Relational positionism: a constructive interpretation of morality in Luhmann's social systems theory

As an ethicist, I am very optimistic about morality in our modern society. In this article, I therefore want to explore a constructive interpretation of morality in Luhmann's social systems theory. Luhmann's views on morality have been very differently evaluated. Scholars have put forward important critical points of discussion about Luhmann's theory, such as the role of morality related to risks and dangers (Morales, 2022), reclaiming the position of morality in functional differentiation (Valentinov, 2019; Valentinov et al., 2016) or discussing the tensions between ethics and epistemology (Dallmann, 1998; Roth et al., 2020; Scholl, 2012). At the same time, scholars have stressed its emancipatory and anti-totalitarian strength (Harste and Laursen, 2022) and Luhmann's view that Luhmann himself always encouraged further critical reflection, also on his theory (Laursen et al., 2022). The discussion about the role of morality for individuals, organizations and society in Luhmann's social systems theory has recently been initiated, deepened and structured in a special issue in this journal (Laursen et al., 2022).

I want to contribute to this ongoing debate by putting forward a critical and constructive interpretation of morality in Luhmann's social systems theory. I will do this in four steps. In section 2, as far as necessary to understand my argumentation, I will introduce critical concepts of Luhmann's social system theory in general and his description of morality as embedded in this theory in particular. I will provide in section 3 the well-known image of Luhmann as giving dismissive critiques of morality. I structure them using three famous quotes: “Whoever suffers anxiety is morally in the right,” “Morality no longer fulfills its integrative function in society” and “Ethics today is nothing more than a utopia.” In section 4, I present other aspects of Luhmann's theory that are less known and not sufficiently mentioned in the Luhmannian morality debate. These statements illustrate that Luhmann has also constructively traced new roles of morality in his work. He positively stated that “the nature of morality is to pose problems of risk” and that “society has recourse to moral sensitivity,” and he considered the “interdiction of moral self-exemption as a promising moral ground.” Section 5 will point to a basic assumption in these positive Luhmannian statements. I indicate how, in my opinion, these basic assumptions hinder a further constructive application of the concept of morality in Luhmann's social system theory and how another basic assumption does not contradict his theory but simultaneously allows for a constructive interpretation of morality in social systems theory. I will illustrate that “social system's attention can answer individual and organizational anxiety.” Although my intuition, in line with general system theory, would be that this is also applicable to functional subsystems such as law and economy, I will not elaborate on this complex issue here as it would require a separate article. I will further illustrate that institutionalized socialization can support an integrative morality and that a relational ontology avoids ethics as a utopia.

Methodologically, I closely read Luhmann in sections 2, 3, and 4. For different reasons, I will use several quotes to scaffold my argumentation in these sections. In section 2, I use the quotes when I consider it essential to give exact definitions as Luhmann formulated them to use the richness of nuances in Luhmann's concepts. In section 3, I want to exhibit how dismissive and thought-provoking Luhmann's statements are. I illustrate how juicy, sharp and radical his quotes are to stress their relevance for the debate. In section 4, I use quotations to scaffold my proof against the common idea that Luhmann is only critical and conservative by showing that his theory contains many ideas of constructive approaches.

I will conclude in section 6 that this article should be seen as a programmatic plea for further development of individual and organizational morality and moral sensitivity in social systems theory. The area of research opened by this contribution will serve to further elaborate morality from a system theory perspective in which meaning is relationally positioned. That is, moral expectations can be at the same time normatively directing without being dogmatic and remain open and flexible without becoming relativistic.

I will explain and interpret the concepts of Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory relevant to my further discussion of morality in social systems. According to systems theory, human beings faced with the world's complexity experience contingency (“also being possible otherwise,” Luhmann, 1995, p. 25). Expectations narrow down the possible actions in the complex world (Luhmann, 1995, p. 96). Expectations of expectations create structures that become norms in social systems (Luhmann, 1995, p. 292).

Luhmann further defines “event” as the “smallest possible temporal atom, an indivisible, all-or-nothing happening” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 287). In an event, a selection is forced (Luhmann, 1995, p. 60) using expectations and norms. “The selection positions and qualifies the elements [of the event], although other relations would have been possible” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 25). Luhmann further explains how a sequence of these events creates a process (Luhmann, 1995, p. 44), calling the reproduction of these event-like elements operation (Luhmann, 1995, p. 49).

As such, a social system emerges via its communication and creates meaning (Luhmann, 1995, p. 60; Weaver, 2021). Meaning is seen as a surplus of references to other possibilities and, referring to Bateson, as a difference that makes a difference. Luhmann differentiates between three critical dimensions of meaning and thus decomposition into differences (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 75–82). The fact dimension relates to the epistemic primary difference between the choice made and the other possibilities. The temporal dimension refers to the difference between before and after. The social dimension refers to the difference between alter and ego and concerns the aspect that one accepts, enabling a constant comparison of how others could position one's actions. Communication in the social systems tries to maintain itself. It creates new communication, which Luhmann calls autopoiesis or self-reproduction of the social system (Luhmann, 1995, p. 35). Luhmann repeatedly stresses that psychic systems, emerging from the autopoiesis of consciousness, do not belong to social systems, whose autopoiesis is communication. However, systems can interact via interpenetration, whether psychic–psychic, psychic–social or social–social.

Luhmann also brings a sociohistorical perspective to his theory. The central portrait here is that our modern society is functionally differentiated. Different functions are separated and taken up by different social systems. Different social systems (law, science, etc.) use different symbolic generalized communications or binary codes (legal vs nonlegal, true–false, etc.). However, functionally differentiated systems (legal and scientific, for example) can interact via interpenetration using these symbolic generalized media. When lawyers and scientists determine a safety standard, the legal and science systems react to one another to come to an overall conclusion where each other's communication is congruent with their expectations. Next to the functionally differentiated subsystems, Luhmann emphasizes that organizations proliferate in modern times (Luhmann, 2018a). As they fill gaps, binary codes have difficulties to solve (Rachlitz et al., 2022).

Luhmann develops his view on morality and ethics within his social systems theory. Central is that morality is a particular form of communication with a binary symbolic generalized communication medium of esteem/disdain. He understands “morality of a social system as the totality of the conditions for deciding the bestowal of esteem or disdain ^[1] within the system” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 236) and esteem as “a generalized recognition and evaluation which honors the fact that others accord with the expectations one believes must be assumed for social relations to continue” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 235).

Morality for Luhmann has unique and particular functions. First, it can supply both interpsychic and social interpenetration at once to reduce the complexity of these interpenetrations (Luhmann, 1995, p. 234). Therefore, morality in the Luhmannian sense is not only (inter)individual but also social. The doubly contingent ego/alter relations of the interpsychic interpenetration enable moral communication to reconstruct complexity through the binary schematism of esteem/disdain (Luhmann, 1995, p. 236). Second, morality relates individual actions to a whole person (Luhmann, 1995, p. 236). Self-esteem and self-exemption are central to focusing on the whole person. Self-esteem refers to symmetric conditions, meaning that “whoever expresses moral judgment gambles his self-esteem at the same time. He must submit himself to that which he demands from others” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1000). Moreover, the interdiction of self-exemption is the only necessary condition for the emergence of moral conditionings. Luhmann stresses that if one allows self-exemption, one would not end up with morality but power (Luhmann, 1996, p. 29).

Luhmann makes a distinction between morality and ethics via first and second-order observations. Morality is about first-order observations. In our modern and functionally differentiated society, second-order observations or the reflection of morality leads to ethics as the description of morality (Luhmann, 1991a).

Luhmann did not shun dismissive words to condemn modern morality and ethics. I cluster his critiques into three leading judgments in line with the time, social and fact dimensions of meaning. I will use several quotes in this third section to illustrate the sharpness of his writing.

Norms narrow down possible actions as they project an expectation of the future. The time dimension of meaning (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 310–311) leads to the exposure of momentary noncorrespondence (Luhmann, 1995, p. 43) between expectations and what is happening. In functionally differentiated societies, this difference between norm and deviation cannot lead to consensus anymore and is therefore replaced by anxiety (Luhmann, 1989a, p. 127). It plays a crucial role in modern society's morality because public rhetoric stylizes anxiety as the principle of self-observation. “Whoever suffers anxiety is morally in the right, particularly if it is anxiety on behalf of others, and this can be assigned to a recognized non-pathological type” (Luhmann, 1989a, p. 130). Anxiety, Luhmann continues, resists any critique. Anxiety is a principle that never fails when all other principles do (Luhmann, 1989a, p. 128). Luhmann stresses that communication is a strength because anxiety, as opposed to fear, cannot be controlled by any other functional systems. “Anxiety, then, becomes the functional equivalent for the bestowal of normative sense; and a valid one since anxiety (as opposed to fear) cannot be regulated away by any of the function systems” (Luhmann, 1989a, p. 127).

As morality can supply interpsychic and social interpenetration (Luhmann, 1995, p. 234), this anxiety relates to individuals. In the modern differentiated society, interhuman interpenetration is decoupling through intimate love relationships and social integration through organizations (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 223–9; Rachlitz et al., 2022). As such, anxiety also emerges in functional systems (Luhmann, 1990) and organizations. Individual and organizational anxiety are shown to have the same structure of appraisal processes, primary beliefs and commitments, secondary resources, and different but analogous responses (biological, psychological and behavioral for individuals; and internal process, organizational trust and organizational practice, respectively) (Baruch and Lambert, 2007) and organizational anxiety have been empirically illustrated (Fellowes, 2012).

In sum, the consensus function of normativity is lost in modern society and is replaced with a central position of individual and collective anxiety or the rhetoric of anxiety.

Individual anxiety can play an important role because of the collective inadequacy of morality – the social dimension of meaning concerns how one relates to others and how they position their actions. In premodern stratificational differentiation, morality, via esteem and disdain, is the social system that refers to the person as a whole and one's membership in society. Esteem and disdain are functions for the inclusion of the person in society ^[2]. Luhmann states morality can no longer decide on inclusion/exclusion in modern society. From this, Luhmann infers that one “cannot exclude, one can only evaluate. […] When you cannot or do not want to kill, one has to do something else instead. One condemns morally if someone violates the conditions of respect and when one cannot avoid that this person is still there and continues to communicate.” ^[3] As morality can no longer reach consensus, it becomes polemogenous, that is, it arises from and encourages conflicts (Luhmann, 2012, p. 244) and becomes pathological (Luhmann, 1996, p. 34). Comparing morality to an alarm function of society, Luhmann states that morality “becomes superfluous when it is successful and useless when it is not” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1003).

According to Luhmann, ethics in modern society formed a peaceful concept of moral sentiments and presented morality as a consensual domain (Luhmann, 2012, p. 244). However, this abstaining from paradox has the opposite effect and creates conflicts. Referring to religiously motivated uprisings and oppressions in Europe since the Middle Ages, Luhmann rather dramatically writes, “This is how steppe fires can arise” ^[4]. The focus on moral grounding has been without fundamental research into systemic structures (Luhmann, 1989a, p. 5). Because ethics uses second-order observations, it destroys, intentionally and unintentionally, the immediacy of moral evidence (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1006). Luhmann concludes that this “has cost ethics its reference to social reality.” (Luhmann, 1991a, p. 89), and it is apparent that morality “no longer fulfills a socially integrative function” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1004).

According to Luhmann, what remains after the individual and collective excavation of morality are moralists covering the unaptness of ethics with values. At the same time, sociologists have relevant answers because of their scientific methodology. For example, he declares that ethicists run the risk of becoming moralists (Luhmann, 1988, p. 25), portraying zeal, intrusiveness, vehemence, anger and combative spread of moral judgment ^[5] when they would continue to perceive their work as successful but society-independent from them as a failure (Luhmann and Fuchs, 1994, p. 126). He vehemently denounces the competencies of ethicists as the following two quotes indicate. “The desolate condition of this academic discipline may be seen today with naked eyes. […] What today goes under ethics exists on the account of the urgency of the problems and the aim of presenting one's own opinions effectively from a rhetorical and journalistic angle” (Luhmann, 1996, p. 1008). “That what is called ‘ethics’ today is nothing other than a utopia […], which is nowhere to be found and which does not exist at all” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1002). Luhmann invalidates not only ethicists but also their core concepts. For example, the use of values in ethics has a purpose to conceal the incompetence of ethics, as values “are indisputable; they do not even need explicit communication. They can be taken for granted, and this taken-for-grantedness can also be taken for granted. They are silent persuaders; but they decide nothing” (Luhmann, 1996, p. 31). Given the weakness of ethics, Luhmann, there is a need for a commonsensical, unbiased assessment of reality that “describes society as it is.” He sharpens his stance by positioning himself outside ethics, pushing ethicists into having limited theoretical imagination. “I shall refrain from answering this question for ethics, for I see no reason to expose myself to moral esteem or disesteem [disdain] by proposing a theory. Moralists characterize such an attitude as cynicism given developing society's urgent problems. However, that is then just their [Luhmann's italics] language and also evidence for the limits of their theoretical imagination” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1009). In the end, Luhmann's epistemological issue with morality seems to be that it is not as scientific, theoretical, and empirical as sociology is (Luhmann, 1996, p. 32). I will further call this standpoint Luhmann's epistemological scientism (Hietanen et al., 2020) stance toward morality and ethics.

One can wonder how such a dismissive theory can be a basis for a constructive interpretation of morality. To answer this deliberation, I want to stress that Luhmann also traced, although far less saliently, a new role of morality (Luhmann and Horster, 2008). I will parallel the three above critiques with three possible new roles as a first step in developing a constructive theory of morality in social system theory.

For Luhmann, to find an answer to the increasing influence of individual and organizational anxiety on morality, risk becomes more important in modern society (Luhmann, 1991a) as a fundamentally different concept than danger. Danger refers to a potential loss that is caused externally and that is discussed by first-order observers. The risk of decisions by second-order observers refers explicitly to the potential loss that is considered a consequence of the decisions or attributed to the decision, and this is for individuals (Luhmann, 1991b, 1993b, p. 20–22) and organizations (Luhmann, 2018a, pp. 133–4). A smoker runs one's own risk but creates a danger for bystanders (Luhmann, 1991b).

I already mentioned that norms narrow down possible actions as they project an expectation of the future. Luhmann elaborates on trust as a crucial element of ethics to reduce complexity and risk (Luhmann, 2018a, b, p. 12, 79). People reflecting on or observing their own norms will experience their actions as risky (Luhmann, 1993b, p. 55). Thus, morality must allude to risk and danger (Luhmann and Horster, 2008, p. 389; Winczorek, 2021). A moral risk assessment is ineffective as people are incredibly prepared to take risks but are highly sensitive to dangers (Luhmann, 1987, p. 88, 90). The nature of morality is, therefore, not to consider specific risk issues but to pose problems of risk itself (e.g. Luhmann, 1987, p. 97; Astola et al., 2022a, b; Dameski et al., 2022; Martin et al., 2023; Miller, 2022).

Of course, it is still very open to how posing problems on risk should be done and what the effect will be on the relation between morality and ethics on the one hand and anxiety, risk and danger on the other. From the theory of Luhmann, a clear next step on how morality should deal with risks to answer individual or organizational anxiety is unclear.

Luhmann is very critical of morality, but eventually, he acknowledges the existence of morality. “Nevertheless it would be a mistake to overreact and declare the whole undertaking of ethics to be out of date or to attribute it, in Diderot's formulation, to the tic of moralizing. Morally conditioned communication exists; ethics thus has the task of taking a position towards it” (Luhmann, 1991a, p. 89). This leads him to a famous assertion that probably the most imperative task of ethics is to warn against morality (Luhmann, 1991a, p. 90). Luhmann mentions several possibilities for how ethics could do so. It must relate to moral communication's polemogenous nature (Luhmann, 1996, p. 34). Ethics emerges as a possible solution to deal with the paradoxes of morality. Ethics, using second-order observations, considers the consensus-forming and the conflict-producing aspects of morality by thematizing morality as a distinction (Luhmann, 1991a, pp. 90–91). Luhmann indicates and admits that the moral is reserved for exceptional cases – Luhmann calls these cases pathological – as functional systems cannot resolve the paradoxes of their own codes. Dealing with this paradox is, for Luhmann, a specific task of morality as a system coupled with other systems (see for some examples of links between morality and other systems Clausen, 2022; Laermans and Verschraegen, 2001; Räwel, 2021; Tække, 2022; Žažar, 2022). “Precisely for that reason, society has recourse at these points to moral sensitivity” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1003). Luhmann's dismissive statements seem to be nuanced. I would say that morality suddenly appears as an alarm function (Luhmann, 2012, p. 244) or a supportive system for all other systems. If other functional systems struggle with their paradoxes when their own binary codes fail, morality/ethics can help address them. Luhmann goes even further to say that the essence of all moral criteria is a paradox or the unity of what has to be distinguished (Luhmann, 1996, p. 33).

Furthermore, Luhmann sometimes seems to come back from his strong claim that morality is not for socialization when referring to Durkheim's solidarity as a “Bindemittel” or binder (Luhmann and Horster, 2008, p. 375). First, the concept of the moral for Luhmann refers to the communication of social systems and not to the consciousness of psychic systems. Morality determines the conditions under which esteem and disesteem can be communicated. Luhmann stresses that these conditions must be institutionalized, which means one can expect social support for them. As he emphasizes time and again, often the consensus of everybody is not possible, but he seems to leave an openness to the support of one's own group (Luhmann, 1996, p. 29) or a specific collective and to the undeniable importance of organizations (Luhmann, 2018a, pp. 68–69) in modern society. This opens up an image of morality of collectives (such as small groups or unorganized crowds) or organizations interacting with each other and showing solidarity with their group.

Also, for his critical elaboration of values, Luhmann has a constructive counterpart. He considers values to be “general, individually symbolized perspectives which allow one to prefer certain states or events” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 317). He puts the value concept very centrally when he states that theories of values can be useful if they avoid the simplistic hypothesis of a normative constitution of the social but instead develop statements about the functions of norms and values (Luhmann, 1995, p. 522, fn84). Luhmann's starting point seems to be that values have a particular and strong function. They “are in force.” It is presupposed in the use of values that there is consensus on value appraisal ^[6] (see also Luhmann, 1991a, p. 84). As an illustration and without further elaboration due to limitations of the limits of this article, a long and nonexhaustive list of values that Luhmann discusses can be given. Respect (Higuchi, 2021), tact and sincerity (Luhmann, 1995, p. 150, 315) are necessary for the autopoiesis of social systems. Other values are the product of communication in social systems, such as freedom (Luhmann, 1995, p. 314), solidarity (Luhmann, 1995, p. 421), fairness (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1005), trust (Luhmann, 1995, p. 127) or responsibility (Luhmann, 1995, p. 387). I consider all the above quite constructive for someone with dismissive views on morality. The multitude of values that Luhmann mentions and how values support social systems' emergence strengthen my opinion.

Luhmann recommends transitioning from speech actions to communication and from language to social system to develop a practical ethics p. 88). For him, morality, like all communication, is based on distinctions, in this case, between good and bad or good and evil (Luhmann, 1991a, p. 91; Fuchs and Bombaerts, 2022; Neisig, 2022). Luhmann gives a sketch of how morality could be developed in, according to him, a promising way. However, this should be done with caution as “to update the moral is to remake the world as a moral entity” (Luhmann, 1996, p. 28). The utopia should be replaced by “the irritant” and the “moralist” by the interdiction of self-exemption. Sociology that aims to describe morality needs to be empirical and not philosophical. It would have to create an “irritant” or learning process within sociology. According to Luhmann, the most crucial aspect is the interdiction of self-exemption. Moral communication has to signal esteem and disdain. The communicator must reflexively apply the standards in the moral claims (Luhmann, 1996, p. 27). This requirement is at the same time an opportunity. As Luhmann puts it: “In the name of ethics, society can rebel against itself. […] However, the problems that social structures generate in modern society are, perhaps, much too grave to be left at that” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1008). This shows that, despite the epistemological scientism stance toward morality and ethics, Luhmann leaves openness to further elaborate the link between morality and social systems in Luhmann's theory.

In the previous section, I gave three ways in which Luhmann traces new roles for morality as a first step for a constructive interpretation of morality in social systems. However, Luhmann has even more to offer. In this section, I describe that for the three above critiques, Luhmann made assumptions that are not constructive to morality but not fundamental to the core of his social systems theory. Hence, these assumptions could, in principle, have been different. I propose other assumptions that will help me to further develop a constructive interpretation of morality in Luhmann's systems theory.

According to Luhmann, whoever suffers anxiety in our modern society is morally in the right, meaning the communication of anxiety cannot be logically refuted, and anxiety has a central position in the practice of morality and ethics. At the same time, the nature of morality is to pose fundamental problems of risk, but it is unclear how this should be done. I will develop here one possible elaboration.

Risk and danger are concepts with negative connotations. Therefore, answering the analysis of anxiety with these concepts remains related to negative dynamics. In psychology, the exclusive focus on negative emotions and evaluations and the emphasis on pathology that has dominated science and policymaking results in an image of human beings lacking the positive features that make life worth living. “Hope, wisdom, creativity, future mindedness, courage, spirituality, responsibility, and perseverance” (e.g. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5) are ignored or explained as transformations of more authentic negative impulses. “A science of positive subjective experience, positive individual traits, and positive institutions promises to improve quality of life and prevent the pathologies that arise when life is barren and meaningless” (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This substantial literature on positive psychology and practice focuses on individual attention to redirect toward a positive dynamic.

In ethics, the link between attention and individual morality is peripheral. However, some nonsystem authors have made this link. Anālayo (2004) describes attention in Buddhism as both “moment-to-moment awareness” and “memory,” seeing attention even more as a fundamental aspect of morality stemming from background assumptions. Murdoch (2001) analyzed attention and “attending to” as the fundamental aspect of moral sensitivity and ethics. Murdoch's explanation of ethical attention is famous in her description of a domestic situation in which a mother-in-law (M) aims to alter her initial dislike toward her future daughter-in-law (D). According to Murdoc, M can choose to direct constructive appraisal toward D's personality, which she had previously felt irritating. M's initial judgment of D being unpolished, brusque, rude and tiresomely juvenile can be reinterpreted as refreshingly simple, spontaneous and delightfully youthful (Murdoch, 2001, pp. 16–17). If M focuses her “loving attention” toward D, Murdoch writes, M can actively reinterpret her negative interpretations into positive ones.

I explore here, very concisely, if this approach can be extended from psychic to social systems. As mentioned earlier, I see a parallel between the research and an interpretation of Luhmann's theory.

Luhmann links attention to risk. When an alarm directs attention to a risk (Luhmann, 1995, p. 394; Morales, 2022), the disturbance influences system operations (Luhmann et al., 2013, p. 196). It is the role of attention to connect the complexity of different systems by activated attention (Luhmann et al., 2013, p. 243). “Integration is not achieved by connecting complexity onto complexity. … Instead, systems must find another way, one more parsimonious in its use of elements and relations, of conscious attention and communicative time” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 229; see also p. 195). I interpret the mechanism of attention in Luhmann's theory as a self-referential operation to select what is focused upon and what remains unnoticed (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 415–6). The selection function of attention is a source for the stability of the social system as Luhmann stresses that concentrated instability is no longer instability. Systems are “restless” but maintain their autopoiesis. Concentrated instability refers to a situation where a system is characterized by a high level of complexity and change, yet it maintains a stable structure or pattern. A structural instability or insecurity is a predictable instability. A company in a highly dynamic environment will internally change immensely but can maintain its stability because of a clear organizational structure.

Attention then is a promptness to communicate and thus a momentarily increased sensitivity to chance (Luhmann, 1995, p. 371). In a process, meaning embedded in an event to which one turns for the moment with primary attention leads to self-reference via generalization in the process from event to event (Luhmann, 1995, p. 95). I want to emphasize that, in this way, attention is not only what is often seen as its quintessence, that is, the awareness at a given moment. Equally important, it is linked to memory and remembering (Anālayo, 2004). In Buddhist terms, this has to do with what meditation is for, in which worldview the entire practice is embedded (Hannes and Bombaerts, 2023).

Individual and organizational anxiety, as described above (Rachlitz et al., 2022), then misses attention as a background mechanism. Differences in attention can lead to different appraisal processes, primary beliefs, commitments and secondary resources. This can lead to different individual biological, psychological and behavioral responses. For organizations, it can lead to different internal process responses, organizational trust and organizational practices (e.g. Fellowes, 2012). The active reinterpretation in Murdoch and the background elements from Anālayo shows analogies with Luhmann's social systems functions of attention (moment-to-moment awareness and memory) that come back in the time or process aspects and the structure aspects, respectively. Attention is the mechanism in the smallest possible temporal atom event (moment-to-moment awareness for Anālayo, concentrated instability for Luhmann) in which selections are forced using expectations and norms (memory for Anālayo, structure for Luhmann).

This concise exploration does not aim to explain in-depth the relation between attention and social systems but wants to make a first plea that the positive approach of attention and moral sensitivity in positive psychology might also be fruitful in Luhmann's social systems theory and would thus merit further research. Attention, as momentary awareness and as remembering, and concentrated instability could be keys to understanding the reasons that the central place of anxiety is not the dead end but the starting point for morality and ethics (Bombaerts et al., 2023a). Coping as a psychic or social system with anxiety attentively and constructively is a natural growth process in these systems.

In this way, I changed the basic assumption of anxiety to that of attention. This assumption is not core to his social systems theory. The new interpretations coherently fit. Moreover, they fundamentally alter the constructive role of morality in the theory.

Luhmann considers the recourse to moral sensitivity not strong enough. Morality thus cannot fulfill its integrative function and abstains from paradoxes. At the same time, Luhmann states that society has recourse to moral sensitivity and acknowledges that conditions under which esteem and disesteem can be communicated should be institutionalized.

I analyze if Luhmann's concept of socialization could be of help here for a positive interpretation. Luhmann defines socialization as “the process that, by interpenetration, forms the psychic system and the bodily behavior of human beings that it controls” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 241). Morality and socialization as social systems theory concepts relate to the whole person, as socialization is always self-socialization (Luhmann, 1995, p. 241). I indicated that Luhmann stresses the importance for morality to use psychic–social interpenetration. However, he also emphasizes this for socialization as he considers it only possible if the psychic system can simultaneously attribute different schemata to itself and the environment. Luhmann refers to attraction or aversion, understanding or misunderstanding, conformity or deviance and success or failure as concepts in which both the psychic and social system interpenetrate (Luhmann, 1995, p. 242). As such, Luhmann describes systems as socialized morally (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1000).

As mentioned above, Luhmann writes that one can expect consensus about the social support of one's group about the institutionalized conditions for morality (Luhmann, 1996, p. 29). The link between socialization and schemata further links it with other functional social systems elements as themes (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 195–196), programs (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 203–204), cultures (Luhmann, 1995, p. 163) and values (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 318–319).

The stress on the inability and powerlessness of morality on inclusion/exclusion for the entire society thus seems to be downsized to the ability and power of morality on inclusion/exclusion at a level that does not relate to the entire society. “The ought is, in contrast to wishes or orders, experienced as an anonymous and objective bid” ^[7] Horster indicates that this is precisely the function of morality, i.e. with its help, you can expect what you expect (Luhmann and Horster, 2008, p. 386). I want to add to that sentence: “in a collective or organization.”

As such, I would say that, through institutionalized socialization, the binding of solidarity for small groups or organizations can be supportively interpreted. Of course, it will need more tinkering with how the separate collectives or organizations (Luhmann, 2018a, p. 221, 228; Baruch and Lambert, 2007) interrelate to the society as a system (Van Assche et al., 2021). The role of institutionalized socialization seems to be a relevant and promising concept to inquire how morality can further fulfill an integrative function in society.

Luhmann considers modern ethics a utopia and takes an epistemological scientism stance toward morality and ethics. At the same time, Luhmann puts forward the “interdiction of self-exemption” as a solid moral condition, and this shows some openness to further elaborate the link between morality and social systems in Luhmann's theory. As Luhmann's dismissive condemnation of ethics is predominant, this interdiction seems not strong enough to cancel the utopia out.

To circumvent this, I propose to start from another basic assumption. A fundamental constructivist interpretation of morality and ethics using Luhmann's event concept could be a constructive reinterpretation of Luhmann's theory. A constructivist interpretation of morality and ethics seems a severe intrusion in Luhmann's theory on morality and ethics. However, other scholars like Valentinov (2019, p. 108) and Dallmann (1998, p. 97) already indicated that many elements in his theory could be labeled as normative, such as the continuation of autopoiesis as the primary goal of autopoietic systems (Luhmann, 1989a, p. 14). Scholl (2012) highlighted that Luhmann's epistemology is nearer to constructivism than realism because of its self-referential logic, strict relation between observer and observed and relativism of reality construction.

More examples thereof can be given for morality and ethics, such as: “We would morally object to a fusion of codes (and this is meant to be an empirical statement!)” (Luhmann, 1996, p. 35); or “Thus it is essential that the entire process of socialization not be dominated by a single schema” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 243) and having ratio or prudentia as better than not having it (Luhmann, 1995, p. 46, 312).

However, there is more. In his social system theory, he often treats epistemic and moral aspects in one category. First, this becomes clear when he explains how observations distinguish cognition and actions (which can be moral, of course) (Luhmann, 1992, p. 998). Second, meaning is created via operations or connections between events (Luhmann, 1995, p. 119). Luhmann talks about the totality of references, not only the factual ones, that are forcefully reduced, leading to the selection when a system is confronted with the overabundance of references to be actualized. The inescapability of selection makes that which is selected meaningful (Luhmann, 1995, p. 60). Luhmann's asymmetrization concept implies that operations choose points of reference, social and factual, which are positioned in the sequences of events. This means they are, at that moment, no further questioned within the operations and are considered a given (Luhmann, 1995, p. 76, 466). This mechanism describes how normativity as an “ought to be” arises, both for epistemic and value statements. These constructive elements enable a constructive interpretation of normativity when applied to Luhmann's theory itself. Both the fact and social dimensions of meaning create another meaning with characteristics as no longer putting in question, through its referential structure, forcing the next step to selection. Normativity, understood as a claim of what ought to be, whether referring to facts or values, then becomes a relational concept. Normativity is something from within, relational to the elements in the connection of events, that positions elements through events.

The positive interpretation here is that Luhmann's theory of social systems has the elements to develop a relational ontology. Factual and social normativity emerges from the connectivity of events. The ontology, as such, is not absolute nor relativistic but relational to the meaning elements of the social system. The polemogenous nature becomes a given, not a negative thing that modern morality is condemned to.

I know this is, again, vastly explorative. However, as I aim to sketch the broad picture in a relatively short article, I provide a broad and rough outline of positionism as a relational ontology that could avoid ethics as a utopia. A normativity from within that could be both nonutopian and flexible.

Here, I replaced Luhmann's basic assumption of what I called an epistemological scientism stance toward morality and ethics with a constructivist one. This third assumption is not core to his social systems theory. The new interpretations coherently fit and fundamentally change the role of morality in the theory.

The key aim of this article was to explore a constructive interpretation of morality in Luhmann's social systems theory. I introduced critical concepts of Luhmann's theory on social systems and morality. I described some dismissive Luhmannian critiques of morality. Moreover, I presented constructive elements of Luhmann's work. I eventually pointed at Luhmannian basic assumptions and showed that replacing them with other assumptions does not contradict his theory but further increases a constructive interpretation of morality in social systems theory. I deliberately explored three constructive interpretations to show that replacing basic assumptions is not a one-shot and that these can be applied coherently and constructively in social systems theory.

Of course, these three constructive interpretations cannot be seen as entirely separate. First, I analyzed if the positive approach of attention and moral sensitivity in psychology might be fruitful in Luhmann's social systems theory. Attention and concentrated instability might be crucial to understanding that those who suffer anxiety are not necessarily morally in the right and that the central place of anxiety is not a dead end but the starting point for morality and ethics for individuals, collectives, organizations, functional systems or society. Second, the previous feeds into institutional programs for socialization that could be further analyzed to develop interpretations of the integrative function of morality at the level of collectives and organizations. Attention and concentrated instability at these levels can undoubtedly influence institutional socialization programs. It would enable social system theory to elaborate a relational view on morality and ethics. Morality is about self-esteem and prohibits self-exemption and how it interpenetrates with the autopoiesis of social systems. Values give direction to socialization, and socialization influences values. It is out of the scope of this article to analyze the consequences, but some illustrations might already be exemplifying. For example, values are not fixed evaluations. When decision-making processes map values to select an innovation, they should consider that the innovations will change the values. Also, individual values are often seen as autonomous and opposite to the more collectively oriented socialization (Bombaerts et al., 2023b; Laes et al., 2023; Laes and Bombaerts, 2021, 2022). Adherents of individual values and growth (sometimes grouped as political left-wing) have difficulties with or are even downward negative toward socialization, automatically seen as conforming to traditional norms. Vice versa, explicit adherents of socialization (sometimes grouped as political right wing) are often negative toward individual growth. The link between attention and concentrated instability offers a framework to depolarize the debate between individual value and socialization.

Doing this, I replaced three basic assumptions of Luhmann's theory: from anxiety to attention, from whole society integration to institutionalized socialization and from an epistemological scientism stance toward morality and ethics to constructivism. I showed that these assumptions and their interpretations are not core to his social systems theory. The new interpretations coherently fit and fundamentally change the role of morality in the social systems theory.

Of course, further research could point to other basic assumptions. It could provide a more profound elaboration beyond the current explorative level, further illustrating that the interpretation of morality in social systems theory is more constructive.

This article should be seen as a programmatic plea for further development of morality and moral sensitivity in social systems theory. As such, many questions open up.

First, what does social system attention mean? How can both the problem of anxiety and the potential solution of attention be developed as a concept for morality in system theory in general and at specific levels, such as the organizational or functional systems levels in particular? Much is currently written about attention. A strong focus on attention for morality will be very fruitful to see how it can be a solution to anxiety. System thinking can add to this inquiry by studying the supraindividual aspects of attention, such as collective or organizational attention. Although I did not elaborate on the effects of functional subsystems in this article, it is in line with general systems theory to expect that the above attention insights might also be applicable to functional subsystems.

Second, how can institutionalized socialization add to insights on Durkheim's binding of solidarity? How do individuals and systems like collectives or organizations interrelate to society as a system? These results touch upon fundamental tensions in modern society of individualism and conformity to groups. Both create problems in their extremes, but a middle way of “good” individualism and conformity is far from easy. System thinking is well-positioned to develop theories that can give guidance.

Third, how can normativity, factual or social, further be elaborated as a relational concept in which meaning is positioned? What does this concept of relational positionism mean for an ontology applied to social systems? It opens up avenues to further develop relational epistemologies in system thinking that can be at the same time normative (strongly argue for basic values without getting dogmatic) and open and flexible (without becoming relativistic). I could paraphrase Luhmann saying that in the name of ethics and science, society can rebel against itself, enabling the necessary increase of self-reflection and self-reflexivity in light of present-day challenges such as climate change or fake news.

I hope with this article to have contributed to the debate in this journal (Laursen et al., 2022) on the concept of morality in Luhmann's theory in particular and to system theory in general by presenting a programmatic, positive, and supportive interpretation of morality in Luhmann's social systems theory that will serve to further elaborate morality from a system theory perspective in which factual, temporal and social meaning is relationally positioned.

The author would like to thank Richard Pretorius, Lukas Fuchs, Diana Martin and Tom Hannes for their valuable comments on earlier drafts.

This research is conducted in the frame of the HTSM research programs “SRCrowd: Individual and Collective Agency in Socially Responsible Nudging of Crowd” and “HTCrowd: A high-tech platform for Human Crowd Flow Monitoring, Modeling and Nudging” with project numbers 18754, 17962, and the VENI-AES research program “Understanding and controlling the flow of human crowds” with project number 16771, all financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO).