This study aims to examine how managerial myopia shapes corporate carbon disclosure strategy and whether myopic managers rely mainly on symbolic rather than substantive disclosure.
Using panel data on Chinese central state-owned enterprises in heavily polluting industries and the transportation sector from 2012 to 2022, this study constructs a manual carbon disclosure index and decomposes it into symbolic and substantive disclosure. The study also examines the moderating roles of peer firms' government low-carbon certification and investor sentiment.
Managerial myopia is positively associated with overall carbon disclosure, and this association is driven mainly by symbolic rather than substantive disclosure. Peer firms' government low-carbon certification strengthens this relationship, whereas investor sentiment weakens it, with both effects concentrated in symbolic disclosure. Environmental management system certification weakens, while central environmental inspections amplify, the disclosure incentives induced by managerial myopia. Managerial myopia also reduces green invention patent applications, supporting a strategic decoupling interpretation.
Regulators and investors should not equate more carbon disclosure with stronger carbon governance. Regulators should establish standardized disclosure and verification requirements, while investors should assess disclosure composition to identify real low-carbon action and constrain strategic decoupling.
This study extends managerial myopia research to carbon disclosure and shows that short-term-oriented managers may respond to external evaluation pressure through symbolic disclosure rather than substantive carbon governance. It also distinguishes symbolic from substantive carbon disclosure and highlights strategic decoupling in an emerging-market setting.
