Open figure viewer
This paper examines whether variations in strong boards explain the differences between risk-taking in Islamic and conventional banks. From an analysis of a pooled sample of Islamic and conventional banks, we find that strong boards in general serve their shareholders through engaging in higher risk-taking activities across both types of banks. In Islamic banks, however, the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) is found to mitigate risk-taking when integrated with a strong board, as religiosity restrains risk-taking.
Keywords:
G21,
G32,
G34,
Strong board,
SSB,
religiosity,
risk-taking,
Islamic banks,
conventional banks
© 2021 S. Mollah, M. Skully and E. Liljeblom
2021
S. Mollah, M. Skully and E. Liljeblom
Licensed re-use rights only
You do not currently have access to this content.
