This study examines how regulatory design shapes information asymmetry in high-value food markets, comparing truffle policies across Türkiye, France and Italy.
A comparative policy analysis was conducted using legislative frameworks from Türkiye (Turkish Food Codex), France (Décret n° 2012-129) and Italy (Legge 752/1985). The study employs Akerlof's “Market for Lemons” theory and credence goods literature to interpret quality uncertainty and calculates production cost asymmetries between authentic and synthetic products.
Vertical, product-specific regulations in France and Italy function as strong market signals by clearly distinguishing authentic truffle products from synthetic substitutes. In contrast, Türkiye's horizontal regulatory framework allows semantic and visual ambiguities that obscure product quality at the point of purchase, creating conditions for adverse selection.
The study proposes a three-pillar “smart regulation” model comprising risk-based auditing, mandatory negative labelling and digital traceability – offering a cost-effective alternative to full-surveillance enforcement for emerging markets.
This study contributes to food policy and food integrity literature by demonstrating that market failure in premium food sectors can arise from regulatory architecture rather than from illegality or safety risks. By linking the asymmetric information theory with comparative regulatory analysis, the paper offers an original policy perspective on how transparency-oriented regulation can protect value creation in high-value agri-food markets.
