This study examines how governance structures and power dynamics shape value capture and inequality in Tanzania's seafood value chains across domestic, regional, and global markets.
Semi-structured interviews were administered to 232 value chain actors; fishers, processors, and traders. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions were also undertaken. Data were analysed through thematic analysis, with primarily inductive coding, interpretation guided by GVC governance, power, and inequality frameworks. Descriptive statistics complemented the qualitative findings. Validity was ensured through pilot testing and triangulation.
Governance varies across filaments supplying domestic, regional, and global markets. In the small pelagic chain, captive governance operates through credit-debt dependency, concentrating bargaining power among traders. In the crustacean chain, institutional power structures participation through compliance-based export requirements. Across both chains, fishers and processors are adversely incorporated, limiting upgrading and stabilising returns for downstream actors.
This study only covered marine fisheries. Power dynamics were not quantified. Future research should examine freshwater governance and quantify credit-based dependency.
Two theoretical contributions are made. First, in informal natural-resource sectors, governance operates through risk mediation and credit-based dependency rather than transaction complexity, as conventional GVC typologies assume. Second, filament-based analysis reveals that a single commodity system can exhibit multiple governance forms depending on market orientation heterogeneity obscured by chain-level classifications. These findings extend GVC theory toward informal and ecologically uncertain trade contexts.
