This article explains how careful attention to straightforward design features can make travel safer and reduce levels of crime. It draws conclusions from national initiatives introduced in UK railway and bus systems. A checklist of good practice is included.
We know from what passengers tell us, through surveys and discussion groups, that design of the environment plays an important part in their feelings of security while travelling on public transport.
The same is true, of course, of the wider physical environment—shopping centres and car parks for example. The public transport environment, however, seems to bring together some of the features that people find most disturbing. It is confined with a potential to feel trapped; it is often a magnet for people who want shelter and protection from the weather, but whose behaviour is feared as unpredictable; it may be a place for young people to hang about, away from the supervision of adults; and after dark it is more likely to be used by people who are drunk.
The levels of crime reported by passengers, however, do not give particular cause for concern. The pattern of victimisation—type of crime, gender and age of victim for example—is much the same as in the wider environment (Table 1).
Rate of incidents per 100 respondents
| Types of incident | By men | By women |
|---|---|---|
| Theft/pick-pocketing | 3 | 3 |
| Robbery/mugging | 5 | 2 |
| Physical assault | 6 | 1 |
| Threat of violence | 10 | 3 |
| Stared at in a hostile or threatening way | 11 | 9 |
| Deliberately pushed | 9 | 8 |
| Sexual assault, harassed, ‘exposed to’ | 2 | 8 |
| Harassed—colour, race or religion | 6 | 3 |
| Types of incident | By men | By women |
|---|---|---|
| Theft/pick-pocketing | 3 | 3 |
| Robbery/mugging | 5 | 2 |
| Physical assault | 6 | 1 |
| Threat of violence | 10 | 3 |
| Stared at in a hostile or threatening way | 11 | 9 |
| Deliberately pushed | 9 | 8 |
| Sexual assault, harassed, ‘exposed to’ | 2 | 8 |
| Harassed—colour, race or religion | 6 | 3 |
Table 1 is taken from a report, entitled ‘Perceptions of Safety from Crime on Public Transport, produced by Crime Concern and Transport and Travel Research in 2003.1 It reveals the scale and pattern of victimisation by gender. In common with other surveys, it concludes that women are much more likely to have experienced sexual harassment, exposure and sexual assault, while men are more likely to have experienced physical violence and threats.
These experiences are reflected in people's perceptions. Fear of crime is related to actual experiences, both those personally experienced and those heard about from family, friends and acquaintances. These experiences include ‘incivilities’ such as being deliberately pushed, or stared at in a hostile or threatening way, incidents which are unlikely to have been reported, and which would not in any case have been recorded in criminal statistics. Women tend to fear being alone with one man and men tend to fear groups or gangs.
Levels of fear are higher in metropolitan and urban areas, where crime itself is also higher. Fear of crime is particularly high after dark, and this is true for both men and women, although the latter consistently express much higher levels of fear for their personal security.
Factors contributing to people's feelings of fear include poor visibility, whether because of inadequate lighting or obstructed sightlines; the presence of others on the system whose behaviour is considered unpredictable and possibly violent, such as young people or people who have been drinking; the presence of graffiti and vandalism, which are seen as indicators that management have lost control of the space; and lack of information, such as accurate timetables and signage, which would allow the passenger to feel more in control of their journey.
Not surprisingly, the presence of trained, competent staff is seen by passengers as reassuring, but passengers are not as reliant on this as they may in the past have been. Most passengers understand that there have been reductions in staffing of the transport infrastructure over recent decades, and are realistic enough to know that this policy is unlikely to be reversed overnight. Moreover, they know that technology has been developed to provide them with the kind of surveillance, information and assistance that the presence of staff once represented. Regular passengers gauge their security by the presence of CCTV, staff carrying mobile phones or other means of communicating with their control centre, real-time service information, and customer help points which can also be used to summon help in an emergency.
There is now an established body of good practice in relation to designing for secure travel. The Secure Stations Scheme, a national scheme whereby railway stations which comply with good practice standards for design and management, sets these out for operators. Basic principles include
defining limits or boundaries, with clearly marked entrances and exits, so that people not using the transport network are kept out
providing formal surveillance, through an appropriate combination of staff and CCTV, so that all parts of the infrastructure are covered
providing informal surveillance, for example from passers-by, road users, or local retailers
using ‘open’ fences rather than solid walls where possible, to enhance the potential for formal and informal surveillance
landscape design that does not provide places for people to hide, for example by using slow-growing shrubs that cannot grow too large, and prickly shrubs that minimise opportunities for concealment
uniform lighting that does not create pools of intense brightness and shadow, matt surfaces that avoid creating glare, illuminating signs and service information
creating clear sightlines by blocking off recesses, use of convex mirrors or wide pillars at corners, and use of clear glazing
providing information to passengers so that they can plan their journey from home, find their way through the network (particularly at service interchanges), and take alternative routes in the event of service delays
providing alarms, help points and public telephones so that passengers can call for assistance, and know what help is likely to be forthcoming.
Ideally, these guidelines should be followed at the design stage. However, the scheme recognises that most train operating companies have inherited old stations, most of them designed well before ‘designing out crime’ had been thought of. Hence, the guidelines are written to allow flexibility, and include a section on management, so that where poor design is a given, its effects can be ameliorated, for example through appropriate deployment of staff. It is to the credit of the operators concerned that several of them have not just picked off the ‘easy hits’ for early accreditation, but have worked hard to bring some of the more problematic stations up to standard.
The design principles set out in the Secure Stations Scheme apply to the bus environment as well. Birkenhead bus station in Merseyside was designed to enhance the passenger's experience and perceptions of personal security. There are clear sightlines with much of the station's structure made from large panels of clear, toughened glass. There are CCTV cameras covering passenger waiting areas, public telephones, the travel shop, and the door providing access to the staff office and facilities.
In Warrington, new bus shelters have been provided as part of a public–private partnership between Warrington Borough Council and Adshel. The programme involves the upgrading of all existing bus shelters and the provision of accessible boarding points to complement the introduction of low-floor buses. The design and construction of the shelters with glass panels allows good visibility, both inwards and outwards. The barrel-shaped roof contains reinforced glass and allows lighting through. Additional focused lighting has also been provided in many shelters, and many others also have a public telephone close by.
An important principle that underpins designing for security is that of user consultation. Sadly, while most would agree in principle, there are few examples of good practice. In Edinburgh though, the location of enhanced lighting and CCTV cameras in the city centre was determined from information obtained through a women's safety survey and crime incident data.
As routine good practice, audits should be systematically applied to existing as well as new transport developments, as an important first step in making these environments secure. Passengers should be consulted as a matter of routine, as should local police (in particular the crime reduction officer or architectural liaison officer) who will have an understanding of the local crime issues as well as the principles of designing out crime. And their expertise in identifying graffiti-resistant materials and small, slow-growing, prickly shrubs is second to none!
Transport for London refers bus station plans to the police architectural liaison officer, who is asked to comment on all planning applications and is likely to be involved at the design stage. The Disabled Passengers Unit and London Regional Passengers Committee are consulted over infrastructure proposals.
Finally, maintenance is an important factor to be considered at the planning stage. Transport operators must play their part by checking stations and vehicles on a daily basis so that graffiti can be removed, breakages repaired, and faulty lighting replaced. But designers can take this a stage further, by only using materials that will be easy to clean and maintain, and where replacement parts will be readily available.
In conclusion, reduced crime and reduced fear of crime brings obvious benefits to passengers and operators. As part of a comprehensive operational review, design improvements can make a worthwhile contribution alongside management initiatives, better supervision and improved information. Further advice on these matters can be obtained from Crime Concern or the British transport police.
