Civilization and War (1st ed.)

This book may well suit every reader. It covers a very broad topic by taking a closer look at the relationship between civilization and war. One might expect such an exploration to require an in-depth study in several volumes. Instead, author Brett Bowden offers in fewer than 210 pages much of what one needs to reflect on the largely neglected relationship between civilization and war. Thus, this book is mainly addressed to those who are interested in these two wide-ranging topics and their interaction. Researchers will find an extensive bibliography, a useful index and countless references ranging from the earliest ideas put forward in the ancient world to the most recent literature. Yet, since the issue of civilizations is now a topic related to international relations as well as to cultural and religious clashes among groups in various geographical areas, this book may also interest a wider audience.

The author, an Associate Professor of History and Political Thought at the University of Western Sydney, examines the interaction between civilization and war based primarily on the history and evolution of political ideas. He also refers to other fields of research, such as psychoanalysis, political science and political economy. Undoubtedly scholarly, the work is never overwhelming, partly owing to well-organized chapter notes. Whatever their interests and goals, a wide range of readers will find food for thought in this book. It is very readable, straight to the point and illustrated with relevant examples or quotes: the mainstream appeal is confirmed and the author’s thought process is easy to follow.

The book is divided into independent, stand-alone chapters, and the reader has the option of reading them one by one, randomly or, more traditionally, in a sequential manner. However, some chapters can easily be tied together. For instance, the introductory chapter leads logically to the two that follow, which illustrate the relations between civilization and peace, and then, civilization and war. The three central chapters focus on civilization in the face of savagery, terror and, more generally, on the process of dehumanization or demonization of the other, which materializes in the radical opposition of “them” and “us”. The final chapter adds an “s” to civilization to address the relationship between different civilizations: their conflicts and also their hybridization through international trade.

Let us take a closer look at the book’s opening section. The underlying assumption is that civilization and war were born roughly at the same time and, globally, in the same places: both phenomena are, therefore, inextricably linked or, as the author sees it, two sides of the same coin. Although war and civilization have been studied independently, the bond that unites them has been explored to a far lesser degree. Civilization is seen as a process and also as an end for a specific time. Civilization requires a socio-political organization, which means some degree of urbanization and forms of governance. The same organization is required to lead wars. Nonetheless, it is necessary to add an ethical and moral dimension to civilization. This is related to the idea of the progress of mankind and what Albert Schweitzer called “a reverence for life[¹]”. The idea of progress as being linked to that of civilization emerged at about the same time; it holds particularly for Western civilization that sees itself as the embodiment of human advance.

As for war, it is defined as a kind of duel between states and nations, in accordance with the definition put forth by Carl von Clausewitz[²]. It is an organized conflict either between nations or between political communities. On that basis, it may also include civil war.

Thinkers who see a link between peace and civilization assume that reason should be the basis of the relationship between nations. This reflects the ideal of the Enlightenment and the positions of Immanuel Kant[³] or the Marquis of Condorcet[⁴], who sought an international order, the goal of which would be to safeguard peace. Its underlying premise was the thought that the spread of liberal and democratic ideas goes hand in hand with an intensification of trade, which enriches all. The idea of this international order preserving peace is based on the capacity to manage diverging interests between nations through reason rather than violence.

One might consider an opposite view of war as being closely intertwined with the idea of property and the struggle for resources. To wage a war, people must be above the subsistence level. Indeed, as for the other components of civilization, including culture and the arts, a production surplus is necessary to mobilize resources beyond providing for basic needs. The conclusion is that both civilization and war require a similar type of socio-historical context to proceed.

Beside the type of war that has at its root in the desire to defend property and resources, there is also a more aggressive war, targeting the property and resources of others, because they represent the civilization they support. Thus, in addition to the conflict of interests, a war may emerge from the idea of a moral crusade aiming to impose one civilization upon others.

Using C. R. Eckardt’s statistics[⁵], we can observe a constant increase in the number of war fatalities throughout the centuries both in relative and absolute terms. The twentieth century may, therefore, be considered as the bloodiest one in the history of mankind. One reason may be that the technological strides of our modern civilization are improving the efficiency of our weapons, but this does not preclude us from considering that the evolution of civilization is not conducive to the end of war and the establishment of a perpetual and universal peace, as we might have hoped.

In his second section, the author questions the relationships between civilization and savagery, as well as terror. Anthony Pagden[⁶] contended that only the civilized believe they know what it means to be civilized! There is indeed a common tendency to consider one’s civilization as the civilization. Thus, Elias[⁷] evokes the feeling of superiority of Western civilization over other civilizations. Among the civilized, two laws should be observed, that of jus ad bellum (the just cause of war) and of jus in bello (the laws of war). According to this, savages are those who do not comply with the laws of civilization regarding war.

But there is an added consequence to this line of thought: if others are barbaric, civilized laws are not going to apply to them. This perspective makes room for legitimizing atrocities committed by the civilized as a reaction against “savages”. Such atrocities will gain further support should opponents already be dehumanized and/or demonized.

From this perspective, the war against terror makes perfect sense. Beyond the difficulty of determining exactly who qualifies as a terrorist, and in particular in distinguishing him/her from an opponent whom we wish to demonize by such labeling, the hallmark of terrorism is that it is “savage” and does not adhere to any rule related to a civilized view of war. In addition, terrorists create a general feeling of insecurity via the terror that they seek to spread, specifically by striking indiscriminately at their opponents. As a result, the war against terrorism takes on another dimension, that of the struggle of civilization against barbarism. This struggle claims to defend and protect civilization against the threat of terrorism. The consequence might be to consider that opponents should be denied any right that civilization would bestow upon them.

The author notes that from this Western perspective, terrorists consider themselves as the true representatives of civilization and their opponents as the barbaric ones. In such a radical logic, it is again “them” against “us”. According to Aristotle[⁸], this dichotomy is fundamental because we need a community to have meaning and aims. Yet, to define a community, it is also necessary to define borders, and, beyond that, to define the “others” who allow us to define ourselves. In the context of war, the “others” – if they are perceived as close to us, for instance, by belonging to the same civilization – should normally benefit from all the rules of a civilized war. On the contrary, if the “others” are foreigners – extremely different from us, and even considered as a threat to their own civilization – they can be dehumanized or demonized. Thus, it will be more difficult to negotiate with them, and their eradication will seem to be the only solution.

Such a framing of the “other” requires preparatory work to make sure that the others are no longer considered as human beings, but as monsters or devils, and to condition our perceptions to see others as total enemies. Whether monsters or devils, these “others”, as framed, cause fear and foster the enlistment of all to fight against the threat. Fear becomes a unifying factor and propaganda may shift this fear into hatred and lead to all kinds of atrocities, including acts of genocide. For example, the Nazis described the Jews as “rats”, and the Hutus of Rwanda portrayed the Tutsis as “cockroaches”. To counter fear and satisfy hatred, the extermination of others then appears as the logical solution.

Far from being a thing of the past, this process of dehumanization or demonization still occurs in certain places of the world. It is the duty of leaders, in particular those who claim to be democratic, to factor in the impact of this process which, although it may help stimulate soldiers to fight the enemy relentlessly, can also produce abusive behaviors.

The book’s last section examines the issue of war between civilizations. First of all, we should question, as the author does, the use of a civilization as a relevant unit for the study of international relations and the incidence of war. After all, the underlying idea is to replace the notion of international relations with that of intercultural relations. It is also important to explore just how different researchers have defined civilizations. Historians and political scientists differ regarding their number of civilizations and their respective borders: according to Arnold Toynbee[⁹], there are 21 civilizations, while for Huntington[¹⁰], there are only 7 or 8 civilizations. However, a civilization may be understood in reference to its geographic location or, more generally, by its way of thinking. In this section, the reader will once again find some of the ideas developed in the first chapters concerning the double nature of civilization, both as an achievement at a given time and as a continuing process.

The relationship between the Civilization, as a global advancement of humanity, and civilizations is not one of a competition but rather one of imitation or hybridization through trade. This idea allows us to challenge a purely Western view of civilization. The clash of civilizations does not necessarily lead to a war among them; rather it may lead to a mutual curiosity if each of the systems of values and beliefs that meet does not consider itself as the sole Civilization.

After reading this book, the relationships between war and civilization will seem clearer, particularly regarding the hopes and disappointments that the linkages between civilization and violence may stir. One of the book’s main virtues is that it bring to our attention the risk that a “civilized” person may shift rapidly, while using good arguments, at least as they might seem from that person’s standpoint, to a behavior showing no signs of moral progress.

Indeed, the use of violence, sometimes without limits, is not the exclusive domain of authoritarian or dictatorial regimes in the face of what ultimately threatens their identity. Brett Bowden fuels this idea with testimonies of the attitudes of Americans during the Conquest of the West and their relationships with native Indians. Sometimes, the latter, qualified as savages, could take prisoners, treat them well and even heal them at times, before sending them back to their enemy. American soldiers did not always reciprocate with similarly civilized treatment of their prisoners.

The book’s conclusion is very hopeful in its claim that imitation and hybridization are much more common than direct conflicts between two civilizations. We still find traces of vanished civilizations today: wouldn’t an ancient Egyptian be surprised to find in the heart of Paris or Washington the traditional shape of the obelisk inherent to her own civilization? For instance, while the Crusades are often used as an example of a clash of civilizations, we forget to mention the role of the Islamic civilization in the transmission of classical texts, in particular Greek ones, to a Western civilization undergoing reconstruction, or the transmission of some innovations, such as the invention of the zero in mathematics from India to other cultures.

If we are to speak of civilization in the singular, we can only follow Brett Bowden and his theory that civilizations, in the plural, bring to the evolution of civilization a global advancement of humanity as a whole. Today, as many problems have become global, it is useful to consider this approach of a global civilization, which should not be confused with Western civilization, but should allow – through trade, business and culture exchanges – intercultural relations which may prevent us from viewing others as a threat, but instead, framing their differences as an asset.

As we would expect, the author introduces various lines of thought that may lead us to further explore many of the aspects addressed in this book. It is worth repeating here that it is quite an accomplishment to present so clearly the relationship – as strange as it is sometimes paradoxical – between civilization, progress, war and peace.

As the book, perhaps implicitly, fits well with a view of civilization derived from the Age of Enlightenment, I have a few reservations regarding some of the ideas proposed. The first reservation concerns setting war and civilization on an equal footing. It is of course the very subject of the book, yet if this rapport is important, we could just as well address the issue of the relationship between culture, art and religion, trade, technical progress or any of the other major components of a civilization. Thus, the idea that civilization and war are two sides of the same coin is not entirely compelling. A counter-example is the ancient Indus civilization that had cities without fortifications, and apparently no army. The Egyptian civilization stands out to us to a far greater extent in terms of its relationship with the after-life than in terms of its military organization or in the way it waged war. It is true, however, that both benefited from a specific geographical position, which made them perhaps less vulnerable to invasion than other civilizations.

The second issue that requires, I think, a deeper level of analysis than it got in the book is the value aspect, including the incompatibility of values two civilizations might perceive as they interact. This relates to the more general issue of the existence of a global civilization that calls for the exercise of fundamental rights. Different values may clash, and we know that it is much more difficult to negotiate and thus to avoid the use of force in disputes rooted in value differences rather than in differences of interests. The philosopher Debray (2012) captured this observation as he stated that the sacred “[…] is not a matter for negotiation!”.

A third aspect that, in my view, deserves further emphasis is the logic of terrorism, which places its opponents in a dilemma: either respect all its own principles and apply them to terrorists, affording them rights that they themselves do not recognize or extend to others – such as the refusal to commit acts of torture – or, alternatively, use “all means necessary” to fight against those enemies who do not observe any rules themselves. The temptation of the second choice may well be one of the main goals of terrorism because it introduces moral doubt in the action of those who seek to protect their own from acts of terrorism.

The fourth aspect that could have used more attention is the effect of globalization. The World Values Survey suggests that cultural phenomena are particularly durable (Staes, 2014), which led the social historian Ruano-Borbalan (2014) to assert that:

Hence, the idea that globalization allows the emergence of a global culture or civilization needs to be put in perspective, as does the possibility, through conflict, that a global culture would be establishing itself to the detriment of other cultures in a civilizational Darwinism of sorts. As the anthropologist Godelier (2014) points out:

The final comment regards the bibliography. It is understandable that it cannot be exhaustive given the breadth of the subject. However, I was surprised not to see any mention of the German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1918), whose reference work on the issue of conflict surfaces the link between peace and conflict and the need of both in an evolving society.

As is the case with any good book, this one raises more questions than answers and offers through numerous chapter notes and its bibliography the opportunity for readers to explore further the many topics addressed. The writing style makes it possible to reach an audience broader than just academic. Although the book is physically small in size, the creation of a single synthesis of ideas makes it worthwhile for anyone who wishes to approach, with the critical distance required, the important issues of the relationship between civilization and war.