The purpose of this paper is to examine how institutional designs governing the executive-legislative relations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have weakened the government’s capacity to effectively govern the HKSAR.
This paper examines institutional designs and rules that govern Hong Kong’s executive-legislative relations. It uses the case of the HKSAR Legislative Council (LegCo) to illustrate the impacts of institutional designs and rules on the performance of political institutions and government performance.
This paper finds that institutional designs and rules do affect the performance of a political institution. This paper suggests changes to the institutional designs and rules that govern the operation of the HKSAR LegCo, and the interaction between the legislature and the executive so as to create a facilitative context for good governance.
Studies on governance in Hong Kong mostly focus on individual institution’s behavior and performance. This paper studies the problem of governance in Hong Kong from the perspective of executive-legislative relations. It adopts the institutional theory to examine the behavior, performance, and interaction between the legislative and executive branches.
