THE TAKEOVER MECHANISM AS AN EFFICIENCY ENFORCER: THE CASE OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES.

The importance of the market for corporate control as a disciplining device has received considerable research interest in recent years. Since the advent of event study methodology pioneered by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), and the availability of machine readable returns data from the Center of Research on Security Prices, the effects of various control related corporate events have been well documented. Jensen and Ruback (1983) in their review of the empirical literature on the market for corporate control report that the findings in general support the hypothesis that outside takeover mechanisms do act efficiently to limit managerial departures from the objective of maximising the economic well‐being of its shareholders. They further point out that studies using the event study methodology cannot distinguish between the different sources of gains in the takeover process, namely those due to synergies, or those due to lack of efficient management in the acquired firm.