Board committees’ gender diversity: an investigative look at the engine rooms of decision-making Open Access

While boards play a fundamental role in corporate governance, a significant portion of board decision-making is delegated to specific board committees. Committees are vital due to the need to meet increasing requirements for legal compliance and the escalating complexity of the business environment. Board committees play a crucial role, including determining executive compensation, recommending potential board members and providing oversight of financial reporting (Kolev et al., 2019). Committees can be described as the decision-making engine rooms, which are principal sources of activity and strength (Oxford English Dictionary, 2024). Committee meetings occur more frequently than board meetings, and their strength lies in the specialised expertise of the committee members (Adams et al., 2021; Rey, 2022). The limited extant studies of committees have shown that board committees, such as the audit, compensation and nominating committees, are important in influencing organisational outcomes (Neville et al., 2018). For example, the presence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees has a positive influence on CSR activities and reporting (Ali et al., 2023; Papíková and Papík, 2023).

A meta-analysis by Velte (2019) and a bibliometric analysis by Khatib et al. (2021) found that prior studies on gender diversity and corporate governance have focused on board gender diversity. An extensive mixed-method longitudinal study of Australian publicly listed companies between 2004 and 2013 also focused on the characteristics of female directors. Other recent studies have focused on board composition and largely overlooked board committees (Endrikat et al., 2020; Adams et al., 2021). Furthermore, the limited studies on committees have primarily focused on individual committees, such as the audit, compensation and nominating committees, and have not fully explored all kinds of committees (Kolev et al., 2019). The prior research on boards has made valuable contributions to the body of knowledge about their diversity. However, the mixed results recorded by previous studies may be linked to their failure to examine diversity within committees that were specifically tasked with making recommendations to the full board. The absence of a sufficient focus on committee-level diversity and the recognition of diversity variations across industries might account for the inconsistent findings.

Notwithstanding the crucial role of boards, they may fail in performing their fiduciary responsibilities. Board members may not be diligent or may possess limited knowledge of the firm’s details. A lack of coordination and cohesion between board members may also limit boards’ effectiveness (Boivie et al., 2016). Research on board committees is needed as legal requirements increase and the business environment becomes more complex (Kolev et al., 2019). Furthermore, there is a paucity of studies on how board gender diversity influences the increasing demand for supporting corporate governance through board committees (Pucheta‐Martínez and Bel‐Oms, 2019).

Adams et al. (2015) noted that mixed results were reported in board diversity studies, which has motivated further studies. However, more recent evidence suggests that board diversity has not changed significantly for larger firms. For example, some US firms still have a low representation of females on their boards (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2024). In 2019, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 50 companies were characterised by high levels of male directors on boards (66%). However, on average, they achieved the ASX 30% female board membership target (Wright et al., 2023).

In 2014, the ASX Australian Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 3rd edition (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014, p. 11) included a recommendation for companies listed on the ASX “to set measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity”. The 4th edition, issued in 2019, endorsed gender diversity targets for 30% of directors on the boards of the top 300 companies within a specified period ^[1]. In 2018, 24% of ASX 300 company directors were women (Watermark Search International, 2018). In 2020, the Australian Institute of Directors reported that 30.8% of board members of ASX 300 companies were women (Watermark Search International and Governance Institute of Australia, 2021). It is now timely to consider the top 300 companies and the extent to which board diversity targets are reflected in the diversity of their committees. The Australian context is of global interest due to the progress made in increasing the proportion of women on boards, which has been achieved without the need for quotas (McCann, 2018).

This study addresses the pertinent issue of whether the benefits of gender diversity in board committees will enhance corporate governance, while also considering that board and committee gender diversity may differ. Diversity studies that consider committees are scarce (Kolev et al., 2019). The work by Carter et al. (2010) is one of the few studies that have included board committees; however, their findings neither supported nor provided negative evidence against the gender diversity of boards. A recent review of quantitative, empirical studies on board committees in the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia (Kolev et al., 2019) found only a handful of studies of committees in Australian companies. No study has been found that compares the level of gender diversity on boards to that on committees, either within or between industry sectors. Carter et al. (2010) is one of the few earlier studies that examined board and committee diversity. They considered the audit, nomination and compensation committees of US companies for the period 1998–2002. The results neither supported nor provided negative evidence against the gender diversity of boards, and they found no relationship between committee diversity and firms’ performance.

In summary, the holistic view of board gender diversity in many prior studies overlooks the fact that gender diversity may vary between the board and its committees or between different committees. Additionally, Carter et al. (2010) examined the membership structures and performance of only three committees more than 20 years ago. Given the changes in membership structure expectations over time, it is appropriate to consider the trends in diversity on board committees compared to the full board’s changing diversity.

The first aim of this paper is to determine whether the gender diversity of the full board differs from that of its individual committees. If this differential rate of gender diversity exists, then these findings provide evidence for future research directions into this gender diversity issue. The second aim is to establish whether the gender diversity of each committee differs across industry sectors. If this differing rate of gender diversity exists, then these findings should provide support for the need for industry dissection for future research into this gender diversity issue, and potentially for a more proactive approach within certain industry sectors to correct this pattern. The third aim is to determine whether the gender diversity of the whole board, relative to the gender diversity of each committee, has changed over time due to the introduction of targets. A significant change in the gender diversity proportions between the whole board and each committee should encourage ongoing replication research until the gender target is reached and stabilises, which may take several years. The study’s aims are summarised in the overarching question: Which measure of gender diversity is more appropriate for corporate governance research: board gender diversity or individual committee diversity?

The paper is designed as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on board and committee diversity, highlighting the benefits and challenges of achieving such diversity. It also explores the motivations behind this study. Section 3 develops three research propositions. The research method used is discussed in Section 4. The results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 discusses the findings and contrasts them with the literature. The discussion and conclusion in Section 7 outline some implications of the findings for future research and policymaking purposes.

The literature review focuses on the roles of boards and committees, the theories that explain the establishment of these committees and the gender diversity of their membership, including the benefits and barriers associated with diversity. The review culminates with identifying the motivation for this study.

Boards are essential to corporate governance as their decisions substantially influence corporate performance and sustainability (Seijts et al., 2019). They are responsible for setting policies, monitoring management and maintaining internal controls for organisations’ activities in two general areas: overall organisational performance and compliance with legal and regulatory obligations. Therefore, boards ultimately ensure that firms may create value for their stakeholders (Adams, 2017; Seijts et al., 2019). A vital aspect of effective board function is having independent directors, who provide an objective and impartial perspective to the board’s decision-making process, ensuring that the board is acting in the organisation’s and its stakeholders’ best interests. They also bring valuable expertise and experience to the board.

The work of committees forms an integral part of board processes. They help boards focus on strategic issues by providing recommendations about the technical complexities of an organisation. Committees provide a forum for in-depth discussion and the analysis of specific issues, which can lead to more informed board decisions (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2020a). A study of board and committee minutes found that committees spend more time on monitoring functions than boards (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013). As committees are smaller groups than the full board, women can form a higher percentage of the participants. Hence, the influence of gender diversity can be more pronounced in committees, which can, in turn, have consequences for boards’ decisions (Khemakhem et al., 2022).

The board and shareholders receive regular reports from committees, which encourages transparency and accountability by verifying that the company’s policies and procedures align with its stated principles and goals (Rey, 2022). The crucial role committees play in decision-making was demonstrated in Adams et al.’s (2021) study of unregulated US companies from 1996 to 2010. On average, there were 2.3 committee meetings for every board meeting.

In Australia, boards of directors are given authority to delegate their powers to committees by the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) Section 198D, which states that boards may delegate any of their powers to a committee of directors unless prohibited by a company’s constitution. The delegation from the boards of large companies to those committees enables committee members to be more efficient and effective in addressing complex and specialised issues (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2020b). There are three sources of guidance/regulation for forming committees and their membership. The ASX Corporate Governance Recommendations follow an “if not, why not” approach. This approach encourages listed firms to adopt best practice recommendations while allowing flexibility in their methods to achieve good governance. The “if not, why not” approach mandates that if a company chooses not to adopt a particular recommendation, it must explain its decision. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is an independent statutory authority that mandates requirements for companies operating in the ASX financial sector, which includes banking, insurance and superannuation. The ASX Listing Rules apply to companies listed on the ASX. The rules regulate the admission of entities to the official list, the quoting of securities, the suspension of securities from quotation and the removal of entities from the official list. A summary of the role(s) of the board and committees addressed in the study appears in Table 1.

Three theories are discussed in this section. The first two theories, agency theory and stakeholder theory (both the ethical and managerial branches), help to explain the existence of boards and committees. The third theory, social role theory, informs the motivation for this study.

The reasoning for the mandatory formation of a board is rooted in agency theory, where Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified the associations and conflicts between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (management, including executive directors). From the corporation’s governance mechanisms viewpoint, the shareholders delegate authority to the agents (non-executive and independent non-executive directors) to appoint an auditor to report on the company’s affairs to shareholders. The ASX Listing Rules require the establishment of audit and remuneration committees, which may also be explained by agency theory. The audit committee should make an independent audit report available. Similarly, the presence of a remuneration committee discourages an agent’s self-interest as measured by higher salaries, financial bonuses, share options and non-financial incentives. It prioritises the principal’s interests of maximising profits and share values.

The establishment of other recommended or voluntary committees may be due to companies responding to a broader audience than just shareholders. One theory that may help explain the creation of these committees is stakeholder theory, which has two dominant branches. The ethical branch of stakeholder theory includes internal stakeholders, proposing that each stakeholder should not only be treated fairly (Deegan, 2014) but also be selected based on an individual’s ability and exclusions should not be based on gender (Manita et al., 2018). The rationale behind the theory is supported by social role theory, which states that females possess more communal, public-oriented qualities, such as being supportive and empathetic; qualities that would lead females to prioritise the welfare of others (Wei et al., 2017). Additionally, Adams et al. (2011) reported that female directors with communal qualities tend to better address stakeholders’ interests. They suggest that these qualities contrast dramatically with those of male directors, who tend to prioritise shareholders and economic concerns.

The ethical branch of stakeholder theory adopts a normative approach, suggesting that companies should consider the needs of all stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Deegan, 2014). This holistic perspective should help explain the acceptance of expanding gender diversity to meet the needs of different stakeholder groups. The managerial branch of stakeholder theory offers a more inductive explanation by considering the importance of different stakeholders based on their power to best manage organisational survival (Deegan, 2014). The dominant, more powerful stakeholders’ salience will likely have a more prominent role within the group, either on the board or its committees. Following this more powerful and dominant salience categorisation of stakeholders, it may be argued that the operations of different industry sectors impact social and environmental approaches differently. Therefore, CSR may be owed to a different number of salience-dominant stakeholder groups. For example, the value chain for the banking and finance industry should have a lower CSR effect. It may affect fewer salience-dominant stakeholder groups than the value chains of the mining or construction industry sectors.

Additionally, some industry sectors have been categorised by the Workplace Gender Equality Agency (2019) as male or female-dominated. For these industry sectors, stakeholder groups that are salience-dominant, whether male or female, may influence the importance of gender diversity within the board or its committees. Therefore, the managerial branch of stakeholder theory may help explain why differing industry sector CSR or gender-related effects may lead to the varying importance of some committees among industry sectors. Hence, the gender diversity issue may be less critical in some industry sectors. For example, Lu and Herremans (2019) work found a positive association between firms’ environmental performance scores and board gender diversity in the more environmentally impactful industries.

Finally, social role theory posits that gender stereotypes have emerged from the characterised societal division of labour (Eagly, 1987). Males’ aggressive, ambitious, strong and dominant tendencies are characterised as being personal-oriented, while females exhibit affectionate, supportive and altruistic tendencies towards others, which are described as public-oriented (Wei et al., 2017). The term “agentic” has also been used to describe male roles, where men appear to dominate roles that require assertiveness, leadership and the provision of resources. Alternatively, women are seen more often in roles that call for communal qualities such as cooperating and caring for others (Eagly and Wood, 2012). Additionally, Cruz et al. (2019) argue that females tend to promote more detailed disclosure, care more about outsiders’ evaluations, have a lower tolerance for ethical compromises, and are more ethical, communal and compassionate than males.

Social role theory also supports the claim that gender diversity on boards would influence firms’ performance. The arguments for diversity centre on enhanced decision-making due to a greater range of perspectives, abilities and experience (Hutchinson et al., 2015; Altrata, 2022). Both male and female directors bring distinctive sets of skills and knowledge to the boardroom. Combining these distinctive attributes enables better decision-making by providing a more comprehensive understanding of the issues under consideration (Ali et al., 2014). Furthermore, female directors have been identified as more focused on details and less risk-taking than male directors (Ali et al., 2014).

The discussion of theories in the reviewed literature suggests that the diverse characteristics of female sustainability committee members may eventually enhance environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance, to a certain extent, under some circumstances (Wei et al., 2017; Cruz et al., 2019). Agency theory and stakeholder theory were presented to help explain the reasons for forming boards and committees. However, social role theory is the primary theory used to motivate the investigation of the issue and exploration of the findings.

Many studies, summarised in Table 2, have demonstrated the wide range of benefits of board gender diversity. Some outcomes included in Table 2 are increased value, performance, innovation and creativity, expanded knowledge base, enrichment of human capital, enhanced sustainability disclosure, competitive advantage and corporate governance.

Important outcomes from board gender diversity research, not included in Table 2, relate to policy changes for board gender diversity quotas (Ferreira, 2015). Adams (2016) found that between 2008 and 2015, 32 countries established boardroom gender diversity policies.

Two additional essential findings mentioned in Table 2 are that the impact of board gender diversity in prior research has found mixed or non-significant results (Carter et al., 2010; Adams, 2016). Furthermore, Adams (2016) concluded that most evidence on the association between firms’ performances and female directors’ preferences on boards is indirect. These earlier studies in Table 2 did not consider that the benefits of gender diversity may not be associated with the full board’s gender diversity but may be contingent upon each committee’s gender diversity, as argued by social role theory. McGuire and Taylor (2017) recommend that further research is required into diversity on board committees, as these committees comprise smaller groups with specialised foci, thereby offering additional opportunities to incorporate diverse perspectives into deliberations before presenting them to the full board.

In keeping with the discussion in the previous section, Table 3 provides details of articles that have investigated the gender diversity of individual committees (audit, compensation, remuneration and nomination) across a number of countries. These studies identified mixed results (significant positive or negative benefits or insignificant benefits) flowing from gender diversity on audit committees. While Singhania ^[2]et al. (2022) recognised that female directors provide benefits through their active participation in influential committees, Adams (2016) concluded that most of the evidence is an indirect association. For example, argued, based on research in behavioural sciences, that female members of audit committees enhance outcomes as they are “more risk averse and process information more comprehensively than their male counterparts”.

Barriers to gender diversity may be explained by the managerial branch of stakeholder theory, which describes how the importance of different stakeholders in various industries is determined by their power to manage organisational survival (Deegan, 2014). Tofts-Len and Barker (2023) identified that Australian industry sectors can be classified as male-dominated, female-dominated or mixed. Therefore, the salience of more powerful stakeholders in different gender-dominated industry sectors may be reflected in board composition and, subsequently, the proportional representation of its committees.

Women sustained high levels of burnout during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, women left director roles at a higher rate than in the past and at a rate higher than that of men (McKinsey and Company, 2021). These trends continued in 2023 (McKinsey and Company, 2023). Women’s opportunities for board seats and board leadership roles are influenced by hiring processes. While women are hired in proportions similar to their representation in interview pools, they are offered interviews at slightly lower rates (Fernandez-Mateo and Fernandez, 2016). Despite possessing higher qualifications and earning board seats, women are much less likely to be selected for board leadership positions (Field et al., 2020). A study of S&P 1500 ^[3] boards revealed that a disproportionately high number of these boards had exactly two women, which was seen as complying with social norms and impression management rather than genuine attempts to increase diversity (Chang et al., 2019). It has been argued that board gender diversity has been limited by the insufficient number of suitably experienced or qualified women. However, recent studies have found that there are adequate supplies of suitable women candidates. After California introduced quotas, there was a high level of support for new women nominees, indicating a sufficient supply of women candidates (Gertsberg et al., 2022). Following the introduction of board gender diversity quotas in Italy, Spain and France, new women appointees were more likely to have qualifications in law, economics and management (Comi et al., 2020). Cook and Glass (2015) found a small positive relationship between board diversity and the prospect of appointing women as CEOs. Additionally, after their appointment, women CEOs had increased promotional success as board diversity increased. However, the appointment of women to boards does not appear to promote further appointments of females as board members. A European study found that the probability of more women being appointed was inversely correlated with the proportion of women currently serving on the board (Schoonjans et al., 2023).

Pucheta‐Martínez and Bel‐Oms (2019) demonstrated that not all female directors contributed to the formation or creation of board committees. This Spanish study’s findings support the notion that there was an increased likelihood of forming voluntary board committees when there were independent women board directors. Women on boards tend to receive lower compensation than their male counterparts, as noted by Ali et al. (2020). They confirm prior literature, which has demonstrated that the average compensation per board member decreased as the proportion of women on boards increased. Busyness may also be a barrier to women accepting board and committee appointments. Safari (2022) found that while women perceived benefits from multiple board memberships, considerations in accepting board positions included the number of board meetings per year and the number of board committee memberships.

A survey of Australian employment in 2023–2024 revealed that 60% of full-time employees are men and 40% are women (Australian Government Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2024a). A gender-balanced workforce in Australia is defined as one with a representation comprising at least 40% of men or women. In the private sector, 27% of organisations meet the definition, while across the Commonwealth public sector, 48% of organisations meet the definition of gender-balanced (Australian Government Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2024b). Women make up 45% of members in federal parliament and state and territory parliaments. The proportion of women in local councils varies across states. New South Wales has the lowest representation, with women comprising 31% of council members, while Victoria has the highest representation at 44% (Pathways to Politics for Women, 2024).

While Commonwealth public sector organisations have achieved an average of 50% women on their boards, the private sector lags significantly behind, with women holding 31% of board positions in private sector organisations (Australian Government Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2024b). Given the lower representation of women on corporate boards, it is possible that there are also lower rates of women on committees. Furthermore, most Australian industry sectors continue to be male-employee dominated: construction (88%); mining (83.7%); transport (79.1%), postal and warehousing (76.2%); electricity, gas, water and waste services (70.5%); manufacturing; agriculture, forestry and fishing (69.6%); and wholesale trade (65.3%) (Tofts-Len and Barker, 2023). The inverse proportion of male employees exists in two female-dominated sectors: health care and social assistance (21%) and education and training (16.8%). Therefore, gender disparities across industries make it pertinent to consider that while gender diversity may relate to industries, it is unknown whether boards and committees exhibit similar or dissimilar gender diversity within different industry sectors.

Diversity was first mentioned in the Australian Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2nd edition) in 2010 (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010). Recommendations included publishing diversity policies and annually disclosing measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity, as well as progress towards these objectives. As mentioned earlier, reporting was also suggested regarding the proportion of women in each entire organisation as well as the proportions in senior management and on the board, which aligns with the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (4th edition), which targets 30% gender diversity (ASX Coprorate Governance Council, 2019, p. 3).

In 2018, 24% of ASX 300 company directors were women (Watermark Search International, 2018). In 2020, the Australian Institute of Directors reported that 30.8% of board members of ASX 300 companies were women. By June 2023, 202 ASX 300 companies had attained 30% or more women on their boards (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2023). Board diversity has been found to vary across different industries. In 2019, 40% or more of the companies in the following industry sectors that report to the Workplace Gender Equality Agency (an Australian Government statutory agency) had no women on their boards: accommodation and food services; retail trade, transport, postal and warehousing; manufacturing; wholesale trade; public administration and safety; and construction (Cassells and Duncan, 2020).

A number of studies using Australian company data have examined the diversity of boards and some of their committees. Australia has a continuous disclosure regime that requires companies to disclose to the stock exchange. Studies of board diversity have produced mixed results and findings that board gender diversity did not directly increase financial performance (Hutchinson et al., 2015; Adams, 2016). Several Australian studies found that including women on boards benefits CSR activities (Nadeem et al., 2017; Mohy-ud-Din, 2023). However, Mohy-ud-Din (2023) found that the benefits were primarily for local CSR activities rather than international CSR activities. The Australian Institute of Company Directors (2020a, p. 1) declared that board committees are essential as they “enable a more effective consideration of complex or specialised issues” and facilitate directors’ efficient use of time. A study of ASX-listed companies demonstrated that audit committee gender diversity had a significantly positive influence on CSR disclosure levels (Appuhami and Tashakor, 2017). Elms and Kent (2024) revealed an association between adopting a nomination committee and board gender diversity in medium-sized and smaller-sized firms. One Australian study found that companies with higher board gender diversity and greater board independence and sustainability committees were associated with improved social and environmental performance (Biswas et al., 2018). Hutchinson et al. (2015) found that ASX top 500 companies with a designated nomination committee were positively and strongly correlated with board gender diversity.

While diversity guidelines and regulations are in place at the board level, this is not the case at the committee level. However, gender diversity does occur for committees, and the recommendations of these committees are the basis for decisions made by the full board. Therefore, the findings of this study will be helpful for policymakers in considering whether recommendations for gender diversity on boards should also extend to diversity on committees. It is timely to consider diversity on Australian board committees because the gender balance within the board may not be identical to or similar to the gender balance within each committee. Green and Homroy (2018, p. 20) asserted that “Female representation on committees is likely to be a more effective measure of board gender diversity and likely to have a more direct effect on firm performance.” Their study found that the presence of women on board committees (nomination, audit and compensation) influenced performance. However, they found no link between the presence of women on the board and performance. Similar results have been found for the positive impact on performance when women are members of committees in India (Singhania et al., 2022) and Turkey (Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2021).

Board committees play a significant role in corporate governance, yet are understudied (Adams et al., 2021). As the recommendations of board committees are paramount to board decisions, research into the influence of the gender balance of each committee is warranted. While some evidence has been found related to gender diversity on boards, as a whole, there is a paucity of data on the association between the influence of gender diversity within each committee and its relation to a board’s overall gender diversity. A comprehensive review of the literature was unable to identify any published studies that compared the gender composition of boards with that of each major committee or that compared the gender composition of each major committee across different industry sectors. Kaczmarek et al. (2012) noted that few studies have examined the diversity of nomination committees.

Green and Homroy (2018) demonstrated the modest but economically meaningful effects of female board representation on firm performance. These effects were markedly larger for committee membership. While these effects were modest, their results demonstrated that greater female representation increased firm profitability, particularly when it was more closely integrated into the governance mechanism. Considering the proposition that female director appointments are merely a compliance requirement, female directors will be less likely to be appointed to committees, if not for the apparent benefits to the functioning of these committees, because a gender quota for committees is not explicitly required. Conversely, this proposition suggests that female directors can influence the governance mechanism more directly through their appointment to these committees. Understanding the extent to which board gender diversity aligns with committee gender diversity helps clarify the degree to which board gender quotas have been perceived in prior research as mere compliance exercises (Chang et al., 2019). Research on the influence of women on board committees is scarce despite its significant implications (Green and Homroy, 2018; Sultana et al., 2020). Furthermore, Knippen et al. (2019) reveal that new women directors added through the increase in board seats had a lower likelihood of serving on significant board committees during the first three years of their appointment than if they were appointed to substitute for male directors. This study provides further evidence that appointing women to boards may not, in and of itself, increase committee diversity.

In conclusion, the recently imposed gender balance targets should impact any future investigation into the effect of this change in gender composition. Therefore, it is considered appropriate and timely to identify any changes in these gender compositions over recent years. These conclusions are used to develop the following research question:

Which measure of gender diversity is more appropriate for corporate governance research: board gender diversity or individual committee diversity?

If this differentiated gender diversity exists, as the literature and theories identified suggest, then these findings should provide evidence for three issues. Firstly, the results should provide a direction for future research into this gender diversity issue within committees rather than within boards. Secondly, if differing gender diversity exists across industry sectors within each committee, then these findings should provide support for the analysis of industry sectors in future research on this gender diversity issue within committees rather than the boards. Thirdly, differences between board and committee gender diversity over time should encourage ongoing replication research until gender diversity targets are reached and stabilised, which may be achieved over several years.

The study explores whether the gender diversity on corporate boards, relative to their committees, is comparable. Hence, the study compares board gender diversity with committee gender diversity to determine which is the more appropriate measure of gender diversity for corporate governance studies. The lack of prior studies on committee gender diversity motivated this study, which uses research propositions: “novel statements specifying relationships between concepts” (Ulaga et al., 2021, p. 396). Research propositions are used to declare a tentative and conjectural relationship between constructs that will be empirically tested (Bhattacherjee, 2019). The novelty of research propositions can stem from linking new concepts to established concepts or by suggesting a new causal agent (Cornelissen, 2017). In this study, the new causal agent is the gender diversity of board committees. Establishing gender diversity targets or quotas for boards cannot be assumed to increase committee appointments, as studies before the introduction of quotas indicate resistance to appointing women to boards. A disproportionate number of S&P 1500 boards had exactly two women on them, which may be undertaken to create an impression of diversity rather than embracing diversity (Chang et al., 2019).

While the percentage of female directors of US Fortune 500 companies has increased from 12.4% in 2002 (Peterson and Philpot, 2007) to 40% in 2022 (Dyvik, 2024), women members of executive committees have had a more mediocre rise from 7.3% in 2002 (Peterson and Philpot, 2007) to 21.9% in 2022 (Schwab, 2023). France is the leading country for women on boards, with 44.7% of board members being women, while in the UK, 42% of board members in Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies are women (FTSE, 2025) ^[4]. These issues are further explored to understand any differences between gender diversity on boards and committees that occur between sectors and over time.

There are several reasons to determine if the proportion of women on boards differs from the proportion of women on committees. An Indian study found that gender diversity on prominent board committees (nomination and remuneration committees) positively affected firms’ market-based financial performance (Singhania et al., 2022). Similar results were found in a study of Turkish Board Committees (corporate governance, audit and risk management committees) where it was posited that women were able to be more active in governance by serving as members of board committees (Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2021). A European study using a sample of EuroTop 100 firms from 2004 to 2015 identified that 47% of women on the board were also members of at least one of the nomination, audit or compensation committees (Green and Homroy, 2018). There was a greater proportion of women on boards of directors compared to specific committees for the EuroTop 100, FTSEurofirst 300 ^[5] and FTSE 350 (Green and Homroy, 2018), as well as Borsa Istanbul companies (Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2021).

By contrast, there was a greater proportion of women on committees than on boards of directors in S&P 500 companies (Green and Homroy, 2018). Women comprise nearly half of the Australian workforce and more than half of the population; however, they are underrepresented on corporate boards in relation to their participation in the workforce. Their workforce participation has increased significantly over the past few decades (from 33% in 1966) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2021). Currently, their participation in the committees of Australian companies, as well as any differences in the proportion of women on boards of directors relative to specific committees, has not received research attention. Therefore, the literature supports the development of the research question and the associated first issue, which leads to the following research proposition (RP1):

RP1: The extent to which ASX 300 companies’ risk, audit, nomination, remuneration and sustainability committees’ gender diversity differs from boards’ gender diversity indicates that committees’ gender diversity ratios are a more appropriate measure of gender diversity for corporate governance research.

Brammer et al.’s (2007)UK study found that above-average proportions of women were on the boards of companies in the retail, utilities, media and banking sectors. Hillman et al. (2007) noted that the number of women on company boards correlated with the proportion of female employees within industries. An Australian study of the top 500 ASX companies between 2005 and 2011 revealed that the highest percentage of women directors was in the financials and consumer staples sectors, and the lowest proportions were in the materials and energy sectors (Vafaei et al., 2015). A 2014 study of the top 166 ASX companies found an average of 14.4% of board members to be female. While the energy sector had the lowest proportion of women on boards (9%), the utilities sector had the highest proportion of women on boards (23%) (Chandrakumara et al., 2017). Baker et al. (2020) noted that workforce diversity may lead to varying levels of board diversity across industries, and comparative studies on cross-sector diversity are needed. In 2020, education and training, health care and social assistance, other services and arts, and recreation services were the four Australian industries with the highest proportions of women on their boards. The industries with the lowest proportions of women on their boards were construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing, wholesale trade and electricity, gas, water and waste services. Women on boards in agriculture, wholesale trade, finance and insurance and health care and social assistance are underrepresented by 50% relative to their employment in those sectors (Cassells and Duncan, 2021). Little is known about how closely women’s levels of participation in committees mirror their participation in boards on an industry basis.

Fifteen of the ASX top 300 companies had no women on their boards as at 1 January 2021 (Watermark Search International and Governance Institute of Australia, 2021). As of 1 January 2024, 26% of 5,000 Australian Corporate Boards had no female directors, indicating that the lack of women’s representation on boards of Australian companies persists and is widespread (Watermark Search International and Governance Institute of Australia, 2024).

Therefore, the discussion in this section provides support for the development of the second issue into the following research proposition (RP2):

RP2: The extent to which ASX 300 companies’ risk, audit, nomination, remuneration and sustainability committees’ gender diversity differs from boards’ gender diversity among industry sectors indicates that committees’ gender diversity ratios are a more appropriate measure of gender diversity for corporate governance research.

Gender diversity on the boards of ASX 300 companies has been increasing. For ASX 300 companies from 2016 to 2020, the number of companies with at least 30% of women on their boards tripled, while the number of companies with zero- or one-woman director on their boards halved. The number of board seats held by women increased by 60% over that period (Watermark Search International and Governance Institute of Australia, 2021).

Considering the year 2020 is essential, as the ASX recommended for financial years after 1 January 2020, ASX 300 companies have measurable objectives to achieve 30% or more women holding board positions (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2019). While the proportion of women on company boards is expected to increase over time, it is unclear whether the proportion of women on certain committees has also increased accordingly. The ASX gender target is aligned with the progress of affirmative action in Australia, and therefore, a decrease in the gender diversity gap trend is expected. Findings for such a trend should encourage ongoing replication research until the gender quota is reached and stabilises, which may be achieved over several years.

Therefore, the third research issue is developed into the following research proposition (RP3):

RP3: The extent to which significant change has occurred in the ASX 300 companies’ gender diversity ratios for the board, as well as the risk, audit, nomination, remuneration and sustainability committees, following the introduction of board gender diversity targets (over the period 2018–2020), indicates that committees’ gender diversity ratios are a more appropriate measure for corporate governance research, depending upon the time period of a study.

The period from 2018 to 2020 was selected because it covers the time frame from the release of the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s public consultation on 2 May 2018 until the final document was released in 2019, taking effect from the first full annual report after 1 January 2020. With submissions due by Friday, 27 July 2018, for the consultation period, the public would have been aware of the impending targets and their commencement date. Therefore, the period during which the data was collected was the pre-quota starting point, but with the public’s knowledge of these female director targets, unlike annual reports for earlier periods. This study, therefore, provides a knowledge basis for future studies to use as a benchmark for comparison studies on various gender diversity issues.

Access to the database available at our university allowed data collection from Bloomberg and MorningStar. Data from a random sample of 230 of the ASX 300 companies listed each year for the study period were gathered from these two databases. The ASX 300 was selected as the population for the study as the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2019) endorsed minimum targets for 30% of directors to be female on the boards of all S&P/ASX 300 firms. A sample of 230 companies was deemed appropriate as a company’s inclusion in the top 300 companies varies from year to year, depending on its performance and market capitalisation. The 230 companies randomly selected met the study’s criterion of being within the top 300 across all years of the study. Additional manual data gathering was necessary because Bloomberg only provided the number and percentage of female directors on boards, while MorningStar only provided information about the audit, nomination and remuneration committees. Therefore, the composition information on risk and sustainability committees needed for this project was collected manually from the 230 ASX 300 companies’ annual reports and corporate governance statements. However, during this manual collection, the required data for one company was not complete, which reduced the usable sample to 229 companies.

Some Australian studies that examined audit committees used manual data collection methods. Appuhami and Tashakor (2017) manually collected data on the size and diversity of audit committees. Johansson and Carey (2016) manually collected data on independent and non-independent audit committee members. Li et al. (2023) also found it necessary to collect some data manually from annual reports, even though they had access to Bloomberg, Morningstar, Thomson Reuters Asset4 and Worldscope. Manual collection of data will generate more unambiguous data that is customised for the project and research design (Li, 2010).

The dissection of data collected was classified into the 11 ASX sectors and is shown in Table 4 and includes the notation of three categories: male-dominated, female-dominated and mixed industry sectors. These categories were provided by the Tofts-Len and Barker (2023) report based on the Labour Force Status Report (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022).

The results in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 1 show that the sampled companies for each industry sector are either aligned with or similar to the proportion of companies in the population for most industry sectors. These statistics support the fact that the randomly collected data is representative of most industry sectors. For each company, the size of the board and the five committees were gathered, along with the proportion of females on the board and each of the five committees.

While collecting data, it was noted that some ASX 300 companies have different financial year periods, and some directors may resign during the year, while others may only be appointed to the board by a certain time. Therefore, there might potentially be some conflicts between the data collected from Bloomberg and MorningStar. The manual data collection process allowed for the comparison of data from each source, enabling a double-check of the accuracy of the collected data and enhancing the robustness of the project. Furthermore, only 46 of the companies selected had a sustainability committee. Consequently, the analyses to test the sustainability committee for the three research propositions were for the reduced case size.

The results of three separate analyses to test the three research propositions are provided in this section. A discussion of these results follows in Section 6.

Individual t-tests were conducted to test for RP1. The statistical results presented in Table 5 and Figure 2 show that the mean of the ratio of females to males on boards differed from the mean of the ratio of females to males on committees at a significant level of <0.05. While diversity guidelines and regulations are established at the board level, a visual comparison across the three years between the gender diversity composition of committees and boards reveals that four committees have a range of 100% to 120% female-to-male members’ gender diversity, compared with the boards’ levels of gender diversity. However, for the nomination committee, board gender diversity is higher than committee diversity for all three years. Additionally, the sustainability committees in 2018 had a lower proportion of female members than the board members. A sustainability committee is not compulsory under current regulations; therefore, only a small proportion of companies in the sample have an individual committee.

The following table relates to RP1.

Further visual comparison in Figure 2 shows two other pieces of pertinent data. Firstly, the boards of companies with a sustainability committee had a greater mean proportion of females to males on their boards relative to the mean proportion of females on boards for all companies in the sample for 2020. Secondly, the sustainability committee also had a higher mean proportion of females to males than the other four committees for 2020.

To test for RP2, two sets of MANOVA with ANOVA and Tukey HSD post hoc analyses were conducted. The first set of analyses was conducted using the 229 cases for the board and committees, except for the sustainability committee. The second set of analyses was conducted using the 46 companies that reported having a sustainability committee.

The Roy’s largest root test produced a significant MANOVA result at <0.001. The subsequent ANOVA tests provided evidence that the diversity composition ratio for the board for both the 2019 and 2020 financial years was significant, at 0.012 and 0.009, respectively; however, it was not significant for the 2018 financial year. Levene’s test of equality of error variances had a non-significant value of >0.05 for all analyses. The post hoc Tukey HSD tests, reported in Table 6, revealed a significantly higher female-to-male ratio component for the boards of companies within the financial sector (40) compared to those in the materials sector (15) for the 2019 financial year. The post hoc statistically significant results for the 2020 financial year identified that the boards of companies within the financial sector (40) had a higher female-to-male ratio component than three other industry sectors: energy (10), health care (35) and information technology (45).

The following table relates to RP2.

The subsequent ANOVA tests for the five committees across the three years yielded two significant initial findings, but only for the 2020 financial year: the remuneration committee was significant at 0.009, while the nomination committee was significant at 0.000. The post hoc Tukey HSD test results provided in Table 6 showed that while the 2020 remuneration committees of the financials (40) and information systems (45) sectors had higher female-to-male ratio components compared to the materials sector (15), only the financials sector (40) had higher female-to-male ratio components in its committees than the real estate sector (60). Finally, the 2020 nomination committees for the financials (40) and information systems (45) sectors had a higher female-to-male ratio compared to the committees for the materials sector (15). Notably, the female-to-male ratio components of the board and the sustainability committees produced robustly increased female membership results, but while there were different increases in female membership, these results were not significant for each of the three years across all 11 industry sectors ^[6].

Separate ANOVAs were used to test the changing trend of gender diversity for boards and committees as postulated by RP3. The ANOVA results showed a significant difference at 0.001, and Levene’s test of equality of error variances had a non-significant value of 0.237. Tukey HSD post hoc test for changes in board gender diversity across the three years is reported in Table 7. The results support a significant positive change in gender diversity between 2018 and 2020 (mean difference 0.049; Sig 0 = 0.001). There was a small negative non-significant change between 2019 and 2020 (mean difference = −0.029; Sig 0 = 0.069).

The following tables relate to RP3.

The ANOVA results for the changing trends in the diversity composition of the risk committee analyses support a significant change for the risk committee (sig = 0.046) with a Levene’s test of >0.5 (0.996). Table 8 presents the statistical results, which show that while a significant increase in the diversity component occurred between 2018 and 2020 (sig = 0.035), there were no significant changes from 2018 to 2019 or from 2019 to 2020.

Similarly, a significant increase in the gender composition trend occurred for the audit committee. With a significant change for the audit committee (sig = 0.026) and with a Levene’s test of >0.5 (0.978). The Tukey HSD post hoc test, as shown in Table 9, revealed a significant increase in the diversity component between 2018 and 2020 (sig = 0.021). There were no significant changes from 2018 to 2019 or from 2019 to 2020.

The results support the changing trends in the diversity composition of the nomination committee analyses (sig = 0.012), with a Levene’s test of >0.5 (0.415). Table 10 presents the statistical results, showing that while a significant increase in diversity component occurred between 2018 and 2020 (sig = 0.011), there were no significant changes from 2018 to 2019 or from 2019 to 2020.

Finally, the results for the changing trends in the diversity composition of the remuneration committee analyses support a significant change for the remuneration committee (sig = 0.009) with a Levene’s test of >0.5 (0.215). Table 11 presents the statistical results, showing that while a significant increase in diversity ratio components occurred between 2018 and 2020 (sig = 0.007), there were no significant changes from 2018 to 2019 or from 2019 to 2020.

Similarly, for the RP1 and RP2 analyses of the sustainability committee, a second set of analyses was conducted related to the female-to-male ratio components. The ANOVA results produced a significant result (sig = 0.021) and a Levene’s test result of > 0.05 (sig = 0.986). The Tukey HSD post hoc test revealed in Table 12 that an increase in the diversity component occurred between 2019 and 2020 (mean difference = 0.096; sig = 0.09) and a more significant increase occurred between 2018 and 2020 (mean difference = 0.120; sig = 0.025).

The issue of gender diversity on corporate boards has gained considerable attention in recent years (Singhania et al., 2022). Firstly, there is a paucity of analysis comparing the gender diversity of boards and board committees to provide evidence that the diversity of the governing body is similar to that of board committees. Secondly, as the board delegates the investigation and recommendations to individual committees, there is neither any logical reason nor past empirical evidence for the use of the overall board gender diversity as the most appropriate measure of gender diversity for corporate governance studies. Due to the investigative nature of our study, we focus our discussion of prior literature on the small number of studies about committees.

Committees are important because they provide recommendations on the technical complexities of an organisation to help boards manage it effectively. Research has shown mixed benefits for studies into board gender diversity, so it is not enough to focus solely on the gender diversity of the overall board composition. It is equally important to examine whether board gender diversity composition extends to the gender composition of various committees within the board structure (Khemakhem et al., 2022). Committees play a crucial role in the functioning of corporate boards, and their decisions often have a significant impact on the company’s overall performance. Gender diversity on boards offers different perspectives for improved decision-making (Hutchinson et al., 2015; Altrata, 2022). Likewise, any variation in the committee’s gender diversity should enhance knowledge about the impact of committee recommendations on decision-making (McGuire and Taylor, 2017). For example, diversity on audit committees has improved monitoring (Sultana et al., 2020). As committees are smaller working groups within the boards that they report to, the gender composition and the impact of gender diversity can be more pronounced (Khemakhem et al., 2022).

In testing RP1, the results showed that a higher female membership committee gender diversity was present for all committees except for the nomination committee. The results for the nomination committee are not surprising and are consistent with social role theory. Following the work of Eagly (1987), social role theory expects women to have lower levels of membership on the nomination committee because this committee represents high-power, gatekeeping roles that control directorship appointments and executive staff succession planning. As nomination committees confer significant influence over leadership and board composition (Green and Homroy, 2018), women who are viewed as communal rather than agentic have lower levels of representation compared to men.

A higher female membership committee gender diversity, being present in other committees, is a finding that has occurred irrespective of the fact that the gender diversity targets only applied to board membership. These findings are consistent with the explicit link of social role theory to gender representation (Boulouta, 2013; Boukattaya and Omri, 2021), which shows that females are aligned with CSR through higher levels of empathetic caring as well as ethical oversight roles. Additionally, while the higher proportion of women on committees suggests that, although women may not obtain board or committee leadership roles (Field et al., 2020), they can still be influential in committees (Khemakhem et al., 2022). Chang et al. (2019) identified that the appointment of women to S&P 1500 boards appeared to be motivated by impression management. However, the higher proportion of women on committees in the current study lends support to the proposition that the appointment of women to boards is not merely for compliance purposes. Agency theory and stakeholder theory may help explain why audit, risk, sustainability and remuneration committees are primarily concerned with monitoring, compliance and stewardship functions (Green and Homroy, 2018; Velte, 2025). However, the results of a higher proportion of females on these committees, where the full board delegates recommendation authority, may support and be related to the more public-oriented characteristics espoused by social role theory (Eagly and Wood, 2012). Communal attributes can be seen in the focus of these committees. Audit and risk committees require caution and thoroughness. Sustainability committees are linked to social responsibility and long-term stewardship, both of which have a communal focus. Remuneration involves fairness, equity and sensitivity to people-related impacts, which also align with a communal orientation.

These results provide some support for future studies into the influence of committee gender diversity as an appropriate measure of gender diversity for corporate research, as postulated in RP1. For example, while Green and Homroy (2018) discovered no correlation between the presence of women on the board and its performance, the gender composition of board committees (nomination, audit and compensation) did influence performance. The lower levels of female representation on nomination committees are a cause for concern. Nomination committees are responsible for identifying and selecting qualified candidates for board positions (Rey, 2022). With reduced female representation on nomination committees, there is a risk that the perspectives and voices of women may not be adequately considered in the selection process due to males’ personally-orientated characteristics as advocated by social role theory. However, the increased presence of women on boards has not been found to lead to further appointments of women to boards (Schoonjans et al., 2023).

The results for analysing RP2 support significantly different levels of gender diversity for the full board in 2019 and 2020 for the financial industry sector. Tofts-Len and Barker (2023) find that the financial sector is neutral in terms of gender representation of employees. Social role theory would suggest that the need for prudence in this sector may be why it is not male-dominated. Additionally, there was a significant difference in the levels of gender diversity for nomination and remuneration committees between the financial sector and the material industry sector, as well as between the information technology and the material industry sectors in 2020. Hillman et al.’s (2007) discovery that industries with a greater percentage of female employment have greater representations of women on their boards has not been negated over time. In Australia, in 2020, within the health care and social assistance sector, which has a workforce of 80% women, 39% of board positions were held by women. Contrastingly, in the construction sector, where 18% of employees are women, women held 11% of board positions (Cassells and Duncan, 2021). These industry associations appear to correspond to the proportions of women on committees. Social role theory would posit that sectors that are male-dominated are likely to continue to be male-dominated in line with gendered role expectations.

A significant difference was shown in the levels of gender diversity on remuneration committees between the financial sector and the real estate industry sector. Committee gender diversity was more pronounced in the finance sector. There were no significant differences in results regarding the gender diversity levels for the sustainability committee for this study. This finding is inconsistent with Li et al.’s (2023) Australian study of the ASX 200, which used data from 2002 to 2016, and found that materials, industrials and energy were the industries with the greatest number of sustainability committees. The current study’s findings support the proposition, RP2, that committees’ gender diversity is a more appropriate measure of gender diversity when studying predictors of outcome differences among industry sectors in future studies. The managerial branch of stakeholder theory may provide some explanation for the relevance of gender diversity among committees in different industry sectors and may be linked to the salience of different, more dominant and powerful stakeholders in various industry sectors.

The evidence provided for the changing trend in boards’ gender diversity analysis for RP3 shows a significant increase for the period 2018–2020, which should be expected given the promotion of diversity by the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines. Changes in board diversity between years were not statistically significant. There was a decrease in board gender in 2020 compared to 2019, but the results were at a probability of less than 0.07. As the 2020 annual reports would be for the period ending during 2020, at the height of COVID-19’s initial impact, this decrease may be due to the COVID-19 pandemic as McKinsey and Company (2021) reported a higher rate of women left director roles than in the past and the rate of women leaving director roles was higher than the rate of men leaving director roles. These results highlight the need to consider changing trends in the composition of the board and the committees.

All five committees had an increased proportion of women members for the period 2018 compared to 2020. While there were no increases in the proportion of women on the audit, risk, remuneration and nomination committees between 2018 and 2019 and 2019 and 2020, the sustainability committees also had an increasing proportion of women between 2019 and 2020. The increased diversity across the five committees from 2018 to 2020 may be related to the increased diversity on the boards of ASX 300 companies during the same period (Watermark Search International, 2018; Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2020a). The smaller positive non-significant change for diversity of sustainability committees between 2019 and 2020 may reflect the small variation in companies ranked in the top ASX 300, minor change in gender-based appointments or more top 300 companies appointing a sustainability committee irrespective of the gender diversity of the committee. With only 46 of the top ASX 300 companies having designated sustainability committees at the time of the study, this specific committee and its gender diversity should continue to increase following the gender and risk assessment management recommendations 1.5, 7.2 and 7.4 by the ASX Corporate Governance Council Report 2019.

The current study’s findings contrast with those of Li et al. (2023), who observed low levels of gender diversity on Australian sustainability committees, with an average of 17% of women members on committees between 2004 and 2016. The inconsistent result for the 2018–2020 period compared to the 2004–2016 period may be attributed to companies’ boards having knowledge of the impending director targets from the first full annual report after 1 January 2020, which supports the argument for analysing proposition RP3. The results also support increases in the levels of gender diversity on sustainability committees from 26.9% in 2018 to 29.75% in 2019 and 42.07% in 2020. In summary, the RP3 analysis results, which confirm a changing trend in the female proportion of committee gender diversity, offer some support for future research to adopt the influence of committee gender diversity as a relevant predictor of outcomes in regression analyses. Greater public-oriented characteristics would suggest increased female committee membership as advocated by social role theory.

The study’s limitation potentially arises from the use of secondary source data; however, manually collecting committee composition data for 229 companies from a random sample of 230 ASX 300 companies’ annual reports and corporate governance statements should mitigate this limitation. It is acknowledged that manually collecting data for analysis has several drawbacks, including the inevitable high cost of data collection and the potential limitation of generalising the empirical results (Li, 2010). However, the rich data gathered by this manual process has enabled additional analysis that would not be possible using large commercial databases. When generalising this research to other settings, limitations to consider include the Australian cultural and regulatory contexts, as well as the study’s time frame.

The research question, the three associated issues and the propositions posited by RP1, RP2 and RP3 are supported by the results and therefore provide implications for future research on this gender diversity issue. The findings lend support to future research benefiting from recognising that using the levels of gender diversity of the full board does not capture the influence of the levels of gender diversity of specific committees that provide recommendations to the full board. These committees have different levels of gender diversity compared to the full board. Hence, committee gender diversity appears to be a more appropriate measure for gender diversity in corporate governance studies. The findings also highlight that different industry sectors exhibit varying levels of gender diversity on their full boards and committees, and that this composition may change over time. Therefore, future research into the impact of gender diversity will be enriched by including not only the gender diversity level of each relevant committee but also variation across industry sectors, as well as accounting for any changes in composition throughout the study period. Consequently, the research implication is that future studies incorporating these diversity-level perspectives for corporate boards and their committees should yield better, more accurate findings about decision-making, improved financial performance and increased shareholder value. This gender diversity component influences all these factors. This proposition is supported by prior evidence showing that diversity within board committees is associated with improved investment risk practices and more efficient resource allocation, particularly in long-term strategic decisions (Li et al., 2025).

Currently, gender targets apply only to boards, not to committees, so this study provides evidence for policymakers to consider extending these targets to committees. Policymakers and legislators should find the trend analysis encouraging, as the market is moving not only towards the gender targets on boards but also towards greater gender diversity on some specialised committees. Enhancing gender diversity on committees, which are the engine rooms for incubating recommendations that support sound decision-making, will improve companies’ corporate governance. Companies will benefit from reviewing the gender diversity of their committees and encouraging greater diversity. The monitoring of overall board diversity targets could be expanded to include committee composition. The limited gender diversity on nomination committees, suggested by the study, is a cause for concern. Boards could address this issue through succession planning for nomination committees. Additionally, boards in conjunction with nomination committees can review their terms of reference to promote diversity of memberships that will foster enhanced decision-making. To maximise the benefits of enhanced gender diversity, attention can also be given to the symbolic versus substantive allocation of female directors.

The evidence gathered and tested to address the three research propositions demonstrates the operation of board committees as formal governance mechanisms grounded in agency and stakeholder theories. The influence of gender diversity dynamics is supported by the results for all three research propositions. Social role theory provides a coherent explanation for these patterns by linking committee membership to gendered expectations, norms and political power. Drawing on social role theory’s distinction between agentic and communal qualities (Eagly and Wood, 2012), the findings suggest that perceived competencies influence how male and female directors are allocated to committees with different governance mandates.

Viewed through a broader governance perspective, these results also speak to issues of internal governance design, delegation of authority and accountability within boards. Committees represent formal structures through which boards delegate investigative, monitoring and recommendation authority, consistent with agency-based perspectives on control and oversight. From this viewpoint, committee-level gender diversity may shape not only deliberative processes but also how effectively delegated authority is exercised and how accountability is operationalised within boards. Accordingly, social role theory complements agency and stakeholder perspectives by helping to explain why gendered attributes may be differentially valued across committees with distinct decision-making and oversight responsibilities.

Policymakers can use the findings from this study to explore how they might encourage gender diversity in committees while at the same time considering potential unintended consequences, such as tokenism or compliance-oriented appointments. Future researchers, investment analysts and policymakers should take note of several implications arising from this study. Firstly, future governance research should explicitly examine whether committee-level gender diversity is associated with substantive governance outcomes, such as monitoring quality, disclosure quality, risk oversight and investment discipline, rather than assuming these effects operate solely through board-level composition. Secondly, future studies could explore how committee-level gender diversity interacts with other key governance attributes, including directors’ expertise, independence and leadership roles, to shape the effectiveness of committee decision-making. Thirdly, committee gender diversity may moderate well-established board-level relationships in corporate governance research, potentially explaining previously mixed findings where board-level gender diversity alone has been used as a proxy for influence and decision-making authority. Therefore, continuing to rely on board-level gender diversity as the dominant measure may systematically misrepresent where influence is exercised within corporate governance structures.