...David M. McEvoy; John K. Stranlund We explore the formation of coalitions to provide a public good when some players are averse to payoff inequality between coalition members and non-members. A model is presented to demonstrate how inequality-averse preferences could cause players to deliberately...

... if farmers could collectively monitor and control groundwater use, but the provision of these public goods is blocked by non-cooperation and weak institutions. Every farmer complains about the others, but no farmer has been willing or able to shift from selfish to collective behavior. This paper...

... the provision of public goods in the absence of a strong regulatory body. Most importantly, the agreement remains highly effective even in the face of uncertainty regarding the benefits from public good provision. Our results suggest that making ex ante deposits, even non-deterrent ones, serves...

...Nathan W. Chan This paper develops and analyzes a model of misinformation in markets for so-called “green” products, and more generally, impure public goods. Unlike previous studies of green goods, I account for strategic interactions between consumers and consider equilibrium outcomes under...

...Dannenberg Astrid This study experimentally examines the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide a public good when the coalition members use different voting schemes to determine their commitment. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared...