The purpose of this paper is to examine how the magnitude of strategic change may be influenced by Chief executive officer (CEO) underpayment relative to comparison CEOs. Based on equity theory, the authors propose that compensation inequity motivates underpaid CEOs to restore equity, which can take the form of making a greater magnitude of strategic change. In addition, this study proposes three important moderators of the relationship between CEO underpayment and strategic change.
Results from a sample covered in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp database for the years 1996-2014 provide support for these theoretical predictions.
CEO underpayment has a positive effect on the magnitude of strategic change. Top management team compensation gap and firm slack are proposed to weaken the impact of CEO underpayment on strategic change, while environmental complexity is predicted to strengthen the relationship between CEO underpayment and strategic change.
This study contributes to strategic change literature by linking research on CEO relative compensation to strategic change studies. This study contributes to equity theory and CEO relative compensation literature by extending its implications to firms’ decisions on strategic change. Moreover, it also contributes to equity theory by revealing the boundary conditions that mitigate or aggravate the impacts of CEO underpayment on firms’ strategic decisions.
