Financial and professional incentives in health care: Comparing the UK and Canadian experiences

Traditionally in health care and in the public sector more generally, little thought has been given to the impact of provider‐oriented incentives on the delivery of services. There has been an assumption that the language of incentives belonged to the private sector and was inappropriate in the public sector. Instead, the governance of health care has relied on the professional ethos of clinicians to direct decision making. Implicitly there has been an expectation that the ethical stance of clinicians would ensure that their actions were always in the best interest of patients. However, in the context of a heightened awareness of cost constraints there has been a greater emphasis on the active management of resources in medical organizations. This article argues that the structure of incentives in health care is highly significant in resource allocation, as medical ethics does not provide an unambiguous guide to clinical decision making. The paper defines the nature of the financial and professional incentives in medical organizations and discusses their impact on the delivery of services through an analysis of positive and negative effects. By undertaking a comparison between the UK and Canada, the paper identifies the differential nature of the incentives present in the health care systems of these two countries and discusses some of their consequences.