Geopolitical disruptions and global supply chains: laying theoretical foundations and building conceptual framework

Geopolitical Supply Chain Disruptions (GSCDs) have gained increasing attention in the Operations and Supply Chain Management (OSCM) field following Brexit (Moradlou et al., 2021; Roscoe et al., 2020), the US-China Trade War (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024; Fan et al., 2022) and the Russia–Ukraine conflict (Kim et al., 2025; Srai et al., 2023). This body of literature sheds light on how firms are reconfiguring supply chains in response to tensions between nation-states, which tend to manifest as tariffs, export controls, economic de-coupling and even armed conflict (Carnovale, 2025; Golgeci et al., 2025). Typically, scholars draw on theories originating from other disciplines to gain insights into GSCD phenomena, including Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) (Zhu et al., 2024), Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Fan et al., 2022) or a combination of RDT and TCE (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024; Fan et al., 2024). TCE and Resource-Based theories offer great explanatory power for decision-making within the firm, and can even be extended to supply chain partners, but often fall short when accounting for the interplay between state-driven actions, policy decisions and supply chain-level responses (Alexander et al., 2022; Munir et al., 2022; Castillo, 2022).

Largely missing within the Operations and Supply Chain Management (OSCM) domain is a unifying theory that can identify causal effects, predict supply chain level responses and enhance generalisability to other GSCD contexts (Golgeci et al., 2025; Roscoe et al., 2022). Due to the ever-increasing ramifications that political actions are having on global supply chains today, there is an urgent need to build a solid theoretical foundation for the burgeoning GSCD field of study (Zheng et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2024). What is required is a framework that enhances predictive capabilities and allows managers to formulate strategic responses to mitigate the impacts of geopolitical disruptions, bridging critical gaps left by traditionally used theories. This leads us to pose the following research questions:

The motivation of this article is to answer these research questions and lay the theoretical foundations of GSCD research. To do so, the article reviews and adapts theories typically used in OSCM and, when appropriate, combines these with theoretical constructs and frameworks from the field of International Relations (IR). This is a novel and interdisciplinary approach, as IR theories have rarely been employed in the OSCM literature to date (Craighead et al., 2020; Gligor et al., 2019) but offer rich explanatory power by providing new perspectives on governance, collaboration and conflict management amongst supply chain actors (Meyer and Li, 2022). IR theories, such as Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, introduce complementary insights by situating supply chains within a broader geopolitical and institutional context (Schieder, 2014). Specifically, realist perspectives highlight the impact of power asymmetries and competitive state interests in shaping global supply chain dynamics (Feng, 2006). Liberal theories emphasise cooperative regimes, interdependencies, and international institutions that facilitate collaborative supply chain governance (Moravcsik, 1992), while Constructivism perceives politics as a social construct. The integration of IR theories can therefore provide researchers with new theoretical perspectives on conventional OSCM issues, particularly when these issues stem from interactions between the nation-state, policy and supply chain actors.

This article's main contributions include the formulation of a GSCD definition and a set of theoretical propositions that both deepen and generalise our collective understanding of geopolitical disruptions on global supply chains, filling a gap for GSCD-specific theory. The article highlights how the adoption and adaptation of IR theories can extend the discourse on GSCD in the OSCM literature and advance research into novel directions. The article culminates in a theoretical framework that will assist scholars and managers in systematically investigating and comprehending the impact that geopolitical disruptions have on global supply chain flows.

New theory-making efforts tend to consist of a variation, modification or combination of existing theories (Makadok et al., 2018). Okhuysen and Bonardi (2011) highlight the benefits of combining theoretical lenses, arguing that management research, more than other “classical” disciplines in social sciences, uses combinations of ideas or blends of theories to advance new insights and develop novel hypotheses that can ultimately be tested empirically. Following the guidance of Makadok et al.'s (2018), we do not attempt to create a new “grand theory”, but instead focus on applying existing theories used in SCM and IR in a new manner, concentrating on the phenomenon of interest, variations of existing theories and intellectual creativity.

We apply a deductive mode of theorising, with conclusions informed by a set of assumptions (see Figure 1). The unit of analysis is global supply chains as a generalised and abstracted entity. We hypothesise at the unit-of-analysis level, but the study also has implications for firms, as the implementation takes place within firms and in cooperation with a firm's buyers and suppliers. The investigated phenomena where the proposed theory is relevant and applicable are Geopolitical Supply Chain Disruptions (GSCD). We seek to identify relational, normative, conditional and causal mechanisms, by comparing different approaches presented by various theories used in SCM and IR. The context of study is the interactions between nation-states, policy and supply chain actors, and the geopolitical disruptions that result. The boundary conditions of our theorising are set by the event of geopolitical disruption to the SC, and the output includes a set of propositions and a GSCD framework (see Table 2 for details).

Starting the theorising process requires a definition of the phenomenon that we want to theorise about (LeMay et al., 2017). According to Suddaby (2010), a good definition should capture the essential properties and characteristics of a phenomenon or concept, avoid tautology (self-reference), and be as narrow as possible. Its precision, however, should not impede the development of the field (LeMay et al., 2017).

Based on the above considerations, we propose the following definition:

Definition: A geopolitical supply chain disruption refers to an irregularity or alteration in the normal flows of goods, services, information or financial resources, triggered by tensions between nation-states, governmental policy or political interference. Such disruptions are often long-lasting and systemic, with the potential to affect multiple industries and generate consequences that extend beyond the supply chain domain, thus impacting broader economic stability, political relations and society.

This definition of GSCD builds upon an earlier definition offered by Carnovale et al. (2025) by highlighting that global supply chain disruptions are often long-term and systemic disruptions to the flow of goods, services, information and financial resources; differentiating such disruptions from other short-term shocks such as terrorism, natural disasters and cyber-attacks.

Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism are the main theoretical perspectives in contemporary IR discourse (Sørensen et al., 2021; Carlsnaes et al., 2013; Dunne et al., 2024). Due to their prevalence and importance in the field of IR, it is impossible to consider interdisciplinary application of IR theories without considering them as the starting point (Sørensen et al., 2021). These theoretical perspectives have overlaps and internal varieties, which are often under discussion, but they are generally perceived and portrayed as separate perspectives (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). Each of these perspectives can be successfully adopted and adapted for the purpose of theory building in the context of GSCD.

Realism stresses the competitive and conflictual side of international politics and, as such, is contrasted with Liberalism, which tends to emphasise cooperation (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). According to realists, states are the principal actors on the international stage, most concerned about their own security, pursuit of national interest and struggle for power (ibid). Realism depicts international politics as a realm of recurrent conflicts among states with very little prospect for change (Cozette, 2008).

Realism claims that because of the absence of a central government IR are characterised by anarchy, and thus power, primarily measured by military capacities, is the driving force in international politics (Schmidt, 2012). Anarchy is the central concept defined as a lack of common rulemaking and enforcing authority, implying that every state is on its own and is responsible for securing its interests and survival (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). Since the power is primarily of a military character, non-state actors cannot exercise it, and thus any other power plays are just by-products of a military power play (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006).

The first step in applying realism to geopolitical supply chain disruptions is recognising the underlying assumption that international conflicts and tensions between states are inevitable and enduring (Cozette, 2008). Realists see politics as driven primarily by geopolitical power concerns; thus, they assume that SCs can be disrupted even if they generate a positive contribution to the state (Meyer and Li, 2022). If one adopts a realist lens, the only way to mitigate global supply chain disruptions is by making supply chains more resilient because conflicts between states will only continue, and supply chain actors have no influence over this.

Given that international relations are characterised by continuous geopolitical conflicts, it logically follows that globalised supply chains are constantly exposed to geopolitical disruptions and therefore at constant risk. Thus, from a realist perspective, the fragility of global supply chains is structural rather than incidental. Building on this inherent fragility, realism suggests that firms cannot meaningfully influence or control the causes of geopolitical disruptions, as these are rooted in state-level struggles for power and security concerns (Schmidt, 2012; Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). Given these assumptions and conditions, Realism leads to the realisation that supply chain restructuring through nearshoring, friendshoring or other means is the only viable long-term solution to minimise the exposure to geopolitical disruptions.

Structural supply chain decisions are of importance when considering the increasing pressures on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to align with national political agendas (Witt, 2019). The process is particularly visible in the strategic high-tech industries under the banner of techno-nationalism, where states increasingly leverage their power of economic coercion and do not recognise the importance of technological interconnectivity, resource complementarity and open innovation (Luo, 2021). With little agency regarding geopolitics, SC managers need to put the relations between their home country and the countries where parts of SCs are or will be situated at the centre of supply chain design decisions.

Another mainstay of IR theory, Liberalism, underlines the plurality of international actors, the importance of domestic factors in the determination of a state's foreign policy and the role of international institutions in establishing rules and norms for state actors. Unlike Realism, Liberalism is interested in a broader set of issues than power and survival in an anarchic international environment (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). At the same time, Liberalism sees states as central actors on the global stage, just ceding more agency and importance to other players (i.e. MNEs, social groups, associations, supra- and inter-national organisations) (Moravcsik, 1992).

Liberalism questions the concept of sovereignty as weakened by International Organisations and transnational processes (Thomson, 1995). A stream of liberal literature, initiated by Rosenau (1990), even sees sovereignty as a burden, not an asset, that MNEs are free of. Liberals see the economy of a state as almost as important as military power and, in fact, as its underlying factor (Friedman et al., 2013). All of these assumptions empower firms as actors on the international stage in their own right, mostly unbounded by association with the state and its politics, with the power to influence political decision-making to some degree. It follows that firms can intervene in political decision-making through relevant policy networks characterised by various types of interdependencies. The institutional features of these networks and the firm's structural position inside them differentiate their influence on the process (Rizopoulos and Sergakis, 2010).

Generally, Liberalism underlines the benefits of such interdependencies and interconnectedness, whether between the MNE, its supply chain partners, and the state, amongst sovereign governments, or between the MNE and its subsidiaries (Polachek et al., 1999). The reason for such optimism regarding an interconnected world is that transnational institutions and organisations minimise the chances of conflicts (Friedman et al., 2013). In this context, a somewhat paradoxical conclusion follows that as SCs become more globalised the chances of geopolitical disruptions diminish. The trends of public-private partnerships and merging civil-military spheres are consistent with the liberal view of IR (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). These overlapping spheres blur the distinctions among the competencies and responsibilities of private and government actors, bringing more power to MNEs overseeing supply chain activities, which, according to the realist view, are just “tools” under the potential economic and legal coercion from the governments. A liberal view, however, would argue that private and public actors can exercise and protect their interests without the burden of sovereignty. If we take this proposition to the extreme, firms in strategic industries would treat supply chain disruptions as positive events, potentially increasing their profitability and stimulating growth in the long run. In direct opposition to the realist view, liberalists see supply chain disruptions as temporary (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006) and globalisation as one of the key, almost permanent, forces underlying human progress (Held and McGrew, 1993). Because, according to the liberalist view, globalisation will only keep advancing, there is no point in nearshoring/back shoring/friendshoring manufacturing to mitigate geopolitical risks, unless doing so brings additional benefits (i.e. faster deliveries, lower environmental footprint, lower costs, etc.).

The last major IR theoretical stream, Constructivism, sees the world of international politics as largely socially constructed (Hoffmann, 2010). It differentiates between the material world, where we deal with oil and gas pipelines or warehouses, and a social reality including norms, identities, beliefs and institutions (Carlsnaes et al., 2013). Constructivism places more emphasis on the latter and assumes that this social reality is constantly changing and thus should never be taken for granted (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). On the surface, what constructivism proposes, with its focus on the intangible, should make it the least useful and the most challenging to adopt and adapt for the purpose of OSCM theory building. However, if we look closer, constructivist concepts prove incredibly useful for management scholars. One of constructivism's key ideas is that norms (i.e. beliefs about what is right or wrong) shape identities (we vs them, China vs America, Democrats vs Republicans), which in turn shape actors' interests. If interests change, it is usually because underlying norms change (Carlsnaes et al., 2013). This mode of thinking helps to understand the causes of GSCD on a deeper level: as rooted in conflicting values. Such a perspective also helps to better understand the process of friendshoring, providing the notion of states being ‘friendly’ with one another as an important decision-making factor. MNEs are therefore pursuing the relocation of manufacturing or supply to a particular country not only because they are our allies, but also because we share very similar norms.

The “Copenhagen School” of Constructivism proposes a valuable concept of “securitisation”, where geopolitics is framed as a security issue (Stepka, 2022). Such a framing is useful for OSCM scholars and supply chain managers because it clarifies which aspects of a supply chain and under what conditions are most likely to become subject to securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998). As Leung et al. (2014) point out, securitisation mostly happens through politicians' speeches and the framing of events by the media as a threat to a country or strategically important sector. Examples of SCs that have been securitised include space, oil and gas, and rare earths, but the process of securitisation also impacts new industries such as batteries or artificial intelligence. For example, the rare earth supply chain has been securitised by the Chinese government during the US-China trade war, where China has threatened to implement export controls on critical minerals shipments to the United States, potentially hampering America's ability to build military equipment and weapons (Depraiter et al., 2025).

This section highlights how theories routinely used in OSCM, such as Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Resource Dependence theory and Institutional theory, are complemented or extended through integration with the main IR theories (see Table 1 for a summary). In general, IR theories move OSCM scholarship from a firm-centric view responding to external events toward a macro-level perspective that integrates insights on geopolitics with a firm's supply chain decision-making. In combination, these theories provide context-specific, explanatory, and predictive insights into the causes, propagation and effects of geopolitical disruptions on supply chain design. IR theories promise a better understanding of the causes of geopolitical disruptions to SCs and conditions for maintaining SC stability, as conflict and stability mediated by power are their primary concerns (Dunne et al., 2024). Further, the IR perspective helps explain the nature of disruptions and thus inform strategic responses (Meyer and Li, 2022).

IR theories enrich the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theoretical toolkit by offering new conceptual dimensions to assess the costs of supply chain design choices in environments characterised by elevated geopolitical risks. TCE posits that firms should choose a sourcing arrangement (make or buy) to economise on production and transaction costs while minimising transaction risks (Ertug et al., 2023). Realism extends transaction costs beyond firm-level decisions by introducing state-driven actions (i.e. sanctions, export controls, trade wars) that may prioritise national security over economic efficiency. Realism extends TCE theory by incorporating geopolitical risks as a factor affecting governance choices and actions of the state as a source of opportunistic behaviour. Realists see politics as driven primarily by geopolitical power concerns; thus, they assume that SCs can be disrupted even if they generate a positive contribution to the state (Kirshner, 2010). TCE primarily focuses on economic exchange, asserting that firms should select sourcing arrangements to economise on production and transaction costs (McIvor et al., 2025; Fan et al., 2024). However, IR theories introduce dimensions where minimising costs and efficiency becomes secondary to securing critical resources and maintaining national security (Kirshner, 2010; Luo, 2021). This overriding factor is evident in the process of “securitisation”, where parts of the global supply chains (such as those related to semiconductors, rare earths or AI industries) are framed as essential security issues (Buzan et al., 1998). Disruptions to securitised supply chains are seen not as random economic shocks, but as the predictable outcome of state behaviour driven by national interest (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). The integration of IR theories highlights that firms facing geopolitical risks are inclined to increase their supply base complexity (i.e. through multi-sourcing and geographical diversification) to mitigate disruption risks, which runs contrary to the TCE mandate of reducing complexity to mitigate transaction costs and risk (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024; Namdar et al., 2025). The fundamental difference between the structural complexity resulting from responses to geopolitical disruptions and that resulting from responses to pandemics, natural disasters or climate change lies primarily in the nature of the disruption, its timeline and the permanence of the required supply chain redesign. Geopolitical tensions and disruptions often take the form of chronic, long-term structural conditions, such as trade wars or technological nationalism, as opposed to a transient natural disaster such as an earthquake or even a pandemic (Hendry et al., 2019; Carnovale et al., 2025). This leads to structurally complex arrangements, such as parallel supply chains that combine both localised (responsive) and centralised (efficient) production facilities, often with separate supply bases (low-cost vs localised suppliers) (Moradlou et al., 2024). While natural disasters and pandemics might prompt redundancy by holding buffer stocks, supply base complexity specifically targets the mitigation of policy uncertainty (Namdar et al., 2025). The comparison to climate change, the process which can be treated as continuous and permanent, is more complex and requires more research. Climate change-related disruptions mitigation is not directly related to the overarching process itself but rather to its manifestations in the form of natural disasters and unusual weather patterns. Their increasing frequency, however, may lead supply chain actors to adopt more permanent supply chain redesign and adaptation, akin to what is currently occurring in response to geopolitical impacts.

Another theory frequently used in OSCM literature is institutional theory, exploring how organisations and supply chains are shaped by institutional environments, including not only the regulatory environment but also norms and cultural beliefs (Kauppi, 2013). A shortcoming of Institutional Theory in the GSCD context is its assumption that all foreign firms in a host country are exposed to the same political risk (Charpin, 2022). This is not an ideal way to assess political risk for individual firms, as it fails to account for variations in specific firm circumstances and relationships, as well as the industry in which the firm operates. Another limitation of Institutional Theory is the assumption that a host government is likely to intervene in a firm's affairs, without shedding light on a government's motivation to do so (Charpin, 2022). Understanding this motivation is important for a comprehensive assessment of political risk and its implications for supply chain management decisions. Addressing this shortcoming, IR theories can offer distinctive explanations and insights into why and how states might influence, constrain or shape business activities in the domain of supply chains (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006; Bauerle Danzman and Meunier, 2024).

Institutional Theory can combine with IR theories to include political motivators such as populism, nationalism or protectionism; providing insights into how political discourse and leadership can alter risk profiles and supply chain strategies. The integration of IR frameworks explains how regulatory divergence, policymaking and trade rules create frictions in institutional environments, which in turn, disrupt supply chain cross-border operations. This moves our understanding of GSCD from one-off shocks to longer-term disruptions that stem from institutional divergence between nation-states. Such a perspective frames geopolitical supply chain disruptions as typically caused by institutional misalignment between states or supranational organisations (i.e. Shanghai Cooperation Organization and NATO) rather than black swan events. Moreover, IR theories complement Institutional Theory by explaining the influence of pressures by international regimes and organisations. Institutional Theory posits that organisations conform to institutional pressures (coercive, normative, and mimetic) to reduce uncertainty and achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). International regimes and organisations act as macro-level institutional entities that generate these pressures (Börzel and Zürn, 2021; Golgeci et al., 2025). For instance, international organisations and regional trading blocs create formal, binding rules that directly constrain supply chain design and operations. Organisations such as the WTO set the overarching rules for global trade (Ranasinghe et al., 2025). Changes in government trade policies, such as the imposition of tariffs, quotas, subsidies or export controls – often influenced by or enacted under the framework of these regimes create coercive pressure that forces firms to reconfigure their supply chains (Carnovale et al., 2025). IR theories explain that the institutional pressures exerted by international organisations on supply chains are manifold: they stem from the mutually beneficial rules of cooperation (Liberalism), the shared values and evolving norms (Constructivism) and the inherent conflicts and power politics (Realism) that characterise the international system (Meyer and Li, 2022).

Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) proposes that organisations are not self-sufficient and rely on external entities for critical resources, emphasising the strategic management of these dependencies to mitigate geopolitical uncertainty and ensure stable operations of supply chains during disruptions (Shu et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2024). IR theories extend RDT by building on constructs of resource criticality and political misalignment. In this context, IR theories can be integrated to diagnose the nature of political misalignment across political jurisdictions and explain how international organisations and state interactions cause such misalignments. There is a potential for Liberalism to show how the absence or weakening of international cooperation exacerbates regulatory and normative differences across jurisdictions (Polachek et al., 1999). The integration of IR theory can be used to understand which countries or regions are aligned or not, and whether this state of alignment is likely to change. This approach enriches RDT by differentiating between firms seeking to gain access to and exert power over critical external resources located in politically aligned or misaligned countries relative to their host country (Ertug et al., 2023).

Geopolitical risks are treated by resource-centred theories as exogenous shocks, basically an unpredictable variable outside of firm control (Darby et al., 2020; McIvor et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2024). Realism reframes geopolitical power asymmetries, sanctions, and trade wars as rational state behaviour driven by security and national interest, not random, exogenous geopolitical shocks (Cozette, 2008; Schmidt, 2012; Balzacq, 2005). Equipped with this understanding, firms could develop strategic resources based on more predictable state behaviour, approaching geopolitical disruptions as more structured and learnable phenomena.

Constructivism sheds light on the importance of intangible resources linked to political access. For example, constructivists perceive recognition, legitimacy and reputational capital as vital assets in the political environment (Hoffmann, 2010; Carlsnaes et al., 2013; Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). Resource-based theories, with a focus on free-market capitalism, take for granted that resources can be acquired and developed if firms have the financial or knowledge capabilities to do so. IR theories, such as Geoeconomics (associated with Realism), highlight that access to strategic resources can be mediated by the state through foreign policies, economic sanctions and political alliances. A perspective that reflects the reality of many supply chains, particularly securitised supply chains in high-tech industries that are used by nation-states to gain political advantage (Bauerle Danzman and Meunier, 2024; Bardalai, 2024).

IR theories complement and extend the Dynamic Capabilities View (DCV) by embedding the geopolitical environment as a core driver and shaper of a firm's adaptive and reconfiguring strategies (Iftikhar et al., 2025). DCV focuses on a firm's ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to navigate a rapidly evolving business landscape and sustain competitive advantage. IR theories extend this by explaining the specific nature, magnitude and political origins of the evolving environment in which these capabilities are deployed, particularly under GSCD (Iftikhar et al., 2025). Geopolitical disruptions act as a driver, opportunity, or catalyst for firms to develop strategic capabilities, like innovation ambidexterity and network capabilities, and thereby enhance resilience. This challenges the conventional view of uncertainty as solely detrimental. DCV outlines the critical processes of sensing (recognising opportunities/threats), seizing (responding to them) and transforming (reconfiguring assets and capabilities) (Hendry et al., 2019). IR theories emphasise that geopolitical events necessitate prioritising the sensing stage of dynamic capabilities. This is extended by promoting “political foresight” as a reconfigurable capability. Sensing, in the context of supply chains, must involve anticipating shifts in government policies, trade agreements and overall political stability (Blessley and Mudambi, 2022). IR concepts may also prove crucial for explaining the “transforming” stage, especially in terms of resource and network reconfiguration. The realist theories suggest increasing pressures on MNEs to align with national political agendas (Meyer and Li, 2022). This institutional context dictates that firms adopt strategies such as reshoring and friend-shoring to achieve political legitimacy, even if these strategies contradict purely economic motives. IR integration forces users of DCV to consider how structural shifts in supply chains, such as strategic decoupling and regionalisation are driven top-down by geopolitical rivalry as a response to perceived strategic vulnerabilities, not just market efficiency. Fundamentally, integration of IR theories, particularly Realism and Liberalism, with DCV provides a crucial theoretical lens for distinguishing between temporary disruptions (requiring operational flexibility) and long-lasting, structural shifts (requiring fundamental supply chain reconfiguration). This distinction is primarily rooted in characterising the duration, certainty and scope of geopolitical events. Realism suggests that conflicts driven by core geopolitical power objectives, such as armed conflicts or trade wars, may be long-lasting, taking years or even decades (Cozette, 2008). Unlike disruptions such as natural disasters or cyber-crime that are perceived to be transient, geopolitical disruptions, such as the Russia–Ukraine war are typically chronic, long-term conditions. When managers perceive that disruption has shifted from temporary to chronic, existing buffering/bridging strategies are called into question (Carnovale et al., 2025). An appropriate response then becomes a more permanent shift in supply chain design and not simply the return to business-as-usual.

Both Network Theory and Complex Adaptive Systems theory (CAS) view supply chains as intricate systems of interconnected firms (agents) that evolve and adapt to environmental changes (Gu et al., 2025; Altuntas Vural et al., 2024). IR theories provide the macro-level political variables necessary to understand why and how these networks become unstable or require reconfiguration. The CAS perspective relies on operational mechanisms like operational leanness (efficiency) and operational resilience (adaptability) (Gu et al., 2025). IR theories inject the geopolitical reality that dictates when one mechanism is prioritised over the other. Network Theory conceptualises SCs as interconnected nodes (El Baz et al., 2025). IR concepts enhance this by linking political misalignment to network dynamics. The integration of IR theories with CAS and Network Theory provides a more sophisticated explanation for the propagation of disruptions through politically misaligned or contested hubs like Russia (energy) or Taiwan (semiconductors). This integration highlights that disruption propagation is not merely an operational failure but a consequence of inherent geopolitical vulnerabilities within the supply chain network, which IR theories help to diagnose.

This section offers two distinct propositions contributing to building a theory around the causes of GSCD. The propositions are rooted in conceptual elements found in the reviewed literature, which are supported by elements of IR theory and illustrated on empirical examples. We begin by discussing a theoretical background and empirical examples before offering a proposition.

While the notion of “securitisation” originates from IR theory, we interpret it as the process through which supply chains become subject to state-led security concerns, influencing supply chain actor-level sourcing, risk management and resource dependence. The realist perspective argues that states prioritise security over efficiency, particularly when it comes to supply chains relevant to national power (Meyer and Li, 2022; Luo, 2021). Securitised supply chains refer to supply networks whose design and operation are directly influenced by national security concerns or state intervention in trade, investment and technology domains. Securitised supply chains are inherently more exposed to disruption because their structure and viability depend not only on economic factors but on strategic calculations by states, often beyond firm control or forecasting. Examples of supply chains that have been securitised include strategically valuable or politically sensitive industries as deemed by their respective national governments, including semiconductors, telecommunications, space, oil and gas or rare earths. Importantly, however, according to the constructivist view, securitisation is not a matter of applying objective, scientific measures— it is socially constructed. Companies friendshore SCs in certain countries because they are allies and those societies share similar cultural norms. Supply chain securitisation represents a significant shift in global trade, where governments actively exert control over key resources and leverage trade to protect strategic industries (Carnovale et al., 2025). These include tariffs, export controls, import restrictions, quotas and subsidies aimed at advancing a political agenda (Carnovale et al., 2025). Moreover, governments can directly provide or restrict resources to firms (Darby et al., 2020).

Supply chain actors have the power to influence societal norms and institutions at home and abroad through active engagement with stakeholders, including policy-makers and the public, and will try to influence the process of securitisation (Meyer and Li, 2022). This can happen, for instance, through CSR initiatives, lobbying, education or dialogue with the media. Proactive managers can monitor public and political discourse to identify the extent to which their supply chain will become securitised, exercising an inherent agency to influence securitisation to their benefit.

The case of Huawei, a Chinese telecoms firm, offers a telling example of supply chain securitisation that leads to disruption. In 2018, the U.S. government launched a global campaign to block Huawei from winning major 5G infrastructure projects, highlighting security concerns (Tse et al., 2024). This narrative rapidly securitised the 5G supply chain, leading to disruptive consequences such as U.S. export restrictions, supplier disengagement, opportunity costs and infrastructure costs for countries rolling back Huawei's projects and equipment (Kirton, 2020). These insights lead us to propose the following:

The explanatory power of Resource Dependence Theory can be deepened in the context of GSCD through the integration of International Relations theories, building on the constructs of resource criticality and political misalignment. The Ambulkar et al. (2014) study underlines that not all resources are equal in terms of their potential for risk mitigation, and identifying which resources and capabilities are more valuable is key to building supply chain resilience. Pfeffer and Salancik (2006) observe that resource dependence generates uncertainty for the supply chain actor when an external party exerts control over the resources and when a small number of alternatives are available.

There is a common characteristic between semiconductors, rare earths, battery materials or oil; the “criticality” of these inputs for the broader economy and security of the nation. Interestingly, the term “critical resources” is underutilised in SCM and OM literature (for a few exceptions, see Charpin and Cousineau, 2024; Darby et al., 2020). In Geoeconomics theory, a field of IR, the term of critical resources is frequently used and integrated into wider theoretical frameworks. For instance, the concept of critical resources is directly related to the construct of geoeconomic tools: the principal levers through which states intervene in markets (Bauerle Danzman and Meunier, 2024). On the one hand, Geoeconomic tools are defensive instruments, designed to prevent others from leveraging economic dependencies against states, such as investment screening, or supply chain diversification policies. On the other hand, geoeconomics tools are offensive instruments serving to develop or maintain key chokepoints in trade, finance, information and technology, such as supporting national champions, controlling critical technology through export controls and using industrial policy to undercut competitors and dominate global markets (Bauerle Danzman and Meunier, 2024). Geoeconomics stresses that access to strategic resources can be mediated by the state through foreign policies, economic sanctions, and political alliances, with direct implications for the construct of politically misaligned regions used in proposition 2 (Bardalai, 2024). The direct implications are that political misalignment between states increases the likelihood that governments will use geoeconomic tools to restrict, condition or weaponise access to critical resources. Geoeconomics shows that states routinely intervene in economic flows when their geopolitical interests are at stake. This means greater exposure to state-imposed restrictions, such as export controls or investment restrictions, and an increased likelihood of retaliatory actions.

Politically misaligned regions are characterised by political divergence, defined as the extent to which two nations do not share similar interests and values in global affairs (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024). This divergence can stem from conflicting national interests, state behaviours driven by security and the maximisation of power, or a prioritisation of national interests over global cooperation (Chidley, 2014). Such misalignment can breed tense relations and national animosity between countries. The state of alignment or misalignment between countries can be assessed through various metrics, such as common voting patterns on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (Kim and Russet, 1996; Charpin and Cousineau, 2024). Historically, countries may become politically aligned when facing a common external threat, and drift apart when the threat diminishes or when an ally becomes disproportionately powerful, leading to distrust. The Realism theory of IR offers further clarification of how to think about politically misaligned regions and critical resources situated in or controlled by them (Feng, 2006). Realism highlights that states act in their self-interest to maximise power and security, often prioritising national interests over global cooperation (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). In the context of supply chains, they may control critical resources and use them as leverage in conflicts or nation-states rivalry for power.

Pfeffer and Salancik (1979) argue that firms operating in uncertain environments have a greater need to control external resources to mitigate instability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1979). By extension, supply chain actors with critical resource dependencies situated in politically misaligned regions are more likely to experience geopolitical disruptions. An example is German chemical firms' dependence on Russian natural gas supplies. Cutting dependency on Russian gas had a profound impact on Germany's largest chemical company, BASF, which faced economic and operational threats, prompting urgent cost-cutting and a strategic shift to new energy sources (Meyer, 2022). This leads us to propose the following:

The integration of Geoeconomics, Realism and Network Theory concepts leads to the identification of two critical factors that amplify geopolitical disruptions in supply chains: the strategic importance of nodes (acting as chokepoints) and the political commitment of a state to weaponise these nodes. A node represents a specific point within an interconnected system, typically a company's facilities or supplier facilities, where supply chain activities occur (El Baz et al., 2025). Geoeconomics and Realism explain why certain critical network nodes are targeted for state control. States that oversee critical hubs in global supply chains can strategically use their position to choke off critical economic flows to other countries for geopolitical advantage (Luo and Van Assche, 2023). The motivation, rooted in Realism, is that states prioritise power and security, often over global cooperation (Buzan, 1991). Network theory concepts, such as Betweenness Centrality, explain how control over a single node can maximise the disruption propagated across the entire network. Betweenness Centrality rooted in Network Theory designates the chokepoint (Gu et al., 2025). Betweenness Centrality (BC) reflects the extent to which a node acts as a bridge to mediate information and resource flows within a network (Gu et al., 2025). A node with high BC is situated at the centre of the supply chain (ibid). If a state controls such a node (a chokepoint), its policy actions can restrict the flow of critical resources between multiple downstream buyers and upstream suppliers (Darby et al., 2020; Fan et al., 2024). When a disruption occurs at a central node (“chokepoint”), the impact is systemic and has the potential to affect multiple firms or supply chain segments (Gu et al., 2025). A failure in a node can stop the flow of material across the network, and the node is a route through which disruptions propagate (Kim et al., 2014). If a state controls a chokepoint supplying a critical resource (i.e. advanced semiconductors from Taiwan's manufacturing facilities), a disruption propagates more severely because downstream firms are highly reliant on that single, centrally located resource. Disruption propagation speed is typically measured by application of simulation models, which analyse the impacts of disruptions on supply chain performance under time-dependent changes (Ivanov, 2020). Disruption extent can be assessed by the calculation of a metric based on the total number of impacted nodes resulting from the disruption of a specific node within a network (Zhao et al., 2019; Namdar et al., 2024).

Geopolitical disruption, often stemming from state actions against central nodes (like the US export controls on semiconductors or semiconductors manufacturing equipment to China from ASML or TSMC), forces firms to initiate strategic decoupling to reduce critical dependencies on chokepoints situated in politically misaligned regions. Moreover, chokepoints can act as an information hub for quickly obtaining signals of environmental change (Gu et al., 2025). Conversely, state control over such a node means the state can influence or restrict information flow, leading to low-tier organisations making decisions based on incomplete information, which hinders coordination and accelerates disruption propagation (Duong et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025). Based on this discussion, we offer the following proposition:

Our fourth proposition is rooted in Resource Dependence Theory, with constructs such as cascading failures, amplification effect and political misalignment borrowed from Network Theory, Complex Adaptive Systems and International Relations theory. The concept of cascading failures refers to a mechanism of disruption propagation within a supply network, essentially acting as a domino effect where an initial failure at one point rapidly spreads to interconnected parts of the system, ultimately impacting other firms and suppliers, even those located far away (Ivanov, 2020; Kim et al., 2014). Cascading failure is sometimes used as a synonym for the ripple effect. The ripple effect itself describes the impact of disruption propagation on supply chain performance and the resulting scope of changes required in supply chain structural design and planning parameters (Dolgui et al., 2017). In the context of supply chains and network theory, the system is conceptualised as a network built from interconnected nodes (facilities or firms) and the connecting arcs (transportation routes) (ibid). A failure in a node or an arc can potentially stop the flow of material across the network, and these nodes and arcs are the routes through which disruptions propagate. Cascading failure specifically accentuates the mechanism where a disruption at one supplier cascades through its supply chain links, affecting neighbouring nodes, and ultimately impacting other supply chain actors and suppliers (Ivanov, 2020).

The phenomenon of cascading failures is particularly relevant and often amplified in the context of geopolitical disruptions which can cause failures concentrated in specific vulnerable nodes. Namdar et al. (2024) observe that “the majority of cascading disruptions are small; a few, however, are large and have widespread impact”, suggesting that if the affected nodes are the nodes dependent on resources situated in politically misaligned regions, the scale and the effect of these disruptions will be amplified and thus overall larger. This is particularly significant in the case of so-called “nexus suppliers”, which are more critical than others due to their position in supply chain network structure and a reliance of many downstream supply chain actors on them (Yan et al., 2015). The concept of disruption amplification or dampening appears in the literature describing how the overall impact of the disruption magnifies or diminishes as it cascades through supply networks (Li and Zobel, 2020; Namdar et al., 2024). Moreover, supply chain actors with higher resource dependence on a particular market or region may be more vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions in that area (Shu et al., 2025). This is because governments can weaponise supply chains by controlling access and allocation of critical resources (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024). A significant aspect of related vulnerability is lock-in of firms' operations, where firms cannot easily exit high-risk regions due to significant investments, asset specificity, or institutional entanglements (Shu et al., 2025). Such firms face even greater uncertainty and are more vulnerable to geopolitical risks (ibid). In this context Resource Dependence Theory can help us to identify nodes likely to amplify propagating disruption due to their reliance on resources situated in politically misaligned regions. IR theory helps to point out which countries or regions are aligned or not, and whether this state of alignment is likely to change.

One of the most popular metrics in IR literature is voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly, where countries are described as politically aligned through common voting patterns on resolutions (Mosler and Potrafke, 2020; Bailey et al., 2016). Realism posits that states prioritise survival in an anarchic international system, becoming politically aligned to balance against stronger powers or threats, thus countries become politically aligned when they face a common external threat, as the alliance enhances their security (Jervis, 1998). In opposite scenario, countries drift apart when the threat diminishes or when one ally becomes disproportionately powerful, creating distrust (Walt, 1990). RDT highlights that firms will seek to gain access to and exert power over critical external resources, and they do not consider whether this resource happens to be in a politically misaligned country in relation to their host country (Ertug et al., 2023). Further, RDT underlies that organisations are open systems, meaning they are influenced by and dependent on their external environment, particularly for resources, but RDT is not concerned with the political fragmentation of this environment (Falcone et al., 2021). This proposition extends RDT by highlighting such differentiating factors. A critical factor amplifying disruptions is also often the misalignment of perceived political risk between buyer and their suppliers (Liu et al., 2025). Such differences in risk perceptions can severely undermine the effectiveness of risk management strategies (ibid). Based on this discussion, we offer the following proposition:

In this section, we offer propositions related to the last dimension of the framework, GSCD's consequences for future supply chain design. SC design choices induced by GSCD are more often than not aimed at mitigating them and enhancing resilience (Bednarski et al., 2023). Governments are explicitly described in the literature as “wielding supply chains as competitive weapons” to achieve national aims (Carnovale et al., 2025). This involves exerting control over key resources and using trade levers to protect strategic industries (ibid).

The treatment of rivalry in SCs for strategic industries by Realists would be classified as an epiphenomenon of military rivalry that may affect domestic and foreign policy (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). Further, Realists would argue that technology and industrial capacities have always been important in warfare (Eriksson and Newlove-Eriksson, 2021). From a realist perspective, the primary means of mitigating GSCD is to make supply chains more resilient, given the expectation that state conflicts will persist. This view implies that, over the long term, reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring are the most viable strategies, as global supply chains are inherently vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions because they cross multiple borders. Recent OSCM papers also highlight that competition and design choices in supply chains, particularly within strategic industries (semiconductors, space, energy) are indeed manifestations of geopolitical rivalries among nation-states and alliances (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024; Bhamra et al., 2024; Duong et al., 2024).

Geopolitical tensions are often associated with political misalignment between governments, breeding tense relations and national animosity, which in turn prompts governments to impose discriminatory policies like tariffs or export bans that directly disrupt supply chains (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024). There are numerous empirical examples of nation-states rivalry impacting supply chains, including rivalry between the collective West (US, EU, UK, strongest East Asian allies such as Taiwan, South Korea and Japan) and China. The US and the EU are investing in increasing their own production capacities in rare earths, semiconductors and space industry (Cohen, 2023; Shivakumar et al., 2024; EU Commission, 2024). Meanwhile, China is trying to become self-sufficient in semiconductors production and reach the same level of sophistication in semiconductors manufacturing as South Korea and Taiwan and join the US and France as a key space-faring state (Duchatel, 2025; Janjeva et al., 2024). Such an approach aligns with Resource Dependence Theory, which says that firms seek alternative sources and increase supply base complexity to reduce their dependence on at-risk suppliers and buffer against external environment uncertainty (Zhu et al., 2024; Charpin and Cosineau, 2024).

Another facet of concentrating supply chain dependencies is related to the constructs of building parallel supply chains with a combination of local, regional, and global manufacturing facilities, leading to a high level of geographical concentration, which is reflected in the reshoring, nearshoring and friendshoring logic (Moradlou et al., 2024; Charpin and Cousineau, 2024; McIvor et al., 2025). A geopolitical bloc is a strategic grouping of nation-states aligned through a commonality of economic, political, or security interests, often formed as a deliberate countermeasure against geopolitical rivals (Vivoda et al., 2024). The concept of a geopolitical bloc reflects the splintering of global trade into competing groupings driven by geopolitical rivalries, protectionism and nationalist agendas, marking a shift away from the post-World War II liberal international order (Luo and Van Assche, 2023; Vivoda et al., 2024).

The goal is to diminish firms' dependence on foreign nations that might exploit them for geopolitical advantages (Charpin and Cousineau, 2024). Initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) aim to stimulate investment in critical minerals among “trusted or like-minded partners” to reduce collective reliance on strategic adversaries, particularly China (Depraiter et al., 2025; Vivoda et al., 2024). This represents a “strategic reorientation from de-coupling to de-risking” (Zhou et al., 2025). Based on this discussion, we offer the following proposition:

The intersection between industry-specific characteristics and exposure to geopolitical risk remains underexplored. OSCM literature has tended to treat these dimensions separately – industry-based determinants of supply chain design as a one stream, and geopolitical risks as an environmental factor as the other. Yet, many industries are structurally exposed to geopolitical disruption precisely because of their technological, regulatory or resource dependencies. For example, semiconductor, defence, pharmaceutical, and energy supply chains exhibit concentrated and technologically clustered production structures that make them particularly vulnerable to shifts in alliances or trade policies. In such industries, geopolitical sensitivity is not incidental but inherent to the structure of production and sourcing. Consequently, when geopolitical tensions rise, supply chain actors in these industries are more likely to adopt regionalisation strategies (reshoring, nearshoring or friendshoring) as adaptive responses. This theoretical connection between industry-specific exposure and geopolitical risk-driven supply chain redesign has not been so far systematically articulated. By linking these two domains, we aim to contribute to understanding why the propensity for regionalisation varies across industries and under which conditions it occurs. This leads us to propose the following:

Our framework theorises how geopolitical disruptions originate, propagate and influence the design of supply chains. It integrates supply chain management theories and concepts identified within the literature review sections, such as Dynamic Capabilities View, Resource Dependence Theory, Transaction Cost Economics with main International Relations theoretical perspectives, such as Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism.

The framework is built around three dimensions of Geopolitical Supply Chains Disruptions: Causes, Propagation and Consequences. Table 2 presents how the framework's dimensions align with analysed empirical phenomena and how key constructs are rooted in the SCM and IR theories.

The propositions developed under this framework serve two aims: a) to consolidate fragmented or weakly theorised empirical findings and concepts that extend well-established theories into coherent theoretical explanations, consolidating the current body of knowledge on GSCD; b) to advance theory by offering empirically testable hypotheses or conceptual constructs not previously considered.

The framework highlights that learning and adaptation mechanisms are crucial for supply chain actors to not only survive but also to thrive in an increasingly volatile global environment (Chakkol et al., 2023; Duong et al., 2024). These mechanisms move beyond mere risk mitigation, implying that companies need to fundamentally re-evaluate and redesign their supply chains. The “new normal” requires a shift from reactive, short-term buffering strategies to more forward-looking, creative, and permanent structural changes (Srai et al., 2023; Zheng et al., 2025). Learning is a key component of this shift, enabling systematic improvement and fostering competitiveness (Tortorella et al., 2025).

The article makes several significant contributions to theory and to the OSCM literature, particularly by addressing a gap in how geopolitical disruptions in supply chains are conceptualised and studied. It highlights a missing theoretical lens in the literature by emphasising the limited use of International Relations (IR) theories to study geopolitical disruptions in supply chains. This study positions the application of IR theories to GSCD problematics as a valuable, novel, and interdisciplinary approach that offers rich explanatory power, complementing traditional OSCM paradigms' views. It notes the limitations of prior definitions of GSCD in the literature and provides a more rigorous and comprehensive definition, which is crucial for advancing the field. This foundational contribution helps to clarify the object of study for all other future researchers in the field, touching upon this subject. Future researchers are encouraged to further engage with it and refine it.

While many articles analyse specific aspects or responses to geopolitical disruptions, this article explicitly aims to lay a solid theoretical foundation and provide an all-encompassing theory for the new and burgeoning field of GSCD. It proposes a framework that encompasses the causes, propagation and consequences of GSCD by integrating existing OSCM theories with novel IR perspectives. Such structured approach provides a comprehensive lens that is often lacking in more focused empirical studies with a narrower scope. This places the article in the stream of literature attempting to theorise other important concepts, emerging research stream and phenomena in the field of management such as coordination of supply chains (Holweg and Pil, 2007), supply chain design choices (Vonderembse et al., 2006), sustainability in multitier supply chains (Tachizawa and Wong, 2014) and supply chains alignment (Wong et al., 2012).

This study also highlights how theories used are extended in the context of GSCD and what new theoretical contributions they offer. The key contribution of this work lies in identifying and consolidating previous research to develop key constructs and concepts conducive to advancing the emergent GSCD field. Offered theoretical propositions contribute to the development and extension of conceptual frameworks already popular in the SCM and OM literature and bring a novel, interdisciplinary element by integrating IR theory insights.

International Journal of Operations and Production Management (IJOPM) has been a leader among journals in the field in moving the conversation on supply chain disruption into a novel territory driven by geopolitics (Alexander et al., 2022). This article is firmly grounded in this discourse and as such, it responds to Golgeci et al. (2025)'s call for a view of SCM that requires interdisciplinary approaches integrating insights from political science and international relations. It also relates to Bhamra et al. (2024)'s work, making the case that the understanding of geopolitics and the theoretical mechanisms that govern it is relevant beyond the narrow case of the critical minerals industry and extends into supply chains for a growing number of industries that, for one reason or another, can be deemed as critical or strategic by the states.

Although the GSCD framework is theoretically grounded, we encourage researchers to examine its three dimensions: causes, propagation and consequences empirically in future studies. Formulated propositions have highly practical implications and should easily lend themselves to empirical investigation.

The causes of geopolitical disruptions discussed by the framework in relation to supply chain securitisation, political misalignment, and critical resource dependencies can be analysed, for instance, through case studies of supply chain actors in strategic industries such as semiconductors, oil and gas, and rare earths. The recent events related to the US-China rivalry and the War in Ukraine provide a rich context for empirically testing the framework. The potential research questions could be – “How do supply chain actors deploy political capabilities to co-create resilient supply chain configurations in geopolitically unstable environments?” or “How do different dimensions of political misalignment, such as ideological distance, alliances membership, or trade disputes, differentially affect the probability and severity of supply chain disruptions?” Although securitised supply chains are argued to be more exposed to disruption, the mechanisms driving this vulnerability remain underexplored. Future empirical research can focus on explaining how securitisation results in supply chain disruptions, for instance, through export controls, resigning from suppliers situated in certain countries, reputational spillovers, restricted access to technology or shifts in political and economic alliances. Researchers might examine how supply chain structure, measured by network centrality, degree of geographic concentration, technological dependence, etc., interacts with political decisions to amplify or mitigate disruption risks.

The disruptions' propagation in supply chains can be empirically analysed by looking at past events such as the Japan–South Korea trade dispute and transforming data on trade and company facilities into a network, where supply chain actors or the whole industry clusters are identified as the nodes, edges are trade flows, and weights can be expressed as supply chain’ dependencies' strengths. While network theory concepts, such as betweenness centrality (BC), are widely used to model the propagation of disruption, their integration with geopolitical constructs opens new research avenues. More empirical research is needed to determine how and why certain supply-network nodes become targets of state control.

Future researchers are encouraged to move beyond considerations of economic or operational efficiency and consider geopolitical rivalry as a central driver of supply chain design. For investigating the impact of GSCD's consequences for future SC design, it would be beneficial to comparatively analyse case studies of supply chain networks for strategic and non-strategic industries (defined based on the potential dual use applications of their outputs or their overall criticality for national security and economic competitiveness) and their adaptation to geopolitical disruptions such as US-China trade war or tensions deriving from technological rivalry. Data collection, both at the supply chain actors' level through surveys or interviews, or at the macro level through analysis of supply chain reconfiguration, could reveal new insights into the phenomena of nearshoring, friendshoring and offshoring, enriching the broader theory. Future research could also test the links between industry-specific characteristics and exposure to or sensitivity towards geopolitical risks. Future studies should develop an integrated theory showing how industry structure inherently determines geopolitical vulnerability. Geopolitical risk is often treated in the literature as an environmental factor that uniformly affects firms. Meanwhile, industries vary widely in their exposure due to factors such as their subject to specific regulations or their status as more critical to national security. By systematically linking industry-specific characteristics to geopolitical rationality, OSCM research can move towards more predictive, policy-relevant findings on supply chain design in a global economy increasingly exposed to geopolitical tensions. The theoretical propositions offered in this article can be empirically tested and a table in the  Appendix outlines how this could be achieved, designating new research directions.

As an alternative to integrating theories from the field of International Relations, some other adjacent fields could have been considered. For instance, the prospects of integrating Political Geography theories into the study of Geopolitical Supply Chain Disruptions looked particularly promising. Political geography is characterised by its interdisciplinary nature, and it brings into focus how location, borders, and territorial control shape state behaviour and economic flows – an attractive proposition in the context of analysing disruptions in geographically dispersed and politically sensitive supply chains (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014). Key concepts from this field, such as territoriality (related to the control of geographic spaces), geopolitical imaginaries (how nations and political entities perceive and project their roles and identities on the global stage) and spatial fix (overcoming crises by reorganising spatial arrangements), could be employed to generate new insights on geopolitical disruptions to supply chains where concrete single geographical locations such as Taiwan (in case of semiconductors) or the Democratic Republic of Congo (in case of cobalt for batteries) can play an outsized role (Seck et al., 2022; Shattuck, 2021). International Relations (IR), however, offered a comparatively richer and better-suited theoretical toolkit to analyse geopolitical supply chain disruptions.

The field of International Relations itself is rich in many different theories that still could be leveraged such as World Systems Theory or Hegemonic Stability Theory, but in this study, the focus is on the IR's three main theoretical perspectives: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism (Schieder, 2014). These three perspectives play a central role in the field of International Relations, with their many variations (including Classical Realism, Neorealism, Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism and Contingent Realism, just in the case of Realism), which becomes impossible to ignore in the study attempting to integrate IR theories (Feng, 2006; Schieder, 2014).

The last 2 decades have provided researchers with many GSCD events to study (Brexit, the Japan–South Korea trade dispute, the War in Ukraine, and the China–Japan dispute over rare earth supply). There is always a time lag to be observed regarding the creation of the literature. New papers exploring the COVID-19 phenomenon continue to be published and constitute now a substantial body of literature. A similar phenomenon might be observed in relation to the War in Ukraine and its impact on supply chains that, as of the time of writing, remains relatively unexplored (Srai et al., 2023; Belhadi et al., 2024).

Geopolitical disruptions to supply chains are empirical phenomena and there remain ample opportunities for theoretical contributions and theory development in this emergent field. Some of the theories more routinely used in OSCM literature that are suitable for the task include Game Theory, Complexity Theory, Systems Theories and Cluster Theory. Geopolitical disruptions to supply chains are empirical phenomena, and there remain ample opportunities for theoretical contributions and theory development in this emergent field. Some of the theories more commonly used in the OSCM literature that are suitable for the task include Game Theory, Complexity Theory, Systems Theories and Cluster Theory.

Game theory models how rational actors make strategic decisions in interdependent situations, where each actor's (player's) outcome depends on others' actions (Rubinstein, 1991). In the context of supply chains and geopolitical disruptions, companies must anticipate moves by governments, supply chain partners and competitors. Such moves could be considered in different types of games, including cooperative and non-cooperative games, zero-sum and non-zero-sum games, and simultaneous and sequential games (MacKenzie and DaSilva, 2006; Ho et al., 2022). Each type of game provides a different framework for analysing player interactions (MacKenzie and DaSilva, 2006). Game Theory could be employed to model the U.S.-China rivalry as a strategic game in which countries or firms anticipate each other's actions and adjust their supply chain management decisions accordingly. In this manner, Game Theory could help model “what if” scenarios, for instance, what happens if China restricts rare-earth exports. Game Theory is also more suitable than TCE for modelling non-economic motivations in vertical integration decisions, such as political alignment or risk aversion (Samuelson, 2016). The disadvantage of applying Game Theory in future research is its fundamental assumption of rational players with clear preferences and full knowledge of the game structure; meanwhile, under the impact of geopolitical disruptions, players may behave in opaque or irrational ways.

Complexity Theory could help researchers move beyond simple cause-and-effect models by providing structural metrics that can be used in regression analysis (e.g. testing how network centrality affects resilience) and case studies to investigate the dynamic interdependencies that define how supply chains adapt to geopolitical disruptions. Measures of centrality and connectivity can quantify a firm's position within a broader supply chain network and its influence on information flow and resource allocation under geopolitical tensions (Gu et al., 2025).

Systems Theory provides a more holistic lens for operationalising empirical research on geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions by shifting the focus from individual firms to mechanisms governing dynamic, interconnected supply chain networks. Qualitative approaches can operationalise Systems Theory to understand the iterative process of supply chain adaptation to geopolitical tensions. The Systems Theory focus on emergence and adaptation, aligns well with analysing how firms build resilience in a shifting geopolitical environment. Researchers are also encouraged to use longitudinal studies in the context of Systems Theory to understand the impact of geopolitical tensions over time rather than focusing solely on single disruptions.

Cluster Theory could be operationalised by defining and analysing groups of firms whose collective behaviour is shaped by shared political or geographic factors. This would allow researchers to study how proximity facilitates collective responses to disruptions. A primary method of operationalising a cluster is to group firms by their geographical location or the concentration of their assets (Carnovale et al., 2025). But in the context of GSCD, the theory can be operationalised by defining a cluster not purely by geography, but as a set of regions united by something other than geography, for instance, by shared values, political, military or economic alliances, exemplified, for instance, by the US, Europe, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea cooperating on semiconductors. Given the novelty and complexity of geopolitically driven clustering, as reflected, for instance, in friendshoring initiatives, the recommended approach would be inductive case study research. This would involve selecting multiple firms within a defined geopolitical cluster (or comparing two different clusters) to develop an understanding of the complex, emerging interrelationships and the evolution of shared strategies over time, thereby paving the way for a strong theoretical contribution.

There is also potential to adopt and adapt less commonly used theories from other social sciences or even the natural sciences if they seem fit for the task and promise to yield new insights.

For future researchers, resource-centred theories integration with institutional theory, DCT and resilience frameworks promise deeper insights into how supply chains respond in the long-term to GSCD and how supply chain redesign can lead not only to more efficient and resilient, but also more ESG-compliant supply chains.