Third-party logistics providers in construction projects – implications for coopetitive interaction in forced relationships Open Access

The construction sector faces growing challenges in delivering a sustainable built environment, and construction projects are becoming more complex (Behera et al., 2015; Stanitsas and Kirytopoulos, 2023). To address these challenges, new and more efficient ways of operating are needed, in which construction logistics has been identified as a key area for improvement (Sundquist et al., 2018; Le et al., 2020). In this regard, construction logistics setups (CLSs) – dedicated logistics resources – are increasingly used with the purpose of improving productivity (Sundquist et al., 2018; Fredriksson et al., 2024a) and reduce interference to surrounding society (Eriksson et al., 2021; Fredriksson et al., 2024b). CLSs complement contractors by coordinating and managing logistics on construction sites and are often operated by third-party logistics (TPL) providers (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016; Janné and Fredriksson, 2019). Despite their increased use, TPL-operated CLSs are still a new phenomenon in construction (Fredriksson et al., 2021) and thus TPL providers represent a new type of actor in construction projects (Sundquist et al., 2018). However, contractors have limited experience of CLSs, as they are mostly used in large or prestigious projects (Fredriksson et al., 2024a).

When CLSs are initiated by the project or programme owner, they are often mandatory for all contractors to use. This creates a forced relationship between the TPL provider and the contractors, challenging contractors’ traditional role in managing logistics (Karrbom Gustavsson, 2018; Hedborg Bengtsson, 2019). Contractors often struggle to understand the purpose of CLSs and their impact on productivity (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016; Sundquist et al., 2018; Fredriksson et al., 2021), which contributes to reluctance to engage with CLSs and cooperate with the TPL provider (Fredriksson et al., 2021). Although the CLSs are mandatory, the lack of a mandate for TPL providers contributes to low compliance with rules and limited service utilisation (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016; Fredriksson et al., 2024b). However, contractors who actively manage their logistics tend to derive greater value from the CLS (Janné and Fredriksson, 2022; Fredriksson et al., 2024b).

The organising of relationships between the initiating actor, the TPL provider, and the contractor(s) affects how contractors perceive the benefits of CLS and engage in the forced relationship with the TPL provider (Janné and Fredriksson, 2019; Fredriksson et al., 2021). However, there is little research on the nature of the forced relationship between TPL providers – as new actors in the construction industry – and contractors, who are well established in the construction business network. This provides an opportunity to investigate how forced relationships affect established actors in construction projects and to better understand the dynamics of such relationships in general.

Several studies have explored how CLSs affect project actors, such as how activities and resources are reorganised (Sundquist et al., 2018), how TPL providers assume new roles in supply chain management (Ekeskär et al., 2022), how public actors as initiators of CLSs push other actors into a customer role of the CLS (Eriksson et al., 2021), and the issue of who the actual customer is (Janné and Fredriksson, 2019; Fredriksson et al., 2021). However, no study has delved deeply into the forced nature of the relationship between TPL providers and contractors. Since contractors are compelled to collaborate with TPL providers on logistics, complementing the logistics services that contractors typically manage themselves (Eriksson et al., 2021; Ekeskär et al., 2022), this forced relationship can be viewed as a form of coopetition.

Coopetition is the simultaneous cooperation and competition between firms, often leading to tensions (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014; Tidström, 2014). While these relationships are usually initiated voluntarily for strategic reasons (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996), they can also be forced (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). For a firm, engaging in coopetition can enhance product and/or service quality and increase revenue through the value-creating role that the other firm has as either customer, supplier, competitor, or complementor, i.e., a firm that complements the focal firm’s offerings (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). However, little is known about how these value-creating roles are perceived when the relationship is forced. Therefore, in this paper an interactive coopetition perspective is used with the overall purpose of investigating cooperative and competitive interactions of forced relationships and how this affects the perception of the value-creating role of a new actor. The value-creating role that is focused on is that of complementor, i.e., that of the TPL provider complementing the products and services of the contractor – as the focal firm – by delivering related logistics services to satisfy the initiating actor’s demands. The following two empirically based research questions guide the paper:

The study adopts an interactive perspective of business relationships, using the activities–resources–actors (ARA) model within the industrial network approach (INA) to investigate the first research question (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Håkansson et al., 2009). As such, the ARA model is used to detail the content of the relationships in terms of the involved actors, resources, and activities. This relationship content analysis is then used to examine the second research question, i.e., the role of TPL providers as complementors (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014) and, in doing so, applying the value net model (VNM) (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). Previous studies on tensions in coopetition (e.g., Tidström, 2008, 2014) are used to analyse the potential tensions in the forced focal firm–complementor relationship. As the INA, VNM, and studies of coopetition have not focused on forced business relationships, this study contributes to these areas as well as to the literature on construction logistics management, particularly regarding TPL providers. The empirical basis is a case study of an urban development district where the municipality organised a mandatory CLS with a TPL provider to be used by all contractors across several parallel and sequential projects. The investigation focuses on one stage in this multi-project context.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. It starts with a literature review of relevant studies of CLSs and TPL providers within construction logistics management. This is followed by a presentation of the literature and perspectives on which the analysis rests: the INA and the ARA model, the coopetition literature including the VNM and insights on tensions, and the role of complementor. Subsequently, the case study methodology is described along with an introduction to the case. The findings are then presented and discussed based on the analytical perspectives used. The paper ends with conclusions, managerial implications, and suggestions for further research in relation to interaction in forced coopetitive relationships as well as construction logistics management.

Clients and public actors (e.g., municipalities) are the primary initiators of TPL-operated CLSs, but they are typically not direct users of CLSs. As a result, they dictate the CLS’s working procedures and the business relationship between the TPL provider and other actors (Dubois et al., 2019; Fredriksson et al., 2021; Fredriksson et al., 2024a). Contractors are the primary users but often encounter a conflict between CLS’s goals – such as reducing disturbances for third parties – and their own priorities of cost reduction and improved productivity (Eriksson et al., 2021). Thus, initiating actors may seek and receive the benefits of introducing a CLS that are not prioritised by contractors (Haglund and Janné, 2024). Even though many CLSs claim to improve productivity, contractors fail to perceive these benefits (Fredriksson et al., 2021). By taking over logistics traditionally handled by contractors, TPL-operated CLSs challenge the contractor’s role in project logistics (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016; Karrbom Gustavsson, 2018).

The introduction of CLSs affects not only contractors but also other project actors, both directly and indirectly through the relationships in which they engage (Sundquist et al., 2018; Eriksson et al., 2021). CLSs, which are project-specific, impose new regulations and procedures (cf. Fredriksson et al., 2021) that can drastically alter actor networks. Sundquist et al. (2018) show that CLSs reorganise relationships and reorients the interorganisational network’s key actors, resources, and activities both on- and off-site, influencing interorganisational relationships, processes, roles, and hierarchies (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016; Karrbom Gustavsson, 2018). These changes can create confusion, particularly as CLSs often impose nonstandard practices (Fredriksson et al., 2021). For example, in a case studied by Janné and Fredriksson (2019), a CLS in an urban development district involved complex organisational arrangements, where various stakeholders (municipality, TPL provider, clients, and contractors) shared responsibilities, leading to ambiguity regarding purpose and value. Insufficient experience in working with CLSs adds to the ambiguity (Fredriksson et al., 2024a).

There are indications of tensions between TPL providers and contractors, as the introduction of CLSs challenges the contractor’s logistics role (e.g., Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016; Janné and Rudberg, 2020; Eriksson et al., 2021). While initiating actors seek to outsource logistics expertise (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016), contractors may view TPL providers as lacking context-specific knowledge and may question their competence (Haglund and Janné, 2024). In addition, the extra activities and costs imposed by CLSs often offer low perceived value (Thunberg and Fredriksson, 2023). Contractors tend to use only the mandatory services provided by the CLS (Janné and Fredriksson, 2022).

Earlier studies of TPL-operated CLSs highlight the creation of new relationships and interactions. In addition, in the reorganisation of logistics, a role ambiguity arises. The forced relationship between TPL providers and contractors often becomes strained. Most studies focus on the perspectives of clients, public actors, or contractors, offering limited insight into how TPL providers perceive their role in the business exchange. While the emphasis has been on how CLSs produce value, for instance in terms of offering the opportunity of a service blueprint as a valuable tool for structuring and streamlining logistics services (cf. Fredriksson et al., 2025), less attention has been paid to how TPL providers perceive their value-creating role in relation to users (cf. Ekeskär et al., 2022). While some studies investigate how interactions change with CLS implementation (e.g., Sundquist et al., 2018; Eriksson et al., 2021; Ekeskär et al., 2022), the forced relationships between TPL providers and contractors requires further exploration. The role ambiguity justifies applying a coopetition lens. Specifically, this paper examines the TPL provider as a complementor to contractors, a role designated by the CLS initiator. The following sections outline the theoretical perspectives – first the INA and the ARA model, which is used to study the content of the forced relationships between TPL provider and contractors through the three relationship dimensions – actors, resources, and activities. Subsequently, the coopetition perspective and the VNM are applied to detail the content of the relationships and to identify their cooperative and competitive aspects, specifically in relation to the TPL provider’s role as complementor.

The INA, or the industrial marketing and purchasing (IMP) perspective, examines interactive business exchange between two or more actors and the material and social adaptations that result from their interactions. Originally applied to stable, long-term relationships in manufacturing industries (e.g., Dubois and Fredriksson, 2008), the INA has also been used to understand temporary relationships in construction (e.g., Dubois and Gadde, 2002a; Bygballe et al., 2013; Crespin-Mazet et al., 2015). Despite the project-based, contract-driven character of construction, which creates a loosely coupled system over time (Dubois and Gadde, 2002a), firms adapt to each other by investing in standardised materials and production processes. This creates resistance towards changing established patterns of investment and ways of interacting in construction projects (e.g., Bengtson and Håkansson, 2008). When a new actor enters an established business network, for whatever reason, this actor needs to establish an “identity” and “meaning” for (at least some of) the established actors (Axelsson, 1992; La Rocca, 2013). This meaning is related to the capacity of the new actor to benefit its counterparts (Havenvid and La Rocca, 2017). As new relationships form, actors interact to understand each other’s capacities (Aaboen et al., 2017).

Within the INA, the ARA model conceptualises the substance of interactions through three interrelated dimensions: actors, resources, and activities. Actors (firms, organisations, or individuals) control technical and organisational resources, such as components and competencies. Resources are used to perform activities such as planning and logistics. An important premises of the model is that the three dimensions are interrelated and thus affect each other (Håkansson, 1987). Through interaction and in the initiation of new relationships, actors gradually adapt socially and organisationally in relation to important counterparts (Ford, 1980). In addition, relationship-specific adaptations are made in resources and activities (Gadde et al., 2012). As such, both temporary and long-term adaptations can be detected in each of the three dimensions (Havenvid et al., 2016).

While most studies using the INA investigate voluntary relationships based on the idea that business relationships evolve when “two parties perceive the potential benefits of joint arrangements as being greater than those stemming from market-like transactions” (Gadde et al., 2012, p. 211), this study deals with forced relationships. This means that the counterparts will need to try to establish a relationship without knowing the benefits, or perhaps even without believing that there are any. By applying the ARA model to forced relationships, it is possible to identify the resources and activities that the actors engage in and/or adapt in relation to each other and how the actors relate to each other both formally and informally. This enables the identification of potential tensions in such interaction processes, as well as the reason for them.

The INA is commonly used in studies of (voluntary) coopetitive relationships (cf. Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Tidström, 2014). From an INA perspective, the nature of the value-creating role that actors take on in relation to one another is reflected in the resources and activities that they engage in and how.

Coopetition can be defined as “a paradoxical relationship between two or more actors simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions, regardless of whether their relationship is horizontal or vertical” (Bengtsson and Kock (2014, p. 182). Actors cooperate in some areas while competing in others, with the relationship ranging from cooperation-dominated (strong) to competition-dominated (weak) (Bengtsson et al., 2010), and it can also evolve over time, from more competitive to more cooperative (Dahl, 2014). These paradoxical dynamics (Chen, 2008) can create tensions (Fernandez et al., 2014; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014), especially in competition-dominated relationships (Bengtsson et al., 2010).

Coopetitive relationships are generally of a voluntary nature, i.e., all parties have something to gain from the relationship (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). However, forced coopetitive relationships can also be part of a deliberate strategy, such as when a powerful customer forces competing suppliers to cooperate with each other (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). Forced coopetitive relationships risk a higher degree of tension and require more management than voluntary relationships (Mariani, 2007).

The tensions that arise in coopetitive relationships relate to how the organisations and individuals within those organisations cope with their respective “cooperative and competitive orientation” (Tidström, 2008, p. 262). Causes of tensions may be, for example, role confusion, knowledge and power imbalances, or opportunistic behaviour (Tidström, 2014). In order for coopetitive relationships to last, such tensions have to be managed (Fernandez et al., 2014). Three common methods of managing tensions are to compete, avoid, or cooperate (Tidström, 2014). Cooperation is most effective in trust-based relationships, but more difficult in forced and highly competitive relationships (Tidström, 2014). Due to their temporary character, tensions in project relationships may be harder to resolve than in long-term relationships (Fernandez et al., 2014; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014).

The concept of “value net” (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996) is widely used to describe coopetitive relationships through which firms can cooperate and compete to create mutual value (Chou and Zolkiewski, 2018). The VNM emphasises coopetition, where businesses collaborate to expand the market and then compete for profits within it. The model highlights how firms can create value for each other through coopetition in roles such as customer, supplier, competitor, and complementor (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). In this paper, we take special note of the role of complementor, which is an actor that makes the product or service of a focal firm more attractive to customers by offering complementary services or products. Thus, by cooperating with such an actor, both firms can possibly gain a larger market share.

Studies after the original model presented by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) have gone on to indicate the fuzziness of the complementor role in that complementors can act both value enhancers and value destructors, creating a complex interplay of cooperation and competition (Carst and Hu, 2023). On one hand, they enhance the value delivered by the focal firm by contributing complementary products and/or services and capabilities that amplify the value proposition and generate network effects (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Teece, 2018). However, their competitive behaviours can lead to tensions, resource conflicts, and even value destruction, particularly when misaligned with the focal firm’s incentives (Gnyawali and Charleton, 2018).

This duality underscores the importance of understanding complementors as coopetitors (Afuah, 2000; Carst and Hu, 2023). While they can be indispensable for co-creating value, their competitive behaviours necessitate careful governance strategies to align their interactions with the rest of the network. Failure to coordinate effectively with complementors can lead to instability or even collapse of the focal firm’s business model and risk destabilising the related network (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018). Despite their importance, the dynamics of complementor relationships, particularly the balance between cooperation and competition, remain underexplored. Further research is needed to uncover how complementors and focal firms navigate these tensions in the pursuit of various benefits (Gawer, 2014; Kapoor, 2014; Liang et al., 2022).

There are two premises of the VNM that need to be elaborated on in relation to the present study. First, the VNM is based on firms making strategic decisions independently, but this study examines forced relationships, which represents a different use of the model. The study focuses on how an initiating actor of a CLS establishes relationships between a TPL provider and contractors to generate benefits for the initiating actor, third parties, and society. Thus, the initiating actor dictates the potential benefits of cooperation, rather than the parties themselves, and while such an initiator of a CLS claims various benefits, the contractors may not directly benefit. The VNM and insights on the ambiguous role of complementor are here applied to how the TPL provider – as a complementor – and the contractors – as the focal firms – relate to each other and use resources and activities both cooperatively and competitively to meet the initiating actor’s demands.

This study adopts an interactive perspective, utilising the ARA model (Håkansson, 1987) as the primary analytical tool to examine the interactions within the forced relationships between contractors and TPL provider, in the role of complementor. The framework entails the three interrelated relationship dimensions: the actor dimension by considering both the formal agreements and the informal social sentiments that shape their interactions. In the resource dimension, the focus is on the material and immaterial resources that the actors exchange and use and/or adapt in relation to one another. Meanwhile, the activity dimension examines the tasks and processes the actors undertake or allocate between themselves. Building on this foundation, the study integrates the VNM (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996) alongside recent research on the dual role of complementors (Carst and Hu, 2023) to categorise each dimension – actors, resources, and activities – as contributing to both/either cooperative and/or competitive dynamics (see Table 3). This classification enables a deeper investigation into the interactions that lead to tensions, as well as the underlying mechanisms and reasons.

Ultimately, this integrated theoretical framework (see Figure 1) provides a comprehensive basis for discussing the nature of forced coopetitive business relationships. More specifically, it examines whether, and in what ways, contractors and TPL providers can derive benefits from their coopetitive complementor–focal firm relationship in construction projects.

The research adopts an abductive approach known as “systematic combining” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b). This iterative process involves moving between a partially known theoretical framework, data collection, literature, and analysis, allowing increasingly informed decisions about the research design and its outcomes. The iterations have significantly influenced the interpretation of the relationship between TPL provider and contractors, framing it as both forced and coopetitive. This interpretation led the authors to engage with relevant literature, ultimately identifying the role of complementor as the most reasonable concept for further analysis.

The paper is based on a case study of a mandatory TPL-operated CLS in an urban development district. A case study approach is recommended for analysing complex interorganisational phenomena (Flyvbjerg, 2006), especially when investigating interorganisational relationships with the INA, which require an in-depth understanding of both interaction processes and contextual factors (Halinen and Törnroos, 2005; Easton, 2010). The case was selected because it utilised a mandatory TPL-operated CLS initiated by a public actor. In the case, the urban development district Stockholm Royal Seaport (SRS), the municipality (hereafter referred to as the City) initiated the CLS to ensure smooth, long-term production across several stages.

Being an urban development district, SRS is a multi-project environment. This allowed to study several relationships between the TPL provider and different main contractors. Furthermore, the CLS was set up by the City, and the TPL provider was procured by the City to operate it. In the case, contractors and developers were contractually obligated to follow the CLS regulations but were not directly contracted to the TPL provider. Consequently, the concept of the CLS was understood by the contractors before project initiation. This meant that contractors in SRS were aware of the CLS beforehand.

The case focuses on the relationships between TPL provider and contractors in a multi-project environment. The empirical data were collected across two periods: the first period of 2018–2019 and the second period of 2024 (see Table 1). The intervals between these periods allowed the study to capture longitudinal aspects of the phenomenon studied – the dynamics of a forced TPL-operated CLS.

The first period of data collection focused on the relationships between the TPL provider and contractors active in the stage Brofästet in SRS. The empirical data sources were mainly semi-structured interviews together with non-participatory observations (see Table 1). The interviews were made with managers of the TPL provider, the contractors as well as the City (see Table 2). The interviews were recorded and transcribed afterwards. The observations included 22 coordination meetings between the TPL provider and the contractors. The observations provided first-hand information on the interactions between the TPL provider and the contractors, as well as the absence of interactions, e.g., which contractors neglected the meetings. Notes were taken during the observations of coordination meetings, which were transcribed afterwards. Further empirical data was also collected through informal meetings with different project actors, site visits, and project- and company-specific documentation and public reports. During the first data collection period, a lot of time was spent at the CLS, informally interacting with managers and stage coordinators as well as observing their daily routines.

The second period of data collection was done in the autumn of 2024 and during this period there were no large stages with ongoing construction in SRS. Therefore, two interviews were conducted with the heads of logistics at two of the main contractors involved in the stage of Brofästet studied in the first data collection period. These two contractors were chosen based on company size and extensive engagement and experience of construction logistics. In addition, one follow-up interview with the CEO of the TPL provider was made. The interviews provided the respondents with an opportunity to reflect and contribute insights into the initial findings, while also expanding the discussion beyond the project level and on the TPL phenomenon as such. All three interviews were recorded and transcribed afterwards. In addition, one of the authors attended a workshop organised by the City to discuss the initial findings, alongside representatives from the City and the TPL provider. This workshop was part of a series involving researchers and stakeholders engaged in SRS and focused on the future direction of the CLS over the next 10–20 years, highlighting the City’s commitment to learning and adapting in relation to CLS users.

The data analysis was done iteratively, starting with the ARA model to identify key aspects of the three relationship dimensions affecting the interactions. This included identifying the resources and activities used, adapted and distributed by the TPL provider and contractors, as well as their formal and informal engagements with each other as actors. Next, using the VNM, coopetition literature, and insights on the ambiguous role of complementors, each aspect was categorised as contributing either to cooperative or competitive interactions (see Table 3). This deconstruction of the interactions into dimensions and subsequently a cooperative/competitive categorisation enabled further analysis of which dimensions of interaction caused tensions and why.

Furthermore, the concept of complementor and tensions in coopetitive relationships helped to identify and describe how the contractors perceived the TPL provider, as well as how the TPL provider perceived themselves, in their role as complementor. This provided further opportunity to explore how and why tensions arose in the forced relationships between TPL provider and contractors. In addition, illustrative quotes were selected to highlight the nature of these interactions as expressed by the respondents.

The SRS is an urban development district with multiple parallel and sequential stages, each comprising numerous construction projects executed simultaneously in a designated area. Typically, each stage involves between five and ten projects, along with their main contractors and subcontractors. The City of Stockholm implemented a CLS known as the Construction Logistics Centre (BLC) to coordinate logistics across the projects. Designed by the City and operated by a TPL provider, the BLC manages deliveries and operations. All main contractors and developers are contractually obligated to comply with BLC regulations (see Figure 2). Some subcontractors also have contracts with the BLC for separate invoicing. The City designed the regulations and pricing model, which were maintained by the TPL provider. It has also assisted in recruiting stage coordinators for the TPL provider. The BLC manages logistics across all stages of SRS, including a terminal for short-term material storage before delivery to the project sites. The contractors are responsible for managing materials on-site once delivered.

During the first data collection period, the case study focused on the stage Brofästet that consisted of nine housing projects with a total of 600 apartments being constructed. There were a total of eight different main contractor firms active in the stage; however, two of them had several site organisations, i.e., the firms were involved in two housing projects. One of these main contractors also had a site organisation working with landscaping and civil works along with another contractor. Construction works began in this stage in 2016 and ended in 2020, with the first tenants moving in in 2018. When the first data collection period began, one house was already finished, and tenants had moved in.

The stage was organised with a shared perimeter protection of gates and fences that was managed by the TPL provider and organised by the BLC. The construction projects also shared access roads in the stage. This meant that the contractors had to coordinate extensively between their respective projects and with the TPL provider. All construction projects had one designated area for loading and unloading materials and no materials were allowed to be stored outside. Weekly as well as monthly coordination meetings between the TPL provider and the main contractors were the main forum for coordination between all actors. The contractors had a responsibility to directly coordinate large deliveries and other activities with the TPL provider.

During the first data collection period, the BLC was undergoing a reform of its business and pricing models. Known as “BLC 3.0,” these changes were part of a broader strategy and occurred while construction in the studied stage had been ongoing for over a year and a half. In essence, the BLC’s overhead costs, funded by the developers, included a connection fee to the City, covering services such as storing materials and deliveries to construction sites. Contractors were charged separately for additional services such as waste management, maintenance, entry fees, and storage exceeding five days. Previously, the contractors had been charged for deliveries from the BLC and in some extreme cases the costs for these transports could exceed the material costs. At the same time as the reform of the BLC, the TPL provider had been replaced by the City, due to conflicts on how the BLC should be operated. All the costs associated with the TPL provider was after the reform also covered by the connection fee and not through fines and the selling of additional services. The mandate of the TPL provider to act on the City’s behalf was also improved.

Since the first data collection period, there have not been any large stages of housing projects in SRS. However, the City has plans for future stages for the coming 15 years. The City has therefore continued its work with developing the BLC further and in 2022 the business model was restructured again; the connection fee paid by the developers was increased but with all basic services now included in the connection fee. In 2024, the City employed a manager for the BLC instead of having the TPL provider fulfilling that role. The TPL provider is still present in SRS with stage coordinators and as advisors to the City.

This section addresses the interactions in each of the three interrelated relationship dimensions between the contractors and TPL provider in the stage Brofästet both as the stage was ongoing and as reflections on the continued development of the BLC concept.

In Brofästet, there are examples of both cooperative and competitive interactions in the actor dimension. Overall, the contractors were sceptical of the mandatory aspect of the setup of the BLC as dictated by the City. In addition, initially, the TPL provider had to deal with the contractors’ prejudice based on their negative experience of the previous BLC operator. This contributed to initial antagonistic sentiments towards the new TPL provider. At the same time, the contractors described the new TPL provider as more competent, easier to contact, and more reasonable and cooperative. Being aware of the earlier disputes between the contractors and the previous operator, the new TPL provider made sure to establish social bonds with the contractors early on. This was done by being more present on-site and listening to the contractors through daily site visits and weekly meetings. Thus, over time, a more cooperative relationship was established:

The TPL provider had a close relationship with the City and was given an increased mandate when the City reformed the BLC, allowing the TPL provider to act on the City’s behalf. The TPL provider was seen as part of the City, e.g., its uniforms had the City’s logo and not the company name of the TPL provider. Notably, during the interviews, the contractors referred to the TPL provider as “BLC,” while the former operator was often referred to by its company name. In this sense, the TPL provider was generally considered a neutral party in the construction projects. Later, the BLC site manager was replaced with a city official to further strengthen the neutrality and maintain the City’s long-term control of the BLC.

In the continued development of the BLC concept, the TPL provider has every year since they were hired conducted a survey among contractors active in SRS. The survey has shown that over time the contractors have become increasingly positive towards the TPL provider. The TPL provider has also, with the survey as a guide, been able to address issues in cooperation with the contractors. In addition, the reformed business model of the BLC eliminated transaction costs previously associated with it, thereby removing a key source of tension in the relationship between the TPL provider and contractors.

The City’s long-term efforts with the BLC can be exemplified by them, together with the TPL provider, inviting contractors (and other actors) previously active in SRS to workshops on the future development of the BLC. At these workshops, they addressed what resources and activities the BLC should provide, as well as how the contractors perceived the BLC. In doing so, the City and the TPL provider demonstrated the intention to listen to the contractors and cooperate with them in future stages. From a long-term perspective, it is only the City as well as the TPL provider (unless another TPL provider is procured) that are present in SRS across several stages. The contractors’ perspective is related to their own stage and project, even though contractors might be active in future stages.

The resource dimension reveals interactions in Brofästet characterised by both cooperative and competitive elements, and by ambiguity. The contractors considered the logistics services provided in SRS to be very expensive. They were forced to use the arrangements with subcontractors and suppliers provided by BLC, even though they already had more cost-efficient arrangements of their own – some services were even provided by the same subcontractors and suppliers. In this sense, there was a competitive type of procurement of the resources provided by these subcontractors and suppliers, in which the forced cooperation with the TPL provider of the BLC overthrew the contractors’ earlier supplier relationships.

The materials delivered were stored in a terminal located next to the BLC site office and delivered upon request to the construction projects. Once the materials were delivered to the projects, the contractors took over the management of them. Material storage was not allowed outside the buildings on-site, which induced a competitive situation compared with how the contractors were used to working. The terminal was therefore considered an important resource and represented a cooperative compromise that allowed the contractors to store materials. It also provided the contractors with flexibility if they were behind schedule. However, storing materials in the terminal increased costs and delayed deliveries.

To uphold the regulations on material deliveries, the BLC relied on a shared perimeter of fences and gates connected to the online planning system. The system often malfunctioned with access codes that were not distributed or did not work, and gates that did not open or close. This annoyed the contractors and caused them additional work. The system was beyond their control and negatively affected their deliveries and production. Although this created a competitive type of situation, the TPL provider was understanding of the issue and cooperated continuously with the contractors, e.g., when the system was malfunctioning, the TPL provider made sure to have personnel directing deliveries at the gates.

The TPL provider had stage coordinators to coordinate construction activities. They were the “eyes and ears” of the TPL provider in the stage, and it was them that contractors contacted when they had any problems or, e.g., when they needed to set up a mobile crane. As such, the stage coordinators were a mutual resource of the TPL provider and the contractors, and were part of establishing cooperation. For instance, they arranged weekly and monthly meetings in which all imminent and upcoming issues affecting the stage were discussed. During the monthly meetings, representatives from the City were also present. Although the stage coordinators were an appreciated mutual resource, the degree of cooperation differed, e.g., some contractors did not attend the mandatory coordination meetings. These contractors only cooperated in strict accordance with their agreements, and sometimes even broke agreements. Often, this was due to time pressure or to protest regarding the costs of using the BLC.

At the same time, most contractors deemed the BLC a necessary measure as nine construction projects were being conducted simultaneously in a small, constrained area. However, the contractors were not used to the new regulations and only used the basic services provided. They also considered the setup to be expensive in relation to what they got out of it. Although it was good for coordinating activities and combining resources in a complex setting, they believed that it did not improve productivity and increased their costs:

In the continued development of the BLC concept, the City’s decision to directly employ a BLC manager, rather than outsourcing that role to the TPL provider, reflects an effort to establish long-term control over the BLC. The decision is a strategic measure, independent of the current and future operator of the BLC. Furthermore, a BLC manager directly employed by the City will potentially make it easier to expand the BLC as a concept to other urban development districts within the City.

The contractors’ still express concerns of the mandatory setup of the BLC, arguing that it does not align with their overall operational procedures. Specifically, they argue that the terminal should be an optional service, allowing contractors the flexibility to use it only when it suits their needs, rather than being a compulsory element of their operations. However, the TPL provider as well as the City replies to this critique by stating that the BLC is designed to work for all kinds of contractors, small as well as large with their own logistics resources in-house:

In contrast to the other two dimensions, in Brofästet the activity dimension shows mainly competitive interactions, which is related to the loss of control and additional costs for the contractors. All deliveries were coordinated by the TPL provider as an intermediary, which meant they had to go through the terminal unless they met certain requirements. The contractors booked the deliveries using an online planning tool. Once at the terminal, the materials could be stored short-term and delivered to the construction sites when needed. The TPL provider charged the contractors for storing the materials, although the deliveries from the terminal were free of charge, which the contractors appreciated. Although this whole procedure deviated from how the contractors normally organised logistics, they perceived it as necessary in the complex multi-project environment that SRS represented. It did, however, mean a loss of control for them, as well as more coordination work in relation to suppliers and a greater cost.

Even though the contractors agreed to the BLC regulations, many of them tried to avoid some of the extra costs associated with it. In several projects, contractors and their subcontractors repeatedly forced the gates open to receive deliveries without using the booking system. This neglect of regulations to favour their own activities, i.e., a competitive type of behaviour, troubled the management of the TPL provider, whose concern was for safety and security in the stage:

The contractors complained that the on-site logistic support from the TPL provider was insufficient. When deliveries arrived, it was up to the contractors to receive and direct the delivery to the right zone for unloading. The BLC was considered an expensive setup that did not increase their productivity nor reduced their costs:

In the continued development of the BLC concept, the City’s decision to include all costs in the connection fee has allowed the TPL provider to focus on the benefits of the BLC, rather than defending a business model they did not fully believe in. Since the new business model introduced in 2022 removed all transaction costs, this reduced the incentive for contractors to circumvent BLC regulations to minimise costs.

The findings show how the engagement in specific resources and activities leads to both cooperative and competitive interactions, and how the actors interrelate to one another. Thus, the relationships between TPL provider and contractors can be called coopetitive. More specifically, in relation to certain resources and activities, the TPL provider and contractors were either:

• primarily cooperating;

• primarily competing; or

• both cooperating and competing.

Table 3 summarises the distinct dimensions of the relationships leading to cooperative and competitive interactions of the contractor–TPL provider relationships in terms of how resources and activities were managed, and how the actors formally/informally related to one another, both as the stage was ongoing and as reflections on the continued development of the BLC concept.

This section discusses the findings based on the two research questions and the integrated theoretical framework of the ARA and VNM models: first, how the contractors and TPL provider interacted in forced business relationships within a mandatory CLS; and, second, how the value-creating role of the TPL provider as complementor was perceived by the contractors and TPL provider. The integrated framework enables analysis of the relationships between TPL provider and contractors by outlining their cooperative and competitive interactions across three relationship dimensions: actors, in terms of how they formally and informally relate to one another; resources, in terms of how they use and adapt material and immaterial resources in relation to each other; and activities, in how tasks and processes are either jointly engaged in or divided.

A striking result is that the relationships between the TPL provider and contractors are inherently coopetitive, in that they contain both cooperative and competitive elements. Tensions arise from the challenge of navigating these paradoxical forces, especially in a context where the relationship is imposed. It appears that forcing this type of relationship on contractors results in ambiguities between TPL provider and contractors regarding how they relate to each other as both cooperating and competing project actors. Despite this, they manage to handle crucial logistics resources and activities on-site. Thus, the forced relationship between contactors and TPL providers aligns with the definition of coopetition by Bengtsson and Kock (2014).

However, the analysis does reveal not only that there were both competitive and cooperative elements, but also which elements dominated in which relationship dimension. There were both cooperative and competitive elements in the actor and resource dimensions and mainly competitive ones in the activity dimension. Thus, while there are competitive elements present in all relationship dimensions in the relationship between TPL provider and contractor, the most problematic dimension appears to be that which relate to the re-orientation and division of activities (cf. Sundquist et al., 2018). However, as the relationship dimensions are interrelated, the competitive elements in the activity dimension appear to influence how actors position themselves and access or control resources, while the more cooperative dynamics in the actor and resource dimensions may be strategically used to mitigate tensions and maintain the relationship despite competition in the activity dimension.

The actor dimension shows that the way a CLS is organised and communicated influences contractors’ ability to identify its benefits (Fredriksson et al., 2021) and align it with their business model, as suggested by Eriksson et al. (2021). In Brofästet, the contractors’ initial perception of the TPL provider was shaped by previous negative experiences with an earlier operator, which led to antagonistic attitudes at the outset. However, the new TPL provider actively built trust through on-site presence, engaging in regular communication, and responsiveness to contractor concerns, gradually fostering a more cooperative relationship. The TPL provider also had a close relationship with the City and was given a formal mandate to act on its behalf. The provider was visually and symbolically associated with the City, and contractors typically referred to the provider as “BLC” rather than by its company name. This reinforced a perception of the TPL provider as a neutral and embedded part of the construction environment. Over time, this positioning, combined with continuous feedback loops – such as annual surveys and responsive adjustments – helped improve the relationship further.

The reform of the BLC business model, including the removal of transaction costs, also addressed a previous source of tension between the parties. Moreover, efforts by the City and the TPL provider to involve contractors in future planning through workshops appear to strengthen a cooperative approach. These developments highlight the importance how the CLS is not only introduced and communicated but also how early relationship challenges are managed and how learning opportunities and adjustment are created over time. Thus, the actor dimension shows the importance of considering how the CLS is organised not only in terms of contractual relationships, but how it is communicated to contractors as it influences their perception of the TPL provider – not least in relation to costs. It also shows the importance of taking advantage of learning opportunities over time, as this is part of creating an identity and a meaning of the TPL provider as a new actor for the contractors (cf. Axelsson, 1992; La Rocca, 2013). In line with Havenvid and La Rocca (2017), this also illustrates how the perceived capacity of a new actor to contribute value depends on how it is integrated into existing relationship structures. Ultimately, as Dahl (2014) argues, interaction over time allows actors in initially forced relationships to recognise mutual benefits.

The resource dimension provides insights into key resources, both established and new, that TPL providers and contractors use and adapt to each other because of their forced relationship. In relation to resources, the coopetitive relationships were not necessarily dominated by either competitive or cooperative interactions but contained both. This relates to how, regardless of the organisational setup of the CLS, TPL provider and contractors must find ways of cooperating regarding crucial logistical resources. Thus, despite the competitive elements in relation to both resources and activities, TPL provider and contractors need to cooperate regarding the handling and storage of materials both on- and off-site, which demonstrates the coopetitive nature of the re-orientation of logistic resources usually handled by contractors (Sundquist et al., 2018). While, for instance, being forced to use service providers under unfavourable terms was considered competitive by the contractors, the cooperative nature is shown by coordination meetings, a shared terminal for storage, and the coordination of personnel. It was also shown that a TPL provider can activate new resources that facilitate cooperation, such as the stage coordinators.

The detailing of both cooperative and competitive interactions in relation to specific resources provides further insights into how and why TPL-operated CLSs challenge contractors’ traditional ways of allocating, using and adapting logistical resources in projects (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016). Thus, the resource dimension shows the importance of considering which resources of the CLS demand cooperation, and where extra care needs to be taken to prevent competitive interactions dominating important resources, as well as the need for new resources to manage the competitive elements of the relationship. In this regard, the resource dimension seems particularly important to investigate in forced coopetitive relationships as it appears to be a way to mitigate their competitive elements.

The activity dimension reveals how activities were performed and divided between TPL provider and contractors. The case show competitive interactions linked to the contractors’ loss of control and extra costs associated with, e.g., needing to engage in increased coordination in relation to suppliers. This adds to the understanding of cooperative and competitive interactions preceding and following from reorienting logistics activities usually handled by contractors (Sundquist et al., 2018). More specifically, it provides an understanding of how and why TPL-operated CLSs challenge contractors’ traditional control of logistics and production from a coopetitive point of view (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016). Thus, the activity dimension shows the importance of considering how the CLS is organised in terms of how activities traditionally handled by contractors are divided among TPL providers and contractors, as well as the handling of any additional costs induced by the CLS, where competitive interactions should not dominate. Thus, an important aspect of forced coopetitive relationships appears to be the division of activities among the involved actors and how it affects their ability to handle costs and benefits.

While the TPL provider perceived themself as a complementor in the positive regard of mainly cooperating, the contractors perceived the TPL provider as both value enhancer and competitor, or value destructor (cf. Gnyawali and Charleton, 2018), in some regards misaligned with the business model of the contractor as the focal firm. This is related to contractors’ loss of control of important resources and activities and, as a consequence, increased costs, which adds to the understanding of role ambiguity in TPL-operated CLSs as indicated by Eriksson et al. (2021) and Fredriksson et al. (2021). Furthermore, it indicates the strategic relevance of considering TPL providers as coopetitors (cf. Afuah, 2000; Carst and Hu, 2023); although they take on a crucial role in co-creating value, particularly in multi-project environments (Ekeskär et al., 2022), the competitive tendencies that result from the re-orientation of resources and activities require well-designed governance strategies to ensure alignment in their interactions with contractors and the broader business network.

Tensions were caused by discrepancies in how TPL provider and contractors perceived the TPL provider as complementor. Thus, there were obvious role tensions resulting from how these organisations were coping with their “cooperative and competitive orientation” (Tidström, 2014, p. 262) in relation to each other, both in regard to resources and activities. The TPL provider, as an operator of the BLC, took partial control over important resources and activities from the contractors as well as introduced new ones, forcing the contractors to change how they operated. The contractors lost overall control of their delivery process and, consequently, their production process, which, in addition, induced additional costs. This was a major “game changer” for the contractors as they became dependent on the TPL provider, its logistical systems, and the business model that came with it. This demonstrates the need as well as difficulties of navigating the tensions arising in this coopetitive type of relationship (cf. Gawer, 2014; Kapoor, 2014; Liang et al., 2022).

However, over time the tensions between the TPL provider and the contractors lessened, as there was opportunity to learn, adapt, and establish a more cooperatively orientated type of relationship. As such, a cooperative governance strategy of the coopetitive relationships was implemented (cf. Tidström, 2014). Combined with a long-term perspective from the initiating actor, this helped balance the interplay between cooperation and competition in these relationships.

From an actor dimension point of view, the contractors managed to separate the TPL provider from the CLS in terms of how their critique was directed, which eventually positioned the TPL provider more as a value-enhancer than a competitor, and this perception was fortified over time (cf. Dahl, 2014). Also, the efforts of the City and the TPL provider of establishing more cooperative elements in the continued development of the BLC has induced more positive sentiments towards this kind of mandatory setup, even if there is still hesitation and a kind of value-destructing perception of contractors towards its mandatory nature. This shows that in forced coopetitive relationships, i.e., when one actor is forced upon another, the role perception of that actor may differ from its own role perception, and it may also differ in relation to particular resources and activities. It also shows that role perception may change over time, if there is opportunity to learn and adapt from interaction, which represents important insights in relation to forced relationships from both an interactive (INA) and a value-creating role perspective (VNM).

However, this should also be understood in light of the TPL provider’s role as a coordinator in a multi-project context (Ekeskär et al., 2022), serving multiple contractors simultaneously. This introduces a fundamental duality in the TPL provider’s role, acting both as a coordinating actor with a broad, multi-project-wide mandate and as a complementor expected to add value to each contractor’s operations. Given the complexity and scale of a CLS in a multi-project environment, a TPL provider is required to manage multiple relationships in parallel, which inevitably leads to a “one size fits all” approach. Consequently, services are standardised rather than tailored to individual contractor needs. While Fredriksson et al. (2025) present the service blueprint as a tool for standardising logistics services, offering structure and efficiency, its standardised nature may limit flexibility and responsiveness to specific project or contractor conditions. From the contractors’ perspective, frustration may arise when services fail to meet their specific expectations or project conditions. For the TPL provider, the challenge is balancing diverse – and sometimes conflicting – contractor needs while upholding standardised processes and coordination. Such a model of value creation through standardisation contrasts with the INA literature, which highlights mutual adaptation and relationship-specific interaction as central to value generation (Håkansson et al., 2009; Havenvid and La Rocca, 2017). This presents a major challenge in coping with forced coopetitive relationships in multi-project environments, achieving mutual value creation through a consistent and stable infrastructure across projects with limited possibilities for relationship-specific adaptation (cf. Fredriksson et al., 2025).

This highlights the importance of the City’s communication in managing expectations (cf. Janné and Fredriksson, 2022). As individual adaptation is not feasible, clearly communicating the CLS concept – and its limitations – is essential. Contractors must understand not only what the TPL provider can offer, but also what compromises are necessary in a shared service model.

This paper offers a new perspective on the dynamics of forced relationships between TPL providers and contractors in mandatory CLSs, contributing to the literatures on INA, coopetition, and construction logistics management. While earlier research has explored how CLSs reshape interaction patterns (e.g., Sundquist et al., 2018; Eriksson et al., 2021; Ekeskär et al., 2022), this study adds nuance by focusing specifically on the TPL provider’s role and its multifaceted interactions with contractors through a coopetition lens. It conceptualises the TPL provider as a complementor in a multi-project context forced upon contractors – revealing how its dual role as both value enhancer and value destructor unfolds over time.

Using an integrated framework of interaction (the ARA model) and coopetition (the VNM model and the role of complementor), the study identifies tensions embedded in the actor, resource, and activity dimensions related to the cooperative and competitive dynamic between TPL provider and contractors. As such, and in relation to previous research in construction logistics management, this study provides a more detailed understanding of how TPL-operated CLSs influence interorganisational relationships, processes, and roles (Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016; Karrbom Gustavsson, 2018). The study also shows the dimensions through which TPL-operated CLSs challenge the traditional way contractors operate in projects (Bengtson and Håkansson, 2008; Ekeskär and Rudberg, 2016) and why. In the actor dimension, the importance of clear contractual arrangements and early, transparent communication of the CLS concept is highlighted, as these shape contractors’ initial expectations and perceptions of the TPL provider. The resource dimension shows how interaction around shared and critical resources drives both cooperation and competition. Meanwhile, the activity dimension highlights that unclear division of tasks – particularly regarding additional costs – can heighten competitive tensions.

The findings also demonstrate the impact of a multi-project logic on this forced relationship. As a single actor coordinating across multiple projects and contractors, the TPL provider must standardise its offering – creating a “one size fits all” setup. This limits service customisation and creates imbalances: each contractor deals with one provider, while the TPL provider manages multiple contractor relationships simultaneously. This setup contradicts the dominant view of value as co-created through mutual adaptation, instead emphasising value through standardisation, predictability, and coordination. Proactive communication from the initiating actor of a TPL-operated CLS is therefore crucial to help contractors understand the CLS model’s logic, limitations, and interaction dynamics. In line with the INA, the study also highlights that while social sentiments in forced relationships may initially be negative – shaped by prior experiences and/or expectations – they can shift through learning and ongoing interaction, particularly when actors recognise mutual resource dependencies. Over time, the coopetitive relationship may evolve toward more cooperative patterns as actors become more familiar with each other’s roles and constraints (Gadde et al., 2012; Tidström, 2014).

More broadly, this study contributes to coopetition research by showing how forced relationships create role ambiguity and tensions, especially when actors hold conflicting views regarding the complementor role. In mandatory CLSs, TPL providers and contractors may interpret this role differently, influencing how value is perceived and cooperation unfolds. While formal contracts define the CLS, it is the ongoing interactions and interpretations that ultimately shape how TPL providers and contractors relate to one another – either as parties seeking mutual solutions enabling coordination and efficiency or as adversaries seeking tightened control and undermining each other operations, leading to unnecessary constraints and increased costs.

This fortifies the findings of Eriksson et al. (2021) and Fredriksson et al. (2021) on role confusion while further emphasising how coopetitive dynamics are interactively shaped through ongoing negotiations of control – not only within dyadic relationships, but also in response to the complexities of multi-project coordination. These insights highlight the need for initiating actors of TPL-operated CLSs, such as municipalities and cities, to go beyond formal contractual definitions when implementing CLSs, by actively facilitating shared understanding of roles and enabling conditions for cooperation across projects.

In mandatory multi-project settings like TPL-operated CLSs, managing forced coopetitive relationships requires careful attention to role perceptions and expectations. TPL providers must navigate the dual role of being both a coordinator across projects and a complementor to individual contractors. This structural asymmetry – where contractors relate to a single TPL provider, while the TPL provider must coordinate with many contractors – limits the ability to tailor relationships, resulting in a “one size fits all” approach. This can cause tensions, particularly when contractors expect flexibility or individual adaptation.

Therefore, initiating actors such as municipalities or cities must clearly communicate the purpose, organisational structure, and limitations of the CLS from the outset. Transparency about non-negotiable aspects of the setup and the rationale behind them helps align expectations and reduce frustration. Moreover, communication should emphasise that value creation in this context comes primarily from system-wide efficiency gains and coordination. However, as these relationships are not static but continuously influenced by how these actors choose to engage with each other, effective management is critical in steering these interactions toward cooperation. Failure to manage the interactions can lead to adversarial dynamics, where control and competition overshadow cooperation, resulting in operational inefficiencies, constraints, and unnecessary costs. Therefore, cultivating a culture of cooperation, open communication, and shared objectives to optimise the logistics service and minimise potential conflicts. This requires mutual learning over time, e.g., creating forums for structured feedback, such as recurring surveys or workshops, allows TPL providers to gather input from different actors, such as contractors, and make system-level improvements. Over time, these efforts may support learning, role clarification, and the gradual development of more cooperative dynamics.

This study opens up several avenues for further exploration. While the findings are based on one empirical case, broader studies are needed to explore how forced coopetitive relationships evolve in different sectors and institutional settings. In construction logistics, future research should examine how the tension between coordination and complementarity plays out across multiple projects and how TPL providers manage the challenge of serving many contractors with divergent needs. Longitudinal studies would offer valuable insights into how perceptions of value and role evolve over time, particularly in relation to learning processes and system-wide adjustments.

In addition, more focused investigations into the resource and activity dimensions of the ARA model could deepen the understanding of how different resource configurations affect perceived role value. For example, how do TPL providers’ control over key resources or logistical processes shape the power dynamics and interaction patterns with contractors?

Finally, theoretical development is needed to bridge value-creation theories in relationship management with the reality of standardised, system-wide coordination. This includes exploring the paradox of delivering value through uniformity when adaptation is traditionally seen as the key to successful cooperation.