The purpose of this study is to provide the discussion about the underlying reasons for predicting someone’s willingness to co-offend in fraud. In doing so, as a main question is how are group-based fraudulent activities initiated, and what rationales and motivations do individuals have for engaging in them?
The authors collected data through semi-structured interviews. They discussed with several civil servants, in a regional government in Indonesia, about the ways Indonesian civil servants made decisions when they were in normalised fraudulent behaviours. They shared their perspectives and opinions on the pressures and incentives that drive fraudulent actions, as well as the mechanisms through which these behaviours are rationalised and perpetuated within the institutional context. The interviews highlighted the complexity of the issue in Indonesian local governments in general.
In the context of co-offending behaviour, the findings suggest that neither reinforcements nor associations, even in combination, are adequate predictors of these behaviours. These factors act as initial triggers in situations that provoke cognitive dissonance, but one’s attitudes towards fraud do not independently motivate law-breaking. The predictive power of individual or social enablers is intertwined with the process of definition or rationalisation. Co-offending behaviours tend to occur and recur in contexts where rationalisations have already been learned and applied. Moreover, the adherence to or rejection of rationalisations favourable to fraud is influenced not just by the consequences of the act but significantly by one’s moral and cognitive readiness to imitate observed behaviours. Therefore, while favourable opportunities may increase the likelihood of co-offending acts, these acts do not inevitably occur without consideration of their moral implications.
This research significantly contributes to the expansion of fraud theories and models, and managerial/practice for instance by complementing the effectiveness of SAS No. 99 and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission internal control framework.
