The critical nexus of water resources and food security underscoring climate justice in Egypt: within-variable comparative analysis Open Access

By 2050, the number of urban residents experiencing water scarcity is expected to double from around one billion in 2016. The World Bank (2016) warned that climate change-driven water shortages could shrink GDP by as much as 6% in some areas, impacting agriculture, health and incomes, and potentially triggering migration and conflict. As the population grows, incomes rise, and urban areas expand, water demand will escalate, while supply becomes increasingly uncertain, especially in regions like the Middle East and the African Sahel, UN-Water (2023: 15–16). The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the most water-stressed region globally. According to 2018 data, 14 of the 17 most water-stressed countries in the world are in this region, including all the top six. Egypt, ranked 14th in the global water stress index, faces a particularly acute crisis, with an annual water deficit and a water stress level classified as critical by the FAO (Stockholm International Water Institute and UNICEF, 2023, pp. 5–6).

The availability of Nile River water for Egypt is increasingly uncertain due to climate change, which affects approximately 97% of the country’s freshwater supply, with 85% of this coming from the Blue Nile in Ethiopia. Climate-induced changes in temperature, evapotranspiration and precipitation in the Nile Basin are significantly impacting Egypt’s water resources. For instance, a reduction in Nile River inflow to the High Aswan Dam from 55 BCM to 45 BCM—anticipated with more frequent droughts—could result in a 22% decrease in irrigated land, an 11% drop in productivity per irrigated hectare and a 9% reduction in agricultural employment. Consequently, Egypt’s overall food production is projected to decline by 5.7% by 2050, surpassing the global average decline of 4.4%. Climate change will notably exacerbate water scarcity, especially in agriculture, a sector that contributes 21% to Egypt’s exports and employs one-third of the working force. Moreover, if water resources remain at current levels while the population continues to grow, Egypt is expected to encounter extreme water scarcity by 2033. Although wastewater recycling could mitigate some climate-related water risks, only 1.7% of wastewater is currently recycled (World Bank, 2022, pp. 4–23).

On July 17, 2024, Ethiopia started the fifth filling of the GERD reservoir, aligning it with the rainy season, which has heightened fears in downstream countries due to the substantial amount of water being withheld. In August 2024, Ethiopia temporarily opened the dam’s upper spillways for four days, allowing around 250 million cubic meters of water to flow into the Nile daily. However, the spillways were then closed for an additional eight days. Ont the other hand, Tayie, (2019) highlighted that since its renaming to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011, the project has been at the heart of regional disputes. Ethiopia’s substantial modifications to the dam’s specifications have heightened concerns in Egypt and Sudan. The dam’s construction threatens Egyptian water interests and security, sparking legal and diplomatic tensions. The GERD’s adherence to international principles, like the “no-harm” rule, remains contentious due to potential risks for downstream countries. This indicates that the fifth filling has been halt before the water level reached the top of the middle wall at 640 meters to prevent overflow (Egypt Today, 2024). As a result, the reservoir’s capacity increased to 64 billion cubic meters, up from 41 billion cubic meters. On September 1, 2024, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC), reaffirming its opposition to Ethiopia’s unilateral actions concerning the GERD (State Information Service, 2024).

This study examines the critical relationship between water availability and food security in Egypt, particularly considering the country’s vulnerability to climate change and the potential aggravation of these challenges due to the GERD. Our hypothesis that given environmental insecurity, and stalemate negotiations-within the hydro-political literature-involving the GERD impact on water availability; water stress will heighten threatening wheat and rice production over the period of study. Jeopardizing the Egyptian economy to global shocks, leading to reduced dietary diversity. Moreover, the study explores how climate-driven water scarcity, termed climate shocks, impact Egypt’s agricultural sector and, consequently, its food security, underscoring the concept of environmental insecurity. The study also investigates the implications of the ongoing stalemate between Ethiopia, the upstream country, and Egypt, which represents downstream nations’ interests, as Ethiopia pursues regional hydro dominance.

To address the hypothesis the paper is divided into the following sections; Section 1 scans the literature exploring the relationship between climate change and water scarcity in the context of Egypt, then analyses the hydrological change impact on agriculture production in the context of international negotiation on geographical dynamics. This is followed by a Section 2 on data limitations and methodological approach highlighted in within-variable trend analysis between 2016 till 2023. The last section concludes with proposing several policy recommendations to address the adverse effects of water scarcity on food security in Egypt. Strengthening agricultural resilience to climate change is highlighted as essential for protecting the country’s food sector.

This review examines the complex challenges of water scarcity and agricultural vulnerability in Egypt. It is organized into two sections: the first focuses on the impact of climatic shocks and water scarcity, while the second addresses the influence of hydro-hegemonic powers on agriculture. Both sections analyze geopolitical dynamics and adaptive strategies, emphasizing the evolving interplay between water availability, crop production and food security.

1. Climatic shocks and Water Scarcity

Water stress refers to the situation where there is a severe shortage in water levels needed to meet national demand, concurrently leading to a deterioration of water levels and impoverishment of freshwater resources (Chandra, 2024). Water stress is distinct in arid and semi-arid regions, where agricultural activities heavily reliant on irrigation. Egypt, characterized by a dry climate, faces continuing water shortages. Research by (Gleick, 1993) shows how over-reliance on river systems like the Nile plays a major role in aggravating water stress, with agriculture consumption recorded to more than 80% of Egypt’s freshwater resources (FAO, 2015, p. 9). Many studies investigated the direct relation between water stress and crop production (Howell, 2001). Some have examined the impact of irrigation on agricultural production in the USA and other countries worldwide. The results suggested that water mismanagement eventually leads to heightening water stress levels. This impacts water use efficiency which leads to a significant decline in crop production over the long term. Water reliant crops like wheat and rice are affected heavily by this phenomenon.

In the Egyptian context, a study by Smith et al. (2013, p. 102) shows that reductions in Nile water flow due to activities like drilling, exploration and extraction, in addition to climate change scenarios are estimated to decrease agricultural productivity by up to 47% for certain crops. Region’s disparities are unevenly affected by water stress; for instance, the study undertaken by Kheir et al. (2021) provided an in-depth analysis of the regional disparities within Egypt, showing that rural areas are more severely affected by water stress compared to other regions like the Nile Delta, which benefits from better irrigation systems. On the other hand, climate change is expected to exacerbate water stress in Egypt. According to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), frequent droughts and unstable Nile River flows will occur because of predictions of increased temperatures and shifted precipitation patterns (IPCC, 2014). The vulnerability of the agriculture sector in Egypt prominently appears in its dependence on a predictable and a balanced flow of the Nile River, the risk posed by climatic shock and upstream geopolitical challenges puts the food sector at risk (Siam and Eltahir, 2017).

The IPCC (2022) reports that the Nile River Basin has experienced increased rainfall in upstream regions and decreased rainfall downstream, leading to reduced water availability for irrigation and drinking in Egypt. These shifts are influenced by climate variability, changes in land use and growing water demand. Future rainfall in the Lake Victoria Basin is projected to rise by 25% in the eastern region and by 5–10% in the western region. The upper Blue Nile Basin may see up to 15% more runoff during wet seasons and up to 24% less during dry seasons, impacting irrigation and hydropower. Annual flow, hydropower revenues and agricultural output from the Blue Nile River at Khartoum are expected to increase under maximum streamflow scenarios but decrease under minimum and median projections.

The persistent rise in temperature levels accelerates the maturation of some staple crops like wheat, barley and corn; which in turn is expected to reduce their growing seasons (Abou-Hadid, 2006). Bhattacharyya et al. (2022, pp. 145-148) estimate that temperature increases of 1–3 °C could reduce the production of major Egyptian crops by 10–30%, depending on whether its rural or urban areas. Furthermore (Kotb et al., 2000), emphasized that collective role played by water stress alongside role of salinization and, rising sea-levels on crop yields in the Nile Delta, considered as one of the most fertile yet vulnerable regions in the country. Adaptation strategies for Egypt’s agriculture in the face of climate change include refining water use efficiency, adopting climate-resilient yield varieties and enhancing water management practices. Drip irrigation and lining of canals are among the adopted irrigation technologies initiated by the Egyptian government to counter water insecurity (Abdel-Dayem, 2011).

The work of Das et al. (2020) also stresses the crucial role of adopting salt-tolerant crops to mitigate the effects of salinization, particularly in the Nile Delta. However, these strategies have been implemented unevenly across regions, leaving some areas more vulnerable than others. Vulnerability to climate change is not only a biophysical issue but also a socio-economic one. The IPCC (2007) identifies the adaptive capacity of populations as a key determinant of vulnerability, noting that communities with low incomes and limited access to technology are more susceptible to climate-induced shocks (Ouda and Zohry, 2015). It also explores how smallholder farmers in Egypt are particularly vulnerable due to their dependence on water-intensive crops like wheat and rice; and limited capacity to invest in adaptive technologies. Institutional factors also play a significant role in determining vulnerability.

Allam and Allam (2007) argue that the water management framework in Egypt lacked the flexibility to deal with sudden disruptions in water supply. Moreover, Sowers et al. (2011, p. 605) point to the lack of regional cooperation among Nile Basin countries as a key geopolitical factor exacerbating Egypt’s vulnerability to water stress. Furthermore, Tayie, (2017) highlighted the growing population within the Nile basin countries as part of the hydro-social framework noting the rising demand for water to sustain development. This escalating demand, compounded by the effects of climate change, worsens existing water scarcity issues. Consequently, Egypt and Sudan reject the notion of treating water as an economic good due to concerns over the social implications of water scarcity and the potential for conflict arising from commodifying this resource. Experts in both countries argue that viewing water as a commodity overlooks its social importance and risks destabilizing the region, particularly if water-exporting states halt supplies, thereby hindering development in importing states (Tayie, 2017).

On the other hand, empirical research on Egypt provides valuable insights into how water stress affects agricultural communities. Sayed and Amer (2017) conducted a survey of farmers in the Nile Delta and found that water shortages during critical growing periods have led to shifts in cropping patterns and a reduction in income for many households. Similarly, Al-Juaidi et al. (2018, pp. 2-6) documented how farmers have been forced to abandon certain water-intensive crops, such as rice, in favor of less profitable alternatives, exacerbating rural poverty. A study by Elsharkawy et al. (2022) discussed adaptive measures by farmers to avoid looping into vicious cycles of poverty, especially in Upper Egypt found that while awareness of climate change effects increased, the adoption of resilient agricultural practices remains low due to financial constraints and the lack of know-how. In contrast, Amer et al. (2017, pp. 12-13) highlighted successful examples of community-driven adaptation efforts, such as the introduction of drought-resistant wheat varieties, though these remain localized and limited in scope.

1. Impact of Hydro-hegemonic powers on Agriculture

Ethiopia’s approach to constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has heightened uncertainties regarding the project’s impact on both Ethiopia and downstream nations, as well as the potential for cooperation within the Eastern Nile Basin. Initially proposed to store 11 billion cubic meters (BCM), the GERD, located near the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, is designed to hold 74 BCM—nearly matching the combined capacity of the four projects proposed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) in the 1960s and included in Ethiopia’s Water Sector Development Program since. The dam’s installed power capacity is 6,000 MW, surpassing the total capacity of the four projects combined. This increase in the dam’s size and storage capacity compared to the original plans has sparked a debate over whether its primary objective is to control water flow rather than solely generate hydropower.

From Ethiopia’s perspective, the hydro-politics surrounding the GERD are primarily aimed at countering what it perceives as Egypt’s hydro-hegemony over the Nile River. In its efforts to challenge this perceived dominance, Ethiopia has employed the concept of benefit-sharing at various stages to promote the GERD and alleviate the concerns of downstream countries.

It is worth mentioning, that the literature related to hydro-politics refers to a broad grouping of scholarship that tries to understand how water and power interrelate. Early literature focused on characterizing different societies according to their approach to water management, the most obvious example being Witfogel’s Oriental Despotism. Witfogel’s proposed that the damming projects usually initiated by the state to fulfil its tendency towards total despotic power; ultimately alter a river flow regime in an attempt to develop agriculture in semi-arid and arid environments. This disruption of the river flows along the Nile banks jeopardized long-established agricultural production systems that depended on seasonal flooding to enrich alluvial soils. However, in too many cases an unacceptable and often unnecessary price has been paid to secure these benefits [of dams], especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment (Witfogel, 1957).

“The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Africa’s Water Tower, Environmental Justice and Infrastructural Power,” analyzes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which since the start of the project in 2011 has escalated tensions in Northeast Africa and challenged Egypt’s historical hegemonic position in the basin. The GERD intended to help expand the reach of the Ethiopian state, domestically and internationally: its reservoir is not only supposed to hold record quantities of water, but it is also intended to help provide the foreign currency necessary to help the nation industrialize and for the state to deliver public services to Africa’s second-largest population.

Ethiopia highlights a broad range of potential benefits from water use that can be shared among riparian states. These include improvements in water quality and cooperative opportunities along the river, such as reduced logistical costs and electricity supply. Ethiopia’s negotiating strategy has involved delaying tactics, such as conducting cost-benefit analyses while continuing construction, as well as securing Sudanese support until late 2018, which bolstered its position. Yet, as so often is the case with mega-projects, the GERD has been politically disruptive not only to riparian neighbors such as Egypt, but it has also altered the balance of power in Addis Ababa itself.

According to Zeitoun and Warner, (2006), analyzing transboundary water interactions through the hydro-hegemony framework reveals that power—more than international law, riparian position or water availability—primarily determines outcomes. This highlights the influence of power asymmetries and strategic control tactics, such as resource capture, integration and containment, in shaping the dynamics of transboundary water conflicts and cooperation. Through hegemonic tactics – that include strategies such as coercion, treaties, incentives, securitization, knowledge construction and sanctioned discourse to exert control over water resources and secure compliance from weaker riparian states—the dominant riparian state, which Ethiopia perceives as Egypt in this case, shapes the prevailing beliefs and discourses within the basin, leading other riparian states to accept its narrative as the natural order.

Based on Zeitoun and Allan (2008), counter-hegemony refers to strategies employed by relatively weaker parties to challenge dominant powers, balance inequalities or alter existing rules. These strategies can involve invoking international water law, engaging in diplomacy, building strategic alliances and securing funding to address power imbalances and promote more equitable outcomes. In the case of GERD, non-hegemonic parties reject the hegemon’s leadership. The challenge then becomes ensuring that this shift leads to a more just order, rather than producing new injustices that could exacerbate climate impacts already being felt by downstream countries. Overall, 10% of the Egyptian population, did not benefit from access to improved sanitation, with marked geographical and socio-economic disparities in 2014 (UNICEF, 2017).

Egypt, on the other hand, continues to defend its share of the Nile’s water as allocated by various treaties, including the 1959 agreement. Egypt’s stance is based not only on the principle of “acquired rights,” —that are long-recognized water usage practices of states along an international waterway, acknowledged for their essential and continuous use, forming a foundation for a state’s economic and social identity, Tayie, (2017) —but also on the notion that the availability of “alternative resources” should be a criterion for equitable use of shared water. Egyptian officials contend that although 1,600 BCM of water falls annually within the Nile Basin, only 84 BCM reaches the river at Aswan, with two-thirds of this amount allocated to Egypt. As a result, Egypt uses only 3% of the basin’s total water. Furthermore, they argue that Ethiopia, with its abundant alternative water sources, is less reliant on the Nile. Ethiopia receives around 122 BCM of surface water annually from 12 river basins, earning it the title of the region’s “water tower,” while Egypt is almost entirely dependent on the Nile for its water security (Tawfik, 2015). According to Tayie and Rashidy, (2024), water security or hydropolitical security, involves ensuring sufficient, high-quality water for development and household needs, safeguarding resources from threats and differs by region. Key indicators include water quantity, quality, economic factors, state power and conflict.

Egypt has extended both technical and financial aid to Ethiopia to promote its development and boost electricity production, while ensuring that no projects are undertaken that would diminish the Nile’s flow. These initiatives build upon Egypt’s proven success with comparable efforts in other Nile Basin nations, including Uganda, South Sudan and Tanzania. Despite this, the approach has been insufficient in narrowing the significant divide between Egypt and Ethiopia, resulting in a stalemate and pushing the situation further toward rising conflict and escalation. Tayie and Rashidy, (2024) noted that the ongoing deadlock over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt and Sudan argue threatens the lives of millions of their citizens, may push the two countries to explore alternative strategies. However, diplomatic and legal solutions remain the most viable option.

While literature on water scarcity and agriculture productivity is well established, most studies focused on effects of water stress on agriculture production in a stationary way, analyzing single point in time or comparing several countries without examining year-by-year effects within Egypt. This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by employing within-variable trend analysis descriptively, in an attempt to capture evolving relationship between water availability, crop production and food security over a time period in Egypt between 2016 and 2024, underscoring the political economy of hydro-power dynamics. This approach to exploring the relation between climatic factors, food security and power dynamics, to the best of our knowledge is underexplored.

Markushina et al. (2024) articulated that environmental security theory highlights the crucial relationship between environmental changes and security, focusing on how resource scarcity and climate change influence national and human security. Challenges such as overpopulation, global warming and extreme weather events threaten national stability and can spark international conflicts. The theory also prioritizes human security by emphasizing the need to safeguard individuals from environmental risks. Water scarcity—a significant component of resource scarcity—affects agricultural output and food availability, linking water resources and food security to broader environmental security concerns. These interconnected issues emphasize the necessity of addressing environmental threats to ensure overall stability and security.

Furthermore, this theory stresses the relationship between climate variability, resource scarcity and agriculture, particularly for nations dependent on international rivers. Climate variability intensifies water scarcity, that is essential for farming. This can lead to disputes over shared water resources, impacting food security and national stability. To mitigate these challenges, effective policies and adaptation strategies are needed to promote sustainable water management and agricultural resilience. In regions with international rivers, like the Nile River, cooperation and coordinated policies are vital for addressing these environmental challenges and preserving regional security and stability.

To capture the relationship between water stress, agriculture production specifically for wheat and rice and food security trends in Egypt, we compiled data on food security index, crop production and yield and Population Growth numbers ^[1]. Egypt’s population grew from about 85 million in 2013 to approximately 105 million in 2023, increasing domestic water demand. Agricultural practices, which account for around 85% of Egypt’s water use, are often inefficient, with water-intensive crops like rice still being cultivated, despite attempts to reduce their area. To analyze water stress over a period between 2016 and 2023, we use metrics such as Total Renewable Water Resources per Capita (TRWR), Water Scarcity Index and water use efficiency. External shocks such as Nile water flow fluctuations due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and climate disruptions are deducted through observing trends in water demand for agriculture purposed and the actual water supply available. Data shows that total Water Resources remained stable at around 58.5 billion cubic meters annually, with 55 billion cubic meters coming from the Nile. However, per capita water availability dropped from about 700 m³ per person per year in 2013 to around 570 m³ in 2023, a figure far below the water poverty threshold of 1,000 m³/person/year. Lastly, the study employed data on annual production of wheat and rice (in tons) are employed in the same dataset.

Although the data employed is reliable, the study acknowledges a couple of limitations; first, food security indicators rely mostly on data projects which might introduce slight inaccuracies. Secondly, the dynamic nature of climate and geopolitical factors (such as GERD negotiations), future trends predictions might inherit systemic uncertainties. Finally, water stress data may not fully capture localized irrigation practices. However, to the best of our knowledge the data have been standardized across years and crops to ensure robust trend analysis.

The study covers a period from 2016 to 2023, to highlight significant development that includes; first the construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its implications on water availability. Climatic threats that heightened within this period; represented in droughts, heatwaves and irregular rainfalls. 2022 global wheat shock due to the Ukrainian Russian conflict, which significantly impacted wheat imports in Egypt. Finally, institutional reforms highlighted in Egyptian government policies aimed at restricting water-intensive crops (such as rice and wheat) in an attempt to conserve available water.

Water availability in Egypt, especially from the Nile River, is a critical issue due to the country’s dry climate, heavy reliance on agriculture and increasing population levels. Egypt’s water supply is chiefly dependent on peripheral sources, with more than 97% of its renewable water resources originating from the Nile Basin. Over the past decade (2016–2023), Egypt has faced increasing water stress due to a combination of factors including population growth, climate change, upstream Nile developments and inefficient water management practices. This analysis explores the shifts in water availability and stress over this period and examines their implications for agriculture and food security in Egypt. As mentioned before in the hydro-political framework; destruction of downriver fishing industries, an increase in waterborne diseases, erosion of the shoreline and coast, degradation of aquatic ecosystems and declines in riparian animal and plant life occurred as a result of dams across Africa.

In April 2011, Egypt has considered the GERD a threat to its water, and thus national, security. Official sources emphasized the economic costs of the dam and its unilateral filling and operation. Accordingly, a decrease of only 1 billion cubic meters of Nile waters flowing to Egypt would lead to 290,000 people losing their jobs, the degradation of 130,000 hectares, an increase worth USD150million in food imports and a loss of USD430 million of agricultural production (UN-Water, 2023). This paper argues that these rough numbers capture the potential impacts of this gigantic project on Egypt’s human security which is key in the analysis of the environmental hazards/climate change repercussions of the GERD. The analysis moves away from the GERD politically disruptive nature to its environmental repercussions to all the bank’s neighbors.

This section highlights the interaction of water stress drivers in Egypt within 2016 and 2023. Water stress in Egypt can be primarily attributed to first, climate change. The variability in rainfall patterns over the Ethiopian Highlands, where the Blue Nile originates, has led to periodic falls in Nile River flows. This period was portrayed with sufficient levels accompanied with seasonal fluctuations. Secondly; upstream Nile developments; the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (starting in 2011 and filling phases during the 2010s) posed real concerns for water availability downstream in Egypt. As of 2023, Egypt’s concerns are shifted on long-term impacts during filling and drought periods.

Nile water flows were relatively stable, averaging around 84 billion cubic meters annually at Aswan. In 2017, the government began efforts to reduce the area under rice cultivation to conserve water, but enforcement measures were not efficient enough to curb production. Meanwhile, warnings about the GERD’s effect on water flow have been rising. Food imports remained stable, and Egypt was highly dependent on imports of wheat and other staples. The available water use change between 2012 and 2025 ^[2] show that the decrease of total available water use in the delta regions of the Nile River is the most significant. While the national population increased from 78.6 to 100 million, the available water available per capita decreased, as did the total water use of each governorate (Luo, 2020). in their study showed the available water use change between 2012 and 2025 exhibit a decreasing trend in water use of each governorate. The decrease of total available water use in the delta regions of the Nile River is the most significant. In their study they analysed the change in water use by governorate. In the governorate of Cairo water use decreased significantly with 0.562 BCM. The governorate of Dakahlia comes in the third place with 0.254 BCM. The available water use change in the governorate of Beheira, Gharbia, Qena and Alexandria is under 0.2 BCM. Monufia, Qalyubia, Sharqia, Kafr el-Sheikh, Fayoum, Giza, Al-Minya, Aswan, Asyut, Beni Suef and Sohag will experience a change in water use from 0.05 to 0.2 BCM. The study highlighted that the governorate of red sea is the only one experiencing an increase with 0.022BCM (Fouad et al. (2022)).

The Nile basin is currently receiving more rainfall, yet is also experiencing hot and dry years on average (Fouad et al., 2022). Fouad et al. (2022) in their study showed that there are causal chain relationships between the anthropogenic effects of population growth in the Nile Delta and their associated pressures such as the urban expansion on the decrease of waterways’ area. This situation led to a rise in wastes and wastewater production from domestic and industrial activities causing increased water pollution and further water stress. In Egypt, 8.4 million inhabitants do not have access to improved sanitation, mostly in rural areas. This adverse public behaviour toward waterways results in polluting and clogging several irrigation waterways, further threating levels of agricultural production and endangering crop yield. Moreover, groundwater irrigation does not provide enough nutrients for crops nor replenishes the soil with fertile sediments as do the waterways. Egypt raised concerns over potential reduced water flows during the filling period that took place in late 2018. Inflows to the High Aswan Dam (HAD) averaged 80 billion cubic meters. In 2016, Egypt experienced a drought episode, it reduced the river’s flow slightly, which, combined with over-irrigation in some regions, worsened water stress. Egypt launched a national water conservation campaign in 2017, aimed at improving irrigation efficiency and reducing the cultivation of water-intensive crops.

Nile flows were largely stable, but rising demands from agriculture and population growth worsened water scarcity. In 2020, the GERD began partial filling, leading to heightened tensions between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The social and human security of these projects and policies have not been sufficiently investigated. For instance, the reduction of the cultivated area of rice from 1.5 million feddans in 2003 to 724,000 feddans in 2020 has a high social and environmental cost. According to World Commission Dams (WCD) recent report, this reduction would impact the food security and revenues of thousands of farmers in the Nile Delta, affect hundreds of small factories of rice processing and packing and increase the salinity of agricultural land that was controlled for decades as a result of rice cultivation (El Nour, 2018). This last impact is particularly important given the expected effect of the GERD on increasing the salinity of the agricultural land in the Nile Delta. An early report by the Abdul Latif Jameel World Water and Food Security Lab (J-WAFS) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) noted that during the filling of the GERD, Egypt would have less excess water to flush salt out of the agricultural soil of the Delta into the Mediterranean, which would lead to a fast buildup of salt in agricultural land. Although this increasing salinization is expected to happen in any case with increasing upstream withdrawals, GERD filling would significantly accelerate this process (J-WAFS, 2014, p. 9).

Despite this, Egypt intensified measures to reduce water stress, including the introduction of new irrigation technologies and a push for drip irrigation systems, targeting water-intensive crops like wheat and rice. Wheat production was stable, but rice production was significantly curbed. The wheat gap between 2000 and 2020 increased annually by 6.5%, which is equivalent to 538 thousand tons annually (Abdalla, 2023). The increasing wheat gap puts pressure on wheat imports, which causes food insecurity, especially when international wheat prices spike and the global supply chain is disturbed under different circumstances such as COVID-19 and the Russian-Ukrainian war. The average wheat gap in the period between 2000 and 2020 is estimated at 7,715 thousand tons. The gap has ranged between a maximum gap in 2019 estimated at 12,936 thousand tons and a minimum gap estimated at 3,564 thousand tons in 2001. As shown in Figure 1; rice production experienced severe decline between 2016 and 2022. Egypt saw a continued dependence on food imports, making it vulnerable to international price fluctuations. During this period, variability in rainfall in the Nile Basin caused concerns over future droughts, which could potentially coincide with GERD water filling and worsen availability downstream.

In 2022, Ethiopia announced the near-completion of the GERD’s second filling phase. While water availability downstream remained largely unaffected, Egypt faced growing uncertainties about the Dam’s long-term impact, especially in drought years. In the same year Egyptian authorities started their first campaign to forcefully remove informal settlements on the banks of the Nile (Shaker, 2022). The campaign triggered a wide controversy on the demolishing of what was considered historical boathouses and relocation of thousands of inhabitants to alternative housing in new urban development areas tens of kilometer deep inland away from the river. That said, the above steering measures will show positive outcomes on the long run and improved urban and environmental landscape can accelerate and sustain these regeneration procedures. Meanwhile, Egypt’s per capita water availability fell further, while inefficient agricultural practices continued to put pressure on the system. The Ministry of Water Resources reported that Egypt now needed to reuse approximately 35% of its wastewater to meet demand. In 2023, Egypt finalized its Water Resources Management Strategy (Ahram Online, 2017), which aims to bridge the 20 billion cubic meter water deficit by focusing on water recycling, desalination projects and strict regulation of agricultural water use. Despite the limitation of insufficient lack of systematic surveys that measure the effect of the decline of water flows due to the GERD filling on vulnerable communities in Egypt, namely farmers;

Few media outlets reported the stories of small farmers who used to grow rice for decades, but had to sell their lands to larger firms or wealthy businesses, aggravating the existing social inequalities. Other farmers resorted to cultivating vegetables, which is not a sustainable source of income as before, or seek other employments altogether. With many farmers, especially at the far north of the Delta, complaining of water scarcity and deficient flows; the situation is said to worsen in the coming years with the filling of the GERD (El-Said, 2021).

Egypt’s dependence on food imports increased due to global supply chain disruptions caused by the war in Ukraine, from which Egypt imports a large share of its wheat. Despite government efforts to reduce rice cultivation, rice remained an important crop, but under strict regulation of cultivation areas. Wheat yields fluctuated with water availability, particularly in dry years (e.g. 2016), as irrigation for wheat is highly dependent on Nile water flows. In 2023, Egypt’s food security remained fragile due to its reliance on external food sources. Rising wheat and fuel prices, exacerbated by global supply chain disruptions, put additional pressure on domestic prices (Abdalla, 2023). Despite government subsidies, food insecurity indicators such as the Global Hunger Index showed a moderate level of food insecurity, with disparities between urban and rural populations.

Figure (1) shows a decline in total water availability from the Nile, reflecting concerns over long-term water availability consistently from 2014 until 2022; 2018 showed a slight increase in water availability due to an increase in rainfalls continued till 2020 then fell again from 2020 to 2022. The per capita water availability showed a consistent decrease; primarily driven by population growth and resource pressures. Both wheat and rice production show minor fluctuations but remain largely declining, with some recovery towards 2020 till 2022. Using Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2022, pp. 39-40) data on food security; trends in food security has declined over time, with the index dropping steadily over the period 2016 till 2022, highlighting the increased vulnerability due to water stress and external factors. These trends underscore the growing water stress and its potential implications for agriculture and food security in Egypt.

Egypt has pursued various approaches in dealing with the GERD challenge. One approach involves engaging with international organizations concerned with climate change and striving for Climate Justice. This framework, within environmental justice, acknowledges the disproportionate impact of climate change on marginalized and vulnerable communities, particularly those who have historically contributed the least to environmental harm. It advocates for a fair distribution of both the burdens posed by climate change and the efforts needed to mitigate it. Estimates suggest that addressing climate change could cost up to 2% of global GDP. Achieving the more ambitious goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 C, as outlined in the Paris Agreement, requires an equitable sharing of responsibilities and rights in a just and fair manner (Dooley et al., 2018, p. 3). This approach highlights the moral and ethical duties of governments, corporations and individuals to protect and uplift those most affected by environmental changes, linking climate action to broader human rights issues and examining concepts such as equality and fairness.

In this context, Egypt benefited from hosting COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2022, seizing the opportunity to call for international support for several climate justice initiatives. Each year, COPs provide key opportunities for advancing climate action by driving negotiations, assessing progress under the UNFCCC and launching new international cooperation efforts and initiatives, such as the Marrakech Partnership and Race to Zero. At COP27, 12 significant climate initiatives were unveiled, with a strong emphasis on Africa. Egypt played a key role in many of these efforts aimed at promoting climate justice, including the “Global Shield Against Climate Risks,” through which the G-7 seeks to enhance financial protection for vulnerable countries (V20) against climate-related disasters (Climate Chance, 2024). Egypt also launched the AWARe (Action on Water Adaptation or Resilience) initiative, aimed at facilitating cooperation to address water-related issues through climate action. This initiative promotes partnerships for early warning systems and transitional adaptation strategies, prioritizing vulnerable communities and ecosystems, starting in Africa (Badr, 2024, p. 194). The Egyptian presidency has positioned this initiative as a call for practical cooperation, including information sharing, joint investments in water governance and enhance regional water management. Additionally, it provides a neutral platform for assessing water resources and preparing for future water scarcity (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UN DESA], 2023).

In another approach, Egypt has sought support from international and regional actors, including the World Bank, the EU, Germany, Japan, UNSC permanent members and Arab countries, urging them not to fund the GERD. When negotiations stalled, Egypt called for international mediation, asking the U.S. to play a more active role. Despite U.S. involvement, the talks ended in deadlock. Egypt emphasized the GERD’s negative impacts, while Ethiopia portrayed it as beneficial to all involved. When U.S.-led mediation failed, President Trump accused Ethiopia of blocking progress and froze U.S. aid, hinting at possible extreme measures by Egypt. Under President Biden, U.S. support for Egypt declined as Biden lifted restrictions on Ethiopia and called for trilateral talks. Following the Tigray conflict and human rights abuses, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Ethiopia, which did not aid Egypt or Sudan. Egypt also sought support from regional organizations, notably the Arab League and the European Union. The African Union’s mediation in Kinshasa did not produce results, with Ethiopia preferring AU-led efforts while Egypt and Sudan sought broader international involvement, including the UN and the EU. In 2021, Egypt and Sudan took the GERD issue to the UNSC, but the UNSC supported AU mediation, disappointing both countries. President al-Sisi then sought stronger Chinese support. Additionally, Egypt’s strained relations with Russia, due to Russia’s stance on the GERD, led some Egyptians to call for a reevaluation of ties with Russia, despite Russia’s denial of any connection between its military agreements with Ethiopia and the GERD dispute (Hasan and Mercan, 2023).

Climate change will heighten the water stress in Egypt, as rising sea levels and seawater intrusion deplete the Nile’s freshwater. Increased evaporation and irregular rainfall will exacerbate droughts and crop failures. A 0.5- to 1-m sea level rise could shrink the Nile by 19–32%, threatening food security (Hamzawy et al., 2023). The increasing water stress presents substantial environmental security risks for Egypt, significantly impacting its agricultural productivity and food security. Considering the significant risks, the study highlights the urgent need for policies that boost the resilience of the agricultural sector. Enhancing the sector’s ability to adapt to and withstand environmental pressures is crucial for protecting Egypt’s food security and ensuring the welfare of its population. These adaptive measures must be prioritized to safeguard long-term environmental security. The cooperative approach to mitigating climate shocks, involving international organizations, has failed, despite extensive mediation by various regional and international actors. Notably, Egypt and Ethiopia officially joined BRICS in January 2024, yet China—an influential player in building the GERD and a partner in Ethiopian development—has refrained from offering mediation between the two new BRICS + members. Ethiopia remains adamant about completing the GERD construction, with the Ethiopian Prime Minister announcing in late August 2024 that the project would be finished by year-end.

In contrast, Egypt has responded using two main approaches. First, the Egyptian Foreign Minister sent a letter on September first to the President of the UN Security Council, warning of Ethiopia’s actions. The letter noted that recent comments from the Ethiopian Prime Minister were “completely unacceptable to Egypt,” The Egyptian government emphasized that Ethiopia’s unilateral approach violates international law and the 2015 Declaration of Principles Agreement signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The letter further argued that these actions undermine regional stability and conflict with broader regional goals of cooperation and integration (Ahram Online, 2024). Simultaneously, Egypt has pursued a sudden assertive military stance. In mid-August 2024, Egypt signed a defense agreement with Somalia, aiming to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence over the Nile and Red Sea—crucial waterways for Egypt’s economy. Egypt has sought to build stronger ties with Somalia, especially as Sudan’s civil war weakened Egypt’s regional influence. Somalia, now Egypt’s key ally in the region, is seen as critical in curbing Ethiopia’s regional ambitions, including denying it naval access to the Red Sea. At the Somali president’s request, Egypt has sent 10,000 troops to Somalia to help stabilize the country, while the Somali government pressures Ethiopia to pull out its forces and cancel a port agreement with Somaliland. However, Ethiopia has voiced significant concerns about Egypt’s growing military presence near its border, perceiving it as a threat to its national security. On August 28, 2024, Ethiopia’s foreign ministry issued a statement subtly cautioning both Egypt and the international community about Egyptian military actions in the African Union (AU) mission and in Somalia more generally. The potential transition of the AU peacekeeping mission at the end of 2024 might provoke armed conflict between Egyptian and Somali forces and Ethiopian troops (Karr and Borens, 2024). The rising tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia are exacerbating the existing mutually hurting stalemate, heightening fears of further conflict escalation. Egypt’s increasing militarization in the GERD dispute underscores its resolve to counter what it perceives as a significant threat, with the hope that this strategy will discourage Ethiopia from pursuing unilateral actions. It remains uncertain whether these measures will prompt Ethiopia to seek a multilateral agreement that considers the interests of all parties involved.

Egypt saw a continuous decline in per capita water availability from 2016 to 2023 due to population growth and pressure from agricultural and domestic demand, falling from 700 m³/year to 570 m³/year per person. While the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a critical factor in water availability debates, its direct impact on Egypt’s water supply between 2013 and 2023 has been limited due to successful negotiations and rainfall compensating for GERD’s filling periods. However, future droughts combined with GERD filling could create significant risks. This highlights the critical role of environmental security in Egypt’s future water and food systems. The Egyptian government has intensified its national and international efforts to mitigate water stress, focusing on irrigation efficiency, reuse of wastewater and desalination. However, these efforts need to be scaled up considerably to meet the growing water deficit.

Despite consistent domestic production of staples like wheat and rice, food security in Egypt remains vulnerable to external shocks. Egypt’s reliance on imports, combined with water scarcity and the global impact of conflicts (e.g. Ukraine war), has exposed the fragile nature of its food system. River ecologists and resource economists are proposing system thinking and methods into water planning and management, and they aim to assess the cost of water development projects. This is not to halt development but to assist governments make more informed and balanced decisions, and to empower all stakeholders to better understand what the future could hold aiming for an inclusive dialogue for a better future.

Funding: This research was funded by The British University in Egypt.