The purpose of this paper is to examine whether client industry importance affects auditor independence.
This study analyzes audit firm merger data from China Stock Market and Accounting Research and uses a difference-in-difference model to find whether client industry importance is associated with auditor independence. This study uses discretionary accruals and propensity to issue modified audit opinions as proxies for auditor independence.
Results show that the greater the decline in client industry importance, the more significant the increase in auditor independence. In addition, the magnitude of decline in client overall importance is also positively associated with the extent of increase in auditor independence; however, this result disappears after controlling for client industry importance.
The authors acknowledge that this study has limitations. First, audit firm mergers provide a unique research setting. However, the findings of this study in such setting may not be generalizable to other situations. Second, this study has a limited sample size because of data availability, which could impact the robustness of the results.
Results from this study are important because investors and regulators have increasing concerns over auditor independence since the Enron scandal. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of client industry importance on auditor independence and in a unique setting of audit firm merger to separate auditor independence from auditor competence, and hence controlling for self-selection bias. Results of this study provide evidence that client industry importance has significant influence over auditor independence.
