This study aims to explain how manufacturers strengthen their standing in triadic channel networks (manufacturer–agent–retailer) by blending asset-specific investments, financial incentives and guanxi building. It assesses how the number of agents (single vs multiple) and agent size condition these effects.
Matched questionnaires from marketing and sales managers at 210 Taiwanese agent firms were analyzed with structural equation modeling to test the research framework.
Asset-specific investments and guanxi, rather than financial incentives, enhance retailers’ commitment to the manufacturer. Heightened retailer commitment subsequently increases agents’ dependence on the manufacturer. This indirect effect intensifies when several agents serve the same market and when agents are relatively small.
The cross-sectional, single-country setting limits causal inference and generalizability. Longitudinal, multi-country studies using data from all three channel members are encouraged.
Manufacturers can offset power imbalances by investing in retailer-direct resources and nurturing guanxi, while tactically appointing multiple, smaller agents to spur competition without destabilizing the channel.
By integrating economic, structural and relational governance mechanisms, this study clarifies how structural ties reshape inter-firm dependence in multilayer business channels, thus broadening B2B channel governance theory.
