... in designing mechanisms and setting up institutions that (1) encourage workers to define a goal that maximizes workers’ welfare and (2) induce managers to pursue and internalize such a broad goal. When compared to capital‐controlled firms, the agency problems become more complex and harder to solve...

... in a sample of 82 firms. The findings offer sufficient confirmation of theoretical arguments, providing extensions of this research stream for non‐U.S. firms. Results show that firms benefit from the design of managerial compensation systems when they match the managerial control and risk‐bearing requirements...

...Moshe Banai; William D. Reisel This study tests the relationships between control mechanisms such as leadership, job design, performance appraisal, and workers’ alienation in Cuba. Beyond internal Cuban economic data or external intelligence reports, limited evidence has appeared in Western...

... is synthesized with qualitative field data collected in Mexican organizations and U.S. organizations that are owned and operated by Mexican immigrants. This analysis is conducted within a framework of leadership, and it suggests that paternalism combines paternalists’ benevolent acts with their subtle control...

...Roberto Pascual; Martí Larraza‐Kintana The control role of the Board of Directors is aimed at monitoring the decisions and actions undertaken by managers in order to protect stockholders’ interests. Considerable theoretical and empirical research has analyzed whether directors’ behavior...