Managerial and legal accountability in state-owned enterprises: exploring financial sustainability through accounting for and reporting public service obligations

As a continent, Africa needs development in several areas, including infrastructure (Yaya et al., 2020), which underpins the reasoning behind the African Union’s Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2015). South Africa’s own developmental vision is encapsulated in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030: Our Future – Make It Work. South Africa’s NDP was adopted in 2013, the same year as the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and two years before the United Nations’ (UN’s) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030. The NDP prioritises job creation, poverty elimination, the reduction of inequality and growing an inclusive economy by 2030 (South Africa, 2012). According to the NDP 2030, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are crucial for achieving South Africa’s developmental goals; therefore, they should be effectively governed by robust corporate governance mechanisms to make meaningful contributions to these goals (South Africa, 2012). Thus, the financial sustainability of SOEs is key in terms of delivering public value and developmental agendas. However, the weak financial position of South African SOEs continues to pose a risk to the country’s finances and fiscal capacity (South Africa, 2023). This paper posits that an SOE is financially sustainable when its commercial operations can cover operating costs and debt service from its own revenues, and any public service obligations (PSOs) are explicitly costed and funded ex ante through transparent budget transfers that are visible in both the state budget and the SOE’s statements. In contrast, while ad-hoc bailouts, rolling deficits and reliance on guarantees may preserve solvency, they do not serve as evidence of sustainability. They obscure PSO costs, undermine accountability and transfer risk to the fiscus. This formulation aligns with our emphasis on distinguishing between social and commercial objectives and the reporting of results.

The SOEs’ ability to contribute to public value and development is contingent upon the structure and disclosure of funding, as well as the amount of funding. Governments can effectively deploy funds without concealing commercial underperformance by using predictable, ex-ante PSO transfers that are defined, calculated, appropriated and reported separately from the commercial account. AGSA documents for 2022–2023 indicate that ad-hoc injections and guarantees can stabilise cash flow in situations where PSOs and commercial activities are not segregated; however, this coincides with deficits, going-concern flags and inadequate spending quality. Consequently, in this paper, sustainability is a governance and reporting outcome, rather than a mere function of ongoing funding. “Strong operating and reporting practices” are regarded as necessary disciplines (e.g. PSO costing and disclosure) rather than sufficient evidence of sustainability. In its latest consolidated general report on national and provincial audit outcomes 2023–2024, Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA) (2025) notes that many ailing SOEs do not want to submit their financial statements for auditing purposes to AGSA or other audit and assurance companies (if they are not audited by AGSA). In many states, especially in developing states, SOEs usually have two objectives, and these objectives may be at odds with each other (Zanellato and Tiron-Tudor, 2022; Vakkuri et al., 2021; Luke, 2010) as the SOEs must meet both a social and a commercial purpose. One of the key good governance practices that SOEs should adopt and account for is how they discharge their public PSOs. In their reports, they should explain how they separate and manage potentially conflicting social and commercial objectives. This is crucial for the financial sustainability of SOEs, as their executives in many parts of the world often hide behind their PSOs to justify frequent balance sheet deficits and losses, which may necessitate substantial bailouts from the state. PSOs include the public goods and services that SOEs are expected to provide and perform, for which they may or may not receive direct compensation.

In this context, this paper explores PSO reporting by Schedule 2 and Schedule 3B South African SOEs (Lee and Stark, 1984). Odainkey and Simpson (2013) note that annual reports are a key tool for exploring accountability in SOEs. This is a sector that has been labelled as a drag on the South African economy as SOEs frequently require state bailouts due to their financial unsustainability (Masekoameng and Mpehle, 2018). AGSA (2025) notes that based on the audited 2022–2023 consolidated financial statements of SOEs, the total bailout given to SOEs in the last five years amounts to R², 13 billion (approximately US$119.92m). In total, 19 SOEs submitted their results and were audited in 2023–2024. Among these, the expenditure of five SOEs exceeded revenue; four SOEs had going concern issues/uncertainty; and 11 SOEs had material misstatements or limitations in their submitted financial statements. To substantiate references to bailouts and imprudent expenditures with systematic evidence, we use the Auditor-General of South Africa’s latest consolidated PFMA report (2022–23). AGSA’s consolidated audits document both (a) direct state subsidies and (b) non-compliant spending under the PFMA categories, which include fruitless and wasteful expenditure. During the last five years (2018 / 2020–2022 / 2023) of the current government, auditees reported R7.62 billion in pointless and wasteful expenditure, with 85% attributed to high-impact auditees; in the fiscal year 2022–2023, the total amounted to R1.73bn (R1.43bn from high-impact auditees). AGSA ascribes these losses chiefly to inadequate payment methods, uncompetitive procurement, suboptimal value for expenditures, deficient property and lease management and shortcomings in project management. In addition to excessive spending, unauthorised expenditures by departments was R4.59bn in 2022–2023 (R28.22bn over the past four years), while overspending by public bodies classified as irregular expenditure was R0.90bn in 2022–2023. Public entities concluded the 2022–2023 fiscal year with total deficits amounting to R12.73bn, prominently including Transnet’s deficit of R5.68bn, highlighting ongoing financial distress. In line with this demand, AGSA indicates that SOEs must execute viable turnaround strategies without depending on government bailouts. The government has provided guarantees of over R466.90bn to SOEs over many years, with a current exposure of R386.47bn. Eskom constitutes over 70% of these guarantees, indicating substantial fiscal risk in the event of defaults. AGSA identifies 21 Schedule 2 “major” public entities (SOEs); in the most recent audit cycle, 15 were audited by AGSA and 4 were audited by private sector auditors, with 2 excluded due to liquidation/mandate, thereby delineating the extent of these results.

This study is important as SOEs are needed for sustainable development in Africa. Considering the aspirations outlined in Agenda 2063 and the SDGs 2030, it is clear that SOEs have a crucial role to play. In this context, there is a need to improve the accountability and governance of SOEs through their reporting. According to Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005), SOEs that do not provide detailed reports do not serve the public interest (Manes-Rossi et al., 2021; Argento et al., 2019). This study, therefore, explores accountability in SOEs in South Africa to illustrate how they account to their shareholder, the South African government, regarding their PSOs. It is understood that SOEs’ public accountability and transparency increase when they account for their PSOs and follow new reporting methods such as integrated and sustainability reporting (Ruiz-Lozano et al., 2022; Manes-Rossi et al., 2021; Argento et al., 2019), rather than operating without recourse to their PSO performance and simply providing historical annual financial statements.

Using South Africa as a case study to assess the PSOs of SOEs appears justifiable for several reasons. Firstly, Wettenhall (2003) notes that SOEs with PSOs should preferably be organised as direct statutory corporations, which is how South African SOEs are organised. Secondly, the USA (2022) notes that South Africa employs an appropriate organisational/ownership model for its SOEs, as they focus on delivering public goods and services. Thirdly, South Africa is often lauded for the quality of its corporate governance and reporting practices, which are aided by the King III and IV principles and integrated reporting (Prinsloo and Maroun, 2020). Organisational reporting in the country should reflect these feats. Finally, South Africa has a strong legal and regulatory framework that spells out the requirements that SOEs must meet. Balbuena (2014, p. 17) confirms that research into South African SOEs is necessary:

Results from the content analysis indicate that some of the sampled SOEs disclose their PSOs, although their reports are not detailed. In this context, interviews revealed that there is no defined method that SOEs use for costing their PSOs. Instead, whenever SOEs undertake a public project, they either fund it directly using their own funds or receive funding through budgetary transfers if they can convince their owning department that they do not have enough money for the project. Furthermore, institutional actors charged with oversight do not encourage such disclosure.

Following this introduction, the institutional setting in South Africa is discussed, and the literature relating to SOEs and PSOs is reviewed. Thereafter, the theoretical framework and study methodology are presented. The results of the study are then analysed and interpreted, and their implications for the governance and accountability of SOEs are discussed. Recommendations for further research are also made.

The Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999 (PFMA), as amended, was enacted to regulate financial management in the national and provincial governments of South Africa, ensuring that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities are managed efficiently and effectively (South Africa, 1999). However, the PFMA does not specifically name or classify SOEs as a type of entity (South Africa, 1999). Schedule 2 of the PFMA covers major public entities, whereas Schedule 3B covers other SOEs (national government business enterprises). Schedules 2 and 3 in the PFMA deal with SOEs. The primary difference between Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 SOEs is that Schedule 2 SOEs are expected to raise funds to finance their operational activities and expansion programs, whereas Schedule 3 SOEs are not required to raise funds. South African SOEs are owned based on centralised and decentralised organising models. In the centralised model, SOEs are governed by a special ministry for SOEs, while in the decentralised model, SOEs are owned by their respective line ministries. In 2023, when this study was conducted, the shareholder ministry in South Africa was the Department of Public Enterprises, and it was responsible for seven SOEs: Alexkor, DENEL, ESKOM, SAA, SAE, SAFCOL and Transnet. The bulk of South Africa’s SOEs have a dual focus on social and commercial objectives. Because of their structure, it can be said that they prioritise social welfare over profit maximisation. Over 700 SOEs operate at the federal, state and local levels in South Africa today (United States of America (USA), Department of State, 2022).

South Africa’s SOEs have both commercial and social objectives, and in theory, social mandates should be prioritised over commercial mandates. However, as SOEs are managed by private sector role-players, in practice more attention is paid to commercial mandates than to social mandates. South Africa (2025) contains a list of SOEs in the country and their mandates. Table 1 lists the 42 Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 SOEs. Five of the SOEs on the list are development financial institutions (Development Bank of South Africa, Export Credit Insurance Corporation of South Africa Limited, Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited, Independent Development Trust and Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa). Five are involved in communications and telecommunications (SA Post Office Limited, Telkom SA Limited, Broadband Infrastructure Company (Pty) Ltd, Sentech and SA Broadcasting Corporation Limited). Four are involved in the aviation industry (South African Express (Pty) Limited, South African Airways Limited, Air Traffic and Navigation Services Company, Airports Company). Three are in the energy and electricity industry (CEF Pty (Ltd), Eskom, SA Nuclear Energy Corporation). Two are in the defence and aerospace industry (DENEL and Armaments Corporation of South Africa). Ten are in the water resources management and infrastructure industry (Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority, Amatola Water Board, Bloem Water, Lepelle Northern Water, Magalies Water, Mhlathuze Water, Overberg Water, Rand Water, Sedibeng Water and Umgeni Water). Two (Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa and Transnet) are in the transportation industry, two (Alexkor Limited and State Diamond Trader) are in the mining industry and SA Forestry Company Limited is in the forestry industry. Inala Farms (Pty) Ltd operates in the agricultural industry. Aventura is a name used across various industries, including travel, technology and impact investing. Mintek South Africa operates primarily in the mineral and metallurgical technology industry. The Public Investment Corporation Limited (PIC) is an asset management firm operating in the financial services industry. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is involved in science and technology research and development. Sasria SOC Ltd operates in the risk and assurance industry. The SA Bureau of Standards (SABS) operates in the standards and conformity assessment industry. Onderstepoort Biological Products (OBP) operates in the animal vaccine manufacturing industry.

Stanton (1999) identifies three aspects that will ensure that SOEs remain accountable. They are:

1. SOEs must be well capitalised and properly supervised to protect them against unnecessary financial risk;

2. their public benefits and costs must continuously and independently be analysed; and

3. there must be an exit strategy that will allow the government to withdraw its sponsorship once an SOE has outlived its public purpose.

This study focuses on the second aspect, namely, the analysis of SOEs’ public benefits and costs as contained in their PSOs. Luke (2010) states that six categories of accountability are applicable to SOEs, namely managerial, political, personal, public, professional and legal accountability. This study focuses on managerial and legal accountability.

Managerial accountability is both formal and direct, encompassing fiscal, process and program accountability. These components specifically relate to money, procedures and results, and are analysed to determine whether intended outcomes have been achieved (Luke, 2010). Legal accountability involves the operations of SOEs and ensures that these operations adhere to legislative and regulatory frameworks. In the context of this study, the requirements of the PSOs of SOEs are contained in a legal and regulatory framework (legal accountability), and managers/executives (including the board of directors) have the obligation to adhere to the PSO regulations in accordance with legal and regulatory frameworks (managerial accountability).

Emerging literature on accountability in the public sector, specifically SOEs’ accountability, indicates that SOEs’ accountability is linked to or studied through the lens of reporting/disclosure, especially non-financial reporting/disclosure (Ahunov, 2023; Manes-Rossi et al., 2021). Exploring the accountability of SOEs by studying their reporting/disclosure appears to be ideal. Capalbo and Palumbo (2013) call for major changes in SOEs’ approach to legal and financial reporting; they argue that the reports compiled by SOEs should reconcile their private-style accounting with their public-style responsibilities. In this paper, accountability encompasses (i) role clarity (mandates and PSOs), (ii) answerability (planning, budgeting, performance reporting and disclosure) and (iii) enforceability (oversight, consequences and corrective action). We explore disclosure because it is the observable interface of answerability. However, we also examine it within the broader accountability ecosystem, which encompasses activities, obligations, pressures and expectations imposed on SOEs (e.g. PSO mandates, funding arrangements and operational risks). Consequently, the unit of analysis is the disclosure of information regarding PSOs and their performance, while the object of accountability is more expansive: whether SOEs are obligated to cost PSOs ex ante, receive budgeted compensation and operate without a soft budget constraint. This is consistent with the managerial-legal accountability paradigm of our paper and the ecosystem view of AGSA (leadership, oversight, audit committees and enforcement).

A number of academic studies have been conducted on accountability and non-financial reporting/disclosure in SOEs, but only a few of these studies investigated accountability and non-financial disclosure in SOEs or the reporting/disclosing of financial sustainability in their annual reports. Royo, Yetano, and García-Lacalle (2019) examine Spanish SOE e-disclosure levels to determine accountability tendencies. The results demonstrate that the e-disclosure practices of Spanish SOEs are in their infancy and should be strengthened. Results also suggest that Spain rarely enforces transparency laws. In a similar study, Yetano and Sorrentino (2023) investigate how SOEs report on both financial and non-financial matters; their study mirrors the current study, as this study focuses on how SOEs disclose their PSOs, which have implications for SOEs’ financial sustainability. These authors (Yetano and Sorrentino (2023)) have discovered that SOEs reveal more information than private companies, although SOEs’ reports also vary. It goes without saying that private companies should improve their financial and non-financial disclosure, but the same is also true for SOEs. Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) examine modifications to budgetary control and performance monitoring in World Bank-sponsored SOE reform. They conclude that although reporting has changed, there have been no significant changes in SOE budgetary practices. Zanellato and Tiron-Tudor (2022) show how the required legislation on non-financial information has affected European SOE disclosure levels. They note that disclosure has improved somewhat in the wake of legislative changes. In a similar study, Andrades Peña and Jorge (2019) examine Spanish SOEs’ required non-financial information disclosure, and their drivers and impediments. Results show that Spanish SOEs disclose less mandatory non-financial information than private enterprises, which is in contrast to the findings by Yetano and Sorrentino (2023). They highlight that key staff cite Spain’s lack of awareness of responsibility as a reason for low disclosures. The most important factor affecting Spanish SOEs’ required non-financial disclosure is institutional size. Papenfuß (2014) examines how public authorities reported on the capital, performance and debts of their SOEs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland between 2009 and 2012. The author reports that the quality of SOEs’ reporting differs considerably.

SOEs are caught in a web of accountability obligations to numerous internal and external stakeholders (Rentsch, Liechti and Finger, 2020; Greiling and Schaefer, 2020). The mandates of SOEs increasingly require SOE managers to satisfy the information needs of multiple stakeholders, often with conflicting interests (Greiling and Schaefer, 2020; Grossi, Papenfuß and Tremblay, 2015). States establish SOEs to operate as commercial entities (Shaat, Aldamen, Kercher, and Duncan, 2023; Tsheola, Ledwaba, and Nembambula, 2013), but often impose non-commercial PSOs on these SOEs (Greiling and Schaefer, 2020. PSOs, also known as universal service obligations (Greiling and Schaefer, 2020), include quasi-fiscal activities (Ghana, 2018), community service obligations, social or public policy purposes, public missions (OECD, 2005) and public service agreements (World Bank, 2014). The attraction lies in the fact that SOEs promise to achieve the twin goals: to deliver public services on behalf of their owning states and to enable those states to become involved in commercial operations, which is generally not supported by states’ public service legislation (World Bank, 2014).

PSOs may include providing services at below-market prices to allow for greater access. Examples include reduced or subsidised railway fares and electricity tariffs. While these benefits may be understandable, the reality is that major issues have been well documented. New Zealand’s State-Owned Enterprises Act, 1986, provides that when SOEs engage in social activities, they should be compensated for any related loss they may incur when engaging in social services. However, the compensation for the social mandate is not generally used owing to the problematic nature of accounting for PSOs (Laking, 2012). In this regard, the provision for PSOs is seldom properly costed or allocated, and in most cases, the costs and funding for PSOs are borne by SOEs rather than the state through normal budget approval processes (Allen, Hemming, and Potter, 2013). The risk emerges that when the oversight body fails to ensure that the PSOs of SOEs are identified and costed, it provides SOEs with excessive autonomy in setting their own objectives or in defining the nature and extent of their PSOs (OECD, 2015), leading to opportunism. While states may compensate their SOEs involved in PSOs (Kowalski and Rabaioli, 2017), they rarely follow the correct budgetary transfer processes (Kowalski and Rabaioli, 2017). Instead, states use concessionary funding arrangements, regulatory derogations, tax breaks and so on (OECD, 2014), which obfuscates the chance to document and analyse the true performance of SOEs (Böwer, 2017). It is nevertheless accepted that PSOs have obvious repercussions on revenues since revenues are constrained by PSOs and not optimised by market forces. In addition, the mentioned repercussions are often exacerbated by implementation problems. As a result, there are calls for PSOs to be prescribed in the SOE legislation and/or regulations of states (OECD, 2015; Balbuena, 2014; OECD, 2005).

The difficulties posed by PSOs prompted the OECD (2005, p. 20) to suggest that when implementing PSOs, SOEs should:

In our context, public value is generated when PSOs are explicitly budgeted and disclosed, which allows taxpayers and lenders to evaluate the true cost of developmental mandates and determine whether outcomes have improved. Even substantial funding may not result in service delivery when PSOs are uncosted or commingled – exactly the spending-quality concern that AGSA emphasises for high-impact auditees. This will allow states and the public to scrutinise the performance of SOEs and to evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal support against predetermined objectives, simultaneously enhancing transparency and sustainability. State accountability is also crucial, as states routinely fail to fulfill their SOE obligations. To ensure fair and transparent compensation, and to empower states to strengthen their financial dealings with SOEs, social and commercial accounts must be separated to determine an appropriate amount of compensation for social obligations. In addition, excessive subsidies must be stopped. Using a neutral, manipulation-free compensation approach is also crucial. This issue is a reform priority for some African states. These states should review and amend SOE-related legislation and fiscal budgeting (OECD, 2014). When SOEs are reimbursed for their PSOs, their accounts could distinguish between social and commercial operations.

When accounts are separated, the monitoring and evaluation of state PSO public finances improve (OECD, 2020). When SOE finances are not separated from state finances or SOE activities are not transparent, it may be harder to account for SOE subsidies. This could happen in many jurisdictions where SOEs are not required to account for their social and commercial operations separately (Kowalski, 2020). If social and commercial operations are accounted for together, especially if they are mismanaged or hidden, PSOs are a major reason why SOEs need bailouts. However, relying on SOEs for PSOs typically puts states at fiscal risk because PSOs require funding outside of budgetary processes. States are the residual risk holders of SOEs; hence, changes in SOE equity values could increase budgetary risks (World Bank, 2014). This confirms the need for reporting on how SOEs are achieving public policy goals like PSOs. Financial sustainability should be a shared outcome, as the operations of SOEs are often subsidised and they are frequently involved in activities for which they may not receive compensation. In contrast, SOEs are responsible for transparently costing the PSO, ring-fencing it from the commercial account and reporting performance when the government assigns PSOs or requires subsidised tariffs. Policymakers are required to define the mandate and finance the net cost ex ante. In the event that PSOs are uncosted or under-funded, it is unreasonable to anticipate complete commercial sustainability. However, it is reasonable to expect (a) policy accountability for mandate design and financing, and (b) managerial accountability for truthful costing, disclosure and stewardship of the commercial business.

Luke (2010) notes that legislation and regulatory frameworks governing SOEs commonly provide clear guidelines on their accountability. The PSO reporting provisions for South African SOEs are key in assessing the extent to which the SOEs comply with such provisions. These reporting provisions are contained in the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector, which was introduced in 1997 to ensure that South African SOEs adhere to the principles of good governance (South Africa, 2002a). The Protocol provides specific guidance to the public sector, taking into account SOEs’ unique mandates, including achieving the South African government’s politico-socioeconomic objectives (South Africa, 2002a). Khoza and Adam (2007) postulate that the goals of the Protocol are to provide SOEs with guidelines on implementing good corporate governance practices and to ensure that corporate governance practices are implemented consistently across SOEs. Part 5 of the Protocol specifically addresses the governance of public enterprises, detailing important issues such as boards of directors and financial governance. Principle 4.3.3 of the Protocol states that “any Social Service Obligations that [an] SOE is to undertake should generally be specified through a Shareholder compact” (South Africa, 2002a, p. 8). A shareholder compact is a performance agreement between the state that owns the SOE and the SOE itself. It is an enforceable written contract between the minister, on behalf of the state, and the chairperson of the board, on behalf of the SOE (South Africa, 2002b). A shareholder compact outlines what the board and the entity are meant to achieve and identifies the parties responsible for achieving the predetermined mandates generally (South Africa, 2002b).

Principle 5.1.16.1 states that:

It further notes that the directors’ report must comprise “[a] description of social service obligations, with an assessment of their cost and likely impact on the SOE and beneficiaries” (South Africa, 2002a, p. 30). Similarly, principles 5.2.5.6 and 5.2.5.7 require SOEs to prepare corporate plans (including detailed budgets) covering a period of three years. The directors of a wholly owned SOE must prepare a corporate plan at least one month before the start of its financial year, or another period agreed to with the National Treasury. This corporate plan must be submitted to the accounting officer of a department designated by the executive authority responsible for that SOE. A corporate plan projects expected revenue, expenditures and activity plans for the ensuing three years (South Africa, 2002b). As the governing body of the SOE, the accounting authority is responsible for the fiduciary responsibilities outlined in Section 50 of the PFMA, as well as Section 75 of the Companies Act, if the SOE is also a company. The accounting officer is the chief executive officer of the SOE (South Africa, 2002b; South Africa, 1999). Thus, the role of the accounting officer is distinct from that of the political head, who is the executive authority responsible for that SOE (South Africa, 2002b). In this regard, the accounting officer is responsible and accountable for implementing the policy choices and outcomes formulated by the executive authority (South Africa, 2002b). Principle 5.2.5.8 states that cognisance should be taken of the social service obligations of the SOE, among other things (South Africa, 2002a, 2002b, p. 35).

In the context of SOEs, Dragomir et al. (2022) have found that corporate governance score, company size, environmental impact, monopolistic position and the state’s strategic interest impact non-financial reporting quality. These factors are institutional. Thus, while many theories may be applicable to this study, it appears that institutional theory is the most relevant for this study, particularly for the conflicting hybrid institutional logics of SOEs (Argento et al., 2019). According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), institutional theory may be traced back to seminal publications in organisations, where symbolic external influence and action spurred transformations (Scott, 2014; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The adoption and reporting of socio-environmental factors are driven and shaped by institutions (Scott, 2014). Thus, it may be argued that SOEs’ attention to non-financial reporting, in our context reporting on PSOs, in annual/integrated corporate plans and strategic intent reports, may result from several institutional factors identified by Dragomir et al. (2022). There are many definitions of institutions; the one by Scott (2014) suffices for the purpose of this study and mirrors the definition formulated by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Scott (2014) states that institutions consist of regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, along with associated activities and resources, give social life stability and significance. This definition is useful as it emphasises the importance of regulating organisational and social activities and resources, which aligns more closely with SOEs that use institutional logics in their sustainability reporting (Argento et al., 2019). Thus, it may be argued that institutional theory is one of the theories that reflects the adoption of non-financial reporting by SOEs, as well as their mandates. Building on Scott’s (2014) three pillars, SOEs function under three of them: normative (professional norms, public service ethics and expectations of transparency), regulatory (PFMA, Treasury Regulations, Protocol on Corporate Governance) and cultural-cognitive (shared beliefs about what constitutes “good governance” or “compliance”). Institutional isomorphism results from the interaction of these pillars (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Mimetic pressures occur when SOEs model their reporting on peers to obtain legitimacy, normative constraints come from governance norms and accounting professions and coercive pressures come from the legal and audit environment. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that reporting methods are not just technical but also symbolic reactions to institutional expectations within this ecosystem to comprehend PSO disclosure and responsibility.

Two aspects of institutional theory, namely institutional stakeholders and institutional logics, have particular implications for this study. Gray, Adams, and Owen (2014) note that institutional stakeholders include regulators, chief executives and standard-setters. In the context of SOEs, institutional stakeholders also include relevant SOE oversight departments and the National Treasury. Their interest in practices related to accountability and financial sustainability is crucial to improving the accountability and financial sustainability of SOEs. Argento et al. (2019) note that institutional logics impact sustainability practices in SOEs. These authors explain that institutional logics entail the contradictory rule structures and practices embedded in modern institutions that both enable and constrain organisations’ behaviour and actions. Thus, it can be seen that SOEs’ conflicting goals have an impact on their financial sustainability, as they may focus on one objective, such as a financial objective, to the detriment of social objectives. This is especially true of SOEs that are managed by private sector role-players, as is often the case in South Africa.

According to the discussion in section 2.3 above, a key method used to track the PSOs of SOEs is to examine their annual/integrated reports. In this regard, as stated in section 2.3, Principle 5.1.16.1 of the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector requires SOEs to include a directors’ report in their annual/integrated reports. The directors’ report must include a description of the SOE’s social service obligations, an assessment of their cost and the impact they have on the SOE and its beneficiaries (South Africa, 2002a, 2002 b, p. 30). Hence, our assessment was informed by the directors’ statements in the most recent, publicly available five-year (2018–2022) annual/integrated SOE reports. However, the study was not confined to the directors’ reports but included all annual/integrated report disclosures. In addition, we scrutinised the SOEs’ corporate plans and/or the strategic intent of SOEs under the oversight of the Department of Public Enterprises. In this context, strategic intent is a five-year statement that the government uses when communicating policies to SOEs and their shareholders (Balbuena, 2014).

In line with the theoretical framework and institutional theory (with a particular focus on institutional stakeholders and institutional logics, see section 3 above), our data points capture statements made by institutional stakeholders that manage and oversee SOEs bound by institutional logics, as described by Argento et al. (2019). In the content analysis, we focused on the directors’ reports as well as other informative sections of SOEs’ reports. During the interview phase, we conducted semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the SOE sector involved in the management, as well as the legal and regulatory frameworks of SOEs.

In the first empirical phase (content analysis), we downloaded the reports of the SOEs (Table 1) for the period covered (2018–2022). The first step was to use the reporting requirements as preconceived codes for content analysis, and to conduct the search and code process using Atlas.ti (Version 24). We then used a two-stage search and code process. We began by reviewing the relevant SOE reports to identify the relevant preconceived codes, and then conducted a data search and code-gathering exercise using Atlas.ti (Version 24). We did this to limit the possibilities of omitting important data and to ensure that we captured qualitative information that could be quantified and/or further used in discussing our findings. After coding the relevant parts of the data points, we counted the actual number of times each code appeared to generate the frequency information. This became necessary because a particular code may appear more than once in a company’s report for a given year, but it only needs to be coded once for that specific SOE for that year. Counting the codes rather than generating a code report helped in addressing this issue. After extracting the frequency information from the codes, we applied the computation process discussed below, distributing the resulting frequencies into the appropriate years.

We used a twofold content analysis method based on core qualitative content analysis. First, we used the qualitative information extracted from the data points to construct a diffusion index, which allowed us to assign a score to each indicator. For the second part of the method, we focused on other important qualitative matters that were distinct from the indicators, especially with regard to disclosure strategies. Thus, we used the qualitative data extracted from the data points to both quantify the indicators and observe important strategies that had to be documented. We scrutinised each report for data on PSOs. In the event that a company provided a disclosure on each indicator, a score of one (1) was assigned to the company; if no disclosure was made, a score of zero (0) was assigned. For example, if three (3) out of a total of 38 companies provided information on a specific indicator, the resulting score would be three (3). The cumulative over the five-year period (2018–2022) was computed in this study by dividing the average score by the number of SOEs (38). It is these cumulative (overall) results that we report in the results and discussion section below. Overall, we calculated the cumulative percentage of disclosure for the average over the course of three years as follows:

The cumulative actual average score reflects the factual disclosure made by SOEs based on the key metrics over the five-year period. We did not compute an average score for PSO disclosure in the corporate plan and strategic intent, considering that they are not annual documents (see Table 2).

We used a two-point scale rather than a three- or four-point scale to minimise researcher bias and subjectivity by forcing categorisation based on whether or not PSOs were disclosed. We only focused on 38 of the 42 SOEs. Three of the SOEs were facing financial difficulties at the time of the study and were therefore inconsistent in their preparation of annual/integrated reports. These SOEs were the Schedule 2 SOEs, namely Alexkor Limited, South African Airways and South African Express (Pty) Limited. We were unable to obtain the annual/integrated reports of Inala Farms (Pty) Limited.

In the second empirical phase, a semi-structured interview guide was used to conduct face-to-face interviews with representatives from the 42 SOEs. The interview questions were developed based on the results of the content analysis. The interview guide was divided into two sections. In Section 1, we asked participant-specific questions to determine which participants would be suitable for the study. Questions were asked about the basic characteristics of the SOEs to compare them with the characteristics of SOEs as described in existing literature. In addition, we enquired about participants’ primary areas of responsibility so as to document their roles in the SOE. In the second part of the interview, we asked participants a series of questions on the subject matter. Thus, Section 2 contained study-specific questions; participants’ answers to these questions provided insight into SOEs’ PSO process and why a majority of the SOEs did not report on their PSOs in the period covered in this study. We further asked participants to explain the use of the shareholder compact, strategic intent and corporate plan, and whether we could obtain information on SOEs’ PSOs from these documents. The study targeted senior SOE officials, particularly those with a minimum of five years’ experience working with SOEs. Data saturation was reached after the 26th participant had been interviewed (Table 3). In this context, Ashe (2012) notes that a sample of two to ten participants is adequate for a researcher to reach a saturation point. The interview guide consisted of two parts.

Since Principle 5.1.16.1 of the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector requires SOEs to include a directors’ report in their annual/integrated reports, and given the significance of PSOs and the fiduciary responsibilities of directors, it was a reasonable expectation that the SOE directors’ reports would describe their PSOs comprehensively, and that they would include an assessment of their cost and its possible impact on SOEs and their beneficiaries (South Africa, 2002a, p. 30). We scrutinised the annual/integrated reports, as well as the corporate plans/strategic intent of the SOEs, to establish whether the SOEs reflected on their PSOs. The content analysis reveals that only a few of the SOEs reported on their PSOs in their annual/integrated reports, as well as in their corporate plans/strategic intent. The relevant PSO disclosures in the first data points (annual/integrated reports) of the Schedule 2 and Schedule 3B SOEs, as illustrated in Table 4, revealed that two SOEs, representing only 6% of the total number of SOEs (38), reported on their PSOs during the five-year period. The extent of non-disclosure of this critical element appears to confirm the assertion by Khoza and Adam (2007) that the Protocol does not provide adequate guidelines for implementation in key areas relating to PSOs.

The results (see Table 4) appear to suggest that the majority of the SOEs are not working towards implementing the provisions of Principle 5.1.16.1 of the Protocol. A number of the SOEs referred to their public service, but not in the context of PSOs. In this context, ARMSCOR noted that “the implementation of the Public Service Integrity Management Framework in all government departments also informs Armscor’s Code of Conduct” (ARMSCOR Annual Report, 2021, p. 14). Further, the PSOs reported by SOEs were not as detailed as required by Principle 5.1.16.1 of the Protocol. Magalies Water stated that “declarations of financial interests, confidentiality, and conflict of interests and disclosures were made by employees as provided for in the government’s 1997 Code of Conduct for the Public Service” (Magalies Water Annual Report, 2022, p. 35). None of these disclosures was made in the directors’ report, as required by the Protocol; they were made with reference to codes of conduct.

The results of the relevant PSO disclosure in the second data points (corporate plan and strategic intent) of the Schedule 2 and Schedule 3B SOEs, as illustrated in Table 2, reveal that nine SOEs, representing only 24% of the total SOEs (38), reported on their PSOs during the five-year period.

As in the first data points described above, Table 2 also appears to suggest that a majority of the SOEs are not working towards implementing the provisions of Principle 5.1.16.1 of the Protocol. Perhaps a more detailed (and still somewhat lacking) version of the report on PSOs can be found in the Corporate Plan (2021–2023) of the South African Post Office (SAPO), which notes that MTEF (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework) allocations to fund the public service mandate exclude VAT. SAPO stated the amounts for the three-year period (2021–2023) (SAPO Corporate Plan, 2021 / 22–2023 / 24, p. 48). The most comprehensive of the PSOs is that of SENTECH (2020 / 21–2024 / 25). SENTECH presented its five-year strategic plan, along with the performance indicators for the MTEF period (SENTECH Strategic Intent, 2020 / 21–2024 / 25, pp. 20–23). In its financial analysis, SENTECH noted that:

The MTEF provides the government with a tool to manage the tension between competing policy priorities and budget realities (South Africa, 2011). Each budget is part of an ongoing three-year plan called the MTEF. Planned expenditure for the year immediately ahead (year 1 of the MTEF cycle) is fixed, while the expenditure for the following two years (years 2 and 3 of the cycle) is revised in the next budget cycle (South Africa, 2011).

Following the low PSO reporting, we investigated whether the reporting requirement in the Protocol still applied and checked whether the recent reports contained any information related to the Protocol. It was found that most SOEs confirmed that the Protocol was still one of the corporate governance frameworks used by SOEs (ACSA, 2021; ARMSCOR, 2021; DBSA, 2021; SAFCOL, 2020; LANDBANK, 2019). For example, the DBSA noted that:

Similarly, the LANDBANK noted that:

Although certain SOEs reported that their corporate governance practices were guided by the Protocol, it nevertheless clearly emerges that the requirement that directors must identify PSOs and include an assessment of the likely cost and impact thereof (South Africa, 2002a, 2002 b, p. 30) is not adequately implemented. The observation that only a few SOEs disclosed their PSOs confirms this. The content analysis results, which clearly show low disclosure, suggest that the likely reasons for the low disclosure need to be identified. In the next section, the interviews with SOE role-players shed light on this.

The main questions that participants had to answer during their interviews aimed to provide researchers with insight into the PSO process of the SOEs and to determine why a majority of the SOEs did not report on their PSOs during the period under study. Participants’ answers to the first question reveal that Schedule 2 SOEs are expected to generate their own revenues to fund their activities and expansion programmes. However, when SOEs are expected to fulfil a special state mandate (PSO), they receive state allocations via direct transfers of the amounts to be spent on the special state mandate (Participant G). Participant H noted that when a shareholding department requires an SOE to perform a public mandate, the SOE has two options. It can either use its own funding or convince the department to fund the public mission. The latter occurs when the SOE lacks sufficient funds to fulfill its public mandate. Under some circumstances, SOEs may therefore be forced to meet PSOs without compensation. Participant B confirmed the above and agreed that when SOEs are funded to deliver on a public mandate, they are compensated with direct transfers. The 2021 / 22 Annual Performance Plan of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC), the department overseeing the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), confirms Participant B’s statement. It discloses that an amount of R38.9 million was transferred to an SOE to address issues relating to steel competitiveness (DTIC Annual Performance Plan, 2021–22, p. 152). Despite the DTIC’s disclosure, the Integrated Report of the IDC does not give any information on this material amount, nor does the Performance Plan of the DTIC reveal how this PSO was costed.

Participants were asked to explain the use of the shareholder compact, strategic intent and corporate plan in detail. They were also asked whether the researchers could obtain information on SOEs’ PSOs from these documents. In this context, Participant I confirmed that the shareholder compact is a written contract agreement between the minister and the chairperson of the board. The minister acts on behalf of the government, and the chairperson of the board acts on behalf of the enterprise. The shareholder compact outlines the results that the board and entity are meant to achieve and stipulates who is responsible for achieving the outlined mandates. The agreement also details the rights of the minister and the director-general. Interviews revealed that the shareholder compact does not usually contain information on the PSOs of the SOEs, as this is usually not applicable (Participants I, X and Z) and, in most cases, not predetermined – owning departments come up with projects for the SOEs abruptly (Participants U, R, O and M). Participant X noted that “the compact is internal, but the key information contained in the compact will be communicated in the corporate plans or strategic intent of the SOEs”. Participant R added that:

The second question was why SOEs do not report on their PSOs. The majority of participants noted that PSOs are not part of what oversight bodies, including the National Treasury, check during the presentation and analysis of results. This finding is consistent with the results of Royo et al. (2019), whose study on SOE reporting in Spain found that the government rarely enforces transparency laws. Participant N noted that:

This finding is consistent with Papenfuß (2014), who examined how public authorities reported on the capital, performance and debts of their SOEs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland between 2009 and 2012. The study reported that the quality of SOEs’ reporting differed considerably. Participant Q insisted that:

Participant Y added that:

This finding is consistent with Kowalski and Rabaioli’s (2017) assertion that funds for SOEs’ PSOs are rarely obtained through budgetary transfers, as they ought to be.

In summary, the interviews revealed that there appears to be a lack of transparency in PSO accounting and reporting. There are numerous disclosure and reporting rules that SOEs must adhere to; however, these rules are not consistently enforced. In this context, Participant N concluded that “you will discover that sometimes those documents are only prepared to tick certain boxes, and they often do not contain enough relevant information”. Participant F added that “most of the people in charge are not sure what to include in the documents as the provisions are too abstract”.

The issue of accountability tends to be more pronounced in the public sector than in the private sector (Greiling and Schaefer, 2020; Bovens, Schillemans, and Goodin, 2014), especially when compared to core public services (Rentsch et al., 2020). As such, stakeholders require complete and robust information on SOE operations to determine whether an SOE is financially sustainable or not, and to establish the extent of losses that SOEs incur as a result of poor management. It is observed that SOEs are not transparent and therefore do not disclose pertinent information about their operations, particularly not information about the allocations of funds and/or reimbursements by the state to the SOEs for providing social mandates on the state’s behalf. As a result, stakeholders cannot assess the extent to which these PSOs are impacting the operational effectiveness of SOEs or contributing to losses that may be incurred. Although South Africa’s corporate governance and reporting practices are perceived as strong (Prinsloo and Maroun, 2020), this does not necessarily apply to its SOEs. Our finding that SOEs do not adequately account for or report on their PSOs is consistent with the results of previous studies on SOEs (see Section 2.1) (Yetano and Sorrentino, 2023; Royo et al., 2019). However, this finding does not correspond with the findings of Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005), who, after examining budgetary control and performance monitoring modifications in World Bank-sponsored SOE reform, found that reporting has changed, albeit with no significant changes in SOE budgetary practices.

In line with the institutional theory described in Section 3, interviews made it clear that the main reason why SOEs do not report on their PSOs is an institutional one. The interview evidence can be interpreted using the mechanisms of institutional isomorphism. Legislation and oversight exert coercive pressures; however, they are inadequately enforced, resulting in formal compliance rather than substantive reporting. Normative constraints from professional and governance standards motivate SOEs to “tick-box” disclosures to appear legitimate to auditors and regulators. Mimetic constraints arise when SOEs replicate the reporting formats of their peers, rather than creating comprehensive PSO disclosures that are tailored to their own mandates. Collectively, these institutional forces elucidate the reason why reporting on PSOs remains ritualistic and symbolic – a legitimacy exercise that signals conformity while concealing underlying accountability gaps. In this context, participants noted that the oversight structure of SOEs does not check whether all the reporting requirements are met. As report preparation is a tedious process, they focus on the aspects that they usually vet. In addition, participants also highlighted the non-transparent manner in which SOEs are forced to carry out PSOs. They emphasised that a payment promised but not received cannot be accounted for in the reports. As stated earlier, these issues involve institutional stakeholders, particularly those identified by Gray et al. (2014), including regulators, chief executives, standard-setters, relevant SOE oversight departments and the National Treasury. In addition to the observation that there may not be transparency regarding fund transfers, the oversight bodies are not particular about reports on the PSOs of the SOEs. This is surprising considering that SOEs in South Africa often require bailouts (AGSA, 2025; BusinessTech, 2024). No stone should be left unturned to ensure that SOEs are financially sustainable, and PSO accounting and reporting are key since executives hide behind PSOs to justify fruitless and wasteful expenditure (BusinessTech, 2024; Tsheola et al., 2013). The aspects of SOE reports that institutional oversight stakeholders are interested in are probably the commercial aspects of SOEs’ operations. SOEs are managed by private sector role-players who focus more on the commercial aspects of SOEs than their social aspects. As Argento et al. (2019) point out, this suggests that institutional logics and conflicting objectives are at play. The participants noted that SOE executives are mostly employed based on cronyism and nepotism, and that they often cater to the interests of their principals (shareholding ministers and oversight stakeholders) to the detriment of their social mandates.

It may be argued that the monitoring/oversight institution for South African SOEs is weak, as is evidenced by the weak monitoring of SOEs. Our finding here is consistent with that of Andrades Peña and Jorge (2019), who report that the most important factor affecting Spanish SOEs’ required non-financial disclosure is the size of the monitoring institution. In our own case, institutional weakness or incapacity in terms of monitoring, as well as conflicting objectives, appear to be the main culprits.

These results bolster the institutional explanation of SOE behaviour, which posits that compliance and reporting are more influenced by legitimacy-seeking under coercive, normative and mimetic pressures than by intrinsic accountability. Therefore, the Auditor-General’s identification of the enforcement and supervision components of the accountability ecosystem necessitates modifying these institutional conditions to enhance accountability. This study has important implications for research, policy, practice and society. With regard to policy and practice, it is widely documented that South African SOEs often indulge in fruitless and wasteful expenditure (BusinessTech, 2024; Tsheola et al., 2013). As a result, national resources and taxpayers’ funds are depleted. Our results are not encouraging, considering the weak financial position of the majority of South African SOEs. As the PSOs, their associated costs and compensation received are not disclosed by SOEs, SOEs cannot be held accountable by external stakeholders, including citizens. These citizens may be seen as the rightful owners of SOEs, as SOEs are funded by taxpayers’ funds. Moreover, since SOE managers are aware of these shortcomings, they may be encouraged to free-ride and incur fruitless and wasteful expenditure (BusinessTech, 2024; Tsheola et al., 2013). This may result in a situation where SOE managers and boards are tempted to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Such behaviour might not come to light as the monitoring and evaluation of SOE performance are often weak or non-existent. Since managers and boards act and make decisions based on the oversight practices of owners, weak oversight practices often have three adverse effects. The first relates to the idea that it results in weak management of SOEs, thereby informing most of the arguments against SOEs. The second is that objectives are often not attainable, resulting in the depletion of national resources without delivering tangible benefits. The third is that it may trigger opportunistic behaviour by boards that know owners are unable to specify their desired goals. All these factors demonstrate the importance of SOEs accounting meaningfully for their PSOs in a transparent and accountable manner. It is therefore important that oversight stakeholders, oversight directors, the National Treasury and shareholding ministries ensure that SOEs meet the legal requirements for accounting and disclosing their PSOs. SOEs’ annual reports and other documents must be scrutinised to determine whether they meet reporting requirements. If this is done, SOEs may become financially sustainable and state bailouts will not be necessary.

The study also has implications for further research into accountability practices in SOEs. As discussed earlier, accountability in SOEs may mirror accountability in the public arena. Luke (2010) has shown that there are six components of accountability in SOEs. Although there is ample research into accountability in the public arena, very little research has been done into the accountability of SOEs.

South Africa is undoubtedly among the countries that have the best corporate governance and reporting frameworks for SOEs in the world (Balbuena, 2014). A combination of the emergence of a compliance orientation (Moodley, Ackers, and Odendaal, 2022) and non-implementation has always been problematic for the country and its SOEs, as this study confirmed. Results of this study indicate that South African SOEs fail to transparently account for their PSOs in their annual/integrated reports, despite the existing mandate to specify PSOs, expense them, and report their effects in directors’ reports and corporate plans. This opaqueness impedes stakeholders’ ability to evaluate the impact of PSOs on financial sustainability and performance, as well as undermining accountability for both policy design and funding, as well as SOE stewardship. This research demonstrates that PSO disclosure is not a technical complement, but rather an institutional response to coercive, normative and mimetic pressures. In the absence of credible enforcement and clear roles, disclosure is reduced to a ritualistic and symbolic legitimacy, rather than substantive accountability. This interpretation elucidates the pattern we observe—"tick-box” reporting in the face of weak supervision and unreported PSO financing—despite the apparent strength of governance frameworks. Despite its lack of legislative or regulatory authority, the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector (South Africa, 2002a, 2002b) is nonetheless a crucial point of reference for SOEs. Because it is a voluntary guiding document, SOEs choose which of its principles to follow, frequently in response to pressure from the department that holds the shares or from Treasury scrutiny. Thus, inadequate execution of the Protocol’s PSO requirements represents a policy-level accountability gap – a failure by the executive authorities to formalise and enforce governance obligations throughout the SOE portfolio – rather than just an SOE reporting failure. This interpretation supports the Auditor-General’s 2022–2023 conclusions that systemic accountability is undermined by the lack of explicit enforcement mandates in coordinating institutions and executive authorities, as well as the seldom use of their available capabilities.

As a result, even though this study concentrates on SOE-level disclosure, it acknowledges that significant progress requires regulatory consolidation, such as incorporating important Protocol principles into Treasury instructions or PFMA regulations, so that SOEs are required, not just encouraged, to disclose PSOs, governance practices and performance in relation to strategic plans.

Thus, Accountability for PSOs should be shared and can be promptly operationalised in the following manner:

• Policy level (Executive authority/Treasury/legislature): Establish the scope and outcomes of PSO in shareholder compacts; implement applicable ex-ante PSO transfers and submit them with the SOE's plan.

• SOE level (Accounting authority and CEO): Separate PSO cost locations; disclose PSO cost, transfer received, delivery against targets and residual effect on the commercial account; cost PSOs using a documented method.

• Oversight ecosystem (audit committees, internal audit, Parliament/committees): Ensure the completeness and credibility of PSO reporting as part of performance and financial scrutiny across the accountability ecosystem. In an effort to reconcile sustainability expectations with mandates, this study suggests the incorporation of four auditable indicators into corporate plans and annual reports: the PSO-coverage ratio (budgeted transfer ÷ audited PSO cost); the commercial operating margin after PSO adjustment; debt-service coverage; and the absence of going-concern flags/material misstatements. These indicators directly address the information gaps identified by our study. The primary deficiency is managerial (SOE stewardship/efficiency), even if PSO compensation is explicit and timely, if losses persist. The primary deficiency is policy (mandate/funding design) if compensation is absent, delayed or undefined. The evidence trail that enables stakeholders to allocate accountability accurately and implement targeted corrective action is, therefore, the clear PSO disclosure.

• Studies of this nature have certain limitations that may be addressed by future research. We were unable to extend this study to other interesting African settings, as we lacked access to participants. Further research could take this study a step further by examining the accounting and reporting of SOEs in other relevant settings. Additionally, although the question of what constitutes the most appropriate means for SOEs to account for their PSOs is beyond the scope of this study, it may be explored in future studies. There may be better and more straightforward methods to account for and report PSOs, which may be explored by SOEs to limit fruitless and wasteful expenditure (BusinessTech, 2024; Tsheola et al., 2013) and to enable them to achieve their mandates without frequent state bailouts. While we have commenced the study by attempting to analyse each SOE individually, the low disclosure (see Tables 4 and 2) led us to analyse the SOEs as a whole. Future studies attempting to replicate this study should consider analysing individual SOEs. This may mean targeting contexts with high disclosure. This study did not explore service-delivery outcomes. Future research should investigate whether these disclosure metrics are associated with output/outcome indicators and whether enhanced oversight (e.g. audit committee mandates and parliamentary follow-up) transforms PSO reporting from symbolic to substantive practice.

No funding was received for this paper.

Data publicly available and will be provided upon request.

The university granted ethical approval for this study.