This study examines how decision-makers evaluate supply chain carbon finance (SCCF) offers involving small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under conditions of information asymmetry. It focuses on how different signaling mechanisms influence financing preferences and investment decisions.
Drawing on signaling theory, the study conceptualizes transparency, supply chain coupling and verification mechanisms as distinct signals that vary in credibility. A choice-based conjoint experiment is employed to quantify how financiers trade off these signals when evaluating financing offers and to estimate their relative importance in decision-making.
The results reveal a clear hierarchy in signal importance. External verification and partnership duration exert the strongest influence on financiers’ preferences. At the same time, transparency-related attributes have a moderate effect, and structural attributes, such as network scope and power balance, play a limited role. These findings indicate that financiers do not evaluate signals cumulatively but selectively prioritize those that are externally validated and difficult to manipulate.
The study advances signaling theory by challenging the assumption that signals operate cumulatively and demonstrating that signal effectiveness is hierarchical in high-uncertainty contexts. It shows that signals differ in their influence by credibility rather than observability and introduces a credibility-based prioritization mechanism that explains how decision-makers weight competing signals. By integrating signaling theory with conjoint analysis, the study also makes a methodological contribution by enabling direct observation of how signals are evaluated jointly rather than in isolation.
The findings indicate that SMEs can improve access to SCCF by concentrating resources on high-impact signals, particularly external verification and long-term partnerships. Increasing disclosure without credible validation yields limited benefits. Supply chain leaders and policymakers can enhance financing outcomes by supporting standardized verification frameworks and reducing certification costs for SMEs.
This study provides an empirical examination of how financiers evaluate competing credibility signals in SCCF. It contributes to the literature by combining signaling theory with conjoint analysis to identify the relative importance of different signals and by explaining how SMEs can structure information to improve financing outcomes.
