An analysis of the challenges in combatting money laundering within Bureaux de Change establishments in Botswana

It is illegal for businesses or individuals in Botswana to buy or sell foreign currency without a licence ^[1]. Nevertheless, putting these laws in place to prevent and combat money laundering does not stop such crimes from happening as exemplified by the existence of the “black market” ^[2] at the popular international bus terminus (popularly known as Bus Rank) in Gaborone. The answer lies in enforcement of these laws. A Bureaux de Change is a business entity that gains profit by purchasing foreign money and then selling it at a higher exchange rate. They typically base their exchange rates on the spot prices for large interbank transactions to guarantee profitability (Ibrahim and Muazu, 2020, p. 1; Emenike, 2016, p. 30; Mazarura, 2008, p. 4) ^[3].

Bureaux de Change entities are typically located at transportation hubs such as travel agency, airport, railway station, large retail outlets or any place where there is a potential market for currency conversion (Ibrahim and Muazu, 2020, p. 2). This entities trade in currencies such as the British Pound Sterling (GBP), US dollar (USD), euro, South African rand (ZAR) and the Pula, Botswana’s official currency. Figure 2 depicts the percentage shares of foreign currency purchases made through these entities in 2022 and 2023. However, to carry out the business of buying and selling of foreign currency, Bureaux de Change entities must obtain licences as regulated by the Bank of Botswana Act (Watambwa, 2021, p. 11; Mazarura, 2008, p. 4) ^[4]. These licences are necessary to make sure that Bureaux de Change entities adhere to the standards of the financial service industry, build and maintain public confidence, operate responsibly and ethically. In December 2023, the total number of licenced Bureaux de Change rose from 48 to 52 (Bank of Botswana, 2024). These entities are regulated by the Bank of Botswana Act in accordance with the Bank of Botswana (Bureaux de Change) Regulations of 2004 (herein referred to as Bureaux de Change Regulations) ^[5].

Figures 1 and 2 indicate that Bureaux de Change entities contribute to the economy by facilitating foreign exchange transactions and generating employment. There was an increase in the activities of bureaux de Change, as seen in the purchase and sale transactions over the year. The value of sales at bureaux de Change rose by 30.1%, reaching P742m in 2023 from P571m in 2022, while purchases grew by 26.3%, increasing from P555m in 2022 to P700m in 2023 (see Figure 2 Figure 1). This rise in the sale and purchase of foreign currency was attributed to higher demand possibly reflecting a growth in tourist numbers and an increase in access points due to the establishment of new Bureaux de Change and the expansion of branches by existing ones. Therefore, Bureaux de Change entities should possess sufficient resources and implement an effective and robust anti-money laundering (AML) framework. In Botswana, one can exchange foreign currency at a bank, licenced ^[6] establishments and Bureaux de Change, however, this study will specifically focus on the challenges related to combating money laundering within Bureaux de Change entities (Hudson, 1978, p. 122).

At least two important occurrences caused significant law modifications to Botswana’s AML and counter-terrorism regime. The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) produced a Mutual Evaluation Report in 2007 that deemed Botswana’s AML and combating the financing of terrorism regime to have significant flaws and advocated for improvements (Matlhare, 2006, p. 34) ^[7]. When Botswana delayed addressing the flaws, the FATF added Botswana to its list of countries with flaws in their Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism framework (Matlhare, 2006, p. 34) ^[8]. These occurrences sparked a flurry of legislative and institutional reforms to the country’s AML regime. These revisions resulted in the passing of the Financial Intelligence Act, the Proceeds and Instruments of Crime Act and amendments to several other relevant pieces of legislation. These legislations are designed to prevent and combat financial crimes and they are key to protecting the integrity and stability of Botswana’s financial sector and its economy.

The Proceeds and Instruments of Crime Act provides that a person shall be deemed to engage in money laundering if he engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves money or other property that is the proceeds of a serious offence, whether committed in Botswana or elsewhere, or if he receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of or brings into Botswana, any money or other property that is the proceeds of a serious offence, whether committed in Botswana or elsewhere and the person knows, or ought to reasonably know, that such money or other property is derived or realised, directly or indirectly, from some sort of unlawful activity (Kgati, 2021, pp. 108–119; Kersop and Du Toit, 2015, p. 1620; Rahman, 2013, p. 159) ^[9]. This definition of money laundering comprises the following three core elements: one, illegally acquired money, two, there must be a link between money and criminal activity and three, the conduct aimed at concealing the latter nexus (Korejo, 2021, pp. 726–727). In summary, the term “money laundering” refers to how organised criminals exploit enterprises to conceal vast sums of money gained through extortion, prostitution, gambling and bootlegging (Korejo, 2021, pp. 726–727).

The money laundering procedure has three steps which can be completed in a single combined transaction or three individual transactions. The first step is placement, which involves transferring huge quantities of illegally obtained cash into the banking system, purchasing expensive items or smuggling it out of the country (Arman and Nendi, 2023, p. 356; Andono and Andono, 2023, p. 545). Bureaux de Change entities can also be used by launders to purchase foreign currency using illegally obtained currency to conceal the source. The goal is to convert illegal funds into the legal financial system to avoid detection. The second step is layering which is a process used to conceal the source of the illicit funds (Arman and Nendi, 2023, p. 356; Andono and Andono, 2023, p. 545). The main goal at this point is to hide the real source of money and mislead authorities about its true origin through different transactions, transfers and purchases. Criminals may buy or sell foreign currency acquired through unlawful means to hide the source of the funds or exchange illicit money for foreign currency and transfer it across borders, making it harder to trace. The goal is to hide the origin of money by transferring money through different countries, making it harder to track their actual source.

The final step in money laundering is integrating the “laundered” funds into legal business operations (Arman and Nendi, 2023, p. 356; Andono and Andono, 2023, p. 545). The funds are redirected back into the criminal’s authorised bank accounts, allowing them to be used without restrictions. The offender might put money into real estate, buy expensive products or business ventures to spend without attracting the notice of the police or the tax officials. Illicit funds can easily pass through these loopholes and Bureaux de Change services can be exploited without enforcement authorities noticing. Although Bureaux de Change offers significant opportunities to promote financial inclusion, they can present notable money laundering risks if adequate resources to counter such activities are not in place.

Due to the predominant use of cash in most transactions conducted through Bureaux de Change, it is possible for large sums of money to be exchanged to obscure the connection between the proceeds of crime and the illegal activities that generated or acquired them (Nazzari and Riccardi, 2024, pp. 18–19). Neither the Bank of Botswana Act nor the Bureaux de Change Regulations define money laundering (Kgati, 2021, pp. 108–119) ^[10], however, both these legal instruments contain clauses aimed at the prevention and control of money laundering ^[11]. While there may be no recorded cases of money laundering within the Bureaux de Change sector, it does not guarantee that money laundering has not taken place in the financial industry. Criminals may exploit these entities to exchange large amounts of cash into smaller quantities, facilitating the integration of illicit funds into the legitimate financial system and allowing individuals to launder money without being detected. While Bureaux de Change serves legitimate purposes in facilitating currency exchange, their characteristics make them susceptible to being exploited by money launderers. Against this background, this article analyses the challenges that still exist in combating money laundering within Bureau de Change entities despite the legal and institutional framework.

Under the Bureaux de Change Regulations, both sole proprietors and registered companies are eligible to seek authorisation for operating a Bureaux de Change ^[12]. Bureaux de Change operations are typically subject to strict regulatory oversight and compliance requirements to prevent money laundering and other financial crimes. Establishing and operating a Bureaux de Change requires robust risk management systems and procedures, which may be challenging for a sole proprietorship to implement and maintain. Operating a Bureaux de Change often requires significant financial resources to meet capital requirements, manage currency reserves and handle large transactions. Sole proprietorships may have limited financial capacity compared to larger corporate entities or financial institutions. Furthermore, Bureaux de Change operations also demand specialised knowledge and expertise in foreign exchange markets, regulatory compliance and risk management. Sole proprietors may lack the necessary experience or access to skilled personnel to effectively manage these aspects of the business.

Although, sole proprietorships can be suitable for certain types of businesses, the complex regulatory environment, financial requirements and operational challenges associated with operating a Bureaux de Change may make it impractical or unfeasible for a sole proprietorship to obtain a licence for such activities. Consequently, it is imperative for the Bank of Botswana to thoroughly assess the potential risks associated with sole proprietorships engaged in Bureau de Change activities, particularly in relation to money laundering. Though it is not meant to be an AML strategy, the idea that a company would be a better fit to run a Bureaux de change has the impact of discouraging money laundering.

According to the Bureaux de change Regulations, an affidavit certifying that the applicant has never been found guilty of a crime involving fraud, money laundering or tax evasion either in or outside of Botswana must be submitted with the licence application ^[13]. This means that before authorising any person to operate a Bureaux de Change, the Bank of Botswana conducts background checks on all the officials to ensure that the proposed directors or other officers of financial institutions are individuals of honesty and integrity before they are appointed. If these criteria is not met, the application will be rejected by the Bank of Botswana ^[14]. The rationale behind prohibiting individuals with a criminal offence from obtaining a licence for a Bureaux de Change is to mitigate the risk of financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorist financing ^[15]. Bureaux de Change are particularly vulnerable to being used as tools for these illicit activities due to their nature of dealing with cash transactions. Requiring applicants to declare any past convictions related to these offences helps prevent individuals with a history of financial crimes from operating Bureaux de Change, thus reducing the risk of these establishments being used for illegal activities.

Bureaux de Change entities are also required to implement thorough screening processes during the hiring of employees to ensure that individuals with suitable qualifications and backgrounds are the ones handling financial transactions. Furthermore, they are required to provide training to their employees on money laundering measures ^[16]. It is crucial for all employees of Bureaux de change entities to undergo AML training to guarantee that everyone possesses a basic comprehension of the AML process. Providing specialised training to staff members with designated AML roles is crucial for them to carry out their responsibilities efficiently and in accordance with money laundering laws (Kemal, 2014, p. 422). The training can encompass a range of subjects such as various money laundering techniques, identifying warning signs and reporting potentially suspicious activities.

Continual AML training ensures staff are up to date on current trends, regulatory updates, and new risks, strengthening Bureaux de change’s compliance structure. Staying informed about regulatory updates helps Bureaux de change’s entities match their compliance efforts with current standards and implement required changes to avoid financial crimes (Kemal, 2014, p. 422). This includes keeping track of the latest developments from financial institutions and global entities such as the FATF. Failure to provide adequate training by the Bureaux de Change can lead to financial costs and possible loss of the licence.

The Bureaux de Change Regulations allow Bureaux de Change entities the authority to restrict the quantity of over-the-counter (OTC) transactions that Bureaux de Change can carry out to thwart large-scale money laundering through Bureaux de Change. Regulation 13(1) of the Bureaux de Change Regulations provides that a Bureaux de Change may purchase or sell foreign currency per person per day, a cash amount not exceeding P10,000 or its equivalent in other currencies ^[17]. It is possible for a money launderer to exchange currencies at different Bureaux de Change entities or even at different counters of the same Bureau de Change with little chance of being detected. This occurs because Bureaux de Change entities in Botswana lack mechanisms to prevent individuals from exceeding set limits due to the issue of using manual receipts for transactions.

Moreover, while Bureaux de Change is mandated to request identity documents, there is no centralised database available to verify if a specific individual has already exchanged the maximum permitted amount of foreign currency on any given day. Despite its noble intentions, the application of the OTC transaction limit has led to unintended consequences that have supported the continued existence of illegal foreign currency traders.

Although, the Bureaux de Change Regulations does not explicitly define or prohibit money laundering, it provides that a Bureaux de Change shall establish and maintain effective AML measures ^[18]. All licenced Bureaux de Change must establish and uphold efficient AML measures through the following actions:

The FATF provides that financial institutions should undertake Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and Know Your Customer (KYC) when there is a suspicion of money laundering ^[19]. Customer identification procedures such as CDD and KYC are critical for preventing and detecting money laundering. They help to ensure that the Bureaux de Change system is not used to launder and convert criminal monies into legitimate assets. These processes also make it easier to set up reporting channels with law enforcement agencies (Jaleel et al., 2021, p. 416). The Bureaux de Change Regulations provides that every Bureaux de Change entity must take reasonable measures to obtain information about the identity of the customer before the conclusion of a transaction ^[20]. CDD procedures are conducted for a transaction of an amount equal to or above P10,000. If a Bureaux de Change is unsatisfied with the information provided by a customer, it is expected to refrain from initiating a business relationship with the customer, decline to conduct the transaction or contemplate filing a suspicious transaction report concerning the customer ^[21]. This well-intentioned initiative is likely to fail because of competition from the black market, which has no limits on money exchanges and does not require any identification documents, unlike the Bureaux de Change.

According to the Financial Intelligence Act ^[22] and the Bureaux de Change Regulations, entities involved in the sale transaction must give a receipt for each sale transaction, keep a duplicate copy of each receipt issued and a register of all transactions ^[23]. The information should be stored for a period of at least five years after the transaction takes place or after the lapse of the business relationship ^[24]. A Bureaux de Change that contravenes this provision shall be guilty of an offence and be liable to a fine not exceeding P1,000 ^[25]. Record-keeping is a good way of storing evidence in cases where there is need for future reference. Therefore, technology can significantly enhance the ability of a Bureaux de Change to keep a duplicate copy of each receipt issued and maintain a register of all transactions. Implementing a digital receipt system will allow the Bureaux de Change to generate electronic copies of receipts issued for each transaction. These digital receipts can be stored securely in a centralised database or cloud storage system, ensuring easy access when needed. By leveraging technology solutions tailored to the specific needs of Bureaux de Change can enhance efficiency, accuracy and compliance in recording transactions and tracking violations of OTC transaction limits.

The Bureaux de Change Regulations provides that every Bureaux de Change should report suspicious transactions to the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime ^[26]. The regulations do not explain what is considered a suspicious transaction. Instead, financial institutions are required to have internal policies and processes in place to assist their employees in detecting suspicious transactions. These policies may contain red flags or indicators that a transaction is suspicious, such as unusual transaction patterns, large cash transactions without a clear legitimate purpose or transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions or individuals. However, the Financial Intelligence Act provides that financial institutions such as Bureaux de Change should report to the Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) a cash transaction concluded with a customer where the amount is P10,000 or above, or an equivalent amount in foreign currency ^[27].

A report must be submitted to the FIA within five business days of the suspicion arising from the transaction necessitating the report ^[28]. The FIA analyses all the information and reports received by it for the purpose of determining whether any information contained in a report constitutes reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed money laundering ^[29]. If upon analysing the report it received, the FIA has valid reasons to suspect that a person or accountable institution has engaged in wrongdoing, it will forward the matter along with any recommended actions it deems necessary to the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) ^[30].

The Bureaux de Change Regulations mandate the Bank of Botswana to conduct inspections on all Bureaux de Change entities at any location and time where they operate ^[31]. These onsite inspections serve as a means to ensure the implementation and existence of AML policies and procedures as well as to evaluate whether a Bureaux de Change has adhered to the OTC transaction limit and the issuing of receipts after a transaction. Onsite inspections assist the Bank of Botswana in ensuring that the Bureaux de Change adheres to regulatory duties such as anti-money laundering. Inspectors can verify whether the Bureaux de Change has implemented appropriate policies, procedures and controls to prevent and identify money laundering and terrorist financing.

Furthermore, inspections enable the Bank of Botswana to assess the inherent risks associated with the operations of Bureaux De Change. In this regard, inspections identify areas in which the systems of Bureaux de Change could be improved and appropriate recommendations for improvement are discussed with the directors of Bureaux de Change. Where the Bank of Botswana finds that a Bureaux de Change has contravened a provision of Bureaux de Change Regulations, it may issue a written warning, impose fines deemed suitable, suspend the licence or revoke the Bureaux de Change license ^[32].

This section discusses the effectiveness of different role players who are tasked with detecting, investigating and prosecuting money laundering within the Bureaux de Change in Botswana.

In terms of Recommendation 29 of the FATF on Money Laundering, member countries are required to establish Financial Intelligence Units. FIUs are designed to function as national hubs for receiving and examining reports on suspicious transactions and other pertinent information related to money laundering, linked predicate crimes and the financing of terrorism. Without this information, the FIU cannot make any further contributions to the investigation and prosecution services. When reporting an unusual transaction, the actual financial transaction serves as the foundation for a broader context and a (digital) biography of the people or entity that conducted the transaction. As a member the FATF, Botswana adopted a legal framework and established a FIU to combat money laundering. Section 3(1) of the Financial Intelligence Act established the Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) and became operational in June 2013.

The FIA was established as a department in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development led by a director and other necessary officers essential for the effective execution of the agency’s functions. It is the national centre responsible for requesting, receiving, analysing and disseminating disclosures of financial information concerning a suspicious transaction ^[33]. This information includes details on suspicious transactions, financial data needed to combat financial crime and information on terrorism financing. To carry out its functions as outlined in section 6(1), the FIA must gather, process, analyse and interpret all relevant information from specified parties that has been submitted to the FIA.

Following the analysis of data regarding a suspicious transaction, it forwards financial information to the DCEC for further investigation. Under the Financial Intelligence Act, the FIA has operational independence, allowing the director to seek guidance from law enforcement agencies, the government and any other individual or entity deemed necessary ^[34]. This provision grants the FIA the flexibility to enter into agreements or arrangements that facilitate access to data either through requests, direct access to databases or indirectly through other government authorities or entities holding the information.

The FIA in Botswana has introduced the goAML system, a digital platform aimed at combating money laundering, terrorism financing and other financial crimes. It allows for the secure and effective submission of financial intelligence reports by organisations such as banks, bureau de change entities, car dealers, retail, non-profit organisation and accounting firms. Out of the 52 licensed Bureau de change entities, only 33 are registered on the goAML platform (see Figure 3). Figure 3 illustrates the sectors and the corresponding number of entities within each sector that registered on the goAML platform during the 2022 / 2023 period.

Entities are required to register for system access, enabling them to electronically submit suspicious transaction reports, suspicious activity reports and reports of large cash transactions. The FIA examines and assesses these reports to detect possible financial crimes and works together with law enforcement or offers feedback to organisations when necessary. For entities lacking technological capabilities, manual reporting options are available.

The DCEC was established by the Corruption and Economic Crime Act in 1994 ^[35]. The Corruption and Economic Crime Act was enacted due to the inadequacies of section 99 of the Penal Code, which was considered insufficient for effectively addressing the complexities and challenges related to corruption and economic crimes ^[36]. However, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act does not contain explicit mention of the crime of money laundering. The legislature appears to have failed to appropriately address the conduct of money laundering as a necessary step to prohibit economic crimes. Nonetheless, in the year 2000, the legislature made amendments to the Proceeds of Serious Crimes Act primarily to incorporate the recommendations of FATF ^[37]. Section 14(1) of the Proceeds of Serious Crimes Act prohibits money laundering, making it an offence for any individual engaged in such activity. If convicted, an individual may face imprisonment for up to three years, a fine not exceeding P10,000 or both. For entities, every director, manager or partner at the time of the offence may be subject to a fine not exceeding P25,000 (Mogomotsi et al., 2020, p. 124) ^[38].

The DCEC is authorised to investigate the alleged, suspected offences of corruption and offences against the fiscal laws of Botswana ^[39]. DCEC uses a three-pronged approach to combat corruption, namely, Corruption Prevention Division, Public Education Division and the Investigations Division. Within the Investigation Division there is an AML unit tasked with receiving reports of suspicious transactions and providing guidance to the financial sector on money laundering (Matlhare, 2006, pp. 34–35). Although the DCEC has been empowered to investigate money laundering, it does not have the power to prosecute ^[40]. After completing the investigations and establishing a credible suspicion of an offence, the Director of the DCEC forwards the case to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) for evaluation. Subsequently, the DPP will review the case and determine whether to proceed with prosecution or not. The role of the DPP will be further elaborated in paragraph 4.3. The researcher was unable to locate statistics on money laundering cases investigated by the DCEC to assess the institution’s effectiveness. Nonetheless, it is noted that the DCEC offers training and capacity-building programmes for its staff. However, it should continue to provide ongoing development opportunities to enhance their skills and effectiveness, as money launderers constantly develop new methods to disguise illicit funds (Mogomotsi et al., 2020, p. 43).

The Botswana Police Service is tasked with investigating various crimes within the country, while the DPP has the sole authority to prosecute criminal offences in Botswana ^[41]. It is important to highlight that private parties can pursue prosecution if the DPP declines to do so ^[42]. Some of the money laundering cases that the courts have dealt with is DPP v Welheminah Mphoeng Maswabi ^[43]. Where Maswabi the former Director of Intelligence and Security Services, had been charged for allegedly robbing the Bank of Botswana of P100bn, being in possession of unexplained property and making a false declaration for a passport. Maswabi was believed to be a signatory to 17 bank accounts, including two in South Africa that allegedly had more than US$10bn stolen from the Bank of Botswana. It was said that she gave some of the money to former President Ian Khama and South African businesswoman Bridgette Motsepe. Absa Bank and Nedbank of South Africa stated that they have no records of the account numbers. The judge stated that there was no single evidence pointing to money laundering and that the allegations were fabricated and outright false. Consequently, the accused was acquitted on all counts.

On the DPP v Carter Morupisi and 2 others, ^[44] Morupisi served as the trustee in the Botswana Public Officers Pension Fund (BPOPF), where he was also appointed chairman of the board. On 11 November 2014, Morupisi awarded Capital Management Botswana (CMB) a contract to manage the BPOPF private equity fund, a decision made without the Board’s authorisation, as it was still suspended. Allegedly, Morupisi received a Toyota Land Cruiser from CMD valued at R630,988.99. He purportedly financed the vehicle using funds established by the prosecution as proceeds of crime. Morupisi faces charges of money laundering, with allegations suggesting he knew or had reasonable grounds to suspect that the vehicle was obtained through the commission of an offence, either wholly or in part. The case is still ongoing, so far no one has been found guilty of money laundering in Botswana. What can be learned is that the prosecution of financial crimes seems to be picking up momentum to bring to account those who are engaged in those crimes.

The Bank of Botswana is the central bank with the responsibility to issue licences and oversee any individual or entity wishing to engage in the buying or selling of foreign currency ^[45]. The Bank of Botswana Act and the Bureaux de Change Regulations outline the responsibility of the Bank of Botswana on the Bureaux de Change entities ^[46]. Businesses must obtain a licence from the Bank of Botswana to engage in foreign exchange transactions since conducting such activities without a licence is illegal ^[47]. While the Bank of Botswana Act lacks explicit AML provisions, the Bank of Botswana plays a leading role in combating money laundering and terrorism financing within the country. For instance, it collaborates closely with regional organisations like the ESAAMLG to evaluate its national AML legislation. The bank is also a member of the National Coordinating Committee on Financial Intelligence which ensures that the policies in place protect the international reputation of Botswana as far as financial crime is concerned.

The Bureaux de Change Regulations have a significant gap as they do not have explicit AML provisions, despite requiring these entities to have effective measures in place against money laundering. While requirements such as customer identification, record-keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions are mandated, challenges in technology and coordination among Bureaux de Change entities make enforcement difficult. The intended preventive measure of setting an OTC transaction limit to prevent large-scale money laundering may have unintended consequences and might not effectively deter illicit activities. As a result, a centralised database should be established to detect whether an individual has already exchanged the maximum permissible amount of foreign currency on any day. By automatically detecting transactions that exceed the permissible limit, authorities can quickly examine potential cases of non-compliance and take appropriate enforcement action. Bureaux de Change entities can use the database to verify customer transaction history and the database can be used to generate reports and statistics on currency exchange activity for regulatory and analytical purposes. However, for effective coordination and collaboration among stakeholders such as law enforcement, financial institutions and technology companies is required to enable the database’s successful installation and operation.

It is important for the Bank of Botswana to thoroughly assess the risks associated with sole proprietorships authorised to conduct foreign currency transactions, particularly regarding money laundering. Sole proprietors may be vulnerable to money laundering activities due to a lack of strong internal controls and compliance systems found in larger financial institutions. As they have a simpler organisational structure, they might not have the necessary resources or expertise to effectively implement AML measures. The Bank of Botswana needs to ensure that these entities follow stringent KYC and CDD regulations, similar to those imposed on larger financial institutions. Ensuring adherence to these standards requires regular audits and compliance checks. Offering training and support to sole proprietorships on AML compliance can reduce risks. This involves teaching business owners about the significance of AML measures, techniques for spotting and reporting suspicious transactions, and the legal consequences of failing to comply.

In conclusion, it is imperative for the Bank of Botswana to update the Bureaux de Change Regulations to enhance the oversight and regulation of financial transactions. The current Bureaux de Change Regulations are inadequate in addressing the evolving tactics used by money launderers. Improving these regulations will not only stop money laundering but also ensure the clear and effective functioning of the Bureaux de Change system, ultimately safeguarding Botswana’s financial reputation. These proposed changes would not just improve the credibility of Botswana’s financial system but also support global initiatives to combat money laundering and promote transparency in the financial industry.

Philadelphia Pontsho Mokone has an LLB, LLM and LLD from the North West University. Her research interests are in Corporate Law, Securities and Financial Markets law.