... Q2 Q20 Q57 (1) x t + 1,1 , i = { m 4 , i , i [ x t , 4 , i + F ( ⋅ ) − k t , 4 , i ] + ∑ j ≠ i m 4 , j , i [ x t , 4 , j + F ( ⋅ ) − k t , 4 , j ] } Given...

... Belief-distorted Nash equilibrium Self-verification of beliefs C72 D83 D84 C61 Q20 Q56 Exploitation of common or interdependent renewable resources is one of the greatest challenges of contemporaneity. This issue encompasses a large variety of problems, among others high-seas...

... resource Common pool oligopoly Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium Q20 C72 C73 It is not unusual for studies of the economic dynamics of common pool resource exploitation to assume that the economic agents exploiting the resource are all identical. Yet, in many situations, the heterogeneity...

... threats when the stock is scarce. Entry Deterrence Multiple incumbents Common pool resources L12 Q20 D62 qi>0 * We thank the editors and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Charles Mason and the participants...

..., which may be finite or infinite). Differential games dynamic games environment Nash equilibrium timing games transboundary pollution Stackelberg equilibrium Q20 Q50 C73 One of the emerging trends in the mutually beneficial relationship between game theory and the social...