This paper aims to investigate how temporal configurations – specifically lead time and closing days – determine success rates and price premiums in mandatory public asset sales.
Analysing 81,470 Indonesian transactions (2022 to 2023), the study employs binary logistic and Ordinary Least Squares regressions to isolate temporal effects on auction outcomes, controlling for asset and bidder heterogeneity.
Results reveal a “duration paradox”: longer lead times generally signal adverse selection, reducing success probabilities. However, this is mitigated by two distinct mechanisms: “Monday Synergy” (demand-side), which maximizes price premiums through weekend information processing, and the “Thursday Anchor” (supply-side), where auctions exhibit procedural resilience against long lead times due to institutionalized administrative cycles. A “Digitalization Trade-off” is also confirmed, where internet auctions increase participation but reduce competitive intensity and premiums compared to conventional formats, even after accounting for asset heterogeneity.
Limitations include the single-country context. Future research should use experimental designs to validate behavioural mechanisms and cross-country institutional applicability.
The study advocates a “Bimodal Scheduling Framework”: Monday closings for revenue maximization and Thursday closings for administrative resilience. Managers must also balance digital access with competitive arousal.
Efficient sales bolster fiscal sustainability and state revenue (PNBP) without tax hikes. Evidence-based scheduling increases transparency and public trust in government resource management.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to treat scheduling as an integrated strategic variable synchronizing market psychology with bureaucratic capacity. It introduces the “duration paradox”, “Monday Synergy” and “Thursday Anchor”, providing a framework for effective public asset disposal.
