This came days after the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed that Russia and Syrian government forces could establish positions near Ain Issa, as a counter to increased military pressure from Ankara around the buffer zone it captured in 2019. Growing SDF-Russian tensions earlier in 2020 had given Turkey an opening to revisit earlier territorial objectives.
Abu Dhabi could support the SDF and increasingly reach out to Damascus to check Ankara’s influence.
Common fear of Kurdish separatism and discontent with Russia’s hegemony might further encourage rapprochement between Turkey and Iran.
As the concurrent conflict in Idlib becomes a zero-sum game, the SDF is less likely to be a bargaining chip for Ankara and Damascus.
Tehran’s strategic focus on southern Syria will limit Damascus’s scope to secure the northeast with Iran-backed fighters.
The SDF will make further conciliatory gestures towards Arab communities, including prisoner releases and restrained response to criticism.
