...Germán Gieczewski; Christopher Li We note and correct a flaw in the analysis of Ferejohn (1986)’s seminal model of electoral accountability. In the original solution, it is supposedly optimal for the voter to impose a stationary path of performance targets on officeholders. We show that, in fact...

...Navin Kartik; Richard Van Weelden We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting...

... of Rochester and the 2015 Midwest Political Science Association conference for helpful comments and suggestions. © 2017 G. Judd 2017 G. Judd Licensed re-use rights only Electoral accountability presidency unilateral policymaking political economy How do electoral concerns affect...

.... Electoral rules party systems coalition governments fiscal policy electoral accountability H00 D72 D78 How do electoral rules influence government spending? We address the question building on three distinct lines of research. © 2007 T. Persson, G. Roland and G. Tabellini 2007 T...