The trade credit transaction: on buyer–supplier relationship development Open Access

Over the last decades, several marketing scholars have devoted their attention to questions about how and why buyer–supplier relationships (BSR) emerge, evolve and dissolve (Dwyer et al., 1987; Palmatier et al., 2013; Mani et al., 2024). Shamsollahi et al. (2021, p. 425) describe that one key “school of thought” within this research area is based on the work of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) (RV) (Jap and Anderson, 2007; Ariño and Torre, 1998; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). RV’s (1994) work centres on the transaction process of negotiation, commitment and execution. The transaction process is argued to describe the sequence of events that will generate relationships as transaction governance structures characterised by high trust, high risk and high transaction-specific investments (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Van de Ven and Ring, 2006). In the framework, RV (1994) describes the different stages at a general level and states that several events will take place. They are, however, not specific about how the sequence of events (Cloutier and Langley, 2020) unfolds at each stage. There is also no specific explanation in RV’s (1994) framework as to why actors move from one stage to another. Each stage in RV’s (1994) framework is driven by actors’ motivation (ex ante) and assessment (ex post) in terms of equity and efficiency. Yet, RV (1994) does not provide any mechanism (Cornelissen and Werner, 2025) that takes actors from assessment to action and thereby brings them to the next stage. In other words, there is no clear explanation in the original RV (1994) framework for the arrows between the stages (cf. Rouse et al., 2025, p. 262).

However, this study introduces a generative mechanism that explains how actors move forward at each stage and why they move to the next stage in the transaction. A generative mechanism is an entity or process that explains how and why change comes about (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Cloutier and Langley, 2020; cf. Cornelissen and Werner, 2025). Since RV (1994) was written, the development of process theory has accelerated (Langley, 1999; Tsoukas, 2017; Cornelissen, 2025). The identification of generative mechanisms has been pointed out as a central task for scholars interested in process research (Cornelissen, 2025; Cloutier and Langley, 2020; Rouse et al., 2025).

The generative mechanism introduced in this paper is the trade credit transactions (TCT). The TCT is, in this paper, viewed as a process in which actors argue and settle on obligations; then, products are delivered, with payment postponed to a later time (cf. Commons, 1950, pp. 48–52) ^[1]. In most cases, the period between delivery and payment in TCTs is 30–60 days. As modern companies own less of their resources (Kay, 2025), TCT, as an empirical phenomenon, has received increased attention from finance scholars (Paul and Boden, 2014; Seifert et al., 2013; Pattnaik et al., 2020). Studies have emphasised both TCT’s upsides in terms of access to cheap working capital (Summers and Wilson, 2003; Paul and Boden, 2014; Ersahin et al., 2024) as well as its downsides in terms of financial problems spreading in supply chains, causing financial distress and bankruptcies (Wilner, 2000; Hertzel et al., 2008; Ivanov, 2024). It is primarily these empirical observations in finance and insights from process theory (Langley and Tsoukas, 2016; Cloutier and Langley, 2020; Grimm et al., 2024) that serve as the foundation for revising RV’s (1994) classic framework (cf. Bermiss et al., 2025) ^[2].

That RV (1994) do not have a generative mechanism is problematic. Without a generative mechanism, their framework cannot really explain a BSR as transaction governance structure. To understand BSR as a transaction governance structure, we need prescribed processes for the negotiation, commitment and execution stages that explain the time gaps between actors’ actions, such as deliveries and payments. There are, for example, at present, no explicit time gaps (e.g. lead time and credit time) in RV’s (1994) execution stage that generate risk, uncertainty or require trust. What RV (1994) appears to explain is that transactions are events in time, not processes. Lacking a generative mechanism is furthermore problematic, as we then lack mechanisms that explain the movements between stages in the framework. This leaves us with a descriptive rather than explanatory process framework of transactions (cf. Rouse et al., 2025). To build rudimentary process theory, we need to move beyond descriptions into explanations of phenomena (Cloutier and Langley, 2020).

Based on the reasoning above, the purpose of this conceptual study is to integrate the TCT as a generative mechanism into Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) framework of relationship development. The purpose is achieved through two questions:

This paper’s major contribution to past research (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Vanpoucke et al., 2014; Shamsollahi et al., 2021) is the integration of the TCT as a generative mechanism into RV’s (1994) framework. By introducing a generative mechanism, the paper transforms the original framework from a primarily descriptive account of relationship development into an explanatory framework that sheds light on how and why business relationships emerge, evolve and dissolve over time.

In RV’s (1994) original model, the stages of negotiation, commitment and execution describe recurring phases in relationship development but offer limited insight into how these stages are performed in practice. Drawing on process theory (Cloutier and Langley, 2020) and further forming RV’s (1994) framework into a TCT structure, the paper illustrates specific patterns of how each stage unfolds. Furthermore, the paper explains that movements between the stages are grounded in situated mechanisms of economic, legal and social nature. As a result, transactions can no longer be treated as events; they become central processes to explaining the ongoing reproduction of BSRs.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the TCT will be integrated into the RV (1994) framework. This includes using empirical observations from financial research (Paul and Boden, 2014; Seifert et al., 2013; Pattnaik et al., 2020), insights from process research (Langley and Tsoukas, 2016; Tsoukas, 2017; Cloutier and Langley, 2020), but also extending RV’s (1994) view of property rights (e.g. Commons, 1950) and ownership. I will also develop our view of mechanisms and the embeddedness of transactions in networks (cf. Van de Ven and Ring, 2006; Hofmann and Kotzab, 2010). In the subsequent section, the second research question is in focus: how the TCT can be useful for understanding relationship development and change. The paper concludes with a discussion of contributions, managerial implications, limitations and avenues for future research.

RV (1994) start their paper by clarifying four key concepts that serve as important starting conditions for their framework and then outline the actual transaction. This paper will follow a similar structure.

The starting conditions (Section 2) in the work by RV (1994) are:

• Uncertainties inherent in a cooperative interorganizational relationships (IOR).

• Efficiency and equity criteria for assessing a cooperative IOR.

• The need for internal resolution of disputes.

• The importance of role relationships in cooperative BSRs.

Below, RV’s view of these concepts is briefly outlined and additions are made to fit with the TCT as a generative mechanism.

Primarily, three additional key concepts are introduced at this point. In Section 2.2, “ownership” is introduced as something actors assess alongside efficiency and equity. Understanding the exchange of property rights is important for understanding the TCT, as they are a foundation for separating the exchange of products and money over time. This implies making the importance of the exchange of property rights (Commons, 1950) more explicit than in the original RV (1994) framework. In this connection, I also make RV’s (1994) implicit distinction between ex post and ex ante motives more explicit. In Section 2.2, motives and assessments are also linked to economic, legal and social mechanisms that explain why actors in theTCT move between RV’s (1994) stages.

Finally, in Section 2.5, business networks are introduced as something within which the TCT takes place and cannot be understood without. For the TCT to work, there must be a network of generalised trust in which several actors act in accordance with commonly shared norms and values (Hofmann and Kotzab, 2010). In section three, I will outline the TCT and explain how it differs from the RV (1994) framework, including the specific events that actors must undertake at each stage and the reasons they move to the next stage.

The RV (1994) framework, based on Macneil (1978), starts by assuming a social matrix of generalised trust, a monetary system and laws. Society is assumed rather than explained. RV (1994) then point out that actors engaging in exchanges of property rights and products that cannot be fully specified in advance will face uncertainty. This uncertainty raises questions about whether actors can trust their counterparts. Trust in one’s counterpart can be defined as confidence in the goodwill of an exchange partner (Dore, 1983). According to RV (1994), trust can be conditioned by legal systems; however, their definition highlights that trust is primarily a product of social interaction, leading to social-psychological bonds. How trust emerges, evolves and dissolves accordingly becomes a fundamental component of RV’s (1994) framework, and the same is true in the TCT.

Trust, however, is by RV (1994) primarily viewed as an outcome. RV (1994) tell us very little about how trust emerges, evolves, dissolves and is reproduced (Van de Ven and Ring, 2006). The view taken on the TCT in this paper, on the other hand, departs from process research (Cloutier and Langley, 2020). Process research that has emerged over the last 10–15 years (Langley and Tsoukas, 2016; Tsoukas, 2017; Cloutier and Langley, 2020) emphasises the importance of understanding the dynamic practices that underpin conceptual entities such as trust and transactions. This view thus aligns with treating the TCT as a generative mechanism. Trust, as will be revealed, is produced and reproduced through the TCT. Thus, as noted in contemporary trust research, it is important to understand trust not just as an outcome but also as a process (Schilke and Lumineau, 2023).

In their framework, RV (1994) assumes that actors make their assessments based on efficiency and equity in exchange. In terms of efficiency, RV (1994) builds on transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), where efficiency “defines [s] the most expeditious and least costly governance structure for undertaking a transaction, given production cost constraints” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 93). RV (1994) then assumes that equity is an equally important criterion for the development of a BSR. The concept is taken from social exchange theory (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964) and refers to fair dealing between the parties in a BSR.

To explain the TCT as a generative mechanism, this paper integrates property rights ownership (Commons, 1950; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Kim and Mahoney, 2010) as a third assessment criterion. RV’s (1994) article builds on the work of Commons (1950), in which the exchange of ownership rights is a fundamental aspect of any transaction. RV (1994) also acknowledge property rights as important to exchange, but they do not treat them as requiring explicit assessment. To understand the TCT as a generative mechanism, however, such assessments become central. The financial research that this paper builds on can, in this case, help us understand why such an assessment is important. This type of research pays attention to understanding risk sharing between actors, focusing on who owns what rights when (Seifert et al., 2013; Pattnaik et al., 2020; de Weijs et al., 2023).

There are, then, from a financial point of view, two main reasons why the assessment of ownership is important. Firstly, for the TCT to function, it is necessary to assess not only what is less costly (efficiency) and what is fair (equity), but also who owns what and, consequently, who bears which risks (de Weijs et al., 2023). Secondly, assessing ownership of property rights is critical because knowing who controls which resources and associated rights enables actors to extend credit over time (de Weijs et al., 2023). If you do not know who owns what, you will not give credit. Viewing ownership of property rights as an integral part of the TCT as a generative mechanism (Cloutier and Langley, 2020) is then different from past research interested in property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Foss and Foss, 2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2010), as it does not focus on the static allocation of rights but rather, along with a process point of view (Langley and Tsoukas, 2016), on the movement of property rights in an ongoing transaction.

In RV’s (1994) framework, ex post assessments are central. However, in the text, they also use the criteria as motives (ex ante) that drive each stage. For example, RV (1994, p. 94), when writing about assessments of equity and efficiency, state: “We also assume that the parties to a cooperative IOR are motivated to seek both equity and efficiency outcomes […]”. Accordingly, in this paper, equity, efficiency and ownership of property rights will serve as criteria that motivate (ex ante) actors to move forward at each stage, as well as a basis for assessment (ex post). These motives and assessments then explain why actors move forward in each stage.

However, to understand the TCT, we also need to know why the actors move between the stages. On this matter, RV (cf. 1994, p. 97) is silent, and assessing each stage does not explain why actors act and initiate a movement. Assessment, accordingly, does not automatically lead to action and movement. If we then do not explain this movement, it becomes difficult to understand the TCT. We accordingly need “to shift the focus to the mechanisms at play” (Rouse et al., 2025, p. 262). Mechanisms are then viewed as “contextually inferred causal processes running across an observed pattern of empirical conditions leading to an outcome or effect “(Cornelissen and Werner, 2025, p. 5). They are then parts of the TCT motor ^[3].

In the TCT, aligned with the criteria of equity, efficiency and ownership, three situated mechanisms (Cornelissen and Werner, 2025, p. 15) will be at play, bringing motives and assessments into action at different points in the cycle. In each assessment, all criteria will be in play; however, at the end of each stage, one will dominate. Between the negotiation and commitment stages, an economic mechanism connected to efficiency will initiate the process. Between the commitment and execution stages, there will be a legal mechanism connected to ownership that binds the actors. Finally, between execution and negotiation, there will be a social mechanism connected to equity that reproduces the TCT. Below, each mechanism and its rationale are further outlined.

The economic mechanism operates between the negotiation and commitment stage. As actors at the end of the negotiation stage assess efficiency, this will create economic incentives (Smith, 2007, [1776]; North and Thomas, 1973) that drive actors from negotiations to signing or agreeing to a contract. According to financial research, the primary economic incentive of the TCT is the possibility for buyers to obtain products first and make payments 30–60 days later (de Weijs et al., 2023). For suppliers, the incentive is to become more attractive so that buyers want to do future business with them (Seifert et al., 2013).

The legal mechanism operates between the commitment and the execution stage. As actors assess ownership at the end of the commitment stages, this will impose obligations on them, in terms of norms and laws (Commons, 1950; Macneil, 1980). It is these obligations that then drive actors from commitment to execution. As Macneil (1980) points out, even the simplest model of exchange must postulate a mechanism for enforcing obligations. In the TCT, the obligations come either from having exchanged property rights that make one’s actions legally binding or from relational contracts (Macneil, 1980) that imply what RV (1994, p. 100) calle “congruency,” which binds actors to a specific course of action.

Finally, we have the social mechanism, which operates between the execution and negotiation stages. As actors at the end of an execution stage, completed in accordance with agreed obligations, assess equity; this will generate trust (Dore, 1983; Uzzi, 1997; Ariño and Torre, 1998) to their counterpart. It is then trust as a social mechanism that will drive the movement from execution to new negotiations. For continuous TCTs, there must be trust among the actors. If there is no mutual trust, the TCT will not be reproduced. In such cases, TCTs will break down and transactions will, as after a major bankruptcy, be performed on a cash-on-delivery basis (Wadell and Åberg, 2021).

To conclude, the motives and the assessments explain movement within the stages. The three mechanisms presented explain movements between the stages.

RV (1994) stresses that the standard legal approach to business is written contracts. Contracts often specify who should perform which tasks and when (Macneil, 1978; Macneil, 1980). Contracts can also detail how ownership rights should be transferred between different actors in a TCT (Alchian, 1965; Macneil, 1980). However, informal agreements are also a central aspect of BSRs (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). As actors come to trust each other and view each other as fair, informal agreements often become a significant part of BSRs (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). As Macaulay (1963) points out, handshakes are often the preferred way to do business, complementing or even replacing written contracts. Thus, property rights to resources can be exchanged through both informal promises (handshakes) and formal written contracts.

What the TCT, as a generative mechanism, adds to this understanding is a more processual view of formal and informal contracts. In the RV (1994) view, contracts primarily seem to be seen as a structuring tool for exchange. From a process perspective, they also bind actors to specific future events that they must perform (cf. Commons, 1950, p. 52).

The RV (1994) framework whant to explain a meso-level phenomena (i.e. BSR). However, despite this meso-level focus, these phenomena emerge, evolve and dissolve over time due to individual actions (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Based on RV (1994), three ways have been outlined in which individuals’ actions influence BSRs: firstly, in defining the level of uncertainty to expect from exchanges with a partner; secondly, in allowing interpersonal trust to supplement or replace formal written contracts; and third, in setting outcome expectations related to gains from both social exchanges and the exchange of products. To these outcome expectations, we then need to add the exchange of property rights to understand the TCT as a generative mechanism. In the TCT, as in all transactions, gains are realised by acquiring control over property rights. As Snehota (1990) points out, it is property rights that enable actors to calculate gains and losses. Thus, in the TCT, an actor’s outcome expectations also include gains from exchanging property rights (Snehota, 1990; Wadell, 2022).

Individuals provide the RV (1994) framework with its micro-foundation. The macro-foundation, however, is not made explicit (cf. Van de Ven and Ring, 2006). In this paper, we thereby add a business network view (cf. Johanson and Mattsson, 1987; Snehota, 1990; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). From this point of departure, BSRs cannot be viewed in isolation; to understand them, they must be considered within the context of interconnected BSRs. To understand the TCT as a generative mechanism, this network view is important as the TCT will not work without several actors who share the belief in the future (Hofmann and Kotzab, 2010). In networks, actors share a sense of belief, purpose and the idea that, together, they can achieve future gains that neither could accomplish alone (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). Expectations and assessments of the transaction will naturally then also be created from the position of actors embedded in a business network (cf. Anderson et al., 1994; Van de Ven and Ring, 2006).

RV (1994) ^[4], based on Commons (1950), argues that transactions consist of three stages: negotiation, commitment and execution. These three stages are also the core building blocks for the TCT. In line with this, the TCT can be understood as repetitive sequences that explain movement between and within different transaction stages. As noted in the original framework (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 97), the stages can, in practice, overlap; yet, for analytical purposes, the separation is important.

Actors’ understanding of transactions is assumed to be based on norms that exist before the exchange (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). It is assumed that actors understand that TCTs take the form of negotiations, commitments, changes in property rights and execution, including delivery, credit terms and payment. This general script or structure functions as a cycle that must be performed for the TCT to work.

What then truly differentiates the TCT from RV’s (1994) original transaction is that it is grounded in a process theory of explanation (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Cloutier and Langley, 2020; Cornelissen, 2025). “Process theory offers an explanation of how and why an organisational entity changes and develops” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 512). The explanation process theory searches for explanations in terms of generative mechanisms that are processes or entities explaining how and why change comes about (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Such a process can then include several situated mechanisms (Cornelissen and Werner, 2025).

As a generative mechanism, the TCT requires that the event sequence of each stage becomes more explicit (how). That so is the case becomes evident from reading financial research such as Paul and Boden (2014), which points out that obligations must come first, then credit time and finally payment. The task will then be to make RV (1994) stages more structured and explicit. As a generative mechanism, the TCT also points out why actors are driven forward between stages. The TCT accordingly drives actors from negotiation to commitment (economic mechanism), from commitment to execution (legal mechanism) and finally from execution to wanting to continue in new cycles (social mechanism). Based on this reasoning, the TCT can be understood as a generative mechanism that underpins BSRs as a transaction governance structure.

In a functional TCT, there will be aspects of conflict at each stage of negotiation, commitment and execution, but, as in RV’s (1994) original framework, it will be dominated by the fact that two actors form shared goals. Thus, even in functional TCTs, there will always be some aspects of conflict, such as bargaining over credit terms or lead times. However, the functional TCT will primarily be characterised by the involved actors setting shared goals and enacting these goals. From this perspective, the TCT is, as in RV’s (1994) original transaction, a recursive process. As the TCT is repeated over time, the two actors will gradually make it more mutually efficient for both.

In Figure 1 and in the subsequent sections of the paper, each step in the process is outlined more explicitly, beginning with negotiation.

According to RV (1994), the negotiation stage of the transaction comprises two sub-processes: the bargaining and sensemaking processes. From RV’s (1994) point of view, the bargaining process includes presenting the terms of the transaction, such as price, rights and duties and product quality. The sensemaking process, on the other hand, implies interpreting each other’s role in the transaction in terms of trustworthiness and understanding each other’s role in the transaction. Based on this, the actors will develop joint expectations and goals (not individual) regarding how a transaction should be structured. Finally, RV (1994) argues that each party will assess the negotiation stage in terms of efficiency and equity.

However, from the perspective of the TCT as a generative mechanism, the negotiation stage needs to be further nuanced. Firstly, the sub-processes in the stage, as outlined by RV (1994), need to be further elaborated to understand how the TCT unfolds. Secondly, we need to integrate ownership through the exchange of property as a motive and assessment criterion in the negotiation stage. Finally, the economic mechanism needs to be integrated.

Starting with the bargaining process, revising RV’s (1994) work suggests that this process can be specified as a prescribed sequence that includes three sub-stages:

1. Exchange of expectations.

2. Terms of transaction.

3. Preliminary agreement.

The exchange of expectations includes what RV (1994) describes as negotiation, starting with the development of joint expectations about motivations, possible investments and the degree of uncertainty. In a TCT, financial research also indicates (Li et al., 2019) that this includes the buyer expressing their need for credit time and dialogue regarding lead times, as well as what will happen if one actor fails to deliver according to the agreements.

The second sub-stage is the terms of transaction. This stage includes what RV (1994, p. 97) describes as actors trying to “persuade each other, argue and haggle”. In a TCT, financial research indicates that this also includes the buyer seeking to increase credit terms and suppliers seeking to secure good payment security. In terms of credit time, actors need to decide whether to use 30, 60 (Paul and Boden, 2014) or even 90 days ^[5]. The length of the credit period can depend on the buyer’s bargaining power. A powerful buyer can generally negotiate longer credit terms (Liu et al., 2020). This power will likely be influenced by an actor’s position in their business network (Anderson et al., 1994) ^[6]. Finally, the bargaining process ends with a preliminary agreement, in which the two actors reach a compromise and decide whether to proceed with the transaction.

The three stages of the bargaining process correspond to three sensemaking stages:

1. Clarifying identity.

2. Finding a solution.

3. Understanding the meaning of the agreement.

In the first sub-stage, the actors clarify their own identity and their counterpart’s identity. In the second, they try to find a solution and reach what RV (1994, p. 100) terms a "shared interpretation" of the transaction terms. Finally, the actors try to see the meaning of the preliminary agreement and at this point, the psychological contract that RV (1994, p. 100) highlights begins to crystallise.

The negotiation stage and its bargaining and sensemaking processes are driven (ex ante) by actors seeking efficiency, ownership and equity. There will also be constant assessments based on the same three criteria (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). The final assessment is made after the preliminary agreement has been reached and actors have made sense of it. This final assessment will be dominated by efficiency considerations. If both actors see the preliminary agreement as beneficial, this will create economic incentives that serve as a mechanism to move the process from negotiation to commitment.

In the commitment stage, RV (1994) notes that two actors reach an agreement on the obligations and rules discussed in the negotiation stage. RV (1994) also notes that the governance structure for the transaction is decided upon at this stage. According to RV (1994), this decision is then codified in a formal contract or, informally, in a psychological contract.

However, from the perspective of the TCT as a generative mechanism, the commitment stage also needs further elaboration. The formal and informal contracting processes need to be nuanced by presenting them as a prescribed sequence (e.g., Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Secondly, in this stage, we also need to integrate the motives, assessments and the legal mechanisms that move actors from the negotiation to the commitment stage.

Starting the revision of RV (1994) with formal legal contracting, this seems to include three sub-stages:

1. Deciding on a formal binding contract.

2. Formal preparation for contracting.

3. Exchange of property rights.

The first sub-stage, deciding on a formal binding contract, involves finally determining the exact terms. Formal preparation for contracting then includes bringing forward the legal documents and appendices. This is what RV (1994) refers to as the contract’s codification. Finally, the exchange of property rights (Commons, 1950) implies both actors signing the contract, creating what RV (1994, p. 98) refers to as a “legal agreement”.

The second process in the commitment stage is the informal psychological contracting process, which includes:

• Sensing assumptions and beliefs.

• Confirmation of assumptions and beliefs.

• Congruency.

Sensing assumptions and beliefs, according to RV (1994), involves understanding what each actor can contribute to a BSR and what they expect to receive. This is commonly a “nonverbalized” process that captures the underlying assumptions and beliefs that shape the interaction between two actors. In the second stage, these nonverbalized assumptions and beliefs are confirmed. Finally, regarding congruency, RV (1994, p. 100) points out that synchronised purposes, values and beliefs will be reached.

The commitment stage, like the negotiation stage, is driven (ex ante) by actors seeking efficiency, ownership and equity. There will also, in this case, be constant assessments based on the same three criteria (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). The final assessment, however, will be dominated by ownership considerations. If both actors recognise that they have entered a contract at the end of the commitment stages, this will impose obligations on them that serve as a mechanism to move the process from commitment to execution.

Finally, in the execution stage, the commitments to the TCT structure are carried out into action by individuals fulfilling their roles in the relationship (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). RV (1994) only mentions that materials are bought, payments are made and actors, through this interaction, become more familiar with each other.

However, from the perspective of the TCT as a generative mechanism, the execution stage, like the negotiation and commitment stages, needs to be further nuanced. This implies specifying the processes of role and personal interaction expected to occur in this stage. As in the negotiation and commitment stages, in this stage we also need to integrate the motives, assessment and the mechanism that moves actors from negotiation to commitment.

Starting with role interaction, this prescribed sequence includes four sub-stages:

1. Lead time.

2. Delivery.

3. Credit time.

4. Payment.

Starting with lead time, this implies that the supplier is preparing to deliver a product to a buyer who is waiting for it. This corresponds to the lead time gap (e.g. Gadde and Håkansson, 2001). The situation represents a first test of whether the supplier will perform as agreed and committed. This is a situation for the buyer that is risky, uncertain and thus requires trust in the supplier.

The second sub-stage in role interaction is the delivery. Will the delivery be on time and at the correct location? If so, this signals commitment, reduces uncertainty and strengthens the buyer’s trust in the supplier.

The third sub-stage in role interaction is the credit time. During this period, the supplier will be working on other projects mean while waiting for payment. For the buyer, it is more important to use the delivered product as input in their production. Even though the product is now in the buyer’s possession, their performance affects both the buyer and the supplier. As research in finance points out, it is only by utilising the product and generating income from it that they can honour the BSR, fulfil past commitments and make future payments (Hofmann and Kotzab, 2010). The commitment is then to make a payment at an agreed-upon time in the future (e.g. 30–60 days later). For the buyer to make the payment, both the buyer and their supplier depend on other actors in the business network (Anderson et al., 1994) to fulfil their obligations. Thus, the execution of the TCT cannot be understood without considering its embeddedness in a network (Anderson et al., 1994; Hofmann and Kotzab, 2010).

The final sub-stage is payment, which marks the end of the credit period. For the supplier, payment is not guaranteed; they can only hope that their waiting will pay off and that the payment will be made in accordance with the structure to which the actors have committed. If so, it will work for the supplier as it does for the buyer. Accordingly, the supplier’s uncertainty decreases and their trust in the buyer increases. This, in turn, strengthens the BSR between the two actors and their ability to drive development and change together as one unit.

The role interaction is mirrored by personal interaction at each sub-stage. These include:

• Ongoing dialogue during delivery.

• Validation of delivery.

• Ongoing dialogue during payment.

• Validation of payment (cf. Ring and Van de ven, 1994, p. 98).

Through the first ongoing dialogue during delivery, both actors in the TCT can communicate about the delivery. In the validation delivery stage, the buyer inspects the product and reports any potential issues. In the ongoing dialogue about payments, there is communication, such as emails and phone calls, regarding any changes to payment dates or payments made. Finally, in verification, both actors check that the TCT has been completed.

The execution stage and its role interaction and personal interaction processes are, as in the other stages, driven (ex ante) by actors seeking to achieve their motives. There will also, in this case, be constant assessments based on efficiency, ownership and equity. A final positive assessment, primarily based on equity, after delivery and payment, consolidates mutual trust between the actors, which acts as a social mechanism that moves the process from execution to a new TCT cycle.

In this section, the integration of the TCT is further outlined, along with its contribution to our understanding of the emergence, evolution and dissolution of BSRs.

RV (1994) presents two scenarios for the emergence of BSRs as transaction governance structures. Scenario 1 can be summarised as a situation in which there is a prior relationship between the actors and in Scenario 2, the actors are strangers. Below follows a short description of both scenarios.

RV (1994, p. 100) notes that BSRs can emerge from a wide range of starting conditions. This includes pre-existing friendships (Ford, 1980), institutional mandates (cf. Van de Ven and Ring, 2006) or resource dependencies (cf. Wadell and Bengtson, 2024). These different starting conditions vary in the degree to which the parties are acquainted and have had prior interactions; thus, RV (1994) describes them in terms of previous sensemaking in understanding oneself in relation to the other. According to RV (1994), prior interactions lead to a high level of trust between the actors. Under such starting conditions, they may be able to negotiate, make commitments and begin executing transactions. Thus, according to RV (1994, p. 101), BSRs between parties with a common history seem to develop faster than usual.

However, according to RV (1994, p. 101), and in line with the arguments of social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), “In practice, most cooperative interorganizational relationships among strangers emerge incrementally and begin with small informal deals, initially requiring little reliance on trust because they involve little risk.” The idea is that as transactions are repeated over time, the actors will feel increasingly secure, which then gives rise to a BSR as a transactional governance structure with high trust, high risk and high transaction-specific investments. In this second scenario, the BSR as a transactional governance structure becomes an outcome of transactions.

In RV’s (1994) case, the second scenario, with relationships as an outcome, is the standard starting situation. From the TCT perspective outlined above, the situation comes closer to the second scenario in which the conditions for the relationship are in place before the transaction. For a TCT to take place, there must already be a substantial level of trust between the actors before transactions start. If this is not the case, the TCT execution stage would not function. From empirical findings, RV’s (1994) “in practice” scenario, where trust is gradually built, seems to reflect a situation where actors start with “psychological scars” and need to incrementally build up trust to gain their counterpart’s willingness to make larger investments (cf. Wadell and Åberg, 2021). In most situations in which actors begin to transact, empirical evidence from financial research shows that they are granted trade credit (cf. Pattnaik et al., 2020).

How then does the integration of the TCT more specifically contribute to our understanding of the emergence of BSRs? To understand this, we need to look more closely at each of the three stages of the RV (1994) framework.

To start, in the negotiation stage, the actors in the RV (1994) case have only limited trust. In the TCT case, there will, as pointed out, likely be moderate or high trust already from the start, coming from parts of the social matrix (Macneil, 1987). Another difference in the emergence of BSRs is the content of the bargaining and sensemaking processes. In RV (1994), the content of these two processes is not specified in detail. As outlined above, the processes in the TCT follow a specific order, an order that is only implicit in RV (1994). In the bargaining process, there is also a focus on lead time and credit time, which are left out in the original RV (1994) framework. Why actors move to the next stage is also left unspecified by RV (1994), which focuses primarily on ex post assessments. The TCT framework identifies incentives as an economic mechanism for transitioning to the commitment stage.

In the commitment stage, RV (1994) notes that negotiations are transformed into fixed obligations (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). These obligations can be formalised in written contracts or through informal agreements. In this stage, RV (1994) only implicitly addresses the actors’ action sequence. In the TCT framework, I provide both a formal and an informal contracting process, making the emergence of a relationship easier to comprehend. In the formal contracting process, it is particularly important that there is, at this point, an exchange of property rights (Commons, 1950). In the informal process, what I present as “congruency” between the actors also plays a role. It is through this exchange of rights and congruence that the negotiation is finally structured into a fixed framework for execution of the transaction. In the TCT, this exchange of rights and congruency binds the actors together. By binding themselves to a future course of action, they become one unit of action. This unit of action is then maintained by a legal mechanism that compels actors to execute the transaction in accordance with their obligations.

Finally, in the execution stage, RV (1994) points out that several actions are carried out at both the role- and the individual level, which then give rise to trust between the actors and the creation of a BSR. This is very different in the case of a TCT. In a TCT, trust is present from the start; it is a starting condition. The embryo of the BSR, which originates from the social matrix (Macneil, 1987), is accordingly already in place before execution. It is this embryo that makes actors willing to take on the risk and uncertainty of waiting for deliveries and payments. This embryo comes to life through the execution of the agreed-upon structure, as actors understand that their business partner upholds their commitments. When actors are assessed as having fulfilled their promises, they move from execution to a new TCT cycle via a social mechanism (trust) that enables them to take this uncertain and risky step.

A strong BSR, with many classical characteristics such as high trust, high uncertainty and high transaction-specific investments (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), might not emerge after just one TCT cycle. However, as Ariño and Torre (1998) point out, keeping promises over time creates a “positive loop” that makes actors increasingly confident. By feeling certain, they become more willing to commit their available resources in subsequent cycles of TCTs. If the parties perceive that the prior cycle has met their expectations regarding exchange, the TCT will become an institutionalised routine. Thus, the TCT provides the foundation for a strong BSR (cf. Dwyer et al., 1987, p. 12) where the collaboration over time likely extends into multiple TCTs and develops into a myriad of other commitments and parallel interdependent processes (cf. Zajac and Olsen, 1993, p. 140; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 101).

In discussing the evolution of BSRs, RV (1994) identifies two areas. Firstly, they argue that during the evolution of a BSR, transaction processes lead to its institutionalisation. Secondly, they discuss the evolution of three different forms of correspondences between formal and informal processes in the BSR. These three correspondences concern:

1. Role relationships vs. personal relationships.

2. Friendship ties vs. formal contracts as a base for conflict resolution.

3. Legal and psychological contracts often mirroring each other.

In the following section, it will be discussed how the TCT can help us to better understand these areas.

RV (1994) describes how the BSR, as it evolves, will become institutionalised through three basic stages: negotiation, commitment and execution. Regarding institutionalisation, RV (1994, p. 102) draws on Berger and Lucknann (1966) to view it as a socialisation process that transforms an instrumental transaction into a socially embedded relationship, with expectations taken for granted by its participants.

The TCT and its three mechanisms outlined can then explain why this institutionalisation occurs. Economic incentives provide the initial rationale for committing. The obligations in execution force actors to stay together and finally, post-execution trust in each other creates possibilities for future exchange. Accordingly, the mechanisms bind the stages together and deepen the process, turning the TCT components into what Berger and Lucknann (1966) refer to as a taken-for-granted reality. Constantly recurring TCT cycles also serve as the foundation for other possible institutional processes, such as product development, joint lobbying or long-term planning (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987; Håkansson et al., 2009).

The first of RV’s (1994) three correspondences between formal and informal processes in BSRs concerns role relationships versus personal relationships. RV (1994) argues that individuals initially interact through their organisational roles to execute specific tasks, but over time, these role-based relationships may develop into socially embedded personal relationships. However, RV’s (1994) framework does not provide a detailed account of the events through which such a transformation occurs. The TCT can help deepen such understanding. In early TCT cycles, exchanges commonly remain based on role relationships. However, when a supplier delivers on time and a buyer honours payments according to agreement, these observable transactional events, through dialogue and validation, create interpersonal trust. Such events of fulfilling agreed terms can then, in the TCT, likely act as a bridge between role-based and personal relationships. As role-based components are executed correctly, communication in personal interactions becomes smoother. In this way, the TCT adds concreteness to RV’s (1994) more abstract and less explicit execution stage by showing how trust and personal ties might emerge from repeated execution of the agreed-upon transaction structure.

The second of RV’s (1994) three correspondences concerns friendship ties versus formal contracts as bases for conflict resolution. RV (1994) argues that as role relationships are gradually replaced by personal friendships, individuals gain a dual foundation in social ties and contracts for handling conflicts. However, RV (1994) does not specify how such friendship ties are created and sustained. The TCT can provide further explanation in this case. The process of negotiating credit terms, ensuring timely deliveries and settling payments requires repeated interactions between individuals, including meetings, calls and emails, which cannot be specified in a formal contract. These repeated interactions occur because of TCT’s structure. The interactions likely generate trust in each other’s goodwill and gradually help transform transactional contacts into friendship ties. In this way, the TCT specifies RV’s (1994) abstract description by identifying more specific events that foster the actors’ dual foundation, contracts and social ties, for conflict resolution.

The third of RV’s (1994) three correspondences concerns the mirroring of legal and psychological contracts as the BSR evolves. RV (1994) argues that if there are positive expectations and trust between the actors, legal contracts will be less developed and less central. Conversely, if expectations and trust are low, legal contracts will be very specific and detailed. However, RV (1994) does not explain how such mirroring takes place. TCT can help us better understand this correspondence.

When two actors enter a TCT, the credit terms they commit to, as noted in the financial research (Li et al., 2019), commonly follow the formal legal contracting process. Such contracts specify delivery and payment dates, as well as sanctions. As buyers and suppliers repeatedly fulfil their parts of the agreements, the psychological contract and friendship ties are strengthened. As more TCT cycles and other transaction cycles are performed between actors, these psychological contracts will likely lead to simpler or more generous contractual terms. Thus, when the psychological contract is strengthened through the TCT, this relaxes the formal contract. The introduction of the TCT, therefore, specifies RV’s (1994) abstract claim by identifying events through which contractual and relational elements gradually come to mirror each other.

In this section, the focus is on how the TCT, which is part of forming the emergence and evolution of a BSR, might also occasionally explain its dissolution. RV (1994) points out that most dissolutions occur when commitments have been fulfilled and actors have met their obligations. In such cases, TCTs are executed in accordance with the commitments and the parties then cease exchanging. As there is no exchange, the relationship is formally over. There is also plenty of research showing this type of relationship ending (Halinen and Tähtinen, 2002; Havila and Medlin, 2012; Zaefarian et al., 2017). In such situations, TCTs will likely play only a marginal role in the dissolution process.

The situation in which TCTs likely plays a more profound role in dissolution occurs when actors fail to fulfil their commitments during execution and leave the other actor waiting without deliveries or payments. This happens when either the buyer or the supplier fails to fulfil their payment or delivery obligations. In this section, I will delve further into a situation that the RV (1994) framework cannot explain or address:

When one actor does not pay or does not deliver there will accordingly be actions by one actor that violate what they have committed to in the TCT. When one party fails to fulfil their obligations under the agreement, this prevents the two parties from operating as a single unit (cf. Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). As one actor begins to pursue its own goals, there will gradually be a shift from two actors operating with shared goals to two actors pursuing divergent goals. This process can also be explained using the introduced mechanisms. In this situation, they will have the opposite effect: the violation in the execution stage will create negative trust and the social mechanism will signal to them not to negotiate further and not to take on any more risk or uncertainty. This reasoning then aligns with Ariño and Torre (1998), who point out that unfulfilled promises will lead to “negative loops” in relationship development and, over time, to deterioration.

Two questions immediately arise in such situations: firstly, how long can the period of unsettled obligations last before divergent ones replace mutual goals? Secondly, at what point will the two actors stop reproducing the BSR and act as one unit? Past research suggests that the larger the investment, the greater the adaptation, and the stronger the trust, the longer the time period that parties not fulfilling obligations will have at their disposal before trust disappears (cf. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Ariño and Torre, 1998; Wadell and Åberg, 2021). As noted by RV (1994, p. 111), BSRs may persist despite indications of growing problems. The reason for such continuation might be that individual managers involved have overinvested in personal relationships with counterparts (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Ariño and Torre (1998, p. 323) bring forward similar arguments and emphasise that in long-term BSRs, there exists a “store of goodwill” that an actor not fulfilling their obligations can draw on for a limited time period. More specifically, Ariño and Torre (1998, p. 323) point out that in an ongoing relationship, there exists a “equity boundary”, where minor deviations are tolerated and subjected to negotiation. It is with significant deviation from one partner’s sense of equity that the store of goodwill is of primary importance.

There are accordingly both economic and social-psychological reasons that make a BSR resistant to dissolution (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). The more committed an actor is to a relationship, the less likely it is to dissolve due to unfulfilled obligations associated with the TCT (cf. Ariño and Torre, 1998, p. 323).

When a TCT fails and debts are notpaid, actors will, in line with the arguments above, gradually shift from more informal agreements to a greater focus on what is written in contracts (cf. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). There will thus be a shift from informal ways of handling problems, such as trust and handshakes, to institutionalised professional norms that generally govern business in a market economy (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 109). As noted by RV (1994), there is typically a balance between formal and informal processes in working BSRs. If one actor is not paying or delivering, this balance is lost. This increases the likelihood that the BSR will dissolve (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 108).

When the TCT no longer works, the focus shifts to contracts, and conflicts increase. In such a situation, the BSR that made the actors act as one unit has disappeared.

The purpose of this study was to integrate the TCT as a generative mechanism into Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) framework of relationship development. To achieve this purpose, two research questions were addressed. Firstly, how can the TCT be integrated into Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) framework? Secondly, how can the TCT be useful for understanding relationship development and change? This conclusion and contributions focus on the integration of the TCT as a generative mechanism.

This paper firstly contributes to past research (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Vanpoucke et al., 2014; Shamsollahi et al., 2021) by integrating the TCT as a generative mechanism into RV’s (1994) framework. As a generative mechanism the TCT brings forward the structure of the negotiation, commitment and execution stage as well as further explanations for movements between the stages. By introducing the TCT as a generative mechanism, the framework is thereby transformed from a primarily descriptive account of relationship development into an explanatory framework that can more explicitly account for how and why BSRs emerge, evolve and dissolve over time. While RV’s (1994) original framework identifies these stages, it leaves both the processes through which each stage unfolds and the mechanisms driving movement between stages underspecified. Drawing on process theory (Cloutier and Langley, 2020), this paper specifies how each stage unfolds. For example, the execution stage is described as a prescribed role-interaction pattern organised around lead time, delivery, credit time and payment. Rather than treating stages abstractly, this paper outlines them as routinised practices that are continuously reproduced through everyday activities. Beyond specifying how each stage unfolds, the paper also explains why actors move between stages. In RV’s (1994) original framework, the movement from stage-specific “assessments” to action is not clearly explained. In this paper, movements between stages are explained through three situated mechanisms (Cornelissen and Werner, 2025). Specifically, the transition from negotiation to commitment is driven by an economic mechanism (cf. North and Thomas, 1973), the transition from commitment to execution by a legal mechanism (cf. Commons, 1950), and the return from execution to renewed negotiation by a social mechanism (Dore, 1983). Taken together, the contribution lies in foregrounding relationship development as a process driven by generative mechanisms rather than by a sequence of unspecified transactional events (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Dwyer et al., 1987).

Based on this integration, the second theoretical contribution of the study concerns scholars’ understanding of the starting point for BSRs. RV (1994), like other schools of thought within marketing (Dwyer et al., 1987) and industrial marketing and purchasing (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995), is based on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), assuming that transactions come first and that BSRs, as transaction governance structures, emerge as an outcome of such transactions. Scholars also point out that there may be aspects of BSRs, such as bonds of personal trust or resource interdependencies, before the actual relationship begins (Wadell and Bengtson, 2024). What this paper refers to as the embryo of a BSR, however, points to something different. Rather than referring to early relational bonds or prior interaction (Ring and Van de ven, 1994), the embryo of a BSR denotes the presence of a basic set of economic, social and legal elements that must be in place for the TCT to be possible. That there is an embryo of a BSR in place thus points to the need for such basic institutional elements to be activated between specific actors for the TCT to begin. Hence, as pointed out by Dwyer et al. (1987, p. 14), “some elements of a ‘relationship’ in a contract law sense underlie all transactions”. This finding shifts the focus to the elements of the social matrix (Macneil, 1980) typically taken for granted as a starting condition for exchange in studies of BSRs (Håkansson, 1982; Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). To explain the TCT, one needs to return to this social matrix and examine it as a starting point for understanding how it conditions the possibility of TCTs. Transactions can then no longer be taken for granted. Transactions become something that needs explanation.

This reconceptualisation of the transaction as conditioned by the relationship embryo also has implications for how to study BSRs. Specifically, the third theoretical contribution then concerns the unit of analysis in studies of BSRs. Traditionally, such studies have analysed relationships through interactions between two actors (Håkansson, 1982; Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). This interaction focus has enabled a comprehensive understanding of how relationship characteristics such as trust, commitment and firm-specific investments change over time. However, as pointed out by Wadell (2022), it tends to foreground the long-term aspects of interaction rather than the short-term reproduction of day-to-day routines. Drawing on Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) distinction between different units of change (multiple vs single), this paper shifts the analytical focus to the BSR as a single unit of change. In doing so, it conceptualises the TCT not merely as a transactional event, in an exchange episode (e.g., Håkansson, 1982; Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) between two actors. The TCT, from the perspective developed in this paper, is viewed as a day-to-day routine that is an important part of reproducing a BSR. The unit of change is then not primarily located in shifting actor characteristics, but rather in how and why patterns of TCTs emerge, evolve and dissolve over time. The arguments developed in this paper then suggest that it is the emergence, reproduction, dissolution and reconstitution of this collective unit, rather than isolated transactional events and interaction between actors, that should be the primary analytical concern for scholars of BSRs.

Importantly, this collective unit cannot be meaningfully separated from the actions performed in the TCT. Rather than transactions causing relationships, as implied in Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) process model, the analysis points towards a conjunctive form of theorising (Cloutier and Langley, 2020), in which the TCT and a BSR are mutually constitutive. The notion of transrelating may therefore provide a more accurate description of what takes place in ongoing business exchange. Actors do not first transact through TCTs and then become related; instead, they become related in and through the performance of TCTs. Such performance that constitutes the “moment of truth” (Carlzon, 1987) of the TCT is thus the moment in time in which actors are actively transrelating.

The framework developed in this paper also has implications for marketing and purchasing managers. Overall, the framework suggests that marketing and purchasing managers may benefit from devoting greater attention to daily routines, such as TCTs, and to their structure and performance. From this perspective, particularly regarding TCTs, three managerial implications can be outlined.

Firstly, the findings in this paper suggest that marketing and purchasing managers may benefit from treating transactions as ongoing processes rather than events. TCTs include several interconnected touchpoints between managers, including negotiations, deliveries and payments. These activities, which are part of day-to-day exchange, should not be understood as insignificant “lumpy” actions and reactions (Håkansson et al., 2009, p. 37). How employees carry out these practices is crucial for shaping BSRs and overall business performance.

Secondly, the findings indicate that managers need to be observant and careful when initiating TCTs in new BSRs. The way early TCTs are carried out appears particularly important, as these practices may serve as the foundation for long-term BSRs. A stable and consistent foundation is likely a good starting point for a successful long-term collaboration.

Finally, the findings suggest that managers of BSRs should be observant to small incremental changes in day-to-day transactional practices, such as variations in delivery or payment times. While such deviations may appear trivial, they might be early signs of larger problems with one’s counterpart. Managers, therefore, need to carefully consider how far they are willing to draw on existing stores of goodwill (Ariño and Torre, 1998) without risking their own business.

The TCT framework presented in this paper comes with some limitations. Firstly, this is a conceptual paper; against this background, the developed TCT framework needs clearer empirical grounding. This includes further specification of its different events. Secondly, the TCT framework has been primarily developed with industrial markets and the exchange of physical products in mind. Given the importance of this business for the world economy, this seems legitimate, even though it needs to be evaluated in other contexts, such as service settings. Third, the TCT framework is specific to financial transactions; further studies are required to identify different mechanisms that generate BSRs. It may be worthwhile to examine whether there are other generative mechanisms that drive BSRs forward as singel units of change. These could, for example, be related to joint ventures, product development or innovation.

Moving to more specific future research avenues, it seems essential to further understand what this paper has termed the “embryo of a BSR”. Basically, all inter-organisational studies (Håkansson, 1982; Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) have their foundation in transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). From their perspective, the discrete market transaction is the starting point and structures come afterwards to govern transactions under different circumstances. The TCT presented in this paper is not a single event in time, as in transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), but rather a process. This process assumes that a relationship embryo exists before the transaction. It is this embryo that makes the transaction possible, and to understand BSRs, it seems necessary to explain it.

Third, and related, several scholars (North and Thomas, 1973; Ostrom, 1990; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997) consider legal institutions and social structures as existing essentially outside the transaction. What this paper illustrates is different: it shows how institutions and social structures are reproduced within the transaction itself. For example, the TCT indicates that transactions are not only an economic phenomenon (Williamson, 1985; Håkansson, 1982; Granovetter, 1985), and, by this, we need to study further the social mechanisms, such as trust, that make TCT a transaction process that can be reproduced over time.

Finally, my hope for the outlined TCT framework is that it will interest young scholars in the interplay of transactions and BSRs and help us take a significant step towards interesting (Davis, 1971) and impactful industrial marketing and purchasing research.

The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Handelsbanken Research Foundations (the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation and the Tore Browaldh Foundation). The author also thanks participants at the IMP Conference in Oulu, Finland, 2024, as well as participants in seminars at the Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University, where earlier drafts of this paper were presented. Finally, the author thanks Editor Antonella La Rocca and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and guidance.