This paper seeks to elaborate on how subject positions promoting shareholder value are infused with an outcome focus.
The study employs Foucault's perspectives on government and the interrelations between objectivity and subjectivity in the analysis of in‐depth case data gathered in one shareholder value‐oriented‐listed company and one non‐listed company.
The outside financial market discipline that objectifies shareholder value‐oriented company executives makes them subjects in their own organisation, allowing them to redirect discipline onwards and thereby objectify their subordinates. The non‐listed company executives, due to the relatively closed governance structure of their company and the lack of outside ownership, are not subject to such continuous outside discipline; they lack the same access to the means to create tangible outcomes within their organisations. The subject positions promoting shareholder value are focused on outcomes, whereas the non‐listed company subject positions are focused on processes.
The subject positions of actors within different types of non‐listed companies and listed companies without a shareholder focus form a target for future studies.
The study contributes to the literatures on manager subject position formation and shareholder value. These contributions are achieved by uncovering a novel consequence of subject position formation and by revealing a mechanism by which outcome focus is tied with shareholder value.
