This paper examines whether the Gwangyang Bay Area can be understood as a hydrogen-port platform in South Korea and whether such a platform could provide the locational foundations for a future international hydrogen exchange. Rather than treating exchange creation as an immediate end state, the paper conceptualizes it as a phased process of market-making that links port logistics, industrial offtake, institutional tools, and business services.
Methodologically, the study adopts an exploratory qualitative case-study design based on secondary materials. It develops a five-dimensional analytical frame—development logic, physical logistics, anchor demand, institutional and market tools, and service ecosystem/trajectory—from the historical evolution of oil and gas trading hubs and from contemporary hydrogen platform initiatives in Rotterdam and Singapore, and then applies this frame to Gwangyang Bay through an evidence-linked SWOT assessment and a domestic plausibility check centered on Ulsan as the closest rival candidate.
The analysis shows that Gwangyang Bay is comparatively strong in industrial demand, port-industrial location, and regional policy commitment, but weaker in finance, internationally oriented business services, and mature market institutions. It also shows that the domestic claim must be qualified: Ulsan remains the strongest Korean rival where existing ammonia logistics, large-scale regional demand, and oil-hub experience are concerned, whereas Gwangyang Bay’s main relative advantage lies in its combination of industrial-port functions and the potential reuse of the former Yeosu Expo site as a business-support node.
These findings suggest that Gwangyang Bay should not be described as an already viable international hydrogen exchange. A more defensible interpretation is that it could evolve first as a hydrogen-port platform organized around import terminals, handling and conversion infrastructure, certification-compatible transactions, and business-support functions, and only later as part of exchange-linked market formation. The paper contributes to marine economics and management by reframing hydrogen market development as a problem of port-platform formation, institutional sequencing, and coastal industrial governance in an import-dependent economy.
1. Introduction
Hydrogen is increasingly discussed not only as a domestic decarbonization option but also as a prospective international energy carrier. Once renewable electricity is converted into hydrogen or hydrogen-derived carriers and moved across borders, production and consumption can be separated geographically in ways that resemble earlier oil, gas, and LNG trade (IEA, 2023; IRENA, 2022). For import-dependent industrial economies, this raises not only questions of shipping and storage, but also questions of how tradable products, transaction rules, and market coordination will be organized.
South Korea is especially relevant in this respect because future low-emission hydrogen demand is widely expected to exceed domestic supply capabilities, implying a substantial role for imports and overseas supply chains (Joint Ministries, 2021a, b, 2022). In the near to medium term, ammonia is likely to matter disproportionately because it already has established international transport, storage, and handling systems and is emerging simultaneously as a hydrogen carrier and as a decarbonized fuel for power and shipping (IEA, 2021; IEA, 2023; Ahn and Lee, 2023; IRENA, 2022). Yet import dependence alone does not produce a market. Cross-border hydrogen trade also requires certification, contracting routines, price reporting, and institutions able to coordinate logistics with industrial offtake and public regulation (ACER, 2024; IRENA, 2024; Steinbach and Bunk, 2024).
For that reason, this paper distinguishes four related but non-equivalent concepts that earlier discussions too often collapse. First, a hydrogen-port platform refers here to a port-industrial node where terminals, storage, handling, conversion, certification-compatible transactions, and business-support functions can be coordinated. Second, an international hydrogen exchange refers to a more formal and later-stage market institution associated with standardized transactions, price reporting, and potentially benchmark formation. Third, a hydrogen hub refers to the broader regional agglomeration of logistics, industrial demand, storage, infrastructure, and services surrounding such a platform. Fourth, market-making refers to the staged process through which price transparency, standards, certification, intermediation, and contractual routines are gradually built (Pivetta et al., 2024; Damman et al., 2025; Steinbach and Bunk, 2024; Hasan and Fuentes, 2025). On this definition, the central research object of this paper is not an already existing exchange, but the locational and institutional conditions under which a hydrogen-port platform could eventually support future exchange formation.
The Gwangyang Bay Area in Jeollanam-do is a useful case precisely because it lies between substantial port-industrial endowments and institutional incompleteness. The area already possesses a large industrial base in petrochemicals, steel, and port logistics, while local and provincial governments have explicitly sought to position it within South Korea's hydrogen economy. At the same time, some elements frequently invoked in local strategy documents—such as hydrogen-ammonia terminal expansion, pipeline integration, and conversion of the former Yeosu Expo site into a business-support node—remain planned, proposed, or under redevelopment rather than fully operational (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a; Yeosu City Hall, 2021a; Yeosu Gwangyang Port Authority, 2024). This mix makes the case analytically valuable because it permits a clearer separation between current capacity and future possibility.
The marine-economics literature has not yet fully explained how emerging hydrogen markets may become anchored in coastal industrial regions. Existing studies emphasize project development, certification, or national policy design, while port and harbor research increasingly shows that energy-transition platforms depend on the coordinated evolution of logistics infrastructure, industrial demand, governance, and service ecosystems (Pivetta et al., 2024; Damman et al., 2025). This implies that Gwangyang Bay cannot be assessed as a stand-alone local development proposal. Its significance becomes clearer only when it is placed alongside benchmark port-platform cases and compared with plausible domestic rivals. Recent Korean feasibility work suggests that Ulsan, because of its industrial hydrogen base, ammonia logistics, and prior energy-hub experience, is the most relevant domestic competitor for such a role (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a, b).
Against this background, the paper asks two questions. First, does Gwangyang Bay currently possess the locational conditions required for a hydrogen-port platform? Second, if so, what phased trajectory would be more plausible: immediate exchange construction, or gradual market-making anchored in port, industrial, and institutional functions? The paper contributes to Marine Economics and Management in three ways. It recasts hydrogen market formation as a question of port-platform development rather than a purely technical supply-chain issue; it introduces a comparative framework that links marine logistics, industrial demand, and market institutions; and it offers a more cautious, staged interpretation of Gwangyang Bay as a possible platform for future international hydrogen exchange, rather than as an already viable exchange in itself.
2. Research design and method
2.1 Research design
This study uses an exploratory qualitative case-study design. Such a design is appropriate because South Korea does not yet have an operating international hydrogen exchange, comparable market data remain limited, and the analytical task is to assess locational plausibility and institutional sequencing rather than to estimate causal effects. The paper, therefore, treats Gwangyang Bay as a strategic case through which to examine the early formation of a hydrogen-port platform in an import-dependent economy. The aim is not to predict whether an exchange will certainly be built, but to identify the conditions under which platform formation could plausibly occur and the limits that currently constrain it.
2.2 Comparative framework and case selection
The analytical frame has two levels. The first is international benchmarking. Rotterdam was selected because it represents an import-distribution pathway linked to hydrogen backbone development and emerging trading-platform institutions. Singapore was selected because it represents a maritime-services and standards-led Asian pathway centered on port governance, bunkering, and internationally oriented business functions (Port of Rotterdam, 2024; HyXchange, 2025; EMA, 2022; MPA, 2024, 2025).
The second level is a domestic plausibility check. Because the present study is exploratory rather than a full multi-port ranking exercise, the domestic comparison is centered on Ulsan as the closest Korean rival candidate. Recent feasibility studies identify Ulsan as the most relevant domestic comparator in terms of industrial hydrogen demand, ammonia logistics, and exchange-related policy ambition, whereas Gwangyang Bay's main relative advantage lies in its combination of southwestern industrial-port functions and the potential reuse of the former Yeosu Expo site as a business-support node (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a, b).
Ulsan is used as a focused comparator rather than as a representative sample of all Korean ports because the purpose is not to rank every candidate port, but to test Gwangyang Bay against the most demanding domestic rival. Other ports such as Incheon, Busan, Pyeongtaek-Dangjin, and Boryeong are relevant to particular aspects of hydrogen or ammonia logistics, but they do not combine existing ammonia-handling capacity, large industrial hydrogen demand, and prior oil- and energy-hub experience to the same extent as Ulsan; a broader multi-port ranking is therefore left for future research.
Five analytical dimensions were derived abductively from literature on oil and gas hub evolution, hydrogen market design, and port energy transitions: (1) development logic, meaning the strategic role expected of the site within national and cross-border hydrogen trade; (2) physical logistics, including port facilities, terminals, storage, pipelines, and conversion capacity; (3) anchor demand, referring to nearby industrial, power, or maritime offtake; (4) institutional and market tools, including certification, price reporting, contracting routines, and governance arrangements; and (5) service ecosystem and likely trajectory, including finance, legal and business services, international amenities, office-space capacity, and the probable sequencing of market development (EIA, 2017; Seo and Kim, 2017; Kang, 2017; Pivetta et al., 2024; Damman et al., 2025; Steinbach and Bunk, 2024).
2.3 Evidence base and coding procedure
The evidence base consists of publicly available secondary materials published mainly between 2021 and 2025, supplemented by historical sources on oil and gas market development. The source set includes Korean national hydrogen plans, clean-hydrogen certification and procurement documents, local government hydrogen strategies, port authority materials, industrial and logistics data, redevelopment studies, and prior feasibility reports on Gwangyang Bay and Ulsan, together with peer-reviewed literature on hydrogen markets and port energy transitions (Joint Ministries, 2021a, b, 2022; MOTIE, 2024, 2025; Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a, b). Using multiple source types helps reduce dependence on any single policy narrative and allows triangulation across institutional, logistical, and industrial dimensions.
The analysis proceeded in four steps. First, the comparative literature and benchmark cases were used to specify the five-dimensional frame. Second, evidence concerning Gwangyang Bay was organized under those same dimensions. At this stage, each item of evidence was classified as (1) existing and operational, (2) planned or officially announced, or (3) aspirational or contingent policy proposal. This distinction was introduced explicitly to separate present capacity from future possibility. Third, the organized evidence was coded into internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) and external factors (opportunities and threats) for the purpose of an evidence-linked SWOT assessment. Fourth, the resulting dimensional profile for Gwangyang Bay was interpreted comparatively against Rotterdam, Singapore, and Ulsan in order to infer a more realistic developmental trajectory.
2.4 Scope and limits of inference
The SWOT framework is used here as a structured interpretive tool rather than as a freestanding promotional device. It does not generate a definitive numerical ranking, nor does it claim that Gwangyang Bay is categorically superior to all alternative Korean ports. Instead, it allows the paper to ask whether the area's combination of industrial demand, port logistics, institutional tools, and service capacity is sufficient to support phased platform formation. The method is therefore suited to identifying relative plausibility, institutional gaps, and sequencing problems.
At the same time, this design has clear limits. Because the study relies on secondary sources, it cannot fully capture firm-level commercial strategies, confidential contract structures, or the views of traders and regulators. Nor does it provide a formal multi-criteria decision model or econometric test of site selection. For these reasons, the paper's claims are intentionally modest: it evaluates whether Gwangyang Bay can reasonably be interpreted as a candidate hydrogen-port platform and under what staged conditions, not whether an international hydrogen exchange will necessarily be located there. Future research could extend the analysis through expert interviews, formal multi-criteria scoring, or systematic comparison with a wider set of Korean port-industrial regions.
3. International trade in clean hydrogen and ammonia and implications for Korea
The clean hydrogen trade is moving from abstract decarbonization rhetoric toward early competition over projects, corridors, and supply chains. The IEA (2023) projects continued growth in hydrogen trade, while potential export regions such as Australia, the Middle East, North America, and parts of Latin America are positioning themselves around abundant renewable resources, industrial policy, and proximity to major demand centers. Although not all announced projects will be realized, the direction of travel is clear: hydrogen and hydrogen-derived carriers are beginning to enter cross-border market formation.
For long-distance trade, maritime shipment is likely to matter most in the near to medium term, and ammonia currently has the clearest commercial advantage as a carrier because it can use existing storage, transport, and handling systems and is already traded internationally (DOE, 2006; IEA, 2023; Ahn and Lee, 2023). While liquefied hydrogen, LOHCs, methanol, and synthetic methane are also under discussion, ammonia has been selected for a large share of the announced export projects, and ammonia demand is expected to expand not only as a hydrogen carrier but also as a decarbonized fuel for power generation and shipping (IEA, 2021; IRENA, 2022).
This matters directly for South Korea because ammonia already enters the country through established import terminals and industrial users. Existing imports are handled mainly through Ulsan, Yeosu, and Incheon, with current storage capacity concentrated in Ulsan (93,000 tons), Yeosu (54,000 tons), and Incheon (13,000 tons) (KEI Consulting Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2023; Kim, 2023). The pre-existing ammonia gateway therefore provides a concrete logistical foundation for the early phases of hydrogen-market formation, especially where import handling, quality assurance, and industrial offtake must be coordinated before liquid exchange trading becomes plausible.
Korean national plans also point to a growing import role. The 2050 carbon-neutrality scenario and the first basic hydrogen plan both assume that a substantial share of future hydrogen demand will need to be met through imports, while the 2022 clean-hydrogen ecosystem plan explicitly links overseas supply chains to receiving terminals, conversion facilities, and strategic infrastructure (Joint Ministries, 2021a, b, 2022). These projections do not by themselves create a market, but they do imply that a future Korean hydrogen economy will depend on institutions capable of handling product definitions, certification, contracting, and price discovery across borders.
In short, clean hydrogen and clean ammonia are becoming internationally traded commodities. If trade expands, market institutions will likely evolve alongside physical supply chains, as they have for oil and natural gas. The policy question for Korea is therefore not only where imports will land, but also where port-based, industrial, and business functions can be combined in ways that support repeated transactions and, eventually, exchange-linked market coordination.
4. Lessons from mature energy markets and emerging hydrogen platforms
4.1 International oil exchanges and benchmark formation
Oil remains the clearest example of a globally traded energy commodity in which production, consumption, transport, and price risk are geographically and institutionally separated. This separation encouraged a layered trading architecture: term contracts and spot cargoes in physical markets, over-the-counter hedging between commercial counterparties, and exchange-traded futures and options for standardized risk management. In this architecture, exchanges do not simply host transactions; they provide standardized contracts, clearing rules, visible price signals, and reference prices that are used across much wider physical and financial markets (Lee, 2016).
The WTI contract on NYMEX and the Brent contract on ICE illustrate this relationship between logistics and benchmark formation. Their status depends not only on the exchange venue but also on the surrounding system of storage, delivery points, price-reporting practices, market participants, and repeated commercial use. In this sense, oil benchmarks are institutional achievements built on dense physical and financial infrastructures rather than prices produced by an exchange in isolation (Lee, 2016).
Other oil exchanges, including DME, TOCOM, MCX, and INE, further show that exchange creation alone does not guarantee global benchmark status. Contracts may remain regional or relatively illiquid when they are not supported by sufficient physical flows, contract standardization, market confidence, and international participation (Lee, 2016). The lesson for hydrogen is therefore cautionary: a formal exchange can only become meaningful after market participants, logistics, and price-information systems have become sufficiently thick.
4.2 Natural gas hubs and network-based price formation
Natural gas hubs developed through related but not identical processes. In pipeline-based gas systems, hubs emerge where production, consumption, storage, and transport routes intersect. These nodes concentrate throughput, balancing, title transfer, and short-term trading functions, and can later become price-reference locations when network access, liquidity, and standardized hub services deepen (EIA, 2017; Seo and Kim, 2017).
Henry Hub in the United States and NBP and TTF in Europe demonstrate how a physical network node can evolve into a commercial pricing institution. In each case, benchmark status was supported by repeated transactions, transparent price information, regulated or well-understood access to infrastructure, and the presence of intermediaries able to connect physical trade with financial hedging (EIA, 2017; Seo and Kim, 2017).
The Asia-Pacific gas market historically followed a different path. Because LNG imports were organized largely through oil-indexed long-term contracts and separated national markets, the region did not produce a pipeline-style hub comparable to Henry Hub or TTF. Nevertheless, as spot LNG trade, portfolio optimization, and price-reporting practices expanded, interest in hub-based and index-linked pricing also increased (EIA, 2017; Seo and Kim, 2017). This contrast is important for hydrogen because Korea is more likely to rely on maritime imports and carrier-based logistics than on a continent-wide pipeline network.
4.3 A staged model of energy trading-hub evolution
The oil and gas cases suggest a general principle: trading hubs do not appear fully formed. They emerge through staged institutional and commercial development in which physical transactions, transparency, standardization, liquidity, and financial instruments gradually reinforce one another. Table 1 summarizes this logic as a heuristic for interpreting the earlier phases of hydrogen market formation (EIA, 2017; Seo and Kim, 2017; Lee, 2016).
Heuristic stages in the evolution of energy trading hubs
| Stage | Dominant feature | Implication for hydrogen-platform formation |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Bilateral trade | Customised contracts between producers, users, and logistics actors | Early hydrogen trade is likely to begin through project-specific import and offtake arrangements |
| 2. Transparency | Publication of price, volume, and transaction information | Pilot price-reporting and cargo-arrival information become important before liquid trading exists |
| 3. Standardisation | Common contract terms, product definitions, and operating rules | Certification, guarantees of origin, and standard transaction routines reduce transaction costs |
| 4. OTC deepening | Growth of intermediaries, brokers, and financial participation | Market thickening depends on repeated transactions and trusted intermediaries, not only on port capacity |
| 5. Hub and index formation | Hub services and reference prices emerge from concentrated flows | Ports with terminals, pipelines, storage, and anchor demand can become price-relevant nodes |
| 6. Exchange-linked trading | Formal trading platforms and benchmark development | A hydrogen exchange is a later-stage institutional outcome rather than the starting point |
At the first stage, market participants begin to transact directly through bilateral contracts tailored to particular products, delivery conditions, and facilities. The second stage involves the publication of more reliable information on prices, quantities, and trade conditions, often through price-reporting agencies or public institutions. The third stage adds more standardized terminology, contract practices, and operating rules, thereby reducing transaction costs and making repeated trade easier (EIA, 2017; Seo and Kim, 2017).
Only after these foundations become more stable can deeper forms of market-making emerge. The fourth and fifth stages involve the entry of commercial traders and financial intermediaries and the formation of price indices that are sufficiently trusted for use in longer-term contracts. The sixth stage adds non-physical traders and hedging instruments, while the final stages involve exchange-traded futures and benchmark-price formation. In other words, a mature exchange operation is the result of prior platform formation, not its starting point (EIA, 2017; Seo and Kim, 2017; Lee, 2016).
For this reason, oil and natural gas provide useful analogs but not direct templates. Hydrogen differs in carrier choice, certification requirements, carbon-intensity accounting, conversion technologies, and demand maturity. Even so, the historical sequence is analytically useful because it separates early platform functions—physical handling, information provision, certification, standard-setting, and intermediation—from later exchange functions such as liquid futures trading and benchmark formation. This distinction is central to the argument of this paper.
4.4 Emerging hydrogen platforms and implications for Gwangyang Bay
Contemporary hydrogen initiatives should therefore be read as pre-exchange market-making projects rather than as evidence that mature hydrogen exchanges already exist. Germany combines public market-making instruments with emerging price benchmarks centered on H2Global and EEX, illustrating how contracts, subsidies, and price references can be assembled before a fully liquid commodity market exists (H2Global Foundation, 2025; EEX, 2025). In the Netherlands, HyXchange has emphasized certification pilots, market design, and a trading platform connected to Dutch hydrogen infrastructure rather than an immediate full-scale exchange operation (HyXchange, 2025; Port of Rotterdam, 2024). Similar policy discussions in Korea and China indicate growing interest in hydrogen-related trading and certification mechanisms, but they do not yet demonstrate mature exchange conditions (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a, b).
These initiatives reinforce the broader point that hydrogen-market development must be built around transaction-enabling institutions as well as physical flows. Ports and harbors are especially relevant because they can co-locate carrier logistics, storage, conversion, certification, demand aggregation, and business services (Pivetta et al., 2024; Damman et al., 2025). This is why Gwangyang Bay is assessed below not as an already operating international hydrogen exchange, but as a possible hydrogen-port platform whose future viability depends on staged coordination among logistics, industrial offtake, institutional tools, and service ecosystems.
5. Assessing Gwangyang Bay as a hydrogen-port platform
5.1 Locational requirements for exchange-linked platform formation
As the cases above show, a future international hydrogen exchange is less a standalone building than an institutional node embedded in logistics, industrial demand, and public regulation. Site selection is therefore important from the outset. In the Korean context, the draft Act on the Establishment and Operation of an International Hydrogen Exchange envisaged the exchange as a special corporation whose principal office would determine its legal location, which means that locational choice is not merely symbolic (Chae, 2022).
Drawing on the historical discussion above and on current hydrogen-market literature, this study evaluates candidate regions through five dimensions: development logic, physical logistics, anchor demand, institutional and market tools, and service ecosystem/trajectory. These dimensions shift attention away from a narrow search for a port site alone. A viable platform location must be able to host or attract traders, logistics operators, certifiers, legal and financial services, and recurring business visitors while also sitting near physical flows and early demand. In practice, the most plausible locations are not generic industrial zones but port-industrial regions with sufficient placemaking capacity to support a gradually thickening market.
5.2 International comparative frame: Rotterdam, Singapore, and Gwangyang Bay
For an international readership, the significance of Gwangyang Bay becomes clearer when it is placed alongside benchmark port-platform cases. Rotterdam provides a reference case of an import-distribution hub linked to backbone infrastructure and exchange-building. Singapore provides a service- and standards-oriented Asian comparator centered on maritime bunkering, regulatory experimentation, and highly internationalized port functions (Port of Rotterdam, 2024; HyXchange, 2025; EMA, 2022; MPA, 2024, 2025). The same five dimensions are reused below to interpret the Korean case rather than treating the comparison as a stand-alone descriptive exercise. Table 2 summarizes this comparative frame by comparing Gwangyang Bay with Rotterdam and Singapore across the five analytical dimensions.
Comparative frame for Gwangyang Bay, Rotterdam, and Singapore as hydrogen-port platforms
| Dimension | Rotterdam | Singapore | Gwangyang Bay |
|---|---|---|---|
| Development logic | Import-distribution hub for Northwest Europe linked to backbone infrastructure and exchange-building | Maritime services and bunkering-led Asian transition platform with ammonia-focused regulatory experimentation | An industrial port cluster that could evolve from an import-and-conversion node toward a trading platform |
| Physical logistics | Import terminals, ammonia cracking, hydrogen backbone, and corridor links to the Dutch and German industry | Major transshipment and bunkering port; Jurong Island projects for ammonia power generation and bunkering | Petrochemical and steel complexes, bulk-port functions, and planned hydrogen-ammonia tank-terminal infrastructure |
| Anchor demand | Refining, chemicals, and Dutch-German industrial clusters | Power generation and future marine-fuel demand | Petrochemicals, steel, power, and regional hydrogen-logistics demand |
| Institutional and market tools | HyXchange, HYCLICX, certification pilots, and open-access network development | National hydrogen strategy, ammonia-bunkering standards, and pilot-based market formation | Exchange concept plus new certification and power-bidding institutions, but limited price reporting and contract standardization |
| Service ecosystem and likely trajectory | Dense trading, logistics, finance, and business services; best placed for benchmark formation | Strong international port-city services; suited to standards-led and service-led market coordination | Weaker international business services; the most realistic path is phased growth from physical hub to price-reporting and exchange-linked node |
The comparison suggests that Gwangyang Bay should not be assessed against a single ideal type. Relative to Rotterdam, it currently lacks mature trading architecture, international service density, and cross-border network integration. Relative to Singapore, it lacks a dense business-services and maritime intermediation ecosystem. Yet it compares favorably in one crucial respect: it possesses a substantial port-adjacent industrial demand base in petrochemicals, steel, and power-related activities, which can provide the anchor offtake required in the early stages of market formation. This implies that a realistic Korean pathway would begin with import concentration, certification-compatible handling, and industrial offtake, and only thereafter move toward systematic price reporting, contract standardization, and exchange-linked trading.
5.3 Domestic plausibility check: Gwangyang Bay versus Ulsan
The international comparison clarifies the broad logic of platform formation, but a domestic plausibility check is also needed. Recent Korean feasibility studies show that the strongest rival to Gwangyang Bay is Ulsan, not because the two regions are identical, but because both combine large industrial demand, port functions, and explicit local ambitions to host hydrogen-market institutions (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a, b).
Here, the comparison changes the tenor of the claim. Gwangyang Bay should not be presented as categorically superior to all domestic ports. Ulsan appears stronger in current ammonia logistics and energy-hub experience: existing ammonia imports are concentrated most heavily in Ulsan, where Lotte Fine Chemical operates a 93,000-ton storage facility and related handling assets, and the city also benefits from prior Northeast Asian oil-hub and energy-hub planning (KEI Consulting Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2023; Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024b). The Ulsan report further projects very large ammonia-equivalent demand in the wider Ulsan/Busan/Gyeongnam region—about 2.545 million tons in 2030 and 8.444 million tons in 2050—although those figures partly reflect a broader regional catchment than Ulsan city alone (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024b).
Gwangyang Bay, by contrast, appears stronger under a different logic. The region already combines port-adjacent petrochemical and steel demand, a significant by-product hydrogen base, a proposed 61.9 km pipeline-centered logistics concept, and a potentially visible business-support site in the former Yeosu Expo grounds (Hydrogen Knowledge Group, 2023; Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a; Yeosu Gwangyang Port Authority, 2024). This does not mean that Gwangyang Bay is a fully prepared trading center. It means that its relative advantage lies in the possibility of linking industrial logistics to a business-support node, whereas Ulsan's relative advantage lies in stronger current ammonia-handling infrastructure and an energy-hub trajectory.
Both regions also share important weaknesses. Each remains heavily manufacturing-oriented; each has a thinner finance-and-business-service base than mature international port-city hubs; and each still scores relatively weakly in internationalization and expatriate-support capacity (Kim, 2020; Lim, 2022; Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a, b). The domestic comparison, therefore, supports a more qualified conclusion: Gwangyang Bay is a credible Korean candidate for hydrogen-port platform formation, but its plausibility depends on a particular combination of industrial demand, port logistics, and business-support redevelopment, not on an unqualified claim of superiority. Table 3 summarizes this focused domestic comparison between Gwangyang Bay and Ulsan.
Domestic plausibility check: Gwangyang Bay and Ulsan as candidate hydrogen-port platforms
| Dimension | Gwangyang Bay | Ulsan | Interpretive implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Development logic | Southwestern industrial-port platform with a possible business-support node at the former Yeosu Expo site | Energy-hub and oil-hub legacy translated into a hydrogen-exchange attraction strategy | The two regions compete under different platform logics rather than as perfect substitutes |
| Physical logistics | Existing port-industrial complex plus planned Myodo hydrogen-ammonia terminal and pipeline concept | Stronger current ammonia handling, 93,000-ton storage, and prior energy-hub infrastructure experience | Ulsan is stronger in existing logistics; Gwangyang Bay relies more on planned but plausible build-out |
| Anchor demand | Large petrochemical, steel, and power-related offtake near the port; strong regional hydrogen logic | Very large projected ammonia-equivalent demand in the wider Ulsan/Busan/Gyeongnam region | Both have strong demand bases, so the domestic argument cannot rest on demand alone |
| Institutional and market tools | Strong local policy commitment, but few mature price-reporting or contract-standardization tools | Strong city-level ambition and policy experience, but no mature hydrogen-trading institution yet. | Both remain pre-exchange sites; institutional preparation is a differentiator to be built, not assumed |
| Service ecosystem | Potential Expo-site business centre, but finance, business services, and internationalization remain weak | Energy-business legacy, but no equally ready-made international business-centre site and still weak internationalization | Gwangyang Bay's main relative edge is the potential business-support site; Ulsan's is logistics and hub experience |
5.4 Evidence-linked SWOT assessment of Gwangyang Bay
Figure 1 illustrates the evidence-linked SWOT assessment of Gwangyang Bay as a hydrogen-port platform. In development logic terms, Gwangyang Bay's strongest asset is sustained local policy commitment. Jeollanam-do has framed hydrogen as a strategic regional industry, and Yeosu has translated that commitment into phased local plans linking industrial development, infrastructure, and port decarbonization (Chonnam National University Industry-Academic Cooperation Foundation, 2021; Yeosu City Hall, 2021a). For an early-stage platform, such policy commitment matters because market-making institutions usually require local coordination and long lead times before private liquidity appears.
The table presents a SWOT analysis of Gwangyang Bay as a hydrogen-port platform. It is divided into four sections: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. The Strengths section lists four points: strong local policy commitment, large industrial offtake base, port and multimodal logistics connectivity, and redevelopment potential of the Yeosu Expo site. The Weaknesses section includes four points: thin business-service ecosystem, limited international urban amenities, and Expo-site plans not yet operationalized. The Opportunities section highlights three points: growth in hydrogen imports and certification-compatible trade, more formal Korean certification and power-procurement institutions, and planned terminals and pipeline development in southwestern Korea. The Threats section mentions three points: central-government commitment remains incomplete, competing Korean and overseas hub initiatives, and risk of lagging in benchmark and market-tool development.SWOT assessment of Gwangyang Bay as a hydrogen-port platform
The table presents a SWOT analysis of Gwangyang Bay as a hydrogen-port platform. It is divided into four sections: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. The Strengths section lists four points: strong local policy commitment, large industrial offtake base, port and multimodal logistics connectivity, and redevelopment potential of the Yeosu Expo site. The Weaknesses section includes four points: thin business-service ecosystem, limited international urban amenities, and Expo-site plans not yet operationalized. The Opportunities section highlights three points: growth in hydrogen imports and certification-compatible trade, more formal Korean certification and power-procurement institutions, and planned terminals and pipeline development in southwestern Korea. The Threats section mentions three points: central-government commitment remains incomplete, competing Korean and overseas hub initiatives, and risk of lagging in benchmark and market-tool development.SWOT assessment of Gwangyang Bay as a hydrogen-port platform
In anchor-demand terms, the region compares favorably with many domestic alternatives. The Yeosu National Industrial Complex and adjacent Gwangyang facilities concentrate petrochemical, steel, power, and LNG-related activities, while existing studies project substantial future hydrogen demand from industrial fuel switching, power generation, and associated logistics (Hydrogen Knowledge Group, 2023; Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a). This industrial offtake base is one of the clearest reasons why Gwangyang Bay resembles an early hydrogen hub more than a generic port-development project.
Gwangyang Bay also benefits from an established deep-water port complex, bulk-handling functions, and multimodal access by road, rail, sea, and domestic air. These conditions reduce coordination costs for cargo handling, site visits, and related business activities. In addition, the former Yeosu Expo grounds provide a potentially symbolic and functional location for market-support activities such as offices, meetings, and business-facing services, even though the site remains under redevelopment rather than ready for immediate use (Korea Convention and Exhibition Industry Research Institute, 2017; Yeosu City Hall, 2023; Yeosu Gwangyang Port Authority, 2024).
The most important weakness lies in the service-ecosystem dimension. Compared with Rotterdam and Singapore, the regional economy remains heavily weighted toward manufacturing, while finance, insurance, specialized business services, and internationally oriented intermediary functions remain relatively thin (Park, 2022; Lim, 2022). A second weakness is the limited depth of international urban functions. Existing plans emphasize industrial promotion and port redevelopment more than expatriate-support facilities, international schools, or broader clusters of business amenities (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a; Yeosu Gwangyang Port Authority, 2024). A third weakness is implementation readiness: the Expo site is promising, but it remains a potential asset rather than an operational business-support platform.
The opportunity structure is concentrated in the co-evolution of import demand and institutional tools. As clean hydrogen demand grows, Korea needs certification-compatible import arrangements, more transparent price information, and eventually benchmark-linked trading practices. The recent expansion of clean-hydrogen certification and hydrogen-power procurement makes the policy environment more receptive to staged market-building efforts (Joint Ministries, 2021b, 2022; MOTIE, 2024, 2025). At the same time, public studies envision hydrogen-ammonia terminals and pipeline connections around Gwangyang Bay, which could turn the region into a southwestern distribution node rather than merely a single import point (Hydrogen Knowledge Group, 2023; Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024a).
The main threats are institutional and competitive. Central government commitment to an actual exchange remains less concrete than earlier blueprints suggested, and other Korean regions—especially Ulsan—are actively framing themselves as candidate locations (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2024b). Overseas initiatives in Germany, the Netherlands, and China also matter because they may shape expectations about certification, pricing, and platform architecture before Korea makes its own choices. In this setting, Gwangyang Bay cannot rely on logistics alone and must differentiate itself through a credible phased institutional strategy. Appendix A and Table 4 provide the supporting evidence-to-SWOT matrix for this assessment.
5.5 Policy implications: phased and actor-specific recommendations
Three sets of recommendations follow from the analysis. First, in the short term, central government actors—especially MOTIE and related hydrogen-market institutions—should support functions that precede a full exchange: arrival-based reporting for imported hydrogen carriers, standardized terminology and transaction templates, linkage to clean-hydrogen certification, and transparent publication of market-relevant cargo and offtake data. These are not substitute measures; they are the institutional preconditions of any future benchmark or platform.
Second, provincial and municipal actors in Jeollanam-do and Yeosu, together with the Yeosu Gwangyang Port Authority, should treat the former Expo grounds not simply as waterfront real estate but as a business-support platform. The policy task is to convert redevelopment into market infrastructure: office space, meeting and convention capacity, service clustering, and, where legally feasible, institutional devices that can attract internationally oriented service firms. At the same time, logistics plans should be sequenced more carefully so that terminal, storage, conversion, and pipeline proposals are linked explicitly to identifiable industrial offtake rather than presented as standalone aspirations.
Third, the medium-term platform strategy should be tied to human capital and internationalization policy. Nearby universities and training institutions could support trader-, certification-, and logistics-oriented programs, while the city should selectively improve visitor and expatriate support services. This is especially important because both the Gwangyang and Ulsan cases show that Korean industrial-port regions may possess strong logistics and demand, yet still fall short in the service ecosystems needed for repeated international transactions.
The longer-term implication is equally important: Korea should not aim to declare a liquid international hydrogen exchange before repeated transactions, certification-compatible cargo handling, price-reporting routines, and a sufficiently thick business-service environment exist. A more defensible pathway begins with a hydrogen-port platform, proceeds through information and coordination functions, and only later considers exchange-linked trading or benchmark ambitions. In this sense, the most credible policy objective for Gwangyang Bay is phased platform formation rather than immediate exchange proclamation.
6. Conclusion
This paper set out to determine whether Gwangyang Bay can plausibly be understood as a hydrogen-port platform and whether such a platform could, over time, support future exchange formation in South Korea. The core argument is deliberately modest. Gwangyang Bay should not be described as an already viable international hydrogen exchange, nor should the domestic claim be framed as unqualified superiority. Rather, the case is best understood as a plausible platform candidate whose main strengths lie in industrial demand, port-industrial location, and the potential reuse of the former Yeosu Expo site as a business-support node.
The comparative analysis shows that the Korean question is not merely where cargo can land, but where logistics, industrial offtake, institutional tools, and business services can be co-developed. Relative to Rotterdam and Singapore, Gwangyang Bay remains institutionally thinner and less internationalized. Relative to Ulsan, it appears stronger in the potential integration of a business-support node with port-industrial functions, whereas Ulsan remains stronger in current ammonia logistics and energy-hub experience. This comparison makes the argument more defensible precisely because it does not collapse different platform logics into a single ranking claim.
The practical implication is that Korean hydrogen market formation is likely to begin not with a liquid exchange but with staged platform functions: certification-compatible handling, price-reporting, transaction routines, offtake coordination, and business-service clustering. In that sense, a future exchange—if it emerges—should be seen as a later institutional outcome of platform formation rather than as the immediate starting point of regional strategy.
The study remains exploratory and relies mainly on secondary sources. It therefore cannot capture confidential commercial strategies or provide a formal multi-criteria ranking of all Korean candidate ports. Future research should extend the analysis through expert interviews, structured comparison with additional sites, and more explicit evaluation of transaction data, service ecosystems, and governance capacity. Even with that caution, the present findings suggest that Gwangyang Bay merits serious consideration as one possible Korean hydrogen-port platform, provided that claims are phased, comparative, and institutionally grounded.
This article is based in part on the project report entitled “Preliminary Review of Attracting an International Hydrogen-Ammonia Exchange to the Gwangyang Bay Area,” prepared by the Korea Energy Economics Institute under the 2023 Jeollanam-do Energy New Industry R&D Planning Program, Second Call. The author has substantially revised, reorganized, and expanded the relevant material for this journal article.
The supplementary material for this article can be found online.
