In light of the inconclusive findings in literature, the aim of this paper is to answer the question: how can negotiation behavior be explained in a situation of power imbalance?
Based on Kim et al., the paper proposes a theoretical model that is empirically studied through a case study.
Power relationship is a key contextual factor in determining negotiation behavior in joint ventures (JVs), but it has to be defined more in terms of the perceived value of the alternatives rather than the amount of available better alternatives to a negotiation agreement (BATNAs). Thus, when a partner looks to gain access to knowledge (market, technology, etc.) about the counterpart, although it has a greater number of BATNAs, they perceive a situation of mutual dependency.
Understanding how the negotiating context affects behavior is crucial for firms to anticipate the reactions and behavior of their counterparts and thus display suitable behavior to gain the most favorable agreement possible in JVs (win/win agreements in view of the importance of establishing long‐term commitment for a correct implementation and performance). The correct selection of the negotiating team also appears as a key element for consideration (people capable to maintain an integrative orientation to confront any competitive reaction).
The paper focuses on the determination of negotiation behavior in joint ventures, an overlooked research area. In particular, it gives light to the inconsistent results found in earlier works centered in analyzing the impact of power‐dependence relationship in negotiation behavior choice.
