Guest editorial

Article Type: Guest editorial From: Safer Communities, Volume 13, Issue 1.

The belief that there was a disconnection between police forces and the communities they served and that this was responsible for eroding public trust and confidence in the police service underpinned the government's decision to institute a fundamental change to the governance of policing. Accordingly, the 2011 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act replaced police authorities with one directly elected police and crime commissioner. This reform applied to all police forces in England and Wales with the exception of the two forces that operate in London (the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London Police Force). Elections for these officials took place in November 2012 and they took office one week later.

This edition of Safer Communities focuses on this reform.

The first paper is written by Mathew Davies. This places the introduction of PCCs in an historical context by analysing key challenges to the tripartite system of police governance that occurred following the implementation of the 1964 Police Act. The paper draws particular attention to the importance of post-1964 developments to the reform that was initiated in the 2011 legislation, especially in connection with the politicization of the police and the erosion of the operational independence of chief constables.

It is also argued that although, in opposition after 1979, the Labour Party eagerly promoted the democratic accountability of the police service to local communities, when in office after 1997 they pursued many of the managerial reforms initiated by their Conservative predecessors which tended to distance the police from their local communities and enhance the control wielded over policing by central government. This created political space for the Coalition government to champion the PCC structure as a move towards democratic accountability of policing and which would ensure a focus on crime fighting.

The second paper is written by Liz Taylor.

This examines two key debates that have been associated with the introduction of PCCs – the politicization of policing and the operational independence of chief constables – both of which are stated to be “myths”. It is argued that the introduction of PCCs has been packaged in a way designed to bolster myths regarding the relationship between policing and democracy and that political objections to PCCs have largely failed to challenge them.

The paper sets about this task by contesting these myths. The view of the police as impartial and non-political is challenged by the argument that “the police have always been engaged in the attempt to maintain a ‘particular’ conception of good order which has tended to be tolerant of significant levels of inequality and injustice and to favour the interests of certain groups”. The doctrine of operational independence is also discussed in the context of an “enduring myth” of policing which obscures the fact that “policing activity is rarely shaped by the ‘law and the law alone’, it is shaped by ideas about who, what and where are most in need of policing”.

An important issue that relates to the introduction of PCCs is that of accountability – the extent to which the actions undertaken by these officials can be effectively scrutinized. This issue is dealt with in two papers that focus on Police and Crime Panels(PCP).

The first of these is by Stuart Lister who argues that “concerns about the limited role and powers of these new local scrutiny bodies […] can be understood partly by excavating the political context out of which they emerged” – primarily as a concession to the Liberal Democrats which did not figure in the Conservative Party's pre-election plans. The paper then details the functions of PCPs and in connection with their effectiveness (or lack thereof) argues that “political willingness to scrutinise can be patterned by embedded party loyalties”. In relation to this argument the paper provides a detailed discussion of the membership of the 41 PCPs, deriving its information from panel web sites.

Lister's paper considers the prospects and pitfalls of the effective scrutiny of PCCs by PCPs, an issue that is further developed by a second paper on PCPs written by Sophie Chambers. This account discusses the role of PCPs and is especially focused on Wales where uncertainty concerning the way in which the future policing arrangements in that Nation should be conducted has resulted in “unstable ground for the four politically different aligned Police and Crime Commissioners, supposedly working together on Wales-wide issues” and the National Assembly paying increased attention to how Commissioners are operating through the Welsh Affairs Committee.

Chambers documents the manner in which PCPs have failed to exercise their scrutiny roles effectively and to illustrate this devotes considerable attention to events in Gwent that ended the tenure of the force's Chief constable, Carmel Napier. She concludes that this episode highlights “the delicate matter of how a Chief Constable fits into the new policing governance framework”.

The final paper provides an assessment of the operations of PCCs and their conduct in office during the first year of their existence in order to consider whether a compelling case has yet been made for its retention as the principle method of police governance. It is written by Timothy Brain, now an Honorary Senior Research Fellow at Cardiff University and formerly Chief Constable of Gloucestershire.

Brain's paper discusses the background to the introduction of PCCs and the role that was given to them in the 2011 legislation. He examines the 2012 elections and the background of candidates and, on the basis of the low voter turnout concludes that this “was hardly evidence that there had pre-existed a democratic deficit that the public were desperate for single elected individuals to fill”.

The remainder of Brain's paper provides a detailed assessment of the performance of PCC since they took office in 2012. This discussion includes appointments made by PCCs, setting the precept level for 2013/2014 Council Tax, drawing up a Police and Crime Plan and their hiring and firing function. In providing this assessment he makes the important point that “for a measure that was theoretically all about fixing a supposed broken relationship between the police and public” there was “remarkably little in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act about routine public consultation”. In conclusion he points out that there is “no evidence that PCCs have been more effective in reducing crime and disorder and increasing public confidence in policing”.

The introduction of PCCs is a relatively recent innovation to the governance of policing and the subsequent development of the office will form the basis of later discussions in Safer Communities.

Peter Joyce

Principal Lecturer in Criminology based at Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK.