The Effects of Ownership Structure on Value Added‐Based Performance

Following the recognition of the separation of ownership and control in the large firm espoused by Berle and Means (1932), a debate ensued on the possible effect of such separation on the value/or performance of the large firm. This controversy was evidenced in both theoretical and empirical studies on the relation between the allocation of shares among managers and non‐managers, and corporate value/or performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1988; Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, 1988; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbad, 1987; and Riahi‐Belkaoui and Pavlik, 1992). Empirical studies focused specifically on the relationship between Tobin Q or accounting‐based profit measures of performance, and equity ownership, yielding mixed results.