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Purpose

This paper explores how the use of intermediaries in public procurement influences the capacity of public organizations to engage in strategic procurement. Focusing on the consultancy brokerage and medical technology sectors in Sweden, the study explores how intermediaries affect accountability and long-term market dynamics, which are central to achieving strategic goals such as innovation and sustainability.

Design/methodology/approach

The study draws on 27 interviews with stakeholders from public sector purchasers, intermediary firms, suppliers and industry organizations. Using contingency theory as an analytical lens, the findings are structured around two strategic dimensions: long-term market effects and accountability.

Findings

While intermediaries are often introduced to increase efficiency and reduce administrative burden, the study finds that they may in practice undermine strategic procurement and reinforce rigidity of the public sector. Specifically, the use of intermediaries may lead to reduced accountability, limited transparency, weakened supplier competition and missed opportunities for innovation. Rather than fostering strategic goals, intermediary arrangements risk reinforcing inflexible procurement practices and distancing public organizations from supply markets.

Originality/value

This paper contributes with new insights into the possibilities and obstacles for public organizations in working strategically with procurement, in contexts where intermediaries are involved. It shows that these arrangements—if not strategically managed—may inhibit rather than support strategic procurement. The findings underscore the need for public organizations to critically assess how intermediary models align with broader public values and strategic ambitions.

This paper explores how the use of intermediaries in public procurement influences the capacity of public organizations to engage in strategic procurement. Strategic procurement emphasizes long-term outcomes—such as fostering political goals and innovation—rather than short-term gains like cost reduction (Guarnieri and Gomes, 2019; Harland et al., 2021). This stands in contrast to the traditional view of procurement as a means to meet operational needs at the lowest price (Guarnieri and Gomes, 2019).

To pursue strategic goals, public organizations must be both capable and flexible (Bekkers et al., 2011; Bekkers and Noordegraaf, 2016), all while navigating their inherent “publicness” (Steccolini, 2019). As Grossi and Vakkuri (2024) note, public organizations embody a distinct set of values that differentiate them from private actors. Yet these same characteristics can create barriers to strategic procurement (e.g. Uyarra et al., 2020) as public entities are often not perceived as particularly innovative or adaptable (Ashok et al., 2021; Eklund and Carlsson, 2023; Torfing and Triantafillou, 2016). For instance, Georghiou et al. (2014) show that public buyers are less likely than private ones to demand or accommodate innovation.

Many Swedish public organizations—particularly municipalities and regions—have turned to intermediary arrangements, especially in sectors like consulting and medical technology (Innovationsföretagen, 2020; Swedish Medtech, 2022). This development makes Sweden a particularly insightful case, not least due to its strong national ambitions around strategic and innovation-driven public procurement. For example, there is a national strategy emphasizing making procurements more strategic. At the same time, the highly decentralized nature of the Swedish public sector—where municipalities and regions operate with significant autonomy—allows for considerable variation in how such models are implemented. Moreover, the widespread use of intermediaries in technically advanced sectors further reinforces the relevance of the Swedish context for examining how these arrangements affect public organizations’ ability to pursue strategic goals while maintaining accountability. In this study, intermediaries are defined as actors that connect buyers and sellers by selling goods, services or construction contracts to public buyer (The Swedish Competition Authority, 2017). In both industries examined, intermediaries consist of multinational intermediary firms. Here, the purchaser typically contracts directly only with the intermediary—not with the end supplier—making the brokerage service the object of procurement. This means that the object of procurement is mainly limited to the brokerage service itself—that is, the contractual relationship concerns the intermediary’s role in connecting buyers and suppliers, not the actual services or products delivered by the subcontractors.

These sectors are highly specialized and technologically advanced, which has been used to justify the intermediary model: intermediaries are seen to help public buyers navigate complex markets and access innovation. A common argument used by public organizations for choosing the intermediary model is that it would be impossible to access the necessary competence and resources internally to procure the relevant services and products—particularly in the industries examined in this study, as they are highly technically advanced. Another rationale for using intermediaries is the cost reductions expected when not having to engage in separate contracts with individual sub-contractors (The Swedish Competition Authority, 2017).

This intermediary model can be viewed in light of broader public sector trends towards multi-actor engagement and hybrid governance (Grossi and Vakkuri, 2024; Grossi et al., 2022). The literature emphasizes that public value can increasingly be achieved through collaborative networks involving both public and private actors (Bracci et al., 2019, 2021). However, such hybrid solutions raise concerns about accountability (Vakkuri et al., 2021)—particularly when multiple logics and control structures intersect (Frid et al., 2024; Rajala and Kokko, 2021). As complexity increases, public organizations must navigate competing demands and relationships (De Waele et al., 2021), and the introduction of an intermediary adds yet another actor into this already multifaceted procurement landscape. This further complicates the question of who holds ultimate accountability and challenges the role of the public organization in delivering strategic outcomes.

Despite these challenges, there is some optimism in the literature about the strategic potential of public procurement—particularly as a tool to promote innovation (Demircioglu and Vivona, 2021; Edquist et al., 2015; Wesseling and Edquist, 2018). As Kundu et al. (2020) note, scholarly interest in this area has grown significantly in recent years. Rolfstam et al. (2011) highlight a continued search for successful cases where public procurement has actively supported innovation. Moreover, strategic procurement is increasingly seen as a mechanism to realize various political objectives, including sustainability (Lagström and Ek Österberg, 2025; Manta et al., 2022). In the literature, the role of intermediaries is largely described as having the potential to foster innovation (Howells, 2006; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). For example, Selviaridis et al. (2023) emphasize the role of intermediaries as institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988), and Georghiou et al. (2014) point to the fact that intermediaries can support public organizations in handling the complexity of procurements. However, intermediaries are often defined quite broadly as a party that functions as support to the contracting organization while enabling dialogue between different actors (Edler and Yeow, 2016) such as in cases where actors are distant from each other, a situation in which intermediaries can function as a bridge (Kivimaa et al., 2019). Seemingly intermediaries could work to make the constrained public sector organizations into more flexible ones, which in itself is a prerequisite to achieve strategic procurement (Selviaridis et al., 2023). The use several intermediaries is mentioned in the literature as increasing chances of achieving different goals. Multiple intermediaries can complement each other and thus help driving development forward with (hopefully) a common and thoroughly elaborated goal (Tokumaru, 2022).

Nonetheless, this creates a tension: the intermediary model carries both high expectations and heightened accountability demands. While some research sees intermediaries as enablers of strategic goals, research also highlights the hurdles and complexities associated with solutions in which public organizations increasingly engage with various types of stakeholders, particularly in terms of accountability (Grossi et al., 2024; Rajala and Kokko, 2021). There is a general consensus that strategic procurement in the public sector remains underexplored (Gordon Murray, 2009; Harland et al., 2021; Uyarra et al., 2014; White et al., 2016). Scholars have called for more research into how strategic goals are handled by procurers (Grandia and Meehan, 2017; Plantinga et al., 2020), and the role of intermediaries in different contexts remains insufficiently studied (Barraket, 2020). This paper seeks to contribute to this gap by examining how the use of intermediaries influences public organizations’ capacity to engage in strategic procurement. The aim of this paper is to enhance our understanding of the possibilities and obstacles for public organizations in working strategically with procurement, in contexts where intermediaries are involved. By including perspectives from contracting agencies both on state, regional and municipal levels, intermediaries and subcontractors, the study offers a holistic view—something the literature has so far largely lacked (Barraket, 2020) as the focus in the literature has mainly been on the buyers’ as actors. Guided by contingency theory, which examines the fit between organizational structures and strategic capacity, the analysis explores how public organizations are equipped to realize these types of goals within this increasingly hybridized procurement system where public organizations are increasingly expected to collaborate with other stakeholders (c.f. Vakkuri et al., 2021).

This paper applies contingency theory to deepen our understanding of how strategy and structure match (Glas et al., 2017), or do not match, in procurement arrangements involving intermediaries and the pursuit of public organizations to achieve strategic goals. These arrangements, in which third-party actors take on coordinating roles between public organizations and suppliers, represent a shift in how procurement is organized. This raises questions about how such arrangements interact with the organizational structure of public actors and how these structures either support or constrain strategic procurement. By applying contingency theory, the paper explores how these developments relate to the specific characteristics of public organizations and their institutional context (Steccolini, 2019), and how this affects possibilities to strategic procurement. After presenting this theory, the concept of strategic procurement will be elaborated and broken down into two strategic dimensions, which guide the analysis in the findings section. The theoretical framework concludes by presenting two questions to be answered in the findings.

Contingency theory focuses on understanding how the alignment between structure and strategy affects the functioning of organizations (Glas et al., 2017). The optimal structure for an organization depends on its goals, environment, technology and size, and varies depending on the context. Rather than assuming one universally best way of organizing, contingency theory emphasizes the importance of fit between internal structures and external demands (Patrucco et al., 2019).

In the context of this paper, contingency theory provides insights into how procurement arrangements involving intermediaries relate to the ability of public organizations to achieve strategic goals. These arrangements often involve changing roles for purchasers, intermediaries and subcontractors, requiring new forms of coordination and interaction. As Glas et al. (2017) note, different organizations vary in their capacities to realize strategic ambitions in procurement, depending on how well they adapt to contextual conditions. Patrucco et al. (2017) further argue that public organizations shape their strategies in relation to both political objectives and external supply markets. Therefore, how such arrangements play out in different settings becomes a key analytical concern.

To be able to achieve strategic procurement, organizations need to be adaptable. Burns and Stalker (1994) describe two organizational types: mechanical and organic. Mechanical structures rely on routine and hierarchy, while organic structures are more decentralized and flexible. Donaldson (2001) points out that organic structures are better suited for dynamic environments, such as those requiring innovation. Strategic procurement, which involves responsiveness and long-term thinking, may therefore require more organic features. For instance, when aiming to achieve goals related to innovation, a participatory approach is beneficial, and this aligns more with the characteristics of an organic organization (Donaldson, 2001). Thus, strategic procurement necessitates an organization that is flexible and capable of responding to a changing environment, adapting to it effectively. Given developments towards hybrid solutions and the blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors (De Waele et al., 2021; Grossi and Vakkuri, 2024), the adaptive capacity of public organizations becomes increasingly important.

At the same time, public organizations must uphold traditional public values such as rule of law, transparency and accountability (Eklund and Carlsson, 2023). In procurement arrangements involving intermediaries, the distance between public actors and service delivery may increase, making the maintenance of accountability more complex. As is emphasized by Bovens (2010), accountability can be seen as a virtue, a public value that we expect public organizations to maintain. Structurally, arrangements need to exist where public organizations are held accountable for how they handle the whole production line in procurement, i.e. to find ways to achieve accountability in these complex arrangements (c.f. Rajala and Kokko, 2021). Thus, one could claim that the intermediary solution represents a complex situation where public organizations need to adapt and handle different types of actors, while still in the end, be the actor accountable for how they handle their procurements and work strategically with them (or not).

Taken together, contingency theory helps us analyze how the structural characteristics of public organizations – often marked by inertia and value-based constraints – relate to ambitions to become more flexible and responsive. We now turn to the concept of strategic procurement and elaborate on two central dimensions that will guide the findings.

As pointed out by Matthews (2005), strategic procurement is a way to move beyond defining procurement as a mere administrative and routine-oriented task. White et al. (2016) claim that contemporary complexity, such as technological advancements, societal and environmental challenges, and a shift toward focusing on “best value” rather than lowest costs, have enhanced the strategic role in public procurement. This shift reflects a growing recognition that public procurement carries responsibilities that go beyond efficiency and financial savings (Dimitri, 2012) including accountability in how public funds are used.

Strategic procurement is based on the assumption that public procurement is fundamentally different from private sector purchasing. While private organizations primarily aim to maximize profit, public organizations must respond to a broader set of goals that are shaped by political decisions and legal frameworks. These goals include innovation, sustainability, social inclusion and economic development (Guarnieri and Gomes, 2019; Matthews, 2005). The heightened attention to the strategic aspects of procurement is closely linked to changes occurring in the external environment, such as technological advancements, societal shifts and environmental challenges (White et al., 2016).

This broader ambition requires a shift in perspective. Instead of focusing solely on price, strategic procurement entails that public organizations adopt a holistic perspective that goes beyond immediate cost savings and efficiency and thus not solely focus on finding the lowest price (Andhov, 2021; Gordon Murray, 2009; Guarnieri and Gomes, 2019). This represents a shift, at least in ambition, towards considering qualitative dimensions in addition to the monetary cost. Strategic procurement thus aims to broaden the perspective of public procurement, moving away from perceiving it as an administrative task (Matthews, 2005) and making it more active and progressive (White et al., 2016). Furthermore, the concept of strategic procurement recognizes the impact that procurement can have on the market in the long run, such as promoting the establishment of smaller companies (Harland et al., 2021). Glas et al. (2017, p. 573) summarize potential strategic goals as follows:

The discussed strategic goals are social benefits e.g. support of minimum wages (McCrudden, 2004), environmentally sustainable procurement (Gelderman et al., 2015), the support of small and medium-sized enterprises (Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014) or the procurement of innovation (Hommen and Rolfstam, 2009).

In the same vein, Guarnieri and Gomes (2019) list innovative, social and environmental gains as examples of the potential benefits. However, the literature also identifies barriers related to the slow pace of evolution within public organizations and the persistence of a view that procurement is primarily routine and administrative. As is highlighted by Harland et al. (2021), in order to achieve strategic goals, it is important to broaden our perspective and consider means beyond legislation. The authors suggest adopting a more systematic approach that incorporates market knowledge and adherence to long-term effects. Meanwhile, as is emphasized by Georghiou et al. (2014) who write about abilities to achieve innovation, it is necessary that there is a shared vision between buyers and suppliers on what is to be achieved. The authors further point to the importance of highlighting if suppliers experience any constraints concerning selling innovations to the public sector. This further motivates the focus on several different actors to understand the possibilities or inhibitions to achieve strategic procurement.

In this paper, strategic procurement is defined as an approach that involves taking long-term effects on markets into account, including the ambition to foster innovation and strengthen competition. At the same time, it includes accountability for realizing broader political goals, such as environmental or social sustainability in the whole production chain. These two elements form the basis of the analytical framework used in the findings section which is presented below.

In summary, the application of contingency theory allows for a comprehensive analysis of how the intermediary arrangement influences the prospects for strategic procurement. The findings of this article will be structured around these strategic dimensions and how the intermediary arrangement seemingly affects them. The following two questions will guide the findings:

  1. How is the intermediary arrangement in public procurement perceived to affect long-term developments in supply markets?

  2. How is accountability of public organizations perceived to be affected in procurements where intermediaries are used?

Building on these questions, the article proceeds to examine how the strategic dimensions identified in the findings relate to the structural characteristics of public organizations. The discussion focuses on how these findings can be interpreted in terms of the opportunities and obstacles that public organizations face in striving for strategic procurement within intermediary arrangements. Since such arrangements appear to require flexibility and adaptability, the discussion further explores the potential and limitations they pose for structural transformation in public organizations.

This study was commissioned and funded by the Swedish Competition Authority and is based on qualitative research methodology. The primary data collection method was interviews, which provided in-depth insights from key stakeholders. Additionally, written statements from interviewees, including reports, were used as supplementary sources of information. The interviews were conducted in collaboration with a master’s student during the data collection phase, which took place from March to June 2022. The interviews were carefully designed to capture detailed and comprehensive data.

In this study, 27 individuals were interviewed to explore the use of intermediaries in public procurement. The research process consisted of several key steps. First, industries where intermediaries are frequently involved in public procurement were identified. Subsequently, key stakeholders—including representatives from central procurement support organizations, procurement lawyers, consultants, contracting authorities, intermediary suppliers, other suppliers and trade associations—were invited to participate. Additionally, an advertisement was placed on a public procurement-focused news platform to encourage interested parties to reach out and contribute to the study. Table 1 provides an overview of the interviewed actors.

Table 1

Summary of respondents

IDRole/PositionSector/Organization type
1Head of ProcurementHigher education
2Representative, procuring regionRegional public sector
3Representative, procuring region (2)Regional public sector
4Representative, procuring region (3)Regional public sector
5Purchaser, large municipalityMunicipal government
6Purchaser, government agencyCentral public authority
7Purchaser, government agency (2)Central public authority
8Procurement specialistPublic sector
9Central procurement supportGovernment agency or coordination body
10Nurse, specialized in procurementHealthcare/Clinical
11Representative, consultant broker (1)Intermediary/Broker
12Representative, consultant broker (2)Intermediary/Broker
13Consultant broker, IT specialist (1)IT consulting/Intermediary
14Consultant broker, IT specialist (2)IT consulting/Intermediary
15Procurement consultantPrivate consultant
16Representative, small consulting firmPrivate consultant
17Representative, consulting companyPrivate consultant
18Representative, consulting firmPrivate consultant
19Representative, consulting firm, senior experiencePrivate consultant
20Supplier in medical technologyMedtech company
21Representative, industry org. for innovative firms (1)Private sector/Industry org.
22Representative, industry org. for innovative firms (2)Private sector/Industry org.
23Representative, medtech industry organization (1)Private sector/Industry org.
24Representative, medtech industry organization (2)Private sector/Industry org.
25Representative, staffing industry organizationPrivate sector/Industry org.
26Procurement lawyer, industry organizationsPrivate sector/Legal
27Representative, travel industryPrivate sector/Other

Source(s): Authors’ own creation

The study focuses on the medical technology and consultancy brokerage industries, due to the widespread use of intermediaries in these sectors. Criticisms and concerns regarding the use of intermediaries in these industries have been raised, particularly by industry organizations. To ensure the inclusion of relevant perspectives, information about the project was shared in the Swedish Competition Authority’s newsletter and various media channels. Interested individuals were invited to participate and contact the researchers. Additionally, a “snowball selection” method (Bryman, 2016) was employed, where contact information for new potential participants was obtained through referrals from those already interviewed, enabling the sample size to expand. Involving actors with diverse roles in procurement was essential to capturing a broad spectrum of perspectives. This approach facilitated the inclusion of various voices and ensured that multiple viewpoints were represented in the study. This approach also aligns with the recommendation of previous research, emphasizing the importance of incorporating different perspectives and not solely focusing on the experiences of purchasers (Barraket, 2020). While the strategy of including a wide range of perspectives is valuable for capturing nuance, its main limitation is that it does not allow for an in-depth exploration of each perspective. The intention, however, was to incorporate the views of diverse actors in order to provide a broad understanding of how the intermediary solution is perceived across the industries—rather than to conduct an in-depth analysis of individual procurement cases.

The interviews followed a semi-structured approach, utilizing overarching categories and thematic questions while allowing flexibility for interviewees to address specific issues. While there were some themes that we wanted to engage in, there was also openness for what interviewees wanted to discuss (Denscombe, 2010). This flexibility was vital given the broad and varied nature of intermediaries as a phenomenon, which can differ in meaning and significance depending on the context. It was particularly important as we sought to capture the diverse experiences of different actors involved in this arrangement, without imposing too many preconceptions. To accommodate this diversity, different interview guides were developed and tailored to the roles and backgrounds of the interviewees. For example, when interviewing buyers, the questions addressed their rationale and motivations for using intermediaries. When interviewing actors on the supplier side, the questions focused on how they perceived being affected by intermediaries and their overall experiences of participating in such procurements. All interviewees were also asked about their general perceptions of intermediary solutions and how they believed intermediaries could (or could not) contribute to achieving strategic goals in these procurements.

The interviews were conducted on platforms such as Zoom or Teams, with durations ranging from one to two hours. Conducting digital interviews provided the opportunity to reach participants from different parts of the country, overcoming geographical limitations. The interviews were recorded using voice memos on an iPhone. The recording of interviews enhances the validity and reliability of the study, as verbatim transcriptions ensure accurate representation of the participants' statements (Watson, 2011).

To minimize the risk of receiving rehearsed or superficial responses, the interviews were conducted in a conversational style, fostering a relaxed environment where interviewees felt comfortable sharing their thoughts and perspectives openly. Additionally, interviewees were assured that their identities would remain confidential, with their names anonymized in the final report, further encouraging candid participation.

To manage the empirical material generated from the interviews, a systematic approach was employed. The interviews were transcribed and stored with utmost respect for the participating respondents, ensuring that their names were anonymized during the data processing stage.

The program NVivo was utilized for qualitative analysis. Initially, overarching codes were created in NVivo, such as competition and societal goals, to categorize the material. As the analysis progressed, more specific subcodes were developed to capture emerging themes and nuances. For instance, within the competition code, subcodes such as impact on transparency and corruption were created due to their recurring presence in the interviews.

This manuscript has been language edited by AI software. This has helped only in proof-reading and has not altered the content of the text.

The following empirical section will focus on the impact of intermediaries on the attainment of the strategic dimensions mentioned in the theoretical section. As stated, the results are based on interviews conducted with various stakeholders, and thus quotations from these interviews will be included. The quotations have been modified for clarity and to eliminate colloquial language. However, these changes are only semantic in nature and do not alter the fundamental meaning of the original statements.

In the following sections, the intermediary solution is examined in relation to the broader strategic dimensions presented in the theoretical framework. The focus lies on the perceived effects on markets and the capacity of public organizations to assume accountability for the entire production chain when intermediaries are involved.

Together, these findings form the basis for the subsequent discussion, which explores the obstacles and opportunities that intermediaries present for public organizations seeking to engage in strategic procurement.

As previously noted, the concept of strategic procurement involves moving beyond the view of procurement as a routine administrative task (Matthews, 2005). One important dimension of this shift concerns how markets are influenced in the long term (Harland et al., 2021). When it comes to the question of how markets are affected long-term, there were different opinions depending on which type of actor was concerned. Buyer organizations often presented the argument that intermediaries are necessary to understand complex markets. One industry highlighted in this study is IT, where public organizations often require IT consultants but lack sufficient understanding of and insight into the market. Given the dynamic and ever-evolving nature of the IT sector, intermediaries can streamline procurement processes, making them an attractive option. By engaging intermediaries, buyers can also avoid the need to continuously develop new specifications for their requirements. This reasoning is not limited to the IT industry; a common justification for using consultants across sectors is the need to address organizational demands and adapt to market conditions, despite limited capacity or expertise within the internal organization. This argument was also used within the medical technology sector. The medical technology industry was often described as complex as it encompasses a wide range of products used in healthcare settings, covering products such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines, bandages, syringes, implants, scalpels and pacemakers.

In terms of long-term market effects, a key aspect of strategic procurement is how the market operates in facilitating the entry of smaller companies (Glas et al., 2017; Harland et al., 2021). In this study, one argument often put forward by public procurers was that intermediaries can foster competition on markets by ensuring that small and middle-sized companies have access to markets. A common view was that smaller businesses have opportunities with the intermediary solution that may not be feasible in traditional procurements. Public organization representatives in this study often highlighted the benefits of accessing a broader market, particularly in industries such as consulting, where smaller suppliers like individual consulting firms can be engaged.

However, concerns were raised about the fact that, in the industries studied, only a few actors operate as intermediaries. This stands in contrast to insights from the literature, which suggest that involving multiple intermediaries could be beneficial (Tokumaru, 2022). In both industries, there were only two large multinational companies respectively. As a representative from the medical technology industry (1) states:

If you only have one person to talk to, you only get one perspective of the market. You lose touch with all the others, and when it comes to the next procurement, for example, or just during the contract period, staying updated on news and knowing what's happening to incorporate new technologies in the relationship with the whole market becomes narrowed down to a single party.

Thus, industry representatives express concerns that contracting authorities may become disconnected from the market, resulting in a limited understanding of market dynamics. This development risks undermining the deepened market knowledge and closer engagement with the market that the literature highlights as central to achieving more strategic procurement (Georghiou et al., 2014; Harland et al., 2021). Moreover, whereas arguments are often put forward that smaller companies ideally benefit from this solution, as one representative of the procurer side claims when discussing the medical technology industry, quite the opposite effect is registered:

There has been a consolidation in the supplier market, making it difficult for smaller companies to participate compared to before. So, the supplier market has been consolidated, and thus at the expense of the smaller actors. (Representative, procuring region 3)

Thus, the intermediary solution was criticized for problems with equal treatment of subcontractors. Some argue that the intermediary solution allows contracting authorities or entities to preselect which subcontractors they want performing a service, without making the necessary analysis of the market. Furthermore, some interviewees claim that individual consultants may continue to maintain close relationships with buyers, even though the communication is supposed to be handled by an intermediary. A representative of a consulting firm shares their perspective:

But as a buyer, you have a significant amount of power, or even all of it, to choose which of these quoting consultants we should go with through the brokerage. It is evident that this can be the case. (Representative, small consulting firm)

Connected to equal treatment, it is central that there is transparency regarding on what grounds contracts are attributed. Several stakeholders highlight that procurement processes involving intermediaries often lack this transparency. To achieve transparency, the subject matter of the procurement as well as imposed requirements must be clear. Some suppliers display frustration over the fact that it can be unclear why they were not awarded contracts. They experience that there often are inadequate and unclear requirements. A representative for an industry organization of innovative firms (2) expresses this concern and claims that how things are done in choosing the suppliers are “like a black hole”. Since the intermediary is not obliged to follow the guiding principles when dealing with tenders from subcontractors, this can be one source of the lack of transparency about the grounds on which subcontractors are awarded contracts. As a consultant points out:

There is a lack of transparency combined with a feeling that it circumvents the public procurement law. (Representative, consulting firm, senior experience)

The general problem with evading public procurement legislation is also emphasized by a representative (2) of the medical technology industry:

It should be the market that decides. The Public Procurement Act (LOU) is not an optimal way to do business. But it still … It contains the principles you mentioned initially, such as equal treatment, transparency, proportionality, and so on. And if you follow those principles, you are clear on what applies, and all parties have a similar chance. But if those principles are disregarded in how the products come to the region, and you only focus on how an intermediary should be procured … There’s actually really only … There’s almost only one. You could say one and a half in Sweden. And that procurement process is as it is. Then in the next step, everything happens without procurement. So, all the products come to the regions without going through a process that considers those principles.

Another central aspect when it comes to long-term effects on markets is how intermediaries can foster or possibly hinder innovation. As shown in the literature, intermediaries are often portrayed as facilitators of innovation, supporting public procurers in achieving innovation-related goals (Edler and Yeow, 2016; Selviaridis et al., 2023). In this study, there are both actors emphasizing the necessity of intermediaries to achieve innovation, and those who raise the question of whether intermediaries can impede innovation, particularly in the cases studied here where a few dominant intermediaries control the market. In certain industries, such as IT, there is an argument that intermediaries are needed to keep up with rapid developments. A procurement specialist at a national agency claims:

Now, speaking from my own experience in the IT industry, I have been involved in procurement processes there as well. It is a rapidly evolving and highly lucrative industry, with new solutions constantly emerging. It is evident that a significant number of intermediaries are required to keep up with the pace of innovation. (procurement specialist)

However, the intermediary solution could also result in procuring entities and authorities becoming detached from subcontractors who possess significant expertise, which in turn can stifle innovation. This further increases the distance between actors and contradicts the fundamental idea of fostering dialogue, cooperation and market insight (Edler and Yeow, 2016; Georghiou et al., 2014). Complicating matters, in the medical technology industry, intermediaries and subcontractors are criticized by industry representatives for offering similar products. Some subcontractors claim to be reluctant to share their products with intermediaries, fearing that their ideas and innovations could be exploited. This risk has been highlighted in previous literature as a significant hurdle (Georghiou et al., 2014). Naturally, if this development materializes, it limits the potential for intermediaries to serve as the links that enable public organizations to become more innovative—an opportunity emphasized in previous studies (Kivimaa et al., 2019). One supplier was adamant in emphasizing the reluctance to disclose products in the development stage to intermediaries. A procurer from a region expresses their perspective on the challenges when buyers are becoming more distant from the market:

What's a bit of a disadvantage is that the original suppliers have a better understanding of the whole picture, and they invest in research and development. Healthcare is missing out on that kind of contact or dialogue. (Representative, procuring region 2)

Similarly, problems with innovation are also observed in the consulting industry. There is criticism regarding a lack of competence among intermediaries when it comes to understanding the specific services provided by subcontractors. This lack of understanding poses a risk to the overall innovation capacity in the industry. An industry representative from innovative companies emphasizes the importance of this aspect:

All these contracts could have been procured publicly through framework agreements and similar mechanisms, allowing for competitive tendering that considers factors such as quality, innovation, and added value. That is not happening at the moment. (Representative, industry org. for innovative firms 2)

On the consultant brokerage side, criticism is rather directed towards public procurers that they do not focus on innovation in the procurement processes. For example, one consultant broker asserts their competence to promote innovation but explains that there must be clear requirements in the procurement documentation. From this perspective, it appears that other priorities take precedence for public buyers—something that is not surprising given previous research highlighting the inherent challenges the public sector faces in working with innovation (Georghiou et al., 2014). This aspect will be revisited in the forthcoming discussion section. Another important ingredient to foster innovation, mentioned by interviewees, is a functioning dialogue and clear communication between different parties. The lack of dialogue is seen as problematic as it prevents the exploration and discussion of different solutions that could potentially foster innovation (c.f. Edler and Yeow, 2016). Representative 2 from an industry organization for innovative firms explains how there is no improvement when communication between actors is lacking and even expresses that dialogue seems to be “completely absent”.

In summary, the use of intermediaries in the selected industries presents potential benefits but also entails risks in terms of long-term impacts on markets. In turn, these risks if realized impede the possibilities to achieve strategic procurement that foster competition and innovation long term. The image existed in both sectors on the supplier side that intermediaries are used to circumvent procurement legislation. This, of course, could lead to a perfunctory use of intermediaries focusing on short-term wins but with limited regard to long-term effects. This insight will be further examined in the discussion section. We now turn to the other strategic dimension of interest—namely, how public organizations are perceived to assume accountability in these types of arrangements.

As previously emphasized, there are growing demands for public procurers to be accountable for the entire production chain and to take greater responsibility for incorporating political objectives into their procurement processes (Guarnieri and Gomes, 2019; Matthews, 2005). Political objectives increasingly involve efforts to promote sustainability in various forms (Lagström and Ek Österberg, 2025). This involves taking responsibility for the entire production chain, including the ability to impose requirements on subcontractors—and, crucially, to follow up on these demands. As previously noted, accountability becomes particularly complex when multiple stakeholders, both public and private, are involved (Grossi et al., 2024; Rajala and Kokko, 2021). In this study, accountability was discussed by respondents and identified as problematic when public authorities and entities are more distant from subcontractors. Since purchasers do not have direct agreements with subcontractors, there is a lack of control, which could make it more challenging to monitor and enforce political goals, such as those entailing environmental and societal objectives.

Interviewees emphasize that the intermediary solution may, in fact, be used to circumvent the growing demands placed on public procurement—thereby allowing actors to evade the integration of various policy goals. In this sense, the solution might function counter to its intended purpose, relieving pressure on public buyers to pursue these objectives. While addressing such goals can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, intermediaries are described as a means to streamline the procurement process. A procurer at a government agency says:

An interesting question that I believe is looming is the issue of regulation or over-regulation, which is pushing us towards different types of solutions aimed at reducing the administrative burden of procurement. (Purchaser, government agency 2)

Apparently, increasing requirements in procurement contribute to a perception of growing complexity in the procurement landscape. While intermediaries might be used to streamline procurements processes and making them administratively simpler, a complexity arises when it comes to taking accountability for the whole production line and controlling subcontractors and how they fulfill various goals. Several interviewees emphasize that it is just as important to diligently follow up on requirements when intermediaries are used as in traditional procurements:

You run the risk of non-compliance if you fail to follow up on the requirements. Without proper follow-up, it becomes uncertain whether the subcontractors down the chain adhere to the agreed terms with the supplier. (Procurement specialist)

Albeit it is difficult to control subcontractors when there are only direct agreements with intermediaries, one solution is to impose requirements on how intermediaries should conduct their interactions with suppliers. However, several actors in the study point out that the pursuit of administratively efficient procurement poses obstacles to effectively implementing and enforcing these requirements in practice when intermediaries are involved. To do this appears central since it is not necessarily that intermediaries take on responsibility if not obliged to. One consultant says:

You don’t really know who your customer is, and we are used to talking to the customer we’re actually delivering to, and that’s when we’re in the execution phase. But in that case, you miss the responsibility division in between, plus the fact that the responsibility division is actually quite … intermediaries are rather unwilling to take responsibility for something they pass on. (Representative, consulting company)

Thus, while public organizations may, in principle, impose requirements on intermediaries related to political goals and normative principles, the way this solution is applied in practice has been subject to criticism by several actors in this study. This highlights the challenges faced in ensuring proper oversight, accountability and control while having a desire for streamlined procedures. There appears to be a risk that the complex setting—where different types of actors are involved and the boundaries between public and private roles and interests are blurred (De Waele et al., 2021; Grossi and Vakkuri, 2024)—may lead public buyers to seek control by simplifying procurement processes. At the same time, this blurriness raises questions about who is ultimately accountable for the product or service delivered. A consultant intermediary says:

Because there is a problem with the fact that we buy something and then have a contract with someone who … eh … who then leads the work, and then they want to hold us, as the intermediary, responsible for the outcome. That can become a bit problematic, so to speak. So, there are … we have contracts where the customer can potentially hold the supplier directly responsible. (Representative, consultant broker 1)

This person continues with an illustrative soccer metaphor to explain the blurriness in this solution when it comes to who is accountable:

The issue is where the boundary for responsibility is … because we have a responsibility as intermediaries, and we act a bit like a football agent. They want a good forward who’s going to score lots of goals. We can make sure to find the best forward out there, at the right price and quality, and balance it with the price … but once the player comes in and starts training and needs to be matched in, and integrated into the team, we can't guarantee that they’re going to score goals. If, after half a year, they come and say that he or she isn’t scoring goals … then we can say, 'Okay, we hear what you're saying, we’ll see if we can find another forward and replace them,' but we can’t take responsibility for it because they’re the ones managing things on-site.

Furthermore, another issue arises as bidders are unable to appeal against decisions made by the intermediary. This lack of recourse can be problematic in ensuring fairness and accountability.

In summary, intermediaries have been portrayed as facilitators of strategic procurement, particularly in the context of achieving goals related to innovation (Edler and Yeow, 2016; Nolden et al., 2016; Rainville, 2021; Selviaridis et al., 2023; Tokumaru, 2022). The findings of this study revealed that while there is potential in utilizing the intermediary solution, concerns were raised regarding its practical implementation in this type of arrangement and the associated challenges it poses in achieving strategic procurement.

The findings of the study highlight a challenging situation for public organizations in the way intermediaries are utilized, which may counteract the potential benefits. One major concern is that public organizations rely on intermediaries for many things, i.e. to provide market insights, take long-term responsibilities and drive innovation, while they themselves experience a loss of control over the end-to-end production line. The findings indicate that the potential circumvention of regulations and the focus on administratively efficient procurements may overlook the incorporation of long-term objectives related to the market, societal/environmental goals and innovation (c.f. Glas et al., 2017). Since intermediaries are not bound by legislation in the way public organizations are, it becomes crucial for the contracting agency to set clear requirements in their agreements with intermediaries to ensure the inclusion of these objectives. Thus, public purchasers may aim to achieve accountability for the entire production chain, rather than focusing solely on the intermediaries. However, they have been criticized for failing to realize this in practice.

The findings underscore the importance of considering the unique dynamics, context and specific circumstances in which public procurement is exercised. Contingency theory suggests that the effectiveness of organizational practices and structures is contingent upon the fit between the internal and external contexts (Plantinga et al., 2020). In the case of intermediary arrangements, the specific context of each industry and the goals of procurement can vary (Barraket, 2020). The problems identified and expressed by interviewees, such as the concentration of market power among a few intermediaries, the loss of control over the production line and the potential circumvention of regulations, can be seen as mismatches between the external context and the chosen procurement practices. Instead of finding strategies to align with various demands at different levels, as proposed by Patrucco et al. (2017) and adopted by Plantinga et al. (2020), the arrangement examined in this study seems to lead to public organizations prioritizing streamlining and conforming to procurement processes, which in turn risk an evasion of strategic dimensions.

Seemingly, there is an inherent problem concerning the mechanical structure (Burns and Stalker, 1994) of public organizations in relation to the intermediary arrangement, as it may not necessarily correspond well with the increasingly complex arrangements that public organizations find themselves in (De Waele et al., 2021; Frid et al., 2024; Grossi and Vakkuri, 2024; Rajala and Kokko, 2021). Bureaucracy tends to emphasize formal procedures, hierarchical decision-making, and adherence to established rules and regulations, which may not always align with the dynamic and innovative nature of strategic procurement and these more complex arrangements (Matthews, 2005). While intermediaries may offer administrative efficiency, and in a sense bureaucratic simplicity, they may inhibit the development of more organic and flexible organizational structures and thus enhance the inertia and inflexibility of the public sector (c.f. Uyarra et al., 2020). Illustrative of this was how suppliers experienced that buyers to a large extent were focusing on the immediate selection of intermediaries but more seldomly included requirements on intermediaries in a broader perspective both considering long-term effects on markets and to pursue wider political goals. Thus, the focus tends to be to follow legislation strictly when it is demanded, in the relationship to intermediaries but not widening the perspective to include more strategic and long-term aspects and ensuring wider accountability. This observed tendency is especially interesting in a time where demands to think more broadly regarding procurement and include wider ambitions are increasing (Lagström and Ek Österberg, 2025).

Perhaps, as was also emphasized by one of the interviewees, streamlining procurements and using intermediaries to strive for efficiency might be a way for public organizations to simplify procurements and make sense (Weick, 1995) of a situation where demands are experienced as too complex. Thus, since public organizations need to prioritize among the complexity and multitude of objectives (Eklund and Carlsson, 2023), this type of arrangement could provide a way to do so while maintaining legality, and some sense of legitimacy, in the procurement process.

Thus, this study highlights the concern that public organizations, in their pursuit of administrative efficiency, may prioritize short-term goals and overlook the potential for strategic procurement and organic organizational development, while weakening the accountability of public organizations over procurements in a wider sense. Hence, in a sense they do the opposite than what is entailed in the pursuit for strategic procurement (Guarnieri and Gomes, 2019; Harland et al., 2021; Matthews, 2005). However, striving for overall efficiency, as we saw here, might be problematic since the arrangement of procurement processes should be contingent upon the specific requirements and objectives of each situation. For example, in industries where innovation and competition are crucial, alternative approaches that promote competition, innovation and support the participation of smaller players may be more appropriate. The main challenge here is, of course, the existence of several goals and values that characterize public sector organizations (Grossi et al., 2017, 2024). If public organizations consider the use of intermediaries necessary, they must develop strategies for how to pursue public value when engaging with private stakeholders (c.f. Bracci et al., 2019; Bracci et al., 2021).

A central dimension highlighted in the study is a distrust of the public sector and a general belief that public organizations could strengthen accountability throughout the production process. Although public procurers may not necessarily share the same perspective as many suppliers regarding their agenda and rationale, there is an argument to be made that there is a problem that the idea persists that public organizations use the intermediary arrangement to circumvent legislation and avoid accountability. Trust in public institutions and their accountability is often viewed as a cornerstone of society (Putnam, 1993; Rothstein, 2005). Thus, a broader reflection on how to restore these values may be important in this context.

This article explored how the use of intermediaries influences the capacity of public organizations, with their certain characteristics, to engage in strategic procurements. Whereas the literature often emphasizes the innovative capacity of intermediaries (Edler and Yeow, 2016; Nolden et al., 2016; Rainville, 2021; Tokumaru, 2022); these findings underscore the need to address challenges and risks associated with the practical implementation of intermediaries, since this study shows that the type of intermediaries used in these arrangements, in practice risk inhibiting strategic procurement. Moreover, the article sheds light on the mechanical structure of public organizations as an obstacle to strategic procurement in the context of these arrangements. While strategic procurement requires organic and flexible organizations (c.f Andhov, 2021; Gordon Murray, 2009; Guarnieri and Gomes, 2019), the study reveals that public organizations tend to approach procurement as a routine administrative task (c.f. Matthews, 2005). Overcoming this challenge involves an overall embedding of long-term goals in procurement practices, even when intermediaries are used. This seems essential to regain trust and accountability in public procurement, which, according to the perspectives presented in this study, risk to be negatively affected by the way the intermediary solution has been implemented in practice.

Previous literature has highlighted the growing involvement of private organizations in public sector affairs and the resulting complexity, particularly with regard to accountability (Grossi and Vakkuri, 2024; Grossi et al., 2022; Rajala and Kokko, 2021). This article further illustrates this complexity, and the findings suggest that one possible way of managing complexity in procurement—arising both from the integration of political goals and the involvement of private organizations with potentially differing values (Grossi and Vakkuri, 2024) may be to streamline and simplify procurement processes.

This study was limited to two industries and a specific type of intermediary arrangement. Nevertheless, the findings offer insights that may be relevant in international contexts, particularly in countries where similar multinational intermediaries are used. The results also contribute to broader discussions on the role of public organizations in strategic procurement, and the challenges they face in adopting the flexible and adaptive role (c.f. Bekkers et al., 2011; Bekkers and Noordegraaf, 2016).

Future research could explore other sectors and national contexts to enable comparative analysis. More knowledge is needed regarding the conditions under which strategic procurement can be achieved through various intermediary arrangements. While this study provides an overview of different perspectives, in-depth case studies are needed to better understand the actual effects of intermediaries in specific industries.

It would also be valuable to analyze the contracts used in intermediary solutions to assess what types of requirements are placed on intermediaries and which strategic dimensions are prioritized—or neglected. Given the wide-ranging political ambitions tied to public procurement, and the simultaneous reliance on intermediaries financed by public resources, it is essential to examine the consequences of such arrangements. Public organizations must retain responsibility and accountability—even when intermediaries are involved—not least to (re)build trust and legitimacy in public sector activities.

This study did not require ethical approval. However, the researcher was careful to follow the ethical guidelines issued by the Swedish Research Council.

This manuscript is based on a project concerning intermediaries in Sweden, which was initiated and funded by the Swedish Competition Authority. The project was supervised by Professor Gustaf Kastberg Weichselberger from the School of Public Administration at the University of Gothenburg, and the interviews were conducted by the author of this manuscript in collaboration with master’s student Erik Gustafsson.

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