The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of non-founder CEO succession on firms’ research and development (R&D) decision, and further explore its mechanism and economic consequences.
Using founders’ personal-level information of entrepreneurial firms in the Chinese growth enterprise market from 2009 to 2015, the authors empirically investigate whether firms can be motivated to launch more R&D activities as the result of switching to non-founder CEOs. The author’s further test the impact of non-founder CEOs on R&D output to distinguish their motivation. Moreover, the authors use stepwise regression to explore the mechanism and possible channels.
The authors find that R&D investment significantly increases in firms with non-founder CEOs and the R&D output that comes in the form of patent exhibits an upward trending in numbers, too, ruling out non-founder CEOs’ incentive to chase private benefits. Specifically, the authors find that non-founder CEOs can promote R&D investment through their more professional human capital and better internal control. The authors also show mitigating effects under different circumstances on the relationship between non-founder CEOs and R&D investment.
This study helps the authors to understand the impact of non-founder CEO succession on R&D investment in emerging markets. It also indicates that human capital of non-founder CEOs is critical in driving firms’ innovation, proposing policy suggestions to improve formal intermediary labor market of professional CEOs.
This study provides elaborate theoretical analysis and empirical tests on the mechanism and economic consequences of (non-)founders’ impact on R&D activities.
