funds. This is achieved by comparing the returns to shareholders with those to the Unrestricted Profit-Sharing Iinvestment Account Holders (UPSIAHs), referred to as the spread.
This study is based on a dynamic panel data analysis using the generalized method of moments for a panel of IBs based in Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) and Southeast Asian (SEA) countries observed over the 2006–2019 period.
The authors find that governance quality reduces the spread of SEA-IBs compared to GCC-IBs, suggesting that Asian banks have access to a wider choice of investment and growth options. The authors also find a positive association between GCC-based IBs governance quality and the widening spread between returns to shareholders and UPSIAHs, which suggests that while IBs are enhancing profitability through better governance, this may not lead to fair profit-sharing with UPSIAHs.
It would be beneficial to expand the sample to include more representative IBs from various countries.
The widening spread between returns to shareholders and UPSIAHs makes the latter feel displaced, which could eventually exacerbate the displaced commercial risk. This highlights the need for targeted governance reforms and investment strategies to better align the interests of stakeholders, thereby improving bank performance and mitigating financial disparities.
This paper is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first to empirically examine the effect of various governance mechanisms on the spread between returns to shareholders and Unrestricted Profit-Sharing Investors’ Account Holders (UPSIAHs) in IBs.
