The Relation Between the New Corporate Governance Rules and the Likelihood of Financial Statement Fraud Available to Purchase

This study examines the relation between the likelihood of financial statement fraud and certain corporate governance requirements of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the new rules of the NYSE and the NASDAQ stock markets. Results based upon a logit regression analysis on a sample of 111 fraud firms and 111 matched no‐fraud firms indicate that fraud likelihood is lower when audit committee is comprised solely of independent directors and when audit committee members have smaller number of directorships with other companies. Board of director independence, audit committee expertise and nominating committee independence are not significant variables in reducing fraud likelihood. The study also investigates several other corporate governance variables and finds that fraud likelihood is lower when audit committee has longer tenure and chief executive officer is not chairman of the board. These results highlight two new significant aspects of audit committee: the directorships of its members with other firms and the committee members' tenure. The results have direct implications for further improvement of corporate governance.