Moral panic and scandal after the Abe assassination in Japan Open Access

On July 8, 2022, Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō was assassinated while delivering an outdoor speech during the official campaign period for the upper house election. The alleged shooter, Yamagami Tetsuya, admitted to investigators that he held a grudge against the South Korean-based Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, formerly known as the Unification Church (UC), and blamed the church for causing his mother to file for bankruptcy (Poppe, 2022; Introvigne, 2022). Abe’s murder and the revelation of politicians’ connections to the church sparked Japan's most significant public reaction to religion since the Aum Shinrikyō attacks in 1995. This paper builds on insights from the concepts of moral panic and scandal to explore the reasons behind this reaction.

In their efforts to understand the aftermath of Abe’s assassination, journalists and scholars have referred to the ensuing events as the “Unification Church Scandal” (Suzuki, 2024; Umoro, 2024; Prusa, 2024). However, the concept of scandal can be challenging to apply to situations involving intense public reactions to religion. To elucidate the events surrounding the UC, this paper will utilize moral panic models commonly employed in sociology and religious studies. Scholars have recently applied these models to the UC following Abe’s murder (McLaughlin, 2023; Kingston, 2023). This study will integrate moral panic and scandal frameworks to explain the public reaction and explore how religion became a significant factor in Japanese political scandals from 2022 to 2023.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses and compares models of moral panic with the concept of scandal, examining the period before and after Abe’s assassination and focusing on key elements and explanations for Japan’s intense public reaction to religion. Subsequently, it considers the role of the media in investigating politicians and generating scandals, as well as the consequences of Japan’s public reaction to the church for politics, religion, and society. The final section provides a summary and conclusion.

Stanley Cohen originally developed the social theory of moral panic, which has been widely used in the sociological literature, particularly in the United Kingdom. Cohen’s (1972) study focused on British society’s response to the conflict between two youth subcultures in the 1960s and 1970s. These groups attended a party where minor acts of vandalism occurred. The news media arrived and reported highly exaggerated accounts of the violence been the groups, leading to public concern and police efforts to arrest individuals for non-violent behaviour. Cohen’s theory illustrated how societal reactions influence the creation and enforcement of law and societal perceptions of threats.

By studying youth groups, the media, and public reactions, Cohen’s theory of moral panic outlines stages of the process. First, a moral panic occurs when someone or something is perceived as a threat to societal values or community norms. Second, the mass media depict the threat in a stylized and stereotypical manner. Third, media portrayals of the perceived threat generate widespread public concern. Fourth, those in power respond to the threat with new policies or laws. Cohen identified key actors within moral panics: the news media, the public, action groups, politicians, and law enforcers such as the police.

Cohen’s theory was later expanded by scholars adopting a broader social constructionist approach. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) reviewed previous empirical studies within this tradition and identified five key elements of moral panic. First, there is concern over the actions of a specific group, which can be expressed through public opinion surveys, proposed legislation, or social movement activity. Second, there is societal hostility towards this group. Third, there is consensus — widespread agreement that the threat is real and serious. Fourth, there is disproportion — members of society may exaggerate or believe the threat is much greater than it is. Fifth, there is volatility — moral panics often erupt suddenly and may also dissipate quickly, as their intensity is difficult to sustain long-term.

According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda, there are three competing explanations for why moral panics erupt. The grassroots model suggests that moral panics are generated from the bottom up, featuring spontaneous eruptions of fear by large numbers of people. The elite-engineered model proposes that elites “engineer” moral panics to again advantage or divert attention. The third explanation, interest group theory, emphasizes that moral panics are more likely to emerge from the middle rungs of power rather than the elite level. While Goode and Ben-Yehuda criticize the elite-engineered model as being empirically overdrawn, they suggest that a combination of the grassroots model and interest group theory may be the most useful in explaining different moral panics (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009).

The concept of moral panic is not frequently paired with the concept of scandal. One of the most influential theoretical studies of scandals is by British sociologist John Thompson. In his comprehensive study of the underlying features of scandals, drawing on examples from the United Kingdom and the United States, Thompson (2000, p. 13) defines scandal as “actions or events involving certain kinds of transgressions which become known to others and are sufficiently serious to elicit a public response”. He contends that scandals consist of several key elements. First, they involve the transgression of values, norms, or moral codes, with the potential to trigger different reactions depending on the context. Secondly, scandals necessitate the awareness of non-participants, who become informed about the actions and events associated with the scandal. Thirdly, these non-participants may feel offended or shocked by the transgression and convey their disapproval to others. Finally, scandals can harm the reputation of those implicated.

One reason that the concepts of moral panic and scandal are not frequently paired is that scholars use them to explain different phenomena. Scholars of political scandal, for instance, tend to focus on political elites and examine the causes and consequences of various transgressions for politics and society. This leads to an important distinction between moral panic and scandal. In their efforts to clarify scandal concepts, Lull and Hinerman (1977, pp. 3-4) define media scandals as emerging when “private acts that disgrace or offend the idealized, dominant morality of a social community are made public and narrativized by the media, producing a range of effects from ideological and cultural retrenchment to disruption and change”. They argue that the most critical difference between a media scandal and moral panic is that media scandals must be connected to specific individuals who are accountable for their actions.

Political corruption scandals have been a persistent issue in post-war Japanese politics (Mitchell, 1996; Carlson and Reed, 2018). The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) formed in 1955 and established single-party dominance in the 1960s. One of the most infamous cases, the Lockheed scandal, happened in the 1970s where investigators discovered that LDP leader Tanaka Kakuei accepted a 500-million-yen payment from the Lockheed Corporation while serving as prime minister (Blaker, 1977). Tanaka used his position to create a patronage system that benefited his supporters, faction members, and himself (Samuels, 2003; Mikuriya, 2016). Scandals in the 1980s and 1990s further implicated the LDP and contributed to its loss of power in the 1993 election.

The passage of political reform bills in 1994, which included the adoption of a new election system, temporarily shifted Japanese politics towards a two-party system. The Democratic Party of Japan won a landslide victory over the LDP in the 2009 election but lost power to the LDP, led by Abe Shinzō, in 2012. Including his earlier term, Abe served as prime minister for nine years, becoming Japan’s longest-serving prime minister when he stepped down in 2020. Prior to his assassination, few scholars discussed religion or the involvement of religious groups in Japan’s significant postwar political scandals. This changed after Abe’s assassination with studies on the “Unification Church Scandal” (Umoro, 2024; Prusa, 2024).

In 2023, another major scandal affected Japanese politics. In 2022, journalists from the communist newspaper Akahata (2022) discovered that LDP factions had failed to properly disclose the names of purchasers of party fundraising tickets. This eventually led to a major investigation by the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo Prosecutors Office. Their investigations discovered that factions had created slush funds from the sales of fundraising tickets. Factions used these slush funds to reward their members through a kickback system for ticket sales. While this scheme involved all major factions, the media and prosecutors focused on the faction linked to former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. The Abe faction had become the largest faction in Japanese politics, surpassing the Tanaka faction in 2005. The scandal led Prime Minister Kishida to purge key members of the Abe faction from party and cabinet positions.

The faction scandal also contributed to Kishida’s decision to not run for a second term as the LDP president, paving the way for Ishiba Shigeru to replace him. In the 2024 lower house election, called one month after Ishiba became prime minister, the LDP lost its majority status, securing 191 out of 465 seats. The largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, won 96 seats. The LDP has since been forced to govern as a minority government, marking a considerable shift from the dominance it enjoyed from 2012 under Abe. This paper provides some context for this shift by discussing Japan’s recent moral panic and scandals that damaged the position of the LDP.

As moral panics often involve religion, scholars have referenced the concept in their studies on Japanese religion. One of Japan’s most significant public reactions to religion occurred in 1995 when members of Aum Shinrikyō released sarin gas on the Tokyo Metro, killing 13 people and injuring thousands. Reader (2001) described the Aum Affair as a watershed moment in Japanese religious history, where the prevailing liberal ethos from the end of World War II until 1995 was replaced by a more negative disposition towards religion. He characterized the period immediately after the Aum Affair as one of moral panic and hysteria. However, Dorman (2005) argued that Aum’s violent attacks represented a real threat to public safety and thus should not be considered a moral panic. He claimed that the first post-Aum moral panic occurred in 2003 when the media reported on a movement known as Pana Wave. This group attracted media attention after its failed attempt to capture and relocate an Arctic seal from Tokyo back to the Arctic, believing that electronic radiation had led the seal astray. Societal fears led to police raids on the group, but no serious criminal charges emerged.

Dorman (2005) credited the Aum Affair with fostering a social environment in Japan that is more conducive to the creation of moral panics. McLaughlin (2012) examined religion in the post-Aum period and highlighted the general mistrust and negative perceptions of “new” religions in Japan, with particular focus on groups such as Soka Gakkai. In more recent studies following Abe’s murder, both McLaughlin (2023) and Kingston (2023) referenced the term moral panic in their discussions of the UC. McLaughlin specifically labelled the period from Abe’s death until the local elections in April 2023 as Japan’s most recent moral panic over religion. This and the next section will discuss some key issues and reasons behind this moral panic, drawing upon ideas from the grassroots and interest group models proposed by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009).

Prior to Abe’s murder, the UC’s activities and efforts to expand in the United States and Japan had a long history of generating concern and hostility. In the early 1970s, new religious movements in the United States emerged and sparked significant public controversy. Bromley and Shupe (1983) discuss how the UC quickly became synonymous with the term “cult” in the United States. They describe how UC’s theology posed a threat to families and established religions, and how its political goals and activities, such as founder Sun Myung Moon’s efforts to defend the Nixon administration after Watergate, generated significant controversy. The creation of an anti-cult movement from this time mobilized public opposition against religions like the UC.

Missionaries helped establish a foothold for the UC in Japan during the 1950s and 1960s. The UC of Japan was officially recognized as a religious corporation in 1964. Unlike the anti-cult movement in the United States, the UC in Japan was less publicly visible. However, criticism of its fundraising practices and beliefs came to the forefront with the controversy known as “spiritual sales” (reikan shōhō). Critics of the UC, along with those loosely associated with a broader anti-cult movement in Japan, coined the term “spiritual sales” (Mickler, 1994, p. 257). These critics, supported by the media, amplified concerns that these sales threatened the fabric of Japanese society. Highly publicized cases involved followers of the UC selling expensive pots, seals, and other items to superstitious individuals, claiming these items were necessary to ward off misfortune and bad karma. The UC also organized mass weddings, which generated intense media attention and contributed to public anxiety and criticism of the church and other religious groups.

While grassroots fear related to the UC has a long history, interest group theory is equally significant. Media attention and public concerns over coercive sales practices propelled a key interest group to mobilize against the UC. In 1987, the National Network of Lawyers Against Spiritual Sales (hereafter the “National Network”) was formed, dedicated to eliminating “spiritual sales” and recovering damages for victims. Issues like “spiritual sales” typically gained attention only when the police or legal system became involved. The problem resurfaced in 2009 when Tokyo police arrested individuals for allegedly intimidating superstitious customers into purchasing expensive personal seals. The ensuing public uproar led to the head of UC Japan apologizing and subsequently resigning.

The ties between the UC and political elites are another crucial dimension in explaining the intense societal reactions. The UC and the LDP share a conservative ideology and a strong opposition to communism. Reverend Moon established the International Federation for Victory over Communism (IFVOC) in Japan. The church estimates that there are around 100,000 active followers in Japan (Reuters, 2022). However, the membership of the IFVOC is much larger, as one does not need to be a member of the UC to join. The anti-communist stance of the IFVOC fostered a strong ideological bond between the UC and the LDP, but it also led to considerable conflict between the UC and the Communist and Socialist parties.

Conservative politicians from the LDP and other parties have engaged with the UC of Japan and its affiliated groups by attending events, participating in interviews with UC-affiliated publications, and signing policy pledges drafted by the church. The UC’s connections with the LDP have facilitated the economic and political objectives of the Moon organization through its global network of affiliated groups, businesses, and nonprofit corporations (Nippon.com, 2023). These close ties with influential politicians may have protected the UC from thorough government investigations, particularly after the Aum Affair in 1995 (McLaughlin, 2023). Following the Aum Affair, the government successfully dissolved Aum as a religious corporation under Japan's 1951 Religious Corporation Law (Madden, 1997).

On July 8, 2022, Yamagami Tetsuya shot and killed Abe while he was campaigning for LDP candidates in the upper house election. This incident triggered Japan’s most significant public reaction towards religion since 1995. After the shooting, police promptly apprehended Yamagami, who confessed to the crime while in custody. Prusa (2024) notes that conservative media outlets in Japan may have initially hesitated to name the UC in their coverage of Abe’s killing, which could explain why French media were the first to identify the church. In Japan, mainstream media focused on what Poppe (2022) describes as the grudge theory: Yamagami harbored resentment towards the UC because his mother, a member, made excessive donations that led to her bankruptcy in 2002. Yamagami also informed investigators that he believed Abe and his grandfather had contributed to the UC’s influence in Japan, which became another prominent media narrative (Introvigne, 2022).

To better understand Yamagami’s motives, Poppe (2022) examined his Twitter postings for clues. Poppe argues that the grudge narrative suggested by the mainstream press may be overly simplistic and inaccurate. He found that Yamagami’s posts revealed significant xenophobia and a strong dislike for anything related to Korea. Yamagami’s use of online media and his far-right views align with those of groups known as “netto uyoku” or cyber right-wingers in Japan (Kawamura and Iwabuchi, 2022).

The immediate sympathy for Yamagami in the media was facilitated by journalists and lawyers who defended him and directed their criticism at the UC and the complacent Japanese government. The most significant action group was the National Network. Days after Abe’s killing, the National Network held a press conference. While condemning Yamagami’s actions, its representatives explained that his motives were understandable. The Network used the press conference to blame the UC for causing widespread suffering among its current and former followers. The National Network (2022) also criticized the government and politicians for failing to prevent the UC from “destroying families” for over 30 years.

As the most influential action group opposing the UC, the National Network’s views garnered significant attention in both domestic and international media. In addition to lawyers, journalists from various media outlets also promoted the view that the UC posed a serious threat to society. One of the most prominent critics of the UC was an investigative reporter known by the pseudonym Suzuki Eito. Suzuki had been writing critically about the UC and the LDP for years. For instance, in his magazine column, he labelled Abe’s new cabinet lineup as a “cult cabinet” (Suzuki, 2019), identifying twelve cabinet members as affiliated with the UC and its associated groups.

The public reaction to the UC following Abe’s murder aligns with key elements of moral panics as described by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009), including concern, hostility, consensus, disproportion, and volatility. These authors argue that most moral panics are typically explained through a combination of grassroots and interest group models. In the case of Japan after Abe’s murder, a grassroots perspective highlights the latent fears and concerns about the UC that already existed within society. However, these latent fears alone were insufficient to spark the moral panic; action groups like the National Network played a crucial role in mobilizing public support against the UC. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) suggest that while elite-engineered models may overstate their case, any study of moral panic must consider all societal levels, including political elites and the mass media’s role.

Cohen’s model of moral panic emphasizes the media’s role in two critical stages: depicting the threat and generating widespread concern through these portrayals. Scandal frameworks, such as Lull and Hinerman’s concept of media scandal, also highlight the media as the primary vehicle for publicizing transgressions. Understanding why Abe’s murder generated the most significant public reaction since the Aum attacks requires further discussion of the media's role and other key elite actors. While the sections below focus on investigations led by Kyodo and other mainstream news outlets, several important studies highlight the crucial role played by social media, television stations, and investigative journalists in shaping public reactions to the UC (McLaughlin, 2023; Poppe, 2022; Prusa, 2024; Saitō, 2024).

In the weeks following Abe’s death, various media organizations and political parties sent out questionnaires, interviewed politicians, and scrutinized social media postings to identify any public officials associated with the UC. Although the LDP and its coalition partner were reluctant to participate in the frenzied hunt, opposition parties, such as the Communists, had a history of conflict with the UC and sought to use the issue to criticize the Kishida administration. Leaders from various opposition parties, including Izumi Kenta of the Constitutional Democratic Party, now the largest opposition party in Japan, acknowledged their members’ ties to the UC and pledged to investigate further. By investigating and quickly clarifying the names and nature of those involved, opposition party leaders and the media aimed to pressure the LDP to do the same.

However, the pressure and media frenzy over publicizing tainted lawmakers did not have the intended effect of pushing the LDP to investigate its ties. Secretary-General Motegi Toshimitsu explained that the LDP headquarters had never had a formal relationship with the UC. Kishida, who was prime minister at the time, also denied having personal connections to the UC. When Kishida selected members for leadership positions in the LDP and cabinet, he relied heavily on members from the Abe faction, which was then the largest faction in the LDP. After Abe’s killing, Kishida decided to demonstrate his respect for Abe by granting him a state funeral paid for with taxpayer money. This decision generated backlash in the press and the court of public opinion due to the high costs and the increasing media coverage of Abe’s own history with the UC and its affiliated anti-communist group, the IFVOC.

With the LDP staying silent, some media outlets scrutinized social media posts for clues. TBS television obtained a photo posted on the Facebook page of a former LDP politician. The photo featured 21 former or current LDP members alongside the IFVOC chairman. The station reported the names of the attendees on both television and its website (TBS News, 2022). This effort was one of the earliest and most extensive attempts to identify individuals with ties to the UC. The scoop drew significant attention because the photograph included Hosoda Hiroyuki, who was then the speaker of the lower house.

The photograph-based investigation was soon replaced by a more comprehensive approach led by Kyodo, a major Tokyo-based news agency with over 1,000 journalists. Kyodo sent a survey to 712 lawmakers in the lower and upper houses, inquiring about their connections to the UC (Kyodo, 2022). The survey included three multiple-choice questions: whether they had ever received a donation or purchased tickets for a political fundraising party from the UC or its affiliated organizations; whether they had received or been offered support in their election campaign; and whether they (or their proxy) had attended an event, meeting, or rally. By September 12, a total of 601 members had responded, yielding a response rate of 84.4 percent. Of these respondents, 119 lawmakers, or approximately 20 percent, acknowledged ties to the UC or its affiliated organizations.

Kyodo’s multiple-choice survey revealed various responses, as detailed in Table 1. Thirteen LDP members reported either purchasing tickets to fundraising events linked to the UC or receiving donations. The survey sought additional details, such as the timing and quantity of ticket purchases. Typically, fundraising tickets cost around 20,000 yen, with most respondents buying one or two tickets for events associated with groups like the World Peace Foundation or the Women’s Federation for World Peace. The only donations mentioned were connected to the president of Sekai Nippō, a UC-affiliated Japanese language newspaper. LDP members acknowledged more connections compared to other parties, which was anticipated. However, 34 percent of LDP members did not respond to the survey, significantly higher than the 5.1 percent non-response rate from other parties. Additionally, several LDP members indicated they were unaware of their office’s situation or could not provide an answer.

The responses to the second question, which asked whether lawmakers had received or been offered support or cooperation in their election campaigns from the UC or its affiliated organizations, are summarized in the middle of Table 1. Approximately 10 percent of LDP members who completed the survey answered affirmatively. Among those who provided details, the most common form of support was volunteer participation in phone banking and leaflet distribution during the election. Additionally, around five LDP members reported receiving offers of electoral assistance, with some accepting and others declining.

The bottom of Table 1 presents the responses to the third question. About 31 percent of LDP members who responded to the survey acknowledged attending events (either personally or by proxy) or sending telegrams or video messages. Sending telegrams or video messages was a common practice to maintain relationships when politicians or their proxies could not attend events in person. Nearly two-thirds of affirmative responses to this question were related to event attendance, including those organized by the World Peace Federation, the Women’s Federation for World Peace, and the anti-communist group IFVOC.

Facing intense pressure, the LDP distributed its own questionnaire to 379 members (Yomiuri, 2022). The survey identified eleven types of connections, ranging from sending telegrams to accepting election support. The results revealed that about half of the LDP members had ties to the UC or its affiliated organizations. However, instead of disclosing the names of all members with such ties, the LDP released only a partial list, which likely fueled public perceptions that party leaders were concealing the truth. Table 2 outlines the responses from the 180 members who reported one or more connections across the eleven categories. The most common connections included greetings by Diet members at events organized by UC-related groups, sending congratulatory telegrams, and having secretaries attend events in person.

One of Prime Minister Kishida’s most pressing political challenges was addressing the numerous ministers in his second cabinet whose ties to the UC were exposed by the media. Following Abe’s assassination, the media identified eight ministers with connections to the UC or its affiliated organizations. In response, Kishida reshuffled his cabinet, aiming to appoint new members free from any association with the UC. However, this reshuffle did not result in a genuine refresh, as journalists soon discovered that eight members of the new cabinet still had links to the UC.

The moral panic over religion, scandals involving the LDP, and the intense media focus on the connections between the LDP and the UC or its affiliates also influenced public opinion, as reflected in cabinet approval polls. Figure 1 illustrates the cabinet ratings conducted by Asahi from the beginning of Kishida’s term in October 2021 until April 2023, when local elections shifted public attention away from the moral panic (McLaughlin, 2023). In the first public opinion survey after Abe’s death on July 8, 2022, Kishida’s cabinet approval rating dropped from 57 percent in July to 47 percent in August (Asahi, 2022c).

The newspaper’s poll included questions about respondents’ views on Kishida’s handling of issues related to the UC. Approximately 21 percent approved of his response, while 65 percent disapproved. When asked whether politicians should sever their ties with the UC, 82 percent agreed, and 12 percent felt there was no need. The approval rating dropped an additional 6 percent from August to September. The Asahi also asked respondents whether they approved of the Kishida cabinet's decision to hold a state funeral for Abe. About 35 percent expressed approval, compared to 59 percent who disapproved (Asahi, 2022d).

The cabinet approval rating continued to decline in October and November, reaching a low of 31 percent in December — the lowest since Kishida’s inauguration in October 2021. By this time, the church controversy was just one of Kishida’s many political challenges. The administration was grappling with a series of cabinet resignation scandals and speculation about potential tax increases, which may have further dampened public opinion. In Asahi’s December poll, the only questions related to the UC concerned legal efforts to protect victims of excessive donations. In this area, 58 percent approved of Kishida's response. However, when asked whether they had high expectations that the new laws would improve the financial situation of victims, 57 percent said no (Asahi, 2022f).

In Cohen’s model of moral panic, one of the latter stages involves those in power responding to the perceived threat with restrictive laws. In December 2022, the first legislation to pass both houses and become law was the Act on Prevention of Unfair Solicitation of Donations by Corporations, linked to the Consumer Contract Law of 2001 (Gaitanidis, 2025). This law aims to protect individuals from solicitations for donations by any corporate body (hōjin) or an association or foundation with a designated administrator. It prohibits corporations from using coercion, threats, or malicious sales tactics to collect funds. The law also prohibits organizations from requesting donors to borrow money by selling their real estate or using their home as collateral. Members of groups that violate the law face up to one year in prison, fines up to one million yen, and potential disclosure of their names by the government.

By October 2023, the Cultural Affairs Agency sought a court order to revoke the UC’s status as a religious corporation following a year-long investigation into its history of coercive donation practices. Supporters of the revocation expressed concerns that the UC might transfer its assets overseas, hindering efforts to fully compensate victims. Consequently, special legislation was passed in December 2023, valid for three years, to monitor the UC's assets and prevent their transfer abroad. In March 2025, the Tokyo District Court ordered the dissolution of the UC’s religious corporation status under the Religious Corporations Law. The UC has appealed this decision.

Following Abe’s murder, journalists and media commentators conducted thorough investigations that revealed previously hidden connections between conservative politicians and the UC. The intense media scrutiny forced the Kishida administration to respond. The government faced significant challenges in investigating itself, managing cabinet appointments, and effectively addressing the ensuing scandals. While Japan’s media landscape and its role in generating fear and concern warrant further study, it is reasonable to conclude that media investigations implicating numerous politicians and generating scandals were a significant aspect of Japan’s recent moral panic.

Abe’s assassination and the subsequent revelation of politicians' connections to the UC sparked Japan's most significant public reaction to religion since 1995. Prior to Abe’s murder, scholars seldom explored the relationship between religion and major political scandals in Japan. However, following his assassination, scholars have focused on the connections between the UC and LDP as key elements of a major political scandal. While scandal approaches typically focus on political actors and their transgressions, the concept of moral panic adds an important dimension with its emphasis on understanding societal reactions to a perceived threat.

The concept of moral panic and its literature on causes emphasized the importance of the grassroots model, interest group theory, as well as elite models (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009). Given their constructionist tradition and the inherent chicken-and-egg problem in determining which “model” precedes the other, these theoretical frameworks are more suggestive than definitive. However, the concept of moral panic can and should help further research on political scandals, particularly when the scandal involves religion and religious groups. Research on the “UC Scandal” can benefit from the use of moral panic concepts and its discussion of the elements of moral panics as well as their possible causes.

This paper emphasized the grassroots and interest group models in discussing public reaction to the UC following Abe’s assassination. While elite-engineered models often overemphasize the role of elites in generating mass panics, elites do play important roles in moral panics. In the case of the LDP, the moral panic and the scandals that ensued contributed to its loss of public support and damaged its position in the 2024 lower house election. The LDP still remains the most powerful political party in Japan although how it will fare as a minority ruling party is uncertain. Replacing the LDP government ideally requires the emergence of an effective and credible opposition. The LDP’s most recent period of dominance that began in 2012 may have ended in 2024, but it may take considerable time for the party system to reach a new equilibrium.

Although there is a growing body of literature on Abe’s assassination and the UC, future research should explore various questions and perspectives to fully understand the events in Japan and potential future developments. Moral panics are volatile, often emerging and dissipating quickly. Japan's recent moral panic over religion subsided in 2023, but future conflicts over religion could arise. More research is needed to better understand the causes of scandals and public reactions, as well as their consequences for politics, religion, and society.

The author is grateful to Mia Picciolo and to the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.