The vast majority of U.S. federal litigation occurs in U.S. District Courts, which are the first—and for most, the last—courts in which a case is heard. While these lower courts’ judges are insulated from outside influence by their life tenure, they may have incentives to heed the preferences of those above them in the judicial hierarchy. Using data on politicized district court decisions and the ideological preferences of circuit court judges in a two-way fixed effects design, we show that district court judges are responsive to changes in the ideological composition of the circuit court above them. We show that lower court responsiveness is increasing in the rate of appellate review and reversal that these courts face. We find no evidence, however, that this responsiveness is motivated by workload reduction or progressive ambition.
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28 June 2022
Research Article|
June 28 2022
Appellate Court Influence over District Courts in the United States Available to Purchase
Michael P. Olson;
Michael P. Olson
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis
USA
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Albert H. Rivero
Albert H. Rivero
Department of Politics, University of Virginia
USA
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Online ISSN: 2689-4823
Print ISSN: 2689-4815
© 2022 M. P. Olson and A. H. Rivero
2022
M. P. Olson and A. H. Rivero
Licensed re-use rights only
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy (2022) 3 (2): 183–213.
Citation
Olson MP, Rivero AH (2022), "Appellate Court Influence over District Courts in the United States". Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Vol. 3 No. 2 pp. 183–213, doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/113.00000057
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