The implications of the Taliban’s comeback on the Gulf Arab Security Complex Open Access

As the State of Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of three sub-regions of the Asia Security Complex, there is a wide consensus that the return of the Taliban has distinct repercussions for Afghanistan, its neighbors, the surrounding region, and the world. As a result, most world government leaders, particularly in the surrounding regional security complexes, are concerned about the emergence of a radical state in Afghanistan and are looking for ways to halt the exportation of fanaticism in the name of Islam into their territories.

The Taliban has had a unique historical trajectory. Some members were mujahideen fighting against the Soviet invasion; they then formed a separate insurgency (pre-1996), became a semi-recognized statehood (1996–2001), were deposed from power, and then started another insurgency against the new Afghan government and coalition forces (2001–2020), and finally controlled the Afghanistan regime in August 2021 searching for gaining formal recognition from the international community to release funds and help stave off a humanitarian crisis that people suffer in Afghanistan statehood.

It is important to recall that between 1996 to 2001, during the governance of the Taliban in Afghanistan, two of the Gulf Arab countries -Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)- extended recognition to their regime.

In general, the core aspect of the relationship between the Gulf Arab countries and Afghanistan, especially concerning the Taliban regime, is intricately linked to their assessment of Iranian threats to their security. In this context, it is important to recognize that Afghanistan bears a similar significance for Iran as Yemen does to Saudi Arabia. Similarly, as Iran effectively exerted pressure on Saudi Arabia in Yemen with limited resources, Saudi Arabia might consider employing this strategy against Iran via Afghanistan.

Although the discourse of the new Taliban members may reflect a bit differently perceived to the world than their predecessors of twenty years ago, they remain fundamentally a religious ideology group that takes their political decisions through a very narrow and conservative prism that allows little space for anyone who has a different viewpoint.

Recently, the Gulf Arab governments have embraced a more progressive approach, diverging from fundamentalist ideologies. They exhibit little commonality with the Taliban and are eager to dissociate themselves from any comparisons to the religious rhetoric of the Taliban group.

It was remarked that throughout the era of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan spanning from 1979 to 1989, the Americans revived the notion of Jihad as a strategic instrument to oppose the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Almost all Mujahideen forces were systematically organized and endowed with financial baking, material resources, weaponry, strategic guidance, direction, and training by American entities, with the collaboration of Pakistan. The aim was to deplete the Soviet military capabilities and compel their withdrawal from Afghanistan. In the end, the United States’ strategy proved to be successful. Nonetheless, the involvement of the United States in the regional security complex facilitated the emergence of Al-Qaeda and numerous groups that echoed the same rhetoric once championed by the USA.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that there has been a significant internal evolution in the Middle East’s Complex. This evolution is due to new non-state actors, territorial disputes, competition for leadership, and rivalry based on power and ideological differences.

The dynamics of friendship and hostility among regional states have evolved, as have the power structures. Friendship can quickly turn into hostility, or it can turn into neutrality, which is a state in between friendship and hostility. This can also happen the other way around.

The Taliban’s government of Afghanistan has engendered diverse perspectives on the extent to which it might implement changes within Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, as well as the potential implications for regional equilibrium and, consequently, the security dynamics of the Gulf complex.

Certain analysts contend that the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan may not align with the long-term interests of all Gulf Arab countries. This is particularly pertinent given that the Taliban’s return has invigorated numerous Islamist factions within the region, who perceive this development as a triumph over the United States and its allied governments within the Gulf Security Complex. Historically, it is acknowledged that the Gulf Arab States supported the United States in its initial efforts to combat the Taliban before a strategic shift in US policy in the Middle East, encompassing Afghanistan, which ultimately led to a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, a singular stance from all Gulf governments regarding the Taliban is not anticipated.

On the other hand, some argue that the Gulf Arab countries may perceive the Taliban’s capacity to assert control over Afghanistan’s regions as a strategic opportunity to counterbalance the influence of jihadist Islamist factions that pose threats to the security complex of the Gulf. In this context, the Gulf Arab countries were reluctant to utilize coercive diplomacy against the Taliban, as such measures might endanger the stability of the Taliban regime. There exists a concern that a breakdown of order within Afghanistan might unwittingly create opportunities for jihadist groups to assert their influence, which could result in consequences that reverberate throughout their respective complex. Nevertheless, they do not operate within the parameters of Gulf regionalism; rather, they participate in bilateral interactions.

This article investigates the potential effects of the reestablishment of the Taliban government in Afghanistan on the Gulf Arab Security Complex.

The main research question underlying this article is as follows:

1. How does the Taliban’s return affect the Gulf Arab Security Complex?

To help answer the research question, two operational questions are used as follows:

1. How does the Taliban’s return affect the perceptions of the Gulf Arab countries?

2. What security changes has the Taliban’s return generated in the Gulf Arab Security Complex?

The literature review is divided into two primary themes. The first theme explores the Taliban’s historical and contemporary transformation. Arguments have been made that the Taliban has undergone an ideological transformation from traditional Islam at its beginning to a strategic approach in contemporary times (Kotokey and Borthakur, 2021; Terpstra, 2020). In addition, some scholars stated that the Taliban’s historical trajectory from its inception in 1994–2001 demonstrates that the organization strategically allied itself with several transnational jihadist factions, most prominently Al Qaeda and other networks, which significantly contributed to the emergence of ISIS in subsequent years. Nevertheless, some studies concluded that the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) has maintained a contradictory relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan since its establishment in January 2015. IS-K, a branch of ISIS, has been engaging in a competition with the Taliban for material and symbolic jihad resources, encouraging Taliban members to defect, and opposing the Taliban’s domestically oriented Jihad policy. Nevertheless, the Taliban and IS-K can be considered components of a broader jihadist movement that is characterized by concurrent factors of conflict and collaboration for resources. Although this has resulted in significant friction between the two factions, their integration within the social and intellectual framework of the jihadist movement alleviated their fight over resources (Ibrahimi and Akbarzadeh, 2020).

The second theme focused on the Taliban’s interactions with Gulf states since its formation. It highlighted the significance of cross-border political identities and ideologies in increasing the likelihood of conflict and tensions in the Gulf Arab region. Additionally, there was a conclusion that some leaders perceive they can leverage these identities to strengthen their control over neighboring states, including garnering support from local populations for military initiatives. In this regard, ideas serve as a source of empowerment for some individuals while posing a threat to others. At the intersection of ideology and state authority, social constructs become tools and threats, as they can enhance a leader’s ability to influence external circumstances or be viewed as risks to the internal stability of regimes. The Gulf Arab Region’s main conflict is over political-ideological leadership with Iran and Saudi Arabia, who represent Shia and Sunni Islam, respectively. They also face Islamic leadership challenges in Afghanistan. The 1979 Iranian revolution heightened the rivalry with Saudi Arabia for Muslim state leadership, including anti-monarchism, anti-Western sentiment, and sectarian discord (Gause, 2010; Harpviken, 2010; Weinbaum, 2021; Shayan, 2017; Kumar, 2019).

This article focused on the implications from August 2021 until December 2024.

The article employs a qualitative research methodology to examine the implications of the Taliban regime within the context of the Gulf Security Complex. This analysis emphasizes Barry Buzan’s theoretical logic of “security” through the lens of the Regional Security Governance concept. In 1983, Barry Buzan put forth the concept of “security complex,” referring to a collective of states whose primary security concerns are so intricately interconnected that their national securities cannot be viewed apart from each other. (Buzan, 1983) In 1986, with Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, Buzan developed his narrative emphasizing that the security complex is distinctly defined by the interactions among units in security (Buzan et al., 1998). The connections that link a security complex may be geographical, political, strategic, historical, economic, or cultural. (Buzan, 1983)

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver molded the “Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)” which asserts that regions operate as substructures within the international system, characterized by their power relations and patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

First, power relations function at a regional level and are recognized through a regional balance of power, whereby powers with no direct link to one another take part in the same network of relationships. The Regional Security Complex (RSC), can be examined through the lens of polarity, which includes unipolar to bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar configurations, exactly as the international system of which they are substructures (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

Second, concerning patterns of amity and enmity. Amity refers to friendly relations or at the very least expectations of protection and support between States, whereas enmity refers to relationships of suspicion and fear. Amity and enmity patterns arise from various origins, including border disputes, interests in ethnically linked groups, and ideological alignments, as well as longstanding historical connections, whether positive or negative (Buzan, 1983).

Buzan asserts that local states frequently pursue external support in defeating domestic rivals. He asserted that external actors exert significantly less influence on the local pattern of amity and enmity than they do with power distribution. He highlighted that external actors typically prioritize their interests, thus following the local pattern of enmity is the most straightforward method to penetrate a local complex. External powers will consequently bolster rather than disrupt the existing pattern of local enmity until they assert their presence in the respective countries or integrate into the local complex (Buzan, 2016).

Buzan argued that new conflicts could arise and alter established priorities (Buzan, 2016). He also noted that power relations are in constant flux, with patterns of amity and enmity occasionally changing as well (Buzan, 2016).

This article examines the impact of the Taliban’s resurgence on the power relations among regional powers and the alterations in amity and enmity within the Gulf Security Complex.

Buzan identified four potential regional security complexes that this article will utilize to analyze the impact of the Taliban’s resurgence on the Gulf Security Complex: (1) Maintenance of the status quo, wherein the foundational structure of the local complex—power distribution and patterns of amity and enmity—remains largely unaltered. This outcome does not ensure the absence of changes. Alternatively, it suggests that, in general, the changes have either strengthened or not significantly undermined the structure. (2) The internal transformation of a local complex transpires when its fundamental structure changes within the confines of its current external boundary. Substantial changes in power relations or a notable transformation in the patterns of amity and enmity can precipitate such change. (3) The external transformation refers to changing a complex’s configuration by either enlarging or contracting its current outside boundary; and (4) overlay, which means that one or more external powers directly enter the local complex, thereby undermining the traditional security dynamic (Buzan, 2016).

This part of the article defines the conceptual framework focusing on Security Governance and Gulf Security Complex.

1. Security Governance

Traditional theoretical frameworks for security are increasingly perceived as inadequate in addressing the declining frequency of interstate conflicts and the emergence of non-traditional, non-state security threats and actors such as terrorism, civil wars, cyber warfare, and transnational crime. This is accurate, as non-state actors and networks, unbound by a specific geographic region, are progressively the instigators of these security threats (Zyla and Kammel, 2013).

Governance acknowledges that no singular governing entity, whether public or private, can address the multifaceted, intricate, and evolving challenges stemming from the increasing global interconnection of economics, societies, and political cultures (Zyla and Kammel, 2013).

Security governance serves as an interdisciplinary analytical instrument that integrates seamlessly into the wider discussions of security and governance. It specifically appropriates the security discourse by recognizing the prevalence of threats beyond those associated with state military defense. Consequently, security governance acknowledges and values a broader security agenda that extends beyond military considerations. Security governance recognizes the diminishing relevance of state-centric paradigms in international politics and the emergence of various private and public entities in security decisions. The security governance framework recognizes the delegation of authority, the coordination and management process among multiple stakeholders within the security sector, and the outsourcing of significant security responsibilities by governments to various international entities. It suggests a fragmentation of governmental authority, a lack of power dynamics, and the presence of mutual trust among network members (Zyla and Kammel, 2013).

The concept of security governance is defined by five key characteristics: heterarchy; the engagement of numerous actors, both public and private; formal and informal institutionalization; ideational relationships among actors, shaped by norms and understandings as well as formal regulations; and, ultimately, purpose (Webber et al., 2004).

The security governance strategy is categorized into four types: assurance (post-conflict involvement), prevention (pre-conflict intervention), compulsion (military intervention), and protection (internal security). These categories fulfill two purposes: institution building and conflict resolution, and they employ two types of governance instruments: persuasive (economic, political, and diplomatic) and coercive (military intervention and policing). All four security governance categories can be pursued simultaneously (Zyla and Kammel, 2013).

1. Gulf Security Complex

Buzan and Weaver’s thesis on regional security complexes posits that the polarity of regional powers has influenced security dynamics in the Middle East. This exemplifies a standard conflict dynamic of amity and enmity, wherein interactions among regional powers influence security politics (Jarzabek, 2018).

Experts in security studies refer to the Gulf region as the Sub-Regional Security Complex within the Middle East Security Complex. It encompasses all countries bordering the Gulf waterway: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (Yossef, 2020).

The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 served as the catalysts for the creation of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which began in the early 1980s. This organization maintains its significance as a loose entity yet a relatively effective collective, uniting Gulf monarchs in their shared pursuit of regime security, territorial integrity, and a cohesive alignment of interests among the Gulf Arab states (Soubrier, 2019). This region evolved into a conductive setting for conflict through three phases. The initial point of conflict lies in the discord between Arabic countries and Iran, rooted in Islamic ideologies that differ between Shia and Sunni sects. The second conflict that arose between Arab countries was between the Saudi Arabia-led Gulf Council Arab members and Iraq. The third one was between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the southern region of the Gulf, which also encompassed the internal strife within Yemen, resulting in multiple civil wars (Algaoud and Kumar, 2021).

The complex is characterized by deeply interconnected and cross-regional conflicts among the relevant actors. Some argued that after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on August 2, 1990, and the subsequent successful establishment of an international coalition under UN auspices, led directly by the US, the US has emerged as a dominant power in the Gulf, exerting a more significant influence on the region’s politics and economy than the local governments (Hollis, 2005; Sick, 2018).

Most US forces in Operation Desert Storm remained in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC states and at sea. Additionally, every GCC state established defense agreements with the USA, leading to joint military training and the acquisition of weapons to improve their capabilities (Hollis, 2005; Sick, 2018).

Following the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the George W. Bush administration introduced the “Greater Middle East Initiative,” which redefined the “Middle East Initiative” and transformed the Middle East Security Complex to encompass the twenty-two Arab nations, Israel, Turkey in Europe, and Pakistan and Afghanistan in South Asia. Consequently, the Middle East Security Complex has broadened to encompass Afghanistan due to the US overlay exerted in the Gulf Security Complex and Afghanistan (Güney and Gökcan, 2010; Stewart, 2005).

In this context, one could contend that the United States’s overlay in the region acted as a foundation for a new dynamic, wherein Iraq relinquished its status as a regional power within the Gulf Security Complex and instead became a focal point of rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially in the aftermath of the US war on Afghanistan and Iraq post-9/11. This rivalry persisted until the rise of small states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, alongside violent non-state actors like al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which significantly influenced both regional and global dynamics.

International dynamics have significantly shaped security dilemmas, leading to the rise of self-sufficient systems. The ramifications became glaringly evident after the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, which dismissed the legitimate concerns of various Gulf Arab countries. Additionally, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan painted a grim picture for these countries, fueling their perception that the US prioritized its interests by negotiating with Iran and the Taliban and sidelining their security needs. In this intricate landscape, every state grapples with a security dilemma, wary of how their peers project power, which only deepens regional tensions.

This article had a descriptive-analytical design and was conducted through library research and review of related researches published in English and Arabic.

1. Primary data: documents, reports and speeches.

2. Secondary data: books, articles, papers, newspapers and social media platforms.

This article analyzed the perceptions of seven Gulf Arab countries, characterized by their diversity. The initial part focused on the Perceptions of Gulf Arab countries regarding the Taliban regime during its first period of governance. The second focuses on the current period of the Taliban regime, which began in August 2021. The third discussed the Gulf Arab Security Complex after the Taliban’s Comeback.

Gulf Arab countries do not share borders with Afghanistan. Their connections with other regional power relations have a significant influence on the majority of their current perspectives on Afghanistan.

The apprehension regarding a Soviet-supported communist regime in Afghanistan led Saudi Arabia and various Gulf countries to use their considerable financial resources and connections to the expanding Madrasa network in Pakistan. This initiative aimed to cultivate and prepare Muslim fighters ready to traverse the border and combat under the banner of Islam. Consequently, the emerging generation of Madrasas exhibited a greater emphasis on the concept of holy war rather than on the pursuit of religious scholarship (Halverson, 2010).

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989 created a power vacuum that resulted in persistent conflict. A cohort of Pashtun Madrasa students, identifying as the Taliban— derived from the Arabic word Talib, meaning “student”—gathered in Kandahar to terminate the civil war among the mujahedin that ensued after the 1992 disintegration of the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan (Halverson, 2010; Ibrahimi and Akbarzadeh, 2020).

The Taliban was founded in 1994, seized control of Kabul in 1996, and governed most of Afghanistan until they fell by a U.S.-led military operation in 2001.

The historical context of the movement indicates that the Taliban is more accurately characterized as a consequence of Cold War tensions and regional dynamics in South Asia rather than by any sectarian ideology, whether Sunni or another.

It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the legitimacy of the Taliban government in Afghanistan after it took power in 1996. On the other side, other Gulf Arab countries didn’t formally acknowledge the Taliban government.

It is crucial to highlight that throughout the 1990s, these countries informally supported a group of militant Arabs in Afghanistan who were engaged in combating the Soviet Union. Saudi Osama Bin Laden had a prominent role in this endeavor. This group eventually transformed into what is now known as al Qaeda. They proclaimed a “holy war” against the United States’ presence in the Arab Land, viewing it as a contemporary crusade aimed at protecting Israel and securing oil reserves in the Gulf Countries.

This part will analyze the framework surrounding the perceptions held by the Gulf Arab countries, focusing on the various determinants influencing each country.

Saudi Arabia provided the Taliban with the most economic aid they had. However, after Al Qaeda-linked suicide bombers attacked the U.S. Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, Saudi Arabia severed relations with the Taliban as a result of Mullah Muhammed Omar’s refusal to surrender Osama bin Laden following the assault (Yousafzai, 2022).

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States reported no evidence that the Saudi government, as an institution or senior Saudi officials, individually financed the organization. The investigation found that it does not rule out the possibility that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with substantial Saudi official sponsorship redirected monies to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda seems to have depended on a central group of financial facilitators who solicited funds from donors and fundraising efforts, mostly in the Gulf region and Saudi Arabia. Some donors were aware of the ultimate destination of their contributions; many were not. Al Qaeda and its affiliates exploited the Islamic practice of Zakat charity (USA, 2004).

Following the 2001 war in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia supported the Hamid Karzai-led Afghan government’s reconstruction efforts and offered direct foreign aid while keeping a low profile in the region. They seem to be evading the intricate involvement with Afghanistan they had undertaken with significant enthusiasm but failed to yield satisfactory results. In September 2008 and February 2009, Saudi Arabia conducted two rounds of covert negotiations at the request of the Afghan government. Saudi Arabia significantly facilitated the establishment of direct high-level communications among the Karzai government, the Taliban, and the militant faction of Hezb-e Islami. The discussions centered on prospective power-sharing arrangements in Afghanistan, with the Saudi government proposing refuge for the senior leadership of the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami, contingent upon a forthcoming political resolution to the conflict. Nevertheless, the Taliban authorities have said that their senior leadership does not view Saudi Arabia as a legitimate broker, considering the kingdom to have betrayed them by aligning with Western countries (Steinberg and Woermer, 2013).

The UAE’s attitudes regarding the Taliban initially aligned with those of Saudi Arabia. Thus, it adhered to the Saudi position about their backing for the Taliban and subsequently their severance of connections with the group. Following the 2001 war, the UAE began an individual policy.

The UAE provided the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with access to its ports and territory, overflight clearances, and essential logistical support. The UAE forces constituted the sole Arab combat contingent in Afghanistan, mostly engaging in the tumultuous southern region. Their principal activities included forging relationships with local populations, developing healthcare and educational institutions, and erecting Masjids (Katzman, 2022; Steinberg, 2020; Sherwood, 2017; Reuters, 2018; Ulrichsen, 2014).

Qatar did not recognize the Taliban regime in the 1990s, despite having cordial working relationships with Afghanistan.

During the 2010s, Qatar established itself as a diplomatic intermediary for Western powers. Qatar significantly contributed to the negotiations between the Taliban and the United States during the Obama administration’s efforts to conclude the war in Afghanistan by sponsoring peace talks. In 2013, the Taliban established its permanent political headquarters in Qatar with the endorsement and assistance of the United States, which determined that keeping Taliban leaders there would be more efficient than tracking them across multiple and shifting global sites. Although Qatar helped the Taliban’s presence in various manners, it did not publicly acknowledge the Taliban’s existence (Harpviken, 2021).

Additionally, in 2014, Qatar facilitated the release of US Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl to the United States after being held captive by the Taliban for five years. In return, five Taliban inmates from Guantanamo Bay were sent to Qatar (Fance24, 2021).

The US negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar resulted in the 2020 Doha Agreement, which defined the conditions for the eventual withdrawal of US troops in 2021 (Fance24, 2021).

Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Iraq did not have a definitive stance toward the Taliban. Kuwait and Oman maintained their hedging regional policies, while Bahrain persisted in its backing of Saudi Arabia.

Iraq faced the aftermath of its 1980–1988 war with Iran and its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which the U.S.-led coalition forces ended on February 28, 1991. Additionally, in December 1996, Iraq encountered a failed coup attempt against President Saddam Hussein. Also, the U.S. and British forces engaged in military attack operations in Iraq during the initial rule of the Taliban (BBC-News, 2018; Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], n.d.).

Since the fall of the first Taliban rule, Afghanistan has not held strategic significance for the Gulf countries on its own; rather, its relevance is derived from its geographical location to Iran, which exerts an expansive influence in Afghanistan, Yemen, Bahrain, and frequently in Saudi Arabia, thereby affecting the complex security dynamics of the Gulf region.

In this regard, the Gulf Arab countries believe that the new Taliban government may align with Iran’s political governance system, and they are remaining tuned and actively seeking to preserve a balanced relationship with all local parties in Afghanistan.

Additionally, the Gulf Countries are concerned about Afghanistan potentially transforming into an ungoverned territory that could facilitate the activities of violent extremist organizations. However, it is unlikely that they will engage in active cooperation with the Taliban against ISIS—K for two primary reasons: their apprehension regarding a Yemen-like situation characterized by prolonged conflict and their assessment that ISIS—K cannot currently extend its reach into the Gulf region (Fontenrose, 2021).

This part will analyze the framework of the Gulf Arab Countries’ perceptions by examining the determinants of each country.

In December 2015, Saudi Arabia proclaimed the formation of the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), and Afghanistan participated in the coalition (Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, n.d.).

The former government of Afghanistan articulated in 2018 that it serves as a front-line state against more than twenty domestic, regional, and transnational terrorist groups (Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2018).

It is noteworthy that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation hosted a two-day international conference in 2018 with over 100 religious scholars from 37 countries, including Afghanistan, with the theme “Peace and Stability in Afghanistan.” This gathering culminated in a declaration following extensive discussions on the Afghan situation. The declaration articulated that the government of Afghanistan is Islamic; its populace is Muslim, and engaging in hostilities against Muslims is deemed illicit per the textual authority of the Quran (Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies [CSRS], 2018).

Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Taliban’s resurgence was conscious of the changing geopolitical dynamics in the region. It considered the reduced US presence and concerns over Iran’s influence on factions countering the Kingdom’s interests (Poornima, 2022).

In this sense, it is possible to comprehend the statement issued by the Saudi Arabian foreign ministry, which was reported by the official media: “The kingdom stands with the choices that the Afghan people make without interference” (Reuters, 2021a, b, c).

Saudi Arabia seeks to eliminate any association with the Taliban as a religious entity since they have transitioned towards a less conservative and more liberal stance. Saudi Arabia exhibits limited similarities with the Taliban. The Taliban adheres to the Sunni doctrine, similar to that of the Saudis. Nevertheless, their comprehension of Islam currently demonstrates a more pronounced affinity with Iran than with Saudi Arabia (Siddiqui, 2021).

In the UAE, the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has raised security concerns, as it has invigorated jihadist organizations throughout the region and the UAE worries about becoming a target for these groups due to its vocal opposition to religious extremism (Poornima, 2022; Ramani, 2021).

The UAE permitted former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani to live in exile in the emirates. The UAE also took in Afghan air force pilots who had flown their aircraft to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. More broadly, after the Taliban takeover, thousands of Afghan refugees fled to the UAE, where they have been housed in temporary facilities known as the Emirates Humanitarian City (Katzman, 2022; Sharp, 2023; The Economist, 2021).

Conversely, the UAE restricted former officials’ ability to engage in political activities in its territories. This move signaled to the Taliban that the UAE would not permit its territory to be exploited for anti-Taliban activities (Cafiero, 2013).

Several months after its suspension, the UAE has reopened its embassy in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan (Majeed, 2021). In this sense, the UAE stated that isolating the Taliban is not a viable international response, and it is essential to sustain a measured approach in interactions with the Taliban as a de facto authority to produce positive outcomes in any area where the international community is concerned (The UAE, 2022) In August 2024, the UAE recognized the credentials of the Taliban’s ambassador (The Associated Press, 2014).

The UAE also shares economic ties with the Taliban; in this regard, the UAE employs humanitarian aid as a means to establish a closer and more balanced partnership with the Taliban. Also, on September 8, 2022, the Taliban and the UAE-based firm GAAC Solutions signed a contract to provide flight services and manage planes landing and taking off at important airports in Afghanistan. The flight guidance services contract included equipping the facilities and training of Afghan staff at the country’s three major airports: one in the capital of Kabul, the second in Herat, in the west, and the third in Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan, which was a Taliban stronghold during the 20-year war against U.S. and NATO forces (Faiez, 2022). According to Ghulam Jelani Popal, Deputy Director of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, the contract is set to span of 10 years (Yawar, 2022).

It is pertinent to note that GAAC Solutions purportedly engaged in a $47 million service contract in 2020 with the Afghan government, which received help from the United States then. The agreement aimed to oversee multiple facets of the country’s airport, including ground handling, information technology, and security (Faiez, 2022).

Furthermore, the UAE asserts that Islamic countries ought to engage with the Taliban to promote religious and cultural dialogue to uphold diversity and eradicate discrimination. In this context, the Islamic Cooperation Organization plays a vital role, with the UAE as a member actively participating in these initiatives (The UAE, 2022).

After the Taliban came back, Qatar temporarily assumed responsibility for managing Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport. Additionally, Qatar Airways, a state-owned airline, conducted charter flights to carry out many foreign nationals who wanted to leave Afghanistan, while Qatari Special Forces ensured ground security (Cornwell, 2022). At the same time, on November 12, 2021, Qatar consented to act as the United States’ “protecting power” in Afghanistan (USA, 2021; Pamuk and Landay, 2021). In this context, it is important to note that it had a significant impact on the US President Joe Biden administration’s designation of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally in early 2022 (USA, 2022).

Qatar deems it essential to engage with the Taliban, the current governing authority, to facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, Qatar persistently encourages and urges the Taliban to meet their commitments and obligations to the international community (USA, 2021).

Bahrain’s approach to the Taliban is not overtly direct. It announced its intention to engage in discussions with other Gulf Arab monarchies concerning the situation in Afghanistan, leveraging its role as the chair of the Gulf Cooperation Council during that period, (Reuters, 2021b; GCC, 2014) and although it shared the many countries that expressed their condemnation of the caretaker government’s decision in Afghanistan to prohibit women from employment in local and international non-governmental organizations within the country (Bahrain News Agency, 2022), it underscored the necessity of honoring Afghanistan’s religious beliefs and traditions to promote peace and stability both regionally and globally (Bahrain News Agency, 2021a; Afghanistan-International, 2022). On the other hand, it kept the humanitarian assistance provided through the Royal Humanitarian Foundation and its collaboration with UN agencies in this area (Hakimi, 2022; Bahrain News Agency, 2021b; UNHCR, 2022).

Kuwait authorized the transit of 5,000 Afghan evacuees; certain Americans and U.S. Embassy staff safely traveled from Afghanistan to the United States via Kuwait (Reuters, 2021a). Generally speaking, Kuwait did not have a distinct stance against the Taliban; it endorsed the joint policy of the GCC towards the Taliban and Afghanistan.

Oman adopted a prudent position regarding the comeback of the Taliban. Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi emphasized the necessity of engaging constructively with the Taliban to promote their participation in solutions and resolutions. He articulated that the past 25 years have demonstrated that perceiving them solely as an ideological adversary is unlikely to result in success (The-Soufan-Center, 2023). On 17 September 2024, the Afghan embassy in Oman was officially reopened, with oversight from the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry (Muscat-Daily, 2024).

The Iraqi government appeared to be assessing its situation after the total withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, particularly regarding the potential rebirth of ISIS if a similar pullout occurred in its territory. Note that security deteriorated after US forces left Iraq in 2011. Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish tensions rose, leading to ISIS in 2014. At this moment, global and regional players agreed that urgent action was needed to stop ISIS’s expansion. In September 2014, the US initiated The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS by December 2014. In 2017, the alliance announced the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Jarzabek, 2018; Mccary, 2024). In this context, it is important to observe that the Taliban have achieved some success in countering ISIS-K; however, they continue to face challenges in dismantling the group’s covert urban cells and in preventing assaults on vulnerable targets (Mccary, 2024).

The comeback of the Taliban rule poses both challenges and opportunities for the Gulf Arab countries. Certain countries of the complex find it beneficial to alter the internal balance of power by adopting positions that enhance their influence inside the complex.

The Gulf Arab countries, excluding Iraq, are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and have chosen to integrate into this organization in response to their perceived threats from Iraq and Iran. However, following the 2003 defeat of Iraq by American and British forces, the dynamics of the complex transformed. The United States assumed a more prominent position in Gulf political dynamics, initially under Paul Bremer, who led the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and administrated Iraq for almost one year. On May 16, 2003, Bremer ordered the expulsion of Baath party members from the Iraqi government, followed by the disbandment of the Iraqi army on May 23, 2003. Evidence suggests that specific government elites and military factions facilitated the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The ousting of Saddam Hussein propelled Iraqi Shia to leadership roles, while Iran played a substantial role in Iraq’s development, raising apprehensions among the Gulf Arab governments. The weakness of Iraq transformed the regional power dynamics, redirecting the sub-complex’s emphasis primarily toward Saudi Arabia.

Following its defeat in 2001, the Taliban has transformed into an insurgent group that predominantly focuses on Afghanistan. Certain Gulf countries have engaged with the Taliban, especially following the 2010 upheavals throughout the Arab world, resulting in a revised framework of interaction in the expanding Middle East region. The 2015 American agreement with Iran and the initiation of negotiations between the Taliban and the American administration in Qatar have revised the rules of engagement into the new framework.

In the early phase of the Taliban’s rule, the Gulf Arab monarchs predominantly depended on the United States and Western countries. The Gulf countries have traditionally been important oil suppliers to the United States; however, the rise in American domestic oil production has reduced their importance as suppliers. This has led to a restructuring of power dynamics, prompting the Gulf countries to view themselves as less significant and influential in their relation to the United States. Moreover, Gulf countries have commenced economic diversification initiatives to reduce their dependence on oil and develop sustainable, diverse economies.

Since 1988, the Gulf Arab countries have prioritized their relations with the European Union at the GCC level. At present, there is a noticeable increase in advanced connections at the individual country level with Russia, China, France, and others, in addition to the GCC level with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Before the comeback of the Taliban, there existed considerable rivalry among Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The contest for influence in regional decision-making was evident in the negotiations concerning the establishment of relations with the Taliban. Qatar played a pivotal role in facilitating the negotiations between the various American administrations and the Taliban.

In the wake of the Taliban’s comeback, the six Gulf countries exhibit a shared recognition of the necessity to engage with the Taliban. However, certain countries among them, having already adopted competitive positions within this intricate complex, are keen on augmenting their capabilities and optimizing their influence strategically. It is clear that the units within the Gulf Arab Complex depend on foreign global powers; however, it is important to recognize that the dynamics and characteristics of these relationships have transformed since the first rule of the Taliban.

The UAE hosted Ashraf Ghani, the leader of the former Afghan government, and took measures to prevent any further escalation of opposition against the Taliban from this government.

Saudi Arabia, adhering to its hedging strategy concerning the Taliban, focused on monitoring and pinpointing opportunities that would require a more active engagement.

It is important to note that the Taliban regime differs significantly from the royal models observed in the Gulf Arab countries, except Iraq, which is presently experiencing internal civil conflicts. So, the Gulf Arab monarchies are very careful to avoid any unintended events that could cause the Taliban to side with Islamist groups like ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda against monarchies and work with them. All these groups are vying for recognition as legitimate leaders within the Muslim communities.

When you carefully look at what the Taliban have said about the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people, which is a critical issue for Muslims in the region, it becomes clear that the Taliban’s principal concern is Afghanistan and that they don’t want to get involved in the internal politics of other countries. This may stem from the Taliban’s intention to safeguard its sovereignty against external interference in its internal matters (Taneja and Shekhawat, 2024).

In this situation, the Gulf Arab countries’ priorities are the same as the Taliban’s when it comes to internal issues: they don’t want other Islamic groups in the region to follow their ideas or rebel against the Gulf Arab countries’ governments.

Currently, the Taliban are waging a war against ISIS-K. This regional radical Islamist organization has connections to ISIS and may present a considerable threat to the Gulf Arab countries. Nevertheless, the stated objective of ISIS-K is to destabilize Iran, as they concentrate on expanding their operations within Iranian borders and targeting Iranian interests throughout the region. This may rationally amplify the pressures on Iran, diminishing its capabilities, which could subsequently influence the equilibrium of power among the Gulf Arab countries. However, examining the historical context of al-Qaida sheds light on the complexities of this situation. Al-Qaida commenced with the backing and collaboration of Gulf Arab countries, strategically opposing the Soviet Union and its adversaries. Subsequently, it directed its focus towards these particular countries.

Furthermore, the ISIS and its Afghan counterpart, the ISIS-K, have consistently articulated their objective to protect Islam, implement sharia law, and restore what they refer to as the “golden era” of the caliphate. If ISIS seeks to defend Islam, it prompts an examination of his audience of why they have neglected the Israeli aggression in Gaza, which has led to significant Muslim casualties and displacement.

The lack of action by ISIS concerning the Palestinian people reveals a discrepancy between its declared goals and its true priorities. ISIS has predominantly focused its violent actions against Muslim local communities. One perspective suggests that these groups intentionally create turmoil within Islamic communities, which may be advantageous to geopolitical actors who prefer Muslim countries that are less resistant to foreign influence.

In this scenario, Gulf Arab monarchies and Iraq would find common ground with the Taliban on the necessity of implementing a strategy to enhance their legitimacy and establish a new framework for collective security against violent Islamist groups and movements.

The Gulf Arab Countries constitute a segment of the Gulf Subcomplex within the broader Middle East Complex. The Gulf sub-region consists of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iraq, as well as Iran, the only non-Arab country in this sub-region. Any change in security in one country affects others’ security assessments.

The Gulf presently exhibits a multipolar sub-regional structure, where the balance of power acts as the primary influence among regional actors. We can classify the state actors of the Gulf as regional great powers, emphasizing Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular. Small regional powers include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, alongside external powers, primarily the United States. Before 2003, the U.S. effectively restrained Iraq, a significant regional power, following its occupation of Kuwait in 1991. In 2003, the involvement of coalition forces and military operations led to Iraq becoming a war-torn state. As a result of this ongoing struggle for domestic security and stability, regional and global actors now view Iraq more as a battleground than as a significant player in its own right.

Actually, no country in the Gulf can possess sufficient power to dictate the policy decisions of others. The Gulf Arab countries are encountering a significant challenge to their internal security and stability due to the rise of the so-called Islamic awakening.

All the Gulf countries display Islamic symbols; all of them have affiliations with the Islamic Cooperation Organization. At one point, the Gulf countries employed Islamic groups as instruments to further their strategic objectives. Nonetheless, these groups altered their positions in various circumstances concerning their sponsors. The Taliban implemented this policy during their first rule in Afghanistan, specifically targeting Saudi Arabia. At present, numerous Gulf Arab countries are attempting to embrace a more secular narrative that encompasses the differences within their societies. It is noteworthy that all of the Gulf Arab countries accommodate individuals from various religions and cultures.

The article elucidated the significant distinction in the Gulf Arab countries’ perspectives from the initial emergence of the Taliban to their subsequent authority in Afghanistan. The formation of the Taliban and its slogans have had a significant impact on the sectarian political landscape in the Gulf countries.

In the Gulf Subcomplex, Iran exerts considerable influence in the sectarian conflicts occurring in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. The legacy of prolonged Sunni political and economic supremacy in the Gulf Arab countries contributes significantly to the current instability of the security situation. The ISIS has recently exerted significant influence on this situation, acting as a key player in the volatile internal conflicts in Iraq. The emergence of ISIS-K in Afghanistan has introduced additional layers of complexity to the political and military landscape. The primary purpose of ISIS-K’s declaration is to target Iran, its allies, and the Taliban.

As a result, Gulf Arab countries might consider backing ISIS-K’s activities aimed at undermining the Iranian regime. Their intention is not to undermine the Taliban regime, which has complied with their most demands regarding Iran. The rise of radical Islamist organizations like ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brothers in the Middle East Complex may have implications for the stability of Gulf Arab countries, especially Iraq. ISIS positions itself as a post-state entity, transcending traditional Westphalian definitions of a state by asserting the establishment of a trans-state caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Considering its efficiency and military capabilities, ISIS presents significant challenges for the Gulf Arab countries.