Decision making in the U.S. Supreme court offers a fascinating context in which to apply game theory. Landmark cases in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court are worth exploring in more detail from a game-theoretic point of view. We focus in this paper on the recent and much discussed ruling to overturn Roe v. Wade and, therefore, the constitutional right to an abortion. Using a game-theoretic framework, we discuss how leaking Justice Samuel Alito’s draft opinion to the national political media can be seen as an unconditional strategic move referred to as cutting off communication, making an action irreversible. In this case, it served conservative justices by cutting off communication between Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature demonstrating how straightforward game theory can be fruitfully applied to the study of constitutional economics.
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24 March 2025
Research Article|
March 24 2025
Did Strategic Behavior End Roe v. Wade?
Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.;
Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.
Center for Economic Education,
Columbus State University
, Columbus, GA 31907, USA
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Rand W. Ressler;
Rand W. Ressler
Department of Economics,
Georgia Southern University
, Statesboro, GA 30458, USA
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Benno Torgler
Benno Torgler
School of Economics and Finance, and Centre for Behavioural Economics, Society and Technology (BEST), Queensland
University of Technology
, Brisbane, Australia
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*
The authors thank two anonymous reviewers of this journal for valuable comments on a prior version of our study. The usual caveat applies.
Received:
February 22 2024
Revision Received:
October 09 2024
Accepted:
October 12 2024
Online ISSN: 2326-6201
Print ISSN: 2326-6198
© 2025 F. G. Mixon, R. W. Ressler and B. Torgler
2025
F. G. Mixon, R. W. Ressler and B. Torgler
Licensed re-use rights only
Review of Behavioral Economics (2025) 12 (2): 215–230.
Article history
Received:
February 22 2024
Revision Received:
October 09 2024
Accepted:
October 12 2024
Citation
Mixon FG, Ressler RW, Torgler B (2025), "Did Strategic Behavior End Roe v. Wade?". Review of Behavioral Economics, Vol. 12 No. 2 pp. 215–230, doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000210
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