A. Fraser, Central Scotland Roads AIU, Stirling Council
A small, but perhaps significant point must be made concerning the suggestion that the Government's 1987 casualty reduction target was met. It was not.
A ‘best’ interpretation of the 1987 target4 might have been: ‘to ensure that the average number of road accident casualties per year for the period 1996–2000 is no more than two-thirds of that for the period 1981–1985’.
However, at the end of 2000, it became clear that the five-year average rose from 322 000 to 323 000.5 That simple fact does not appear to have received the emphasis that it should. This may explain Mr Sanders' statement, which is no different from the belief of many. But why does the myth persist?
Perhaps it does so because, in its strategy document,6 central government reiterates the ‘2000’ casualty target, but the failure to reach it is not immediately thereafter stated. Instead, attention is drawn to the (gratifyingly large) proportion by which serious injuries and fatalities fell, and it is claimed ‘we are (sic) now one of the safest countries in Europe and indeed the world’. (Almost as if Great Britain had not always been.)
The subject is then switched from casualties to accidents, but the 5% fall in the equivalent number of accidents is not mentioned, and there is no explanation of the different directions apparently taken by accidents and casualties.
Is this important? I think so, particularly if it is deliberate. In an environment that is the most dangerous that constituents face daily, there can be no room for the lack of precision displayed in the strategy document. Municipal engineers must know what they face or they cannot begin to change it.
Sadly, lack of precision seems to be a feature of recent government documents. The exaggeration of the contribution of ‘speed’ to accidents, to ‘one-third’ when only 7·3% are ‘definitely’ thought to have involved ‘excessive speed’, is a prime example. Another is the lack of rigour inherent in the camera enforcement site selection process, in which some unlucky municipal engineers may have become embroiled and which, belatedly, government now appears to wish to address.
I hope, therefore, that municipal engineers will note John Sanders' timely reminder of their position of influence. This may include influence over those who would mislead (whether by accident or design). Few are in a better position than the municipal engineer to ensure authority is not assumed where there is none, and so to ensure that what might generously be described as misinformation does not become the truth. All they have to do is exercise that influence. Let them not fail so to do.
Author's reply
I do not dispute Andrew's astute observations on the road safety statistics contained in my paper. Despite Andrew's comments, the thrust of my argument remains. Municipal engineers have been instrumental in containing the number of accidents against hugely increased traffic flows and reducing the numbers of fatal and serious accidents. They have done this through effective lobbying for additional funds, undertaking structured analysis, implementing many more projects and bringing in fresh skills not previously directly related to engineering. They have utilised the media, undertaken education and training regimes and engaged more proactively with enforcement and planning bodies. In other words they have added to their base engineering skills to create successful outcomes. The danger is that, with increasing politicisation of many of the local authority functions, the traditional engineering skills of analysis, generating options and creation of cost-effective solutions will be subjugated for political expediency in the name of safety. Municipal engineers must be true to themselves and as Andrew suggests we should not abuse statistics, and we must not make statements that we cannot back up with facts or experience.
