Effective irrigation management hinges upon effective collective action among farmers and irrigation managers. The purpose of this study is to examine how the institutional design of irrigation agency affects the incentives and ability of irrigation managers to do a conscientious job and to relate to farmers in managing irrigation, and hence affects irrigation performance.
This study compares the Department of Irrigation (DOI) in Nepal and the Irrigation Associations (IAs) in Taiwan. Based upon extensive fieldwork undertaken in the two countries, this study identifies the opportunities and constraints embedded in the institutional designs of the agencies, and analyzes their effects on the behavior of irrigation managers.
The two irrigation agencies are designed upon very different conceptions of how the provision and production of irrigation can be organized. The DOI is built upon the premises of top‐down control, a reliance on technical knowledge, professional management, and uniform rules and regulations. The IAs, on the other hand, are designed upon the premises of reciprocity among irrigation managers, complementarity between the agency and farmers' efforts, the importance of mobilizing local knowledge and resources, the embeddedness of the agency in local communities, and a problem‐solving orientation.
Irrigation institutions that enable farmers and irrigation managers to cope with the problematics involved in the provision and production of irrigation operation and maintenance (O&M) are better able to nurture and sustain synergistic and productive working relationships.
The findings of this study can inform policy reform in the irrigation sector in specific, and in resource management and development administration in general.
This study provides not only a theoretical perspective for understanding and comparing institutions, but also empirical evidence for understanding how institutions affect irrigation performance.
