Managing institutional multiplicity: a case of a bilateral development agency’s regional office Open Access

To provide financial and/or technical assistance to developing countries, many member counties of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have established bilateral development agencies (BDAs) (Fushimi, 2022). These examples include the United States Agency for International Development ^[1], the German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH ^[2], and the Korea International Cooperation Agency ^[3]. To conduct development cooperation (DC) activities abroad, BDAs set up overseas offices (OOs) in aid-recipient countries. Although having offices in operational areas is critically important for BDAs, in practice, it is impossible for them to have OOs in all countries. Hence, they often establish regional offices (ROs) that cover a group of countries. Managing DC activities in multiple countries is incomparably more difficult for ROs than managing them in a single country, because each country has its own regulations, norms, and cultural values. The question is how ROs do manage this extraordinarily complex situation?

Institutionalism, also called “neo-institutionalism” or “sociological institutionalism” (Morgan et al., 2014), should offer useful insights into this question. Institutionalism is “one of the main theoretical perspectives used to understand organisational behaviour as situated in and influenced by other organisations and wider social forces—especially broader cultural rules and beliefs” (Lounsbury and Zho, 2013). In fact, the theory is used by papers in a broad range of leading management and organisational behaviour research journals, including the International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior (e.g., Chen, 2007; Fulton, 2010; Glebovskiy, 2019; Hoang et al., 2023; Pappas, 2019).

The central assumption of this theory is that an organisation seeks legitimacy within its institutional environment to survive. Legitimacy not only increases chances for organisational survival but also enhances organisational performance through, for example, better access to resources (Volberda et al., 2012). Owing to their legitimacy-driven nature, organisations become isomorphic to one another when placed in the same institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutionalism has emerged to explain the behaviour of ordinary domestic organisations embedded in a single institutional environment ^[4] (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). However, more recently scholars have begun to examine the behaviour of an organisation that is embedded in two institutional environments. For example, the subsidiary of a multinational corporation (MNC) is embedded into the institutional environments of (1) its MNC parent and (2) the host country. The subsidiary must be legitimate in both environments simultaneously. However, this is challenging because being legitimate in one institutional environment can mean being illegitimate in another. This potentially problematic situation is called “institutional duality” (Kostova and Roth, 2002).

The current study goes one step further. It examines the behaviour of an organisation embedded in three or more institutional environments. The situation that ROs encounter is far more complex because they are embedded into the institutional environments of (1) their headquarters and (2) their multiple host countries. This extraordinary situation is called “institutional multiplicity” (Powell and Lim, 2022).

Although institutional theory has frequently been used to research how organisations manage institutional duality (Ahworegba, 2018), it has seldom been used to study how organisations cope with institutional multiplicity. Considering the complexity of institutional multiplicity (Powell and Lim, 2022), this lack of research should not be overlooked. Existing studies on institutional duality with institutionalism target the subsidiaries of private MNCs (Ahworegba, 2018) and ignore the OOs of public sector organisations. The current study fills these gaps by applying institutional theory to understand the behaviour of a government-owned BDA’s RO under conditions of institutional multiplicity. The application of theory (institutionalism) to underresearched themes and subjects can make a substantive theoretical contribution (Crane et al., 2016).

This study employs a micro-political perspective to supplement the institutionalist perspective. The use of macro and micro perspectives can be considered another theoretical contribution. This is because institutional duality studies with a macro theoretical perspective tend to overlook the complexity of intra-organisational behaviour (Fushimi, 2024a,b). Thus, a combined perspective should offer a two-dimensional view and unique insights that will help understand the RO’s behaviour.

The purpose of this study is to explore how a BDA RO manages institutional multiplicity by employing a macro-micro combined perspective. While examining the influence of institutional environment factors from an institutionalist perspective, the study also pays attention to individual actors’ responses to the influence taking a micro-political perspective. This is an exploratory qualitative study, and Reflexive Thematic Analysis proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006, 2021a) is chosen. The data obtained through in-depth interviews with members of a BDA RO in South-East Europe are analysed using this method. As a result, two themes are developed: (1) the decomposition of institutional multiplicity into multiple institutional dualities and (2) the division of duties among office staff members to demonstrate legitimacy.

This article is structured as follows. After this introduction, the next section discusses the conceptual background. The third section explains the research methodology. Following this, themes developed through Reflexive Thematic Analysis are elaborated on in the fourth section. Lastly, conclusions are drawn, and implications and limitations are presented.

This section elaborates on the notion of institutional duality (2.1). This notion is based on institutionalism; thus, the core concepts of this theory are also discussed here. Following this, the section elaborates on institutional multiplicity (2.2). Then, it discusses a micro-political perspective that supplements the institutionalism used in this study (2.3).

The notion of institutional duality is based on institutional theory (Collings and Dick, 2011; Kostova and Roth, 2002). The central assumption of this theory is that an organisation seeks legitimacy within its institutional environment to survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). The institutional environment is “the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy” (Scott, 1987, p. 498). As organisational survival depends on its legitimacy to institutional requirements, an organisation attempts to maintain organisational legitimacy, or “the perceived appropriateness of an organization to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and definitions” (Deephouse et al., 2017, p. 32), even if legitimate actions could damage the functional efficiency of its performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987).

The institutional environment comprises three elements: (1) regulative, (2) normative, and (3) cultural-cognitive (Scott, 2008). The regulative element of an institutional environment represents laws, rules, and regulations. The normative element includes work roles, habits, and norms widely held by the population in an institutional environment. The cognitive element refers to values, beliefs, and assumptions commonly shared by the population in an institutional environment (Palthe, 2014; Scott, 2008). The combination of these elements creates a unique institutional environment.

A typical BDA’s OO is located in its host country and embedded in the host country’s institutional environment. Hence, it seeks legitimacy in the environment. Importantly, the OO is not an independent entity. Rather, it is part of the BDA and must comply with the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutional demands of the BDA headquarters. Here, the OO is placed in the institutional environments of the host country and the BDA headquarters. This situation facing the OO is called “institutional duality” (Kostova and Roth, 2002, p. 216).

Institutional duality is problematic for the OO because it must simultaneously meet two potentially incompatible institutional demands (Ahworegba, 2018; Collings and Dick, 2011; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Legitimate action in one institutional environment can be illegitimate in the other. For example, although performance appraisal associated with performance-based salary is acceptable in Western cultures, it is often not acceptable in Asian cultures, which value family-like relationships between employers and employees (Takahara, 1992).

There are several ways to manage institutional duality. “Ceremonial adoption” is a well-known organisational response to institutional duality. Namely, MNC subsidiaries implement but not internalise organisational practices brought from their MNC parents to demonstrate legitimacy in two institutional environments (Kostova and Roth, 2002). There are other responses. Holm et al. (2017) proposed five responses that offices at overseas locations take to manage institutional duality. They are; (1) compliance, (2) compromise, (3) manipulation, (4) decoupling, (5) selective coupling, and (6) non-compliance (Holm et al., 2017). Compliance means complying with existing rules and norms. Compromise is a strategy adopted by an office when it is confronted with conflicting institutional environment pressures (Holm et al., 2017). Manipulation is an attempt to co-opt, influence, or control institutional demands (Holm et al., 2017). Decoupling is a strategy used to respond to disagreements between technical and institutional requirements (Holm et al., 2017; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Selective coupling is to “combine different intact elements from conflicting demands to simultaneously satisfy all sets of actors” (Holm et al., 2017, p. 107). Lastly, non-compliance indicates an absolute rejection of at least one of the institutional environment pressures (Holm et al., 2017).

The term “institutional multiplicity” has been used with different meanings in different contexts in institutional research. For example, in their study of international coalitions of private companies, Powell and Lim (2022) referred to it as a situation in which coalitions experience parallel institutional demands from multiple parent firms. Meanwhile, in the study of MNCs’ nonmarket strategy, Sun et al. (2021) regard that institutional multiplicity comprises; (1) the home country’s institutional demands, (2) the host country’s institutional demands, (2) the supernational institutional demands, and (4) the interaction among these demands. In her study of high-tech conferences in Israel, Zilber (2011) focuses on the micro-organisational field and considers institutional multiplicity as ‘the simultaneous existence of various institutional arrangements’ (p. 1540) such as; (1) global identity, (2) national identity, (3) managerial best practice, and (4) investment guidance best practice.

Those who employ Scandinavian institutionalism (e.g. Blomgren and Waks, 2017) use the term “institutional pluralism” for the same meaning. Kraatz and Block (2008, p. 243) defined the term as “the situation faced by an organisation that operates within multiple institutional spheres”. They view institutions as “the rules of the game” and claim that when organisations confront institutional pluralism, they must play multiple games simultaneously (Kraatz and Block (2008, p. 243).

Regardless of differences in interpretation and terminology, institutional multiplicity generally represents a multitude of parallel institutional demands. In this article, institutional multiplicity refers to a situation in which BDA ROs simultaneously confront the institutional environment demands of their headquarters and multiple host countries.

Synthesising macro and micro perspectives is helpful because it “can open each other’s eyes to new phenomena and start looking at familiar phenomena in new ways” (Smets et al., 2015, p. 283). It also has significant potential to reveal both how organisational constituents behave in broader contexts and how the organisations act accordingly (Greenwood et al., 2017).

Hence, a micro-political perspective is helpful for this study because it complements the institutionalist account. Based on institutional theory, ROs seek to maintain legitimacy in their institutional environments. However, this account does not consider the influence of complex intra-organisation dynamics. Attention should be paid more to how ROs constituents manage this complex situation.

Micro-politics means “the intra-organisational use of formal and informal power by individual actors and groups to attain their objectives” (Or and Berkovich, 2023, p. 534). The micro-political perspective asserts that an organisation’s responses can be “shaped by individual interests and actor rationales” (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009, p. 100). Based on this assertion, different members act differently to manage institutional duality or multiplicity, exercising distinctively different types of power.

Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011) examined the power exercised by MNC subsidiary members. Through a literature review, they identified “four genuine types” of subsidiary power (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011, p. 30). The first is micro-political bargaining power. This can be seen when subsidiary members try to influence their MNC parent through their own initiatives, manipulative behaviour, and/or deliberate information politics. The second is systemic power. This relates to the specific functions that subsidiary members exclusively perform within the MNC system. The third is resource-dependency power. The subsidiary members use this utilising their expertise and specialised knowledge when MNC parent depends on their ability to solve local issues. The last is institutional power. This stems from the host country’s institutional requirements. For example, subsidiary members use local institutional requirements to prevent the use of MNC-wide policies and practices introduced by their MNC parent (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011).

Intriguingly, MNC subsidiary members may use language as a tool to exercise their power (Ciuk et al., 2019; Piekkari and Tietze, 2014; Piekkari and Westney, 2017). Within an MNC subsidiary, multiple languages are used, and interlingual translations occur at all times (Ciuk et al., 2019; Piekkari and Westney, 2017). Hence, the use of multiple languages in the subsidiary “provides space for individuals and organizational units to exercise power” (Piekkari and Tietze, 2014, pp. 260–261). For example, subsidiary members may resist MNC parent policies and practices, interpreting them differently in their own language (Piekkari and Tietze, 2014). Or they may deliberately include or exclude others by choosing the languages they use and strengthen their power positions within the MNC (Piekkari and Tietze, 2014).

In sum, the assertion that different members act differently to manage institutional duality or multiplicity, exercising distinctively different types of power, should supplement the institutionalist account. This is because the integration of a micro-political perspective into institutionalism can change our understanding of theoretical relationships and help us comprehend the complex organisation behaviour under institutional multiplicity.

This section first discusses the philosophical and theoretical foundations of this study and its research approach (3.1). Then, it explains the settings, namely, the subject BDA and RO (3.2). Later, data collection (3.3) and data analysis (3.4) are presented.

The current study explores how a BDA RO manages conditions of institutional multiplicity. This study is underpinned by social constructivism’s ontology and epistemology. Namely, it assumes that multiple realities are constructed through our lived experiences and that reality is co-constructed between the researcher and the researched (Creswell, 2012). The theoretical foundations of the study are institutionalism and a micro-political perspective. It employs a qualitative research approach. To analyse qualitative data, Reflexive Thematic Analysis was chosen because the “open, exploratory, flexible, and iterative” nature of this analysis method (Braun and Clarke, 2019, p. 593) aptly fits the exploratory nature of this study.

Subject BDA. The subject BDA is a governmental agency of an OECD member country in Asia. The BDA provides technical and financial assistance to more than 150 developing countries. It is headquartered in the home country’s capital, with a dozen domestic offices. The BDA has established nearly 100 OOs worldwide. The number of full-time employees is approximately 2,000. This figure excludes those hired on a contract basis and those employed locally in foreign countries. Roughly half of them (approximately 1,000) work at the headquarters. A quarter (approximately 500) work in domestic offices. The remaining (approximately 500) work at OOs as expatriates.

Subject RO. A few OOs of the subject BDA function as ROs. These ROs are located in regional hub countries. The target RO was established in the capital of a South-East European country (Country A) in 2006, aiming to cover five neighbouring countries (Countries B, C, D, E, and F). Seven expatriates (four proper and three contracted employees) and seven LHEs (six officers and one clerk) work for the RO.

Countries A, B, C, D, and E were members of a former Socialist Federal Republic. Country F did not belong to the Republic. The amount of assistance each country receives is not large. However, the amount of work required for the RO is large, as each country has its own constitution, head of state, government, currency, budget system, and development challenges. A simple calculation shows that the workload of the RO is six-fold heavier than that of ordinary OOs.

Because of the BDA’s ethnocentric OO management (see Branine, 2011), expatriates hold managerial positions in the RO, and LHEs support them. To operate DC activities in the neighbouring countries, the RO deploys local representatives to four countries (Countries B, C, D, and F). Country E does not have a local representative because of limited DC activities. Expatriates and LHEs remotely operate DC activities in these countries with the support of local representatives. Despite their external contracted staff status, local representatives are de facto representatives of the BDA RO in their respective countries. Figure 1 shows the chain of command within the RO.

Importantly, the fluidities of RO constituents are not the same. LHEs indefinitely serve the RO. The service terms of local representatives are renewed annually, but most work continuously. However, expatriates have a fixed assignment term (usually three years) and are constantly replaced.

The subject BDA RO is desirable for this study, which explores how a public sector organisation’s RO manages institutional multiplicity. Although some (e.g. diplomatic missions, public schools, offices of trade representative, cultural centre, etc.) have offices abroad, few, except for BDAs, have ROs. The subject BDA RO was established specifically to cover multiple countries in South-East Europe and is therefore well suited for this study.

Due to travel restrictions caused by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, it was not possible to visit the subject RO. Hence, I conducted in-depth online interviews with informants, which are the primary sources of data. The interviews covered; (1) expatriates, (2) LHEs, (3) local representatives, and (4) ex-expatriates of the subject RO. The interviews were conducted between October 2021 and April 2022.

I included ex-expatriates who had previously worked for the subject RO. This is because, at the time of the interviews, the RO’s DC activities were not active because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, the RO’s expatriates had few opportunities to contact people in neighbouring countries, and they might not have encountered much institutional multiplicity.

Interviews were conducted as follows. I invited all expatriates, LHEs, and local representatives to the interviews via e-mail. For ex-expatriates, informants were selected through criterion-based sampling. First, all ex-expatriates of the RO were listed. I prioritised those who had recently worked at the RO because they were thought to have a clearer memory than those who had worked there long ago. In addition, those who served at the programme unit were preferred because they were expected to have had frequent contact with recipient government officials and counterpart organisation staff in neighbouring countries.

To arrange interviews, I e-mailed candidate informants and explained the purpose of the study and the expectations for the informants. If they responded positively, a remote interview was arranged. All except one LHE agreed to participate in the study. In total, 20 informants joined the study (seven expatriates, four local representatives, five LHEs, and four ex-expatriates). Table 1 lists the informants.

Determining sample-size prior to data collection is not relevant to thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2021b). Instead, “data saturation”, or “the point in data collection and analysis when new information produces little or no change to the codebook” (Guest et al., 2006, p. 65), should be considered (Braun and Clarke, 2021b). Indeed, 20 interviews were sufficient to meet the criteria.

The interviews were conducted using online video conferencing tools (Zoom and Teams). I used: (1) an interview topic guide, (2) video recordings (with the informant’s consent), and (3) field notes to support data collection. The interview topic guide was created to facilitate the interviews. It contained questions regarding; (1) demographic information and (2) perceived institutional duality/multiplicity. The latter question includes; (a) while working in your office, what cultural and institutional differences do you notice between the BDA’s home country and aid-recipient (host) countries? (b) how do these differences influence the way you perform organisational practices in your office? and (c) how do you manage cultural and institutional differences? These open-ended questions were used to explore how the RO manages institutional multiplicity.

Each interview lasted 60–90 min. The informants were asked to explain their perceived institutional environment pressures from the BDA headquarters and recipient countries. The BDA home country’s native language (non-English) was used for interviews with expatriates and ex-expatriates. English was used for interviewing LHEs and local representatives.

Reflexive Thematic Analysis comprises six phases (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 2021a). The computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software NVIVO ^[5] (version 12) was used to support data analysis. First, I transcribed the recorded verbal data using NVIVO transcription ^[6] and corrected errors in the transcriptions by listing the voice recordings. I read and re-read the transcriptions and put initial ideas on them (phase 1: familiarising yourself with your data). Next, I generated initial codes that I thought contained interesting features by reviewing all datasets (phase 2: generating initial codes). I created potential themes by comparing, adjusting, and matching codes (phase 3: generating initial themes). In parallel, I organised the themes into parent-child relationships (phase 4: reviewing themes). Later, I defined and refined the themes and generated definitions and names for each theme (phase 5: defining and naming themes). While undertaking the analysis, I began writing a report (phase 6: producing the report). Importantly, the analysis process of Reflexive Thematic Analysis is “organic” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 593). The process of generating codes and themes is by no means linear; rather, it is iterative (Braun and Clarke, 2021a). In reality, the phases went back and forth throughout the study.

Through Reflexive Thematic Analysis, I developed two themes: the decomposition of institutional multiplicity (4.1), and the division of duties for demonstrating legitimacy (4.2).

The subject RO must manage DC activities in six countries (Countries A to F). Although all of them except Country F share similar regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutions, each has unique features (e.g., religions, languages, and ethnicities). For example, Country A, where the RO is located, had a central government during the former Republic’s era. It has been the political and economic centre of the region and has inherited its legacy. Although the RO is a “donor”, it is registered as a non-diplomatic organisation by the government of Country A. Hence, it must comply with Country A’s regulatory requirements. For example, when the RO hires LHEs, local labour laws will override BDA’s regulations. Country B was once an autonomous province of Country A. A few years after the collapse of the former Socialist Federal Republic, Country B declared independence from Country A. Certainly, Country A does not accept this, and the two countries have a difficult diplomatic relationship as a result. Country C comprises three ethnic groups and has a complex government system consisting of two entities under the central government. Furthermore, one of the entities has ten cantons, each with its own government (i.e., prime minister and cabinet). Country D, on the other hand, is composed of two ethnic groups and is politically unstable. Country E has the lowest population in the region, and DC activities are limited. Hence, no local representatives are deployed to that country. Finally, Country F was not a member of the former Republic. It is institutionally and culturally different from its neighbours.

When operating DC activities, the RO encounters regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutional requirements from all these countries, a situation that constitutes institutional multiplicity. Figure 2 describes the institutional multiplicity encountered by the RO.

Institutional multiplicity is far more complex and more difficult to control than institutional duality (Powell and Lim, 2022). To manage it, the RO deploys local representatives to the neighbouring host countries and shifts the place where institutional environment pressures from the home and multiple host countries collide. By doing so, it decomposes institutional multiplicity into more manageable multiple institutional dualities. Each local representative manages institutional duality that comprises the institutional environments of the BDA headquarters and her/his host countries (see Figure 3).

Although institutional duality is more manageable than institutional multiplicity, managing it is still not an easy task. It requires experience. And local representatives have this. Two have worked for the RO for more than ten years and another for more than five years. They are accustomed to working in the BDA’s institutional environment and are confident in coordinating the institutional duality they face. A local representative states the following:

Another local representative explains how s/he manages institutional duality:

LHEs acknowledge that local representatives play an indispensable role in managing each institutional duality. An LHE expresses the importance of local representatives for the RO:

Another LHE also appreciates the role that local representatives play in neighbouring countries:

By interpreting the RO’s institutional decomposition strategy from a micro-political perspective, it is thus possible to say that expatriates exercise their “systemic power”. This power relates to the specific functions that the RO performs exclusively in the BDA system (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011). By using it, expatriates attempt to distance themselves from the pressures of the host countries’ institutional environments and defend themselves from the problems that arise.

As discussed above, after decomposition of institutional multiplicity, the subject RO still needs to demonstrate its legitimacy in each institutional environment. Here, we see a division of duties strategy. Certainly, local representatives are expected to demonstrate legitimacy in the institutional environment of their own country because they are deployed there to do so. However, there are many other staff members in the RO, and by constructing a division of duties, the RO specifies who demonstrates legitimacy in which institutional environment. This strategy is helpful for the RO when it is attempting to show its legitimacy in multiple institutional environments effectively and efficiently.

A micro-political perspective offers unique insights into understanding the division of duties strategy. The division seems to be determined by the languages used in institutional environments. For example, the native language of the BDA’s home country is used in the BDA’s institutional environment, and expatriates are responsible for showing legitimacy in the environment. Meanwhile, in Countries A and E, the native language of Country A is used, and LHEs who speak that language demonstrate legitimacy there. In Countries B, C, D, and F, their own languages are used, and the local representatives who speak these languages demonstrate legitimacy in their institutional environments (see Figure 4). Using a distinct language, RO staff members may exclude non-speakers from their communication in their institutional environments (Piekkari and Tietze, 2014).

In addition to an institutional decomposition strategy, the expatriates may also use a division of duties strategy to keep themselves away from the forefronts. Thanks to these two strategies, expatriates may not seriously suffer from contradiction caused by the institutional dualities. An ex-expatriate remembered her/his experience at the RO:

Meanwhile, local representatives are the ones who must deal with problematic conditions, and they often feel stress. A local representative expresses her/his frustration as follows:

Although the expatriates can keep themselves away from the forefronts of host countries’ institutional environment pressures applying a division of duties strategy, they are still responsible for dealing with the home country pressure. An ex-expatriate remembered the enormous pressure s/he felt when the RO was ordered to formulate a new infrastructure project in Country E through the political level:

This section concludes the study. It provides conclusions (5.1). Then, it offers theoretical implications (5.2) and practical implications (5.3). Lastly, limitations and recommendations for future research are discussed (5.4).

Although how MNCs manage conditions of institutional duality has been well researched (Ahworegba, 2018), how they cope with institutional multiplicity has seldom been researched. Also, public sector organisations have rarely been the subjects of either institutional duality or multiplicity research. Moreover, studies with institutional theory tend to overlook the complexity of intra-organisational behaviour. This study has filled these gaps. It explored how a government-owned BDA’s RO manages institutional multiplicity through institutionalist and micro-political perspectives.

I developed two themes through Reflexive Thematic Analysis. One is the decomposition of institutional multiplicity into multiple institutional dualities by deploying local representatives to RO’s neighbouring countries. By doing so, the RO disperses the forefront of institutional multiplicity to the places where local representatives reside. The decomposition of institutional multiplicity seems to be a rational organisational survival technique. Local representatives handle institutional duality that comprises the institutional environments of BDA headquarters and host countries; thus, expatriates are not seriously bothered by conditions of institutional duality. Here, expatriates may exercise their “systemic power” (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011) and keep themselves away from the forefront of host countries’ institutional environment pressures to defend themselves from the problems that arise.

The other theme is the division of duties for demonstrating legitimacy. There seems to be a division of duties among RO staff members as to who exhibits legitimacy in which institutional environment. This division may be determined by the language used in particular institutional environment. For example, expatriates show legitimacy within the institutional environment of BDA using their native language. Meanwhile, LHEs demonstrate legitimacy within the institutional environment of Country A in their native language. Local representatives exhibit legitimacy in the institutional environment of their own country in their respective language. RO staff members seem to use languages to exercise their power. They may exclude non-speakers of their languages from their communication in their institutional environments.

There are two implications to institutional theory: (1) actors’ influence on institutional environment and (2) combining a micro-perspective.

Actors’ influence on institutional environment. Institutional theory asserts that an organisation seeks legitimacy within its institutional environment to survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). In other words, organisational behaviour is controlled by the institutional environment. The findings of this study cast doubt on this statement. The subject RO decomposes institutional multiplicity into multiple institutional dualities by deploying local representatives. Here, an active organisation behaviour to modify the conditions of institutional environments is observed. Organisations are not only influenced by an institutional environment, but they also influence it.

Combining a micro-perspective with a macro-perspective. The current study identified RO’s institutional decomposition strategy and division of duties strategy for dealing with the extraordinarily complex situation of institutional multiplicity. The findings were possible thanks to the combined theoretical perspective. This perspective provided a two-dimensional interpretation of the phenomenon. For example, an institutionalist perspective provided a broad picture of how the RO manage institutional multiplicity. A micro-political perspective complemented this by adding elements of intra-organisational dynamics. It also helped the researcher realise the power exerted by RO staff members.

However, combining theoretical perspectives has potential disadvantages. The most serious one is the weakening of the argument. For example, while an institutionalist perspective emphasises the influence of external factors, a micro-political perspective insists on internal factors. Combining different claims may thus blur the focus of the argument. Another potential disadvantage is the difficulty in finding patterns. To understand a phenomenon using multiple perspectives, researchers must examine the different elements on which each perspective focuses. As the number of perspectives increases, the number of elements also increases. Accordingly, finding patterns will be more difficult. Failing to find patterns, researchers may conclude that “it all depends”. Repeating this type of answer will not create bricks in the wall of knowledge (Crane et al., 2016).

Unfocussed discussion is another potential disadvantage. Studies with a single theoretical perspective can be more focussed than those with multiple perspectives. By focussing on the most essential part of research and simplifying arguments, the most powerful insights can emerge (Suárez and Bromley, 2016). Focused discussion also helps readers understand the arguments easily. Researchers must be aware of these potential disadvantages when combining theoretical perspectives. To avoid weakening and defocussing arguments, the prioritisation of perspectives, as adopted in this study, is essential.

Employing an institutional decomposition strategy, the subject RO modifies institutional multiplicity into multiple institutional dualities by deploying local representatives to each neighbouring countries. DC practitioners should consider using this strategies if their organisations are placed under similar conditions.

DC practitioners also need to acknowledge the important role that local representatives play. They are indispensable not only for ROs but also for entire BDAs to manage DC activities in multiple countries with limited human resources. Besides, thanks to local representatives, expatriates may not be severely bothered by discrepancies caused by institutional duality.

Finally, DC practitioners need to consider the qualification of local representatives. Although institutional duality is easier to manage than institutional multiplicity, managing institutional duality remains challenging. It requires a profound knowledge of institutional environments of both BDA headquarters/home country and host countries. Local representatives who have such knowledge and ability to manage institutional duality are necessary.

There are two limitations. One is the generalisability of the themes developed in this study The subject RO is a donor organisation in recipient countries. It provides technical assistance, grant aids, and loans to these countries. To carry out these activities, the aid-recipient organisations must comply with regulations and guidelines of the BDA. Hence, the RO encounters little host countries’ regulative institutional pressures. Therefore, the developed themes may not apply directly to ROs of other public sector organisations. Also, the case of the RO in South-East Europe may not be generalised to ROs in other regions. Future institutional multiplicity research should examine different types of public sector organisations in different regions.

Another limitation is the source of information. Originally, I was going to visit the subject RO to conduct face-to-face interviews and observe behaviour. However, due to the travel restriction caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, the visit was cancelled. Interviews were conducted remotely, but observation was not. Nevertheless, it is desirable to obtain multiple types of data for exploratory studies. Future research should consider collecting multiple types of data through field surveys.

The author thanks those who participated in this study for providing invaluable information. The author also thanks the editor of IJOT&B and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.