This study examines the relation between pay inequalities in top management teams and how efficiently firms convey valuation-relevant information to investors. Given that reward comparisons with reference groups create feelings of inequity, top management team pay inequalities can impair the information environment. This manifests into lengthier or less readable financial reports.
This paper employs an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to test whether and how the pay distribution in the top management team is associated with the readability of the annual report. It also employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model to further address the endogeneity concern. Lastly, it conducts cross-sectional analyses to examine heterogeneity in the observed relation.
Using the intra-firm pay gap as a proxy for pay inequality and file size, Bog Index and Fog Index of the 10-K filings as a proxy for financial report readability, the author finds that firms with larger pay gaps exhibit lengthier or less readable 10-K filings. The main findings are robust to the use of an instrumental variable approach. She finds some evidence that the relation is less pronounced when pay gaps are justified by explicit legal authority of CEOs or high ability of CEOs. The main results are robust to considerations of alternative explanations.
This paper adds a new dimension to the debate on pay inequality by studying pay gaps in the top management team and financial report readability. The author's findings have important implications for executive compensation policies and for corporate disclosure policies.
