The phenomenon called “suicide by cop” (annotated herein as SbC) has only recently emerged in the academic literature on the police. I was pleased to see that Dr Lord, whose work I have followed and respect, has compiled a collection of writings on this topic. As a topic, the notion that a police officer is used by someone to assist in their suicide is controversial, unpleasant, and surrounded with uncertainty. It is controversial because, to those who do not trust the police, it feels like an officer is trying to find an excuse for a lethal shooting that perhaps should not have occurred (it should be noted that this notion has limited merit in that SbC holds no standing as a legal defense in the criminal or civil law). It is unpleasant because no officer wants to think that she was used as an agent to carry out someone else's death wish. And it is surrounded by uncertainty because we can never actually know what went through a person's mind prior to being killed. We can only infer. The interpretive connection that enables us to understand is lost at the moment of death – there is no one left to communicate the content of their thoughts or the internal processes of their decision‐making. Without that information, we can never be sure that what seems like a suicide by cop actually is.
The opening section addresses the concept of SbC. Dr Lord's collection of readings overviews the increasing body of information pointing to the presence of some sort of SbC phenomenon. Reconstructed histories increasingly suggest that a small number of people make a decision to provoke officers into killing them and their subsequent behavior is aimed at making that happen. By assessing the circumstances of SbC – the laws involved, the kind of individuals involved, the decisions they make and their behavioral characteristics – the police might be able to respond in ways to mitigate lethality.
As Dr Lord notes at the outset, even the phrase “suicide by cop” is controversial. It has been noted, for example, that the term “suicide by cop” implicates the motivation of the officer involved. Other ways of framing the idea include “suicide by proxy”, which involves any case in which an individual seduces another person to carry out their suicide, and “victim‐precipitated homicide”, in which a suicidal individual confronts an assailant with the appearance of a deadly weapon, forcing the assailant to use deadly force.
Dr Lord also discusses the difficulties in operationalizing the concept of SbC in a way useful for police practice. How can a person determine that a case involved a suicide instead of a poorly carried out attempt to inflict death on an officer, an inarticulate attempt to evade capture, or an act of mental illness where intention is not ascertainable? Dr Lord compared successful SbC cases – those where the person was killed or injured by the police, or who turned their weapons on themselves – to unsuccessful cases where the person was talked out of the suicide attempt or otherwise apprehended by the police. Interestingly, one of the findings was that SbC individuals often had support networks, which is uncharacteristic of suicides. However, those individuals often had a stressful event involving those relationships, possibly triggering the SbC incident. Successful SbC incidents also were more likely to have a history of mental health problems, to have used of hard drugs, been nonresidents, had financial problems, had a previous attempt, had a handgun, were involved in criminal activity, and had homicidal conversations, with unsuccessful attempts.
The second section looks at the relationship between the law and SbC. Chapter 4, for example, provides a court review of SbC cases in terms of section 1983 cases. A 1983 case is one in which a civil case is brought against the police for violations of a defendants constitutional rights. In use of force cases, the question is whether the police violated the fourth amendment protections against unconstitutional search and seizure. For example in any SbC use‐of‐force encounter, what matters is not whether the encounter is SbC but the degree of danger a reasonable officer would perceive herself to be in. However, in Palmquist vs Selvik (1997), SbC‐related information can be introduced into testimony if it facilitates understanding the facts of the case. SbC information can also be introduced for determining amount of damages. Interestingly, it is frequently the plaintiff, not the police, who bring up the SbC issue in courts.
The third section looks at tactical approaches to SbC encounters. Is there a way that we can recognize a SbC attempt early in an encounter? If so, then we can respond tactically, perhaps thereby saving the life of the person who initiates the incident. However, identifying a tactic that shows consistent success has been perplexing. For example, in many encounters, negotiation seemed to have worked to stop the attempt. But this does not necessarily mean that negotiation is the best tactic. It may simply be that some SbC individuals were more susceptible to being talked out of suicide. Similarly, the use of less lethal technology seems to have several advantages, but its use also may provoke a predisposed person to more extreme measures, precipitating violence and suicide. The evidence seems to support the use of nonlethal and less lethal interventions, since both resulted in lower percentages of deaths than did negotiation or other alternatives. However, a consideration of SbC cases, instead of yielding clear direction, tends to lead to the conclusion that there is a certain unpredictability and uniqueness to each case.
Finally, this book looks at the aftermath of SbC on the people involved. One of the most important and least understood dimensions of an SbC encounter is the impact of SbC on an officer who was the immediate agent of a person's successful suicide. SbC situations can be particularly difficult emotionally, because an officer who initially arrives with an expectation to provide assistance to someone ends up being the immediate cause of that person's death. Chapter 12, for example, provides a good discussion of the problems faced by officers and the mental health interventions that are essential to their well‐being. It is important for departments to recognize the emotional impact of SbC on officers, on the family of officers, and on the other officers who are witnesses. SbC encounters should be treated as crisis incidents, and those involved learn to recognize and try to offset self‐destructive behavior that may be precipitated by a SbC. This discussion provides a sobering recognition that SbC has far‐reaching implications and touches many people.
In conclusion, this book provides an excellent discussion of SbC and its related issues. It is appropriate for undergraduate classes regarding police issues and for classes on police and the law. For police, the topic is timely and important. It should be required for police training in both POST and in‐service settings. And it should be on the bookshelf of all command officers.
