Does decentralizing policymaking authority to the local level lead to a closer match between public policies and citizen preferences? We study this question in the context of minimum wage laws, a salient and substantively important policy area with significant variation in the degree of local policymaking discretion. Using novel survey data and aggregation methods, we generate estimates of minimum wage preferences for all US cities with at least 1,000 residents and compare these preferences to actual minimum wages. We show that prevailing minimum wages are generally lower than residents prefer, and this conservative bias is most pronounced in states with preemption laws. However, locally controlled minimum wages leapfrog public preferences and are higher than residents want, on average. Finally, we consider how various counterfactual policies might improve representation and compare the conditions under which a centralized minimum wage would reduce policy bias relative to a decentralized approach.
Locally Controlled Minimum Wages Leapfrog Public Preferences
For helpful feedback, we thank Neal Beck, Jim Bisbee, Alexander Bor, Pat Egan, John Matsusaka, Jonathan Nagler, Hye Young You, and participants at the University of Oxford Department of Social Policy and Intervention Workshop and MPSA 2022 Multilevel Governance in Local Politics and Policymaking panel. We also thank the editors and referees at QJPS for their comments and suggestions, our replication assistant Kevin Angell, and our research assistant, Sebestyén Pap. The research was reviewed and deemed exempt by NYU’s IRB Protocol (IRB-FY2020-4728).
Simonovits G, Payson J (2023), "Locally Controlled Minimum Wages Leapfrog Public Preferences". Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 18 No. 4 pp. 543–570, doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021133
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