The purpose of this paper is to employ an emerging phenomenon in China concerning collaborative carbon emission reduction (CCER) to investigate: first, the coordination of suppliers and manufacturers within supply chains to reduce carbon emissions, and second, the role of governmental policy in facilitating this process.
This paper draws upon evolutionary game theory to develop an evolutionary game model for CCER for suppliers and manufacturers within supply chains. This includes a detailed analysis of the evolutionary direction and process in different areas, both with, and in the absence of, governmental subsidies.
The results demonstrate that CCER is path dependent and that its evolutionary process is influenced by the following four factors: the initial status within supply chains; the cost; the additional benefit; and the investment risk related to CCER. The research also reveals that the reward provided by manufacturers is rational over the long term, due to the excessive cost of incentives potentially preventing the implementation of CCER.
This study represents the first attempt to investigate CCER within supply chains through the application of an evolutionary game-theoretic model. The investigation of multiple factors in the model will deepen understanding of the collaborative role required for the carbon emission reduction.
