This study aims to identify: (i) what prosocial outcomes servant leaders expect to achieve when hiding knowledge from their subordinates, and (ii) what knowledge types and strategies are associated with these outcomes.
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews and diary entries from managers in the software industry, yielding detailed accounts of fifteen knowledge-hiding episodes. Thematic analysis was used to interpret the data.
Servant leaders engage in top-down knowledge hiding, expecting to either achieve positive or prevent negative outcomes for their subordinates. Six configurations of knowledge types and hiding strategies are associated with each of these expected outcomes.
To apply top-down knowledge hiding constructively, managers are recommended to prioritize “fair” strategies, such as rationalized hiding or substituting, in situations where their applications will not lead to undesirable outcomes.
By examining specific knowledge-hiding episodes rather than general tendencies, this study reveals the complex nature of top-down knowledge hiding. It extends the theory of planned behavior by showing that the type of requested resource alters the relative influence of attitudes and subjective norms on intentions to engage in social exchange behaviors. The study also advances the organizational justice theory by demonstrating that, under certain conditions, acting unfairly may cause less harm than acting in a just way. Finally, the study discovers a new knowledge-hiding strategy, substituting, primarily used by managers with prosocial intentions.
