Terrorist financing is an integral part of terrorist preparation and, critically, may be an early intervention point for intelligence and counterterrorism interception. This study aims to assess the diverging paths to successful and failed intervention through counterterrorist financing (CTF) protocols by comparing two terrorist plots. One, planned by the Chicago gang “El Rukn” and funded by Libya, was foiled because of a convergence of the geopolitical context of the plot and cooperation among critical national security institutions. The other, nicknamed “the Planes Operation” but better known as “9/11”, killed over 2,000 people and devastated the USA socially and economically.
The study performs comparative case studies and crime script analyses to illustrate similarities and differences in these cases and highlight respective mechanisms of success and failure from a CTF perspective.
The study found that in the case of El Rukn, the critical factor in the plot’s failure was the prior criminality of the group, leading to the group’s investigation by the US Customs, CIA and FBI. These agencies were then able to use traditional anti-money laundering (AML) protocols to intercept the plot. This is in contrast to the Planes Operation, where the hijacker’s financing activities never alerted the attention of AML protocols and thus went undetected prior to the plot.
This study adds to prior literature discussing whether AML techniques, frequently conflated with CTF techniques, are the most efficient to intercept terrorist financing.
